Myongji University HMCL

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Westar Energy Smart Grid
Advertisements

1 An overview of Smart Grid Technology for Consumers.
Requirements Based Evaluation of BPL for Power System Sensing, Command and Control Applications Erich W. Gunther EnerNex Corporation
Introduction Build and impact metric data provided by the SGIG recipients convey the type and extent of technology deployment, as well as its effect on.
UCAIug HAN SRS v2.0 Summary August 12, Scope of HAN SRS in the NIST conceptual model.
David Grochocki et al.  Lures Potential attackers  Smartmeters do two way communication  Millions of Meters has to be replaced  Serious damages just.
1 Programa de Engenharia Elétrica - PEE/COPPE/UFRJ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro A Review of Anomalies Detection Schemes for Smart Grids Andrés.
Home Area Networks …Expect More Mohan Wanchoo Jasmine Systems, Inc.
| March 26, 2013 National Summit on Integrating Energy Efficiency & Smart Grid HEMS and Smart Meter Integration.
Vendor Briefing May 26, 2006 AMI Overview & Communications TCM.
Smart Grid City: A blueprint for a connected, intelligent grid community Dennis Stephens Director, Utility Innovations and Smart Grid Investments OSI.
By: Abdullah Almurayh CS691 Summer 2011 University of Colorado at Colorado Springs.
Workforce & Engineering Design Optimization Plenary Session: Enterprise Resource Planning for Infrastructure and Utilities Gurgaon India Feb GIS.
Xanthus Consulting International Smart Grid Cyber Security: Support from Power System SCADA and EMS Frances Cleveland
Cyber Security and the Smart Grid George W. Arnold, Eng.Sc.D. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) U.S. Department of Commerce
Using Cryptographic ICs For Security and Product Management Misconceptions about security Network and system security Key Management The Business of Security.
Cyber Security and Key Management Models Smart Grid Networks The Network System Key Management and Utilization Why Hardware Security Christopher Gorog,
SmartMeter Program Overview Jana Corey Director, Energy Information Network Pacific Gas & Electric Company.
11 WIRELESS SECURITY by Prof. Russell Jones. WIRELESS COMMUNICATION ISSUES  Wireless connections are becoming popular.  Network data is transmitted.
By Lauren Felton. The electric grid delivers electricity from points of generation to consumers, and the electricity delivery network functions via two.
1 ACTA R1 Smart Grid Communications Overview Trone Bishop Service Provider Representative (Verizon) September 9, 2010.
Submission doc.: IEEE /0035r0 November 2014 Tim Godfrey, EPRISlide Smart Grid TAG Consolidated White Paper Presentation Date:
August 8, 2015ECI Confidential. AccessWave Smart Grid Market Trends& Applications Matthias Nass VP Field Marketing EMEA.
Advanced Metering Infrastructure
ENERGY INDUSTRY FUNDAMENTALS: MODULE 5, UNITS A & B: Emerging Technologies.
ENERGY INDUSTRY FUNDAMENTALS: MODULE 4, UNIT B— Transmission, Governance, Stability & Emerging Technologies.
Wireless Network Security. Wireless Security Overview concerns for wireless security are similar to those found in a wired environment concerns for wireless.
TG4g - SUN May 2009 Brian K. Seal, Electric Power Research Institute doc.: IEEE g Project: IEEE P Working Group for Wireless Personal.
Smart Grid Utility Challenges in the 21 st Century Andrew Tang Smart Energy Web Pacific Gas and Electric Company September 18, 2009.
Smart Cities & Smart Utility
Getting ready for Advanced Metering Infrastructure Paper by : Rajesh Nimare Presented by : Prashant Sharma.
Wireless Versus Wired Network Components By: Steven R. Yasoni & Dario Strazimiri.
IOT5_ GISFI # 05, June 20 – 22, 2011, Hyderabad, India 1 Privacy Requirements of User Data in Smart Grids Jaydip Sen Tata Consultancy Services Ltd.
Confidential and proprietary materials for authorized Verizon personnel and outside agencies only. Use, disclosure or distribution of this material is.
Neighborhood Watch: Security and Privacy Analysis of Automatic Meter Reading Systems Ishtiaq Rouf, Hossen Mustafa Rob Miller Marco Grutese Presented By.
Future of Smart Metering Kansas Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency Conference September 26, 2007.
Instituto de Investigaciones Eléctricas
Business Data Communications, Stallings 1 Chapter 1: Introduction William Stallings Business Data Communications 6 th Edition.
FirstEnergy / Jersey Central Power & Light Integrated Distributed Energy Resources (IDER) Joseph Waligorski FirstEnergy Grid-InterOp 2009 Denver, CO November.
Low Cost and Secure Smart Meter Communications using the TV White Spaces Omid Fatemieh (UIUC) Ranveer Chandra (Microsoft Research) Carl A. Gunter (UIUC)
Smart Grid- An Introduction
Experience you can trust. Knowledge2006 – Technology Roundtable Dan Ruiz
Security Challenges for Customer Domain in the Smart Grid
The Smart Grid Enabling Energy Efficiency and Demand Response Clark W
Smart Grid Security Challenges Ahmad Alqasim 1. Agenda Problem Statement Power system vs. smart grid Background Information Focus Point Privacy Attack.
© 2008 OSIsoft, Inc. | Company Confidential Smart Grid, Smart Metering and DSM OSIsoft and Cisco systems Arjen Zwaag- Cisco Martin Otterson- OSIsoft.
Smart Grid and the Game Changing Applications Phenomena Lisa A. Dalesandro ISG - Industry Solutions Group Strategic Principal Service Industries.
An Overview of the Smart Grid David K. Owens Chair, AABE Legislative Issues and Public Policy Committee AABE Smart Grid Working Group Webinar September.
The Smart Grid: A Brief Introduction Qinran Hu Ph.D. Candidate Jun 12 th, 2014 Knoxville, Tennessee.
A small chip a big change in energy efficiency Overview of the Smart Grid Smarter Networks, Bristol, June th Guillaume d’Eyssautier, CEO.
Meter, Facility Interfaces
1 Smart Grid Cyber Security Annabelle Lee Senior Cyber Security Strategist Computer Security Division National Institute of Standards and Technology June.
© CURRENT Group, Proprietary & Confidential1 currentgroup.com CURRENT Overview October, 2010.
FCC Field Hearing on Energy and the Environment Monday November 30, 2009 MIT Stratton Student Center, Twenty Chimneys Peter Brandien, Vice President System.
The IP-enabled grid – more than just smart meters Henning Schulzrinne Department of Computer Science Columbia University.
. 1. Computer Security Concepts 2. The OSI Security Architecture 3. Security Attacks 4. Security Services 5. Security Mechanisms 6. A Model for Network.
Enforcing Cyber security in Mobile Applications – Public Sector Use Case SAPHINA MCHOME, VIOLA RUKIZA TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION.
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011 Iiro Rinta-Jouppi – Sweden – RT 3c – Paper 0210 COMMUNICATION & DATA SECURITY.
Applied cryptography Project 2. 2CSE539 Applied Cryptography A demo Chat server registration Please enter a login name : > Alice Please enter the.
CONTENTS: 1.Abstract. 2.Objective. 3.Block diagram. 4.Methodology. 5.Advantages and Disadvantages. 6.Applications. 7.Conclusion.
SMART GRID A smart grid for intelligent energy use. By: Suhani Gupta.
Realization of Home Appliances Control System based on Power Line Communication Technology.
Smart Grid Schneider Electric Javier Orellana
Consumers Energy Advanced Metering Infrastructure Review and Feedback Utility AMI / Open HAN Meeting August 15, 2007.
S V.MOUNICA 09551A0294.  To increase the distribution rate of present electric supply which is 70% to 100%.  Improving the supply to house holds without.
Smart Grid & Electric Vehicle in Computer Scientist’s Perspective by Minho Shin, Myongji University.
Smart Grid PRESENTED BY: ZUBAIR AHMAD
Cyber Security in Smart Grids BY ADITYA KANDULA DEVASIA THOMAS.
© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.Cisco ConfidentialPresentation_ID 1 Wireless LANs.
Sahar Rahim MS-Electrical Engineering Supervisor: Dr. Nadeem Javaid
Presentation transcript:

Myongji University HMCL Attacks, Vulnerabilities and Security Requirements in Smart Metering Networks: A Survey Myongji University HMCL

Table of Contents Electricity Crisis Smart Grid Advanced Metering Devices Power Resources Communication Attacks and Security issues

The Electricity Crisis Population of Electric devices + More Electricity demanding

The Smart Grid Smart grid is an electrical grid that intelligently predicts and responds to the behaviors of electric power users So, it efficiently delivers reliable, economic, and maintainable electricity services.

Comparison on properties of the grids Existing vs. Smart Grid Existing Grid Smart Grid One-way communication Two-way communication Centralized generation Distributed generation Few sensors Sensors throughout Manual monitoring Self-monitoring Manual restoration Self-healing Limited control Pervasive control Few customer choices Many customer choices Comparison on properties of the grids

Smart Grids Achievement Three important components needed: Governments Companies: Utilities Companies and Vendors Customers: Owners, Residents.

Power Sources for Smart Grid Wind Plant Hydropower Solar power Nuclear power

Power Sources for Smart Grid Wind Plant Hydropower Solar power Nuclear power Micro Hydro

Power Sources for Smart Grid Wind Plant Hydropower Plant Solar power Nuclear power

Power Sources for Smart Grid Wind Plant Hydropower Plant Solar power Nuclear power

Power Sources for Smart Grid Wind Plant Hydropower Plant Solar power Nuclear power Others

Smart Grids Conceptual Model

Communication media used for smart grids FCC allocation for smart grids PLC –Power line carriers Ethernet WLAN Zigbee Bluetooth Optical fiber Microwave etc FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Multi-Tier Smart Grid Architecture Smart Grids consists of Multi-Tier Network: WAN (distribution) Miles NAN (metering)  Meters HAN (consumer)  Yards

Multi-Tier Smart Grid Architecture

Security attacks in Smart Grid Large-scale attack [Core network] Small-scale attack [ HAN, CAN] Current Risk of Attack through Smart Grid Technology Attackers may use entry points physically unprotected. Wireless networks can be easily monitored by attackers. Wireless networks may be vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks. There may be weaknesses in preventing unauthorized communication. Vulnerable appliances can be easily attacked and compromised to attack other appliances or smart grids Vulnerabilities exist, not discovered yet. No significant risks at this time, but the risk grows as the deployment of smart grids grows .

Attack Methodologies A: Physical attack: exists when a criminal physically attacks home security

Attack Methodologies B: Cyber-attack: exists when accessible information gets attacked causing a compromise to the home controller or appliances

Advanced Metering devices AMI: Advanced Metering Infrastructure A device for a utility or the customer to monitor and control energy usage. It transmits data on energy use back to the utility instead of \ driving by and reading. SMART METER

Advanced Meter Infrastructure (AMI) AMI: integral part of smart grid Reconfigurable nature and communication capabilities of advanced (smart) meters allow for deploying a rich set of applications Automated meter reading Outage management Demand response Electricity theft detection Support for distributed power generation

Security attacks in Smart Metering Networks False Data Injection attack Denial of Service attack – Jammer (RF signals) Eavesdropping Attack – (Human behavior rec:) Impersonation Attack – (man-in-the-middle) Replay Attack – Storing unauthorized data

Security requirement for Smart Metering Networks Data Confidentiality- cryptosystems Data Integrity – MAC can be added for verification. Data Freshness – nonce technique (Counter) Data Availability - network alive during DoS attack Non-Repudiation – public key cryptography Authentication – Data and Entity Authentication

Conclusion and Open Issues Privacy Issues Data Aggregation Issue Security Issue in smart Metering Data

Contact: Myongji University Computer Engineering Dept. HMCL Lab, Dileep Kumar +82-010-8073-2281 dileep@mju.ac.kr http://hmcl.mju.ac.kr