(Food for thought)

 Verification of States’ compliance with NPT  Implemented in accordance with bilateral legally binding agreements  SG measures:  Design verification  Analysis of States declarations (e.g. nuclear material accountancy, types of activities, etc.)  On-site observations by inspectors  Independent assay of nuclear materials (quantities, composition) by NDA and DA  Containment and surveillance techniques  Process monitoring

 Destructive Assay (DA): ◦ Analytical chemistry, mass-spectrometry ◦ High precision, low timeliness, intrusive  Non-Destructive Assay (NDA): ◦ Gamma-spectrometry, neutrons counting ◦ Less precise, timely (up to on-line), site-specific  Containment/Surveillance (C/S): ◦ Various seals/tags (tamper indicators), cameras ◦ Maintaining continuity of knowledge (CoK) ◦ Monitoring status/activity, detect anomalies ◦ Ranging from post-factum to real-time capabilities

 Power reactors: ◦ “On-power loaded” reactors (CANDU):  Assay of all fresh fuel (NDA, counting, IDs)  Monitoring of fuel flow (qualitative NDA, portal monitors)  Monitoring of SF in wet and dry storages (C/S, NDA) ◦ LWRs & BWRs:  Assay of all fresh fuel (NDA, counting, IDs)  Inspectors presence during “open core” periods (NDA/C/S)  Monitoring of SF in wet and dry storages (C/S, NDA)  Research Reactors and Critical Assemblies:  Assay of all fuel and targets (NDA, counting, IDs, weight)  Power monitoring for P>25MW

 SG measures: ◦ Design verification ◦ Analysis of States declarations (e.g. at facilities level) ◦ On-site observations by inspectors ◦ Independent assay of nuclear materials (quantities, composition) by NDA and DA ◦ Containment and surveillance techniques ◦ Process monitoring  Reactor power monitoring: ◦ “Needed” only for R&D reactors with power exceeding 25MW  Thermo-hydraulic monitoring  In-core radiation detectors (n, gamma)  Splitting signals from operator’s gauges  Antineutrino ?? ◦ In addition to.....? ◦ Instead of..... ? ◦ Better than.....?  Precision, timeliness,  cost, convenience, usability, reliability…  non-intrusiveness

 Involvement of additional “observables”: ◦ Dynamics of antineutrino count rate > prerequisite:  Power baseline shall be obtained from another source ◦ Spectral information > prerequisites:  Required statistics are orders of magnitude higher than for power monitoring  Stability or “perfect knowledge” of all influencing reactor parameters (power, neutron profiles, fuel admixtures, etc.)  Availability of “perfect” core simulation codes ◦ Directional information:  Seems inapplicable in “classic inverse beta” detectors  Pessimistic expectations for alternatives…..

Deterrence Verification effort/resources 100% Joining NPT SG measures Deterrence effectiveness : Subjective factor: Risk of detection from the “proliferator’s” viewpoint Not exclusively driven by applied SG measures Unmeasurable ! Evaluated by assigning “detection probabilities” under SG measures: Numerous “diversion” scenarios Arbitrary established “low medium, and high” levels Constrained by definitions of “significant quantities”, “timeliness”, etc. Complex, but coherent system of SG criteria

 YES - ability to detect (or discover, come across, guess, suppose or exclude) undeclared activities…. ◦ A lot of political sensitivities:  Either “nothing to verify” or suspect “everything and everywhere”  Clash with national sovereignty  Nondiscrimination  Verification vs. intelligence ◦ Priorities:  Reprocessing/enrichment  Mining/conversion  Reactors  Satellite imaging, open sources, international trade …Additional Protocol (AP),  ANTINEUTRINO ???

Thank you ! Welcome to Q/As and discussion