1 RAND October 30, 2003 Border Security Issues After 9/11 November 5, 2003

2 RAND October 30, 2003 The ‘Border’ is Complex  Passenger traffic through numerous international airports  Goods and commercial traffic through national ports  Traffic over land borders  Summary observations

3 RAND October 30, 2003 We Worry about a Variety of Things Actions  Crime, including people smuggling and drug smuggling  Terrorism Goods and people  Weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction and disruption  Contraband, including drugs, stolen goods and goods evading taxes  People, including potential terrorists

4 RAND October 30, 2003 Airports

5 RAND October 30, 2003 Key Airport Issues Work done on:  Physical security (including hardening doors, arming pilots, transfer of the security function to public sector)  Passenger screening and profiling (before airport entry or boarding plane) More work needs to be done on:  Passenger screening and profiling (before entering the country)  Air cargo and airport personnel security measures  Cost effective positive identification (biometric) issues  Contraband detection

6 RAND October 30, 2003 Ports

7 RAND October 30, 2003 Cargo Containers Have Revolutionized Global Trade  Cargo containers are the standard for shipping merchandise  Millions of containers in use  Ports optimized to handle container ships  Easy transition to ground transportation modes  The number of containers passing through US ports is expected to increase 2-3 fold over the next years

8 RAND October 30, 2003 Cargo Containers Have Revolutionized Global Trade  US logistics costs dropped from 16.1% of GDP in 1980 to 10.1% in 2000  Annual savings in logistics of foreign trade approximately $150B  Security threats and US countermeasures could reverse these savings  Shipping costs are sensitive to container costs and security measures  Inventories costs are sensitive to supply uncertainty

9 RAND October 30, 2003 Key Port Issues Work done on:  Projecting the border outward  “Know your customer” programs Much remains to be done on:  Port personnel  Contraband detection  Inspection rates, regimes  Cost effectiveness analysis  Understanding how the pieces work together through simulation modeling Commercial shipping will be transformed by 9/11 in the same way air travel was transformed by hijackings

10 RAND October 30, 2003 A Common “Vision” of Secure Ocean Commerce  Trusted suppliers at origin of cargo being placed in containers  Secure container locks, with tamperproof alarms  Accurate manifests, suitably protected  Improved visibility of cargo containers throughout supply chain  Vetted personnel at all transshipment locations  Secure warehouses  International cooperation on security procedures and practices  International sharing of intelligence data Assertion: Security motives might enable supply chain improvements that can reduce current logistics costs, even up to percent - a “win- win” scenario

11 RAND October 30, 2003 Land Borders

12 RAND October 30, 2003 Key Land Border Issues  Land borders have most of the same issues as ports and airports, plus:  Problems of wide open spaces to patrol and control  Research from criminal justice shows that a very large percentage of deported criminals reenter the US within a year

13 RAND October 30, 2003 Lessons from Drug Policy  History suggests border control will be very difficult  Drug prices and availability difficult to affect with border control efforts  Integration of border control with other strategies (defense in depth) is necessary  Economic concerns are valid and very large

14 RAND October 30, 2003 Summary Observations

15 RAND October 30, 2003 Focus on More Effective Resource Allocation Likelihood of Weapon Importation Across Border Type PeopleNuclearRadiologicalChemicalBiologicalConventional AirportsHighLow HighLow PortsMed.High LowMed.Low Land Borders High LowHighLow

16 RAND October 30, 2003 Focus on More Effective Resource Allocation Likelihood of Weapon Importation Across Border Type PeopleNuclearRadiologicalChemicalBiologicalConventional AirportsHighLow HighLow PortsMed.High LowMed.Low Land Borders High LowHighLow

17 RAND October 30, 2003 There are Also Questions of Relative Resource Allocations  With limited resources, where are our dollars best spent?  Preventing attacks  Hardening targets against attacks  Improving response against attacks  We can mis-allocate resources if we think about threats too generically or the ‘port problem’ in isolation. For example:  In absolute terms, it makes little sense to think about inspecting cargo for smallpox because of the difficulty in finding and identifying it  In relative terms, better and less expensive policies such as vaccination of health care workers are available

18 RAND October 30, 2003 Challenges Can Only be Met Collectively  Private sector  Concerns: security costs and impact on business  Data: profit margins, security expenditures  Trade associations  Concerns: impact on members; government regulation  Data: industry procedures and trends  Public  Concerns: ease of travel and movement, cost of goods  Data: travel patterns  National governments  Concerns: trade flows, attacks, security measures  Data: threats; level of effort; security procedures  Local governments:  Concerns: facility revenues, consequences of attacks  Data: users’ price sensitivity and willingness to substitute; security procedures

19 RAND October 30, 2003 Challenges Can Only be Met Collectively  National governments  Concerns: trade flows, attacks, security measures  Data: threats; level of effort; security procedures  Local governments:  Concerns: facility revenues, consequences of attacks  Data: users’ price sensitivity and willingness to substitute; security procedures  Private sector  Concerns: security costs and impact on business  Data: profit margins, security expenditures  Trade associations  Concerns: impact on members; government regulation  Data: industry procedures and trends  Public  Concerns: ease of travel and movement, cost of goods  Data: travel patterns No single party controls all of the relevant information. Parties need to collaborate to support an integrated assessment