1. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY Dr. Tom Froese IIMAS-UNAM

2. How to scale from life to mind? No culture without social interaction. No mind without social interaction. No life without social interaction. The life-mind continuity thesis has to overcome a “cognitive gap” – how to explain the transition from bacterial chemotaxis to human cognition? -Adopt a developmental perspective -Drop the individualist perspective Froese and Di Paolo (2009) Sociality all the way down the life-mind continuity?

3. Autopoietic theory Varela (1997)

4. Autopoiesis: regenerating identity “An autopoietic system—the minimal living organization— is one that continuously produces the components that specify it, while at the same time realizing it (the system) as a concrete unity in space and time, which makes the network of production of components possible. More precisely defined: An autopoietic system is organized (defined as unity) as a network of processes of production (synthesis and destruction) of components such that these components: (i) continuously regenerate and realize the network that produces them, and (ii) constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the domain in which they exist.” Varela (1997, p. 75)

5. Enactive approach to development? Autopoiesis: identity of living system remains the same Adaptivity: identity of living system only changes with respect to external perturbations Development: identity of living system is qualitatively transformed in a spontaneous manner How to explain this self-organized instability of identity? E.g. Nuño de la Rosa (2010) “Becoming Organisms”

6. Origins of social cognition In the case of human infants, when is the point that we can say that they understand other minds? When is the point that they begin to interact socially? The answer depends on what kind of definition of social cognition we prefer. And on what kind of experimental methods we use. Let us consider the classic definition and methods.

7. Social cognition = Theory of Mind “In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual imputes mental states to himself and to others (either to conspecifics or to other species as well). A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory, first, because such states are not directly observable, and second, because the system can be used to make predictions, specifically about the behavior of other organisms.” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515, emphasis added)

8. Belief Question: "Where will Sally look for her marble?"

9. Sally-Ann false belief test The Sally-Ann task was originally devised as a false belief task by Wimmer and Perner (1983). For a participant to "pass" this test, they must answer the Belief Question correctly by indicating that Sally believes that the marble is in her own basket. They showed that normally developing children aged 4 and above passed this test. Children with autism, with a mental age of 4 years and above, had difficulty with this task. Frith (2001)

10. Sally-Ann false belief test The correct answer is continuous with Sally's perspective, but not with the participant's own. If the participant cannot take an alternative perspective, they will indicate that Sally has cause to believe, as the participant does, that the marble has moved. Passing the test is thus seen as the manifestation of a participant understanding that Sally has her own beliefs and that these may not correlate with reality. This is the core requirement of theory of mind.

11. Questions regarding early infancy Theory of Mind is the branch of cognitive science that investigates how we ascribe mental states to other persons and how we use the states to explain and predict the actions of those other persons. More accurately, it is the branch that investigates mindreading or mentalizing or mentalistic abilities. These skills are shared by almost all human beings beyond early childhood. They are used to treat other agents as the bearers of unobservable psychological states and processes, and to anticipate and explain the agents’ behavior in terms of such states and processes. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (“Theory of Mind”)

12. Another kind of explanatory gap Cognitivism is forced to divide human development into two qualitatively distinct phases: 0-4 years: infants merely show instinctive behavior to social stimuli without any form of social understanding 4 years and more: children explicitly understand the existence of other minds based on belief-desire concepts There is no doubt about the fact that something crucial develops around 4 years of age in normal children. But are children really mind-blind “solipsists” before then? Or has cognitivism asked the wrong questions?

13. Prenatal life

14. Mother-fetus interaction

15. Affective maternal-foetal relation “the maternal body schema forms the basis of and for the foetal body schema and subsequent foetal development. Together, the manner in which the maternal and foetal body schemas merge and then diverge will form a communication that is born through situated, gestational embodied negotiations. This relationship is affectively structured through the negotiated movements themselves. Thus, by the time of our birth we have already, within our habituated repertoires, a way of moving and interrelating that may well set the foundations for affective intersubjective relations post-partum.” Lymer (2011, p. 139)

16. Neonatal imitation Meltzoff and Moore (1977) How might 2-3 week old babies respond?

17. Neonatal imitation Meltzoff and Moore (1977)

18. Primary intersubjectivity In primary intersubjectivity, neonatal imitation gives way to to more complex forms of reciprocation. Awareness of being the object of others’ attention. Reddy (2003) First examples of communication and cooperation based on dyadic interactions. Trevathen (1979) – “Primary intersubjectivity” Key characteristic: reciprocity

19. Secondary intersubjectivity Formation of a second-person perspective with a triadic structure (“me”, “you” and “it”). The second-person perspective is developmentally prior to the third-person perspective (Fuchs 2013). Developmentally, this shift occurs around 9 months, widely noted as a developmental milestone. “cooperative task performance becomes possible and attractive for the infant, who now shows ‘person-person-object’ awareness” (Trevarthen 1998, p. 18) Confidence, confiding and acts of meaning (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978) Key characteristic: joint attention

20. Tertiary intersubjectivity “Tertiary intersubjectivity concerns third person engagements, involving he, she, it or they; at this level, the self and others become public representations, able to be discussed and judged by other parties. This psychological development usually begins around 20 months and is generally established by 4 years. It is this development which theory theorists propose indicates that subjects have attained a ToM” Daly (2014, p. 237-238) Key characteristic: linguistic understanding of others’ beliefs

21. Still-face paradigm “The Still-Face Paradigm (SFP) was first introduced by Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, and Brazelton (1978) to test the hypothesis that infants are active contributors to social interaction. In the SFP, infants are generally observed in a three-step face-to-face interaction with an adult: (1) a baseline normal interaction episode, (2) the ‘still-face’ episode in which the adult becomes unresponsive and maintains a neutral facial expression, and (3) a reunion in which the adult resumes normal interaction. The still-face has been found to evoke marked changes in infant behavior, now known as the still-face effect. Infants typically show increased gaze aversion, less smiling and more negative affect during the still-face compared to during normal face-to-face interaction” Mesman et al. (2009, p. 121)

22. Double TV monitor paradigm Murray and Trevarthen (1985)

23. Nadel et al. (1999) “Expectancies for social contingency in 2-month-olds”

24. Nadel et al. (1999)

25. Double TV monitor paradigm Nadel et al. (1999)

26. Re-enactment of intended acts Meltzoff (1995) Subjects tested were 18-month-olds

27. Re-enactment of intended acts “The question can now be posed as to whether they interpreted the presentations differently. The data showed that they did. The groups significantly differed in their tendency to produce the target act. The children were six times more likely to produce the target act after seeing the human attempt to pull it apart (60% did so) than they were after seeing the demonstration by machine (10%).” Meltzoff (1995, p. 845)

28. Rational imitation in preverbal infants How would a 14-month-old respond when presented with the switch? Gergely et al. (2002)

29. Rational imitation in preverbal infants Gergely et al. (2002)

30. Violation of expectation false belief test Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) “Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?”

31. Violation of expectation false belief test Onishi and Baillargeon (2005)

32. Violation of expectation false belief test Onishi and Baillargeon (2005)

33. Violation of expectation false belief test Onishi and Baillargeon (2005)

34. Active helping false belief test “Children watched as a toy was switched from one box to another while an adult either witnessed the switch (true belief condition) or not (false belief condition). Then the adult attempted unsuccessfully to open the box the toy originally had been in. In the true belief condition, infants could follow their natural tendency to help immediately by opening the empty box for the adult. Since in this condition the adult had watched the moving of the toy from one box to the other, his attempt to get into the first box could not be to extract the toy. In contrast, in the false belief condition, if infants understood the adult’s false belief and wanted to help, they should infer that he wanted the toy he thought was in there. In this case they should not simply go help him open the first box but rather go to the other box and extract the toy for him.” (Buttelmann et al. 2009, p. 338)

35. Active helping false belief test

36. Reddy (2003)

37. Changes in paradigm Developmental psychology was founded on the cognitive principles of Theory of Mind. Experiments tested abstract knowledge of other minds in passive spectator scenarios. But when we test practical knowledge of other minds in interactive embodied situations, we find much earlier evidence of social understanding. The theoretical foundations of cognitivist developmental psychology must therefore be revised.

38. Homework Start reading: De Jaegher, H. (2014). Enacción y autonomía: Cómo el mundo social cobra sentido mediante la participación. In A. Casado da Rocha (Ed.), Autonomía con otros: Ensayos sobre Bioética (pp. 111-131). Madrid: Plaza y Valdés Copy of paper to be sent by e-mail! Note: The deadline of first assignment has been extended to Wednesday, March 18.

39. References Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm. Cognition, 112, 337-342 Daly, A. (2014). Primary intersubjectivity: Empathy, affective reversibility, 'self-affection' and the primordial 'we'. Topoi, 33, 227-241 Frith, U. (2001). Mind blindness and the brain in autism. Neuron, 32, 969-979 Fuchs, T. (2013). The phenomenology and development of social perspectives. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12, 655-683 Gergely, G., Bekkering, H., & Király, I. (2002). Rational imitation in preverbal infants. Nature, 415, 755 Lymer, J. (2011). Merleau-Ponty and the affective maternal-foetal relation. Parrhesia, 13, 126-143 Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31(5), 838-850 Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1977). Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates. Science, 198, 75-78 Mesman, J., van Ijzendoorn, M. H., & Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J. (2009). The many faces of the still-face paradigm: A review and meta-analysis. Developmental Review, 29, 120-162 Murray, L., & Trevarthen, C. (1985). Emotional regulations of interactions between two- month-olds and their mothers. In T. M. Field & N. A. Fox (Eds.), Social Perception in Infants (pp. 177-197). Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishin

40. References Nadel, J., Carchon, I., Kervella, C., Marcelli, D., & Réserbat-Plantey, D. (1999). Expectancies for social contingency in 2-month-olds. Developmental Science, 2(2), 164-173 Nuño de la Rosa, L. (2010). Becoming organisms: The organisation of development and the development of organisation. History and Philosophy of Life Sciences, 32, 289-316 Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308, 255-258 Reddy, V. (2003). On being the object of attention: Implications for self-other consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(9), 397-402 Trevarthen, C. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before Speech (pp. 321-347). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Trevarthen, C. (1998). The concept and foundations of infant intersubjectivity. In S. Braten (Ed.), Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny (pp. 15-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Trevarthen, C., & Hubley, P. (1978). Secondary intersubjectivity: Confidence, confiding and acts of meaning in the first year. In A. Lock (Ed.), Action, Gesture and Symbol: The Emergence of Language (pp. 183-229). London, UK: Academic Press Varela, F. J. (1997). Patterns of life: Intertwining identity and cognition. Brain and Cognition, 34(1), 72-87 Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103- 128