1. The Self
ETSI: Year 5

2. Lecture Goals Define “self” and understand its value
Discuss self-concepts
structure: what makes up a concept
dynamic: concepts are not fixed entities
function: how are concepts useful?
Examine brain networks and different neural theories of self processing
Today we’ll be talking about the “self” from the perspective of western science. We’ll first go over different ways of defining self and examine the value of this conceptual system. Then we’ll address the many forms and functions of self-concepts. Finally, we’ll look at neural correlates of the self, and discuss different approaches to this question within neuroscience.
The self is a very complicated topic that bridges psychology, neuroscience and philosophy. We are also aware that Buddhism has particular views this topic. As we go through the lecture, we’d love to hear your thoughts about the intersection between these western science views on self and Buddhist ideas. Are there places where the approaches agree or contradict one another?

3. What is “self”? Three Levels:
Proto-self: most basic sense distinguishing self from other, even simple organisms have this – moment to moment representation of the bodily state
Antonio Damasio
Core self: simple, transient sense of self in the here and now, recreated in each moment
Autobiographical self: timeline of your own history extended over time (involves memory)
Self is a complicated construct and there are many ways of thinking about it. Antonio Damasio, one of the premier scholars in this area, has proposed three levels of self. What he calls the “proto-self” is the most basic level, whereby an organism can distinguish self from other. In humans, this would be the moment-to-moment representation of the bodily state, without any higher cognitive processing. The next level is known as the “core self,” which is more complex than just the bodily state, but is still transient and recreated in each moment. This involves the relationship between the proto-self and any object, which can modify the proto-self or be modified by it. Finally, the third level is called “autobiographical self,” which is what we often think of as our “self” – the person you are, complete with a history extended over time. As you might imagine, memory processes are central for this kind of self, because you must remember and integrate your experiences into some cohesive whole.

4. Self vs. Other what are some benefits of an organism
Why might these processes of self have evolved? Consider the most basic function – differentiating self and other. Can you think of some benefits of being able to distinguish yourself from others in the environment? [DO NOT TRANSLATE: e.g. to get around in the world, control movement, survival – must take care of this entity]. This basic function is central for survival, and occurs even in bacteria! It also is present in humans, from a cellular level (e.g. our immune system recognizes “self” and “other”) all the way up to the cognitive level where you know that “you” are different from the person sitting next to you. You can imagine why this function would be evolutionarily conserved.
what are some benefits of an organism
being able to distinguish self from other?

5. Autobiographical Self
Over time, we develop self-concepts based on our cumulative experience
These are particularly developed and important in social organisms
Self-concepts are central for regulating one’s own behavior
goal setting
cognitive preparation for action
planning, rehearsal, strategy
monitoring
evaluating
In this lecture, we will be focusing on the more high-level, cognitive process of self. As we grow, develop and accumulate experiences, we develop a self that is based on memories of these events and interactions. This is the self that is bound up in the “story” of our lives, as we remember it. This self, called the “autobiographical self,” is very complex and is based on many self-concepts. Like any other concept, self-concepts are multimodal, dynamic representations in our brains. The function of self-concepts is thought to be primarily to guide and regulate behavior – a pretty important function!

6. What are some concepts you have about yourself?
Self-concepts
What are some concepts you have about yourself?
[DO NOT TRANSLATE: have monks list some self-concepts (ie, devout, learned, compassionate, etc?), write on the board - try to break out into structure on next slide – some traits, some memories, some values, etc…]

7. Self-concepts are multi-faceted
contain ideas about:
traits
values
feelings
memories
social roles
many different types:
positive or negative
current experience vs. past or future
actual self vs. ideal self vs. other possible selves (feared, ought)
central (well developed, important, relatively stable) or peripheral
As we just saw, we can have many different self-concepts. They exist in many dimensions, covering traits (e.g., tall, healthy, compassionate, etc), to values (what you believe), to feelings, memories and roles in society. Self-concepts also can be classified into different types. For example, they can be positive or negative, and they can involve the past, present or future. In addition, they can relate to your “actual self” (how you think you are right now), the “ideal self” (how you’d like to be), or other selves like the “ought self” (how you imagine others think you should be) or the “feared self” (how you worry you might become if…). Finally, some self-concepts seem to be more central than others, and are more stable over time, while others are more transient and peripheral – they may change easily with circumstances. [ask for examples]
Markus & Wurf (1987)

8. Self-concepts are dynamic
Interestingly, the concept of the “self” was once viewed by researchers as unitary, stable concept. You can see how this might have been the case, because when we think of ourselves, we generally have a fairly stable idea of a being that in some way stays the same over time. As you’re probably beginning to see, however, self-concepts are quite dynamic and changeable, and researchers now realize that nothing about the self is fixed: it represents a continually active and shifting array of knowledge and ways of relating to the world.
What do you think about how this overlaps with Buddhist ideas about impermanence?
While we may think of our self-concept as unitary or fixed, these concepts are NOT stable or static, but ever-changing

9. Self-concepts are dynamic
Highly dependent on context and surroundings
Many factors can cause our self-concepts to shift. One of the most significant factors that influences our self-concepts is the surrounding context. As it turns out, what we value or focus on, or even the way we behave, depends strongly on our environment. This is particularly relevant in social settings. For example, a woman in a room full of men only might become very aware and focused on her gender, whereas this would not factor into her self-concepts very much in a setting with equal numbers of men and women. Likewise, for a tall person surrounded by shorter people, height may become very relevant.
Our self-concepts also change with experience. For example, a young child doing well in school may come to believe that s/he is smart in a general sense (good at all subjects). However, with time and experience, s/he may modify their self-concept to reflect that they are smart in some subjects (e.g., math) but not necessarily others (e.g., languages).
in this situation, gender will be salient
in this situation, height will be salient

10. The dynamic self-concept
ENVIRONMENT
PERSON
Internal processes
Self-Concept
self-schemas
values
strategies
possible selves
Behavior
Instead of a unitary self-concept, we can refer to the “working” self-concept, which is the self-concept that is accessible at any given time, constructed largely from social context and experience, as we just discussed. The working self-concept influences, and is influenced by, factors within oneself (internal processes), and between oneself and others (social behavior). It draws from the larger pool of traits, beliefs, memories, etc, that have accumulated over time, based on what is relevant to the current situation. Thus, the entire environment affects our working self-concept.
Working
Self
adapted from
Markus & Wurf (1987)

11. What is the function of self-concepts?
Internal Processes:
information processing
affect regulation
motivation of behavior
Behavior:
social perception, evaluating others
choice of situation and partners
interaction strategies (the image we present to others)
reacting to feedback
Earlier, we said that the main function of self-concepts was to regulate behavior. As we just saw in the previous slide, this can apply to internal processes, or to behavior in your environment. Within yourself, self-concepts affect information processing. For example, we are faster to process stimuli that are congruent with our self-concepts, or are generally “self-relevant.” Self-concepts can also act to regulate emotional states and motivate our behavior towards goals we deem important.
In the context of interacting with others, self-concepts play many roles. They are involved in how we perceive and evaluate others (which is usually based on self-relevant dimensions). For example, if you think you are very intelligent, or funny, or kind, and you value that in yourself, you will likely judge others on whether or not they have those same qualities. Another domain where self-concepts are very important is in interacting with others. If you have a facebook profile, you can examine it as an excellent example of how we filter and select the “image” of ourselves we present to others. Furthermore, we usually have somewhat different identities depending on those around us – friends, family, revered teachers, etc.

12. The danger of self-concepts
Think of a self-concept you have that you value highly, or feel is very important or central to you being “you”
Now, imagine that you are in a scenario in which you act completely opposite from this self-concept (or someone tells you they think you are not that way)…
We’ve looked at several ways that self-concepts can be beneficial, even essential for survival. However, self-concepts can also have detrimental effects. To illustrate this, let’s do a brief exercise. First, think of a self-concept you hold that is very important to you – a central self-concept that doesn’t vary too much across circumstances, and that you value highly. [e.g. smart, compassionate]
Now, how would you feel if you found yourself in a situation where this concept was challenged – for example, you acted in the opposite way, or someone told you they thought you were the opposite? [example: smart  stupid; compassionate  self-serving]
The usual response in this situation is stress! In fact, many theorists now propose that a central component of what makes something “stressful” is that it represents some threat to our “self.” This could be a physical threat to our bodies (material self), but is also often a more subtle psychological threat to “who we think we are.” This kind of mental stress can come from holding too tightly to fixed views of self (remember, self is dynamic). Again, here we see some interesting overlap with Buddhist views, in that believing (erroneously) in a solid, stable self leads to suffering.
 STRESS!
In fact, “threat to self” is a central element in stress – this occurs when any of your goals, values, or core beliefs about yourself are challenged.

13. Neural Correlates of Self
So now that we know a little bit about the self and self-concepts, how are these represented in the brain? This is an exciting field of research that is growing rapidly today. Because of this, we don’t yet know for sure how the brain represents “self.” However, there are many current ideas about self in the brain – we’ll examine some of them here.

14. Meta-Analysis of Self vs. Other fMRI
One of the ways to approach this question is to look at the results of brain imaging experiments that use paradigms contrasting “self” and “other” processing. For example, many studies asked people in the scanner to judge how well various words or images described either themselves or some other person. They could then contrast the average brain activity in “self” conditions vs. “other” conditions. The results of a meta-analysis (remember, that is when the results of many separate studies are analyzed together) of many of these kinds of studies are shown here. As you can see, these data indicate that midline cortical regions of the brain seem to be preferentially activated for “self” processing, over and above “other” processing.
[Note: the yellow symbol means “union,” representing the overlap, or conjunction, of the two datasets. This actually foreshadows the point on slide 21 – if someone asks what it is, you can explain and say we’ll come back to this in a few slides.]
Northoff et al, NeuroImage 2006
Many studies show cortical midline regions preferentially activated when processing information related to SELF vs. OTHER

15. What functions might midline cortical regions serve in relation to self?3 4 2
Much is already known about these cortical midline regions of the brain (specifically, the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the cingulate cortex), and what cognitive operations they might be serving. Imagine you are asked to view the word “honest” and judge how much it applies to you. First (1) you will have to represent the trait “honest” in your brain. It has been proposed that this sub-process might be performed by the ventromedial PFC (red). Then (2) you will have to evaluate, or judge, how that trait applies to you – this sub-process of evaluation is thought to be performed by the dorsomedial PFC (yellow). All this time, you will be internally monitoring your own actions (anterior cingulate, blue (3)) and integrating the stimulus word with your pre-existing self-concepts (posterior cingulate, green (4)). Remember, this is just a theory of how this might work in the brain, but it is interesting to consider in light of the data we just saw. 1
VMPFC:
Northoff and Bermpohl, TICS 2004

16. Default Mode Network
Meta-analysis of brain regions more active at “rest” than during task
posterior cingulate cortex
medial prefrontal cortex
You may remember learning about these cortical midline regions last year. These regions are major hubs in the default mode network, which is the set of brain regions that are preferentially active during REST periods, when people are not actively engaged in any other task.
LATERAL SURFACE
MEDIAL SURFACE
Buckner et al, Ann NY Acad Sci, 2008
Definition: a specific, anatomically defined brain system preferentially active when individuals are left to think to themselves undisturbed

17. Mind wandering: what do we think about? …almost always about SELF!
Cognitive operations:
moving in time
remembering
imagining (without doing)
planning, incorporating memories
When we’re not doing anything else, we usually engage in “mind wandering.” What kind of cognitive functions are associated with mind wandering? It is usually not about the present moment – in other words, we tend to move in time. We remember things from the past, imagine things in the future, make plans, etc. As you might imagine, activity within the default mode network has been associated with mind wandering processes.
Interestingly, if you reflect on the content of mind-wandering – it is almost always about your SELF! Thus, its interesting that these same brain regions along the midline (and also other default mode regions, in fact) are thought to be involved in self-related processing.
…almost always about SELF!

18. Neural Correlates of Self
For the above reasons, many neuroscientists relate the default mode network, or regions within in (particularly mPFC), to “self” processing.
However, other theorists propose different ideas… neuroscientists are just beginning to distinguish between various definitions of “self”.

19. Self-as-object vs. Self-as-subject
“me” versus “I”
me = self-concept, the object
I = the observer, subjective sense
example: looking at image in mirror
perceived me is self-as-object
perceiving I is self-as-subject
This view argues that default mode processing (mPFC especially) views self as object only.
Now we come to a point where we need to discuss some philosophical ideas. There are two ways in which we can talk about self – one is as an object and the other is as a subject. To get an idea of the difference, imagine you are looking at your own image in a mirror. The image you perceive is your self-as-object. This contains all your self-concepts and ideas about yourself that we’ve been discussing so far. However, there is also the “you” that is looking into the mirror. This is the self in the subjective sense – the perceiver. This self-as-subject represents the basic feeling that “I am,” and also more specifically, “I am the one perceiving the image in the mirror.” This distinction is related to Damasio’s difference between the “core self” (self-as-subject) and “autobiographical self” (self-as-object).
Legrand & Ruby (2009)

20. Self: a re-conceptualization
default mode regions as a non self-specific evaluation network, relating to both “self” and “other” processing
Several years ago, another group of researchers headed by Dorothée Legrand brought up two problems with the previous model. First, they performed a more extensive meta-analysis than the previous group, and found that many of the regions that some studies found more active in self > other contrasts (white dots above) were shown by other studies to be more active in other > self contrasts (blue dots above)! To resolve this somewhat confusing finding, they proposed that the DMN may be a general evaluation network that undertakes inferential processing using information recalled from memory. Basically, this means that whenever you’re evaluating stimuli (regardless of self or other), you utilize this brain network. In both cases, the content is similar (your name vs. another’s name, your traits vs. another’s traits, etc.).
Second and perhaps more importantly, Legrand and Ruby pointed out that all the studies that relate the midline regions (or default mode regions) to the “self” are viewing the self as an object. Do you see the difference? The studies used in the previous work all asked the person to reflect on themselves, as an subject – without addressing the subjective sense of “I” that is ever-present in our experience. (Note here, this is an example of applying latent constructs in science – the construct of self-as-object and self-as-subject.)
self > other (white dots)
other > self (blue dots)
Legrand & Ruby (2009)

21. What IS self-specific?
Christoff et al (2011)
So if the default mode network is not specific to the self, but rather can process information relevant to both self and other, is there anything in the brain that IS self-specific? It seems that the contents of the self-as-object are not necessarily specific to the self (traits, values, etc) because they can be applied to others as well. So what determines the self-as-subject? What processes might underlie the subjective sense of “I”?
As illustrated in this slide, Legrand and Ruby ("What Is Self-Specific? Theoretical Investigation and Critical Review of Neuroimaging Results”, Psychological Review, 2009) propose that the first person perspective is what accounts for the sense that you are the one perceiving. The relationship between what you see (object) and you seeing it (subject) is what determines your perspective. No-one else can have the exact perspective that you do when you are interacting with the world. How might this be rooted in the brain (and body)?
contents are not self-specific
- even feeling of one’s body
perspective is self-specific
This perspective involves acting, and knowing you are acting: reafference

22. Self as Perceptual-motor Grounding
Sensorimotor integration
Efference copy
Motor command from motor cortex
Effector (e.g., muscles)
Sensory
Consequence
SELF
EXTERNAL WORLD
Reafference
Self-specific perspective, at the most basic level, is a sensorimotor loop implemented by integrating efferent and reafferent information. Efferent information is sent from your brain out to the body. For example, an efferent signal would be sent to your muscles to create movement, to say, bite a lemon. An efferent copy is an internal copy created with a motor command and kept in the brain (to estimate sensory feedback). Reafference corresponds to afferent signals coming back from the body into the brain, issuing from the perceiving subject’s own action. So, there is no such thing as a non-self-related reafferent!
The efferent copy and the reafference are sent to the same area of the brain and compared. Relating an efferent signal with its reafference plays a crucial role in monitoring performance, by comparing output (represented in reafference) with the command (represented in the efferent copy). It also enables the perceptual act to be characterized not only by a given content (the acidity of a lemon) but also by a self-specific perspective (I am the one experiencing the acidity of the lemon juice).
Legrand & Ruby (2009)

23. Anterior Insula: another view on ‘I’
feeling of knowing
inspection time
Studies in many domains find activation in anterior insula
Hypothesis: awareness is common process underlying all activations
Awareness = knowing that one exists; the feeling that “I am”
Inner feelings that underlie one’s representation of self are only accessible from one’s own brain
sensual touch
painful temperature
Another view on the self-as-subject involves the anterior insula, which we’ve learned about before. The insula has been implicated in a wide range of functions, including interoception (internal signals about the state of the body), pleasure and reward, self-recognition, anticipation, feelings of time passing, monitoring performance, and awareness of emotion (empathy). In general, a cognitive operation that is common to all these experiences is present-moment awareness – the awareness that something is happening RIGHT NOW. This awareness is a central feature in the feeling that you exist, or knowing “I am.” For this reason, some researchers hypothesize that the anterior insula is an important brain area for awareness, consciousness, or the subjective sense of self.
respiration & exercise
itch
Craig (2009)

24. Is there a a neural substrate of self?
Ideas about self in the brain abound
Some presume “self” can involve any set of brain regions representing experience and memory
Self may emerge from multiple streams of processing
Elements of all these theories may be correct
There is likely no single neural substrate of self
This topic is still very much in debate, and is closely related to the study of “consciousness”
As you can see, there are many ideas about how self is represented in the brain. Aside from the theories we’ve just seen, other researchers propose that self can exist wherever experience and memory exists in the brain (which is distributed widely). It is important to remember that elements of all of these proposals might be correct, and there is likely no single neural substrate of self in the brain. This is a good example of the multiple different ways of knowing that science embraces. This field will surely continue to develop, and increasingly, neuroscientists are working with philosophers and other cognitive scientists (and Buddhists!) to gain a better understanding of this complex topic.

25. Summary
Self is an important construct for survival, and involves many domains (traits, values, memories, etc.)
Although we often think of it as stable and fixed, self is dynamic and very dependent on the situation.
While the self is important and very useful for regulating behavior, it can also lead to stress if tightly-held views are challenged.
The neural underpinnings of self are still being investigated.
Some research focuses on self-as-object (mPFC and default mode).
Other work tries to distinguish self-as-subject (reafference and insula).

26. ETSI: Year 4, Day 4 afternoon
Exploring Brain Networks
during Meditation
Let’s take a look at a recent experiment that was done at Emory, that tried to get some information about how activity in the networks we discussed this morning relates to our subjective experience.
ETSI: Year 4, Day 4 afternoon

27. Default Mode Network
Meta-analysis of brain regions more active at “rest” than during task
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)
medial prefrontal cortex
You may remember learning about these cortical midline regions last year. These regions are major hubs in the default mode network, which is the set of brain regions that are preferentially active during REST periods, when people are not actively engaged in any other task.
LATERAL SURFACE
MEDIAL SURFACE
Buckner et al, Ann NY Acad Sci, 2008
Definition: a specific, anatomically defined brain system preferentially active when individuals are left to think to themselves undisturbed

28. Overlap between DMN and Self-referential processing
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)
medial prefrontal cortex
And zooming in a bit more, sue did a simple but critical experiment –she had the same subjects do both resting state and self-referential processing tasks. Overlap shown in green.
Fig. 2. Conjunction analyses of self-referential processing and default network for Experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 2 (b). GREEN: Self > Semantic and Rest > Semantic in BA 10 and BA 31; RED: Self > Semantic and Self > Rest in BA 9; BLUE: Rest > Self and Rest > Semantic in BA 7.
participants viewed 160 trait
adjectives presented across 4 functional runs; in Experiment 2, there
were 144 trait adjectives in 3 functional runs. Words were drawn
from Anderson's (1968) list of trait adjectives, and lists were
counterbalanced across conditions for word valence, length, and
number of syllables. In Experiment 1, words were presented in a
blocked design such that each word was presented for three seconds
in blocks of ten words. Prior to each block onset, participants viewed a
two-second cue screen describing their task for the upcoming block.
Participants either judged the words in the following block for selfreference
(“Does this word apply to you?”) or for valence content (“Is
this word positive?”).
Whitfield-Gabrieli Neuroimage (2011)

29. Decreased DMN/self-related activity during meditation in experienced meditators
Contrast: (Experienced Meditator > Novice)
medial prefrontal cortex
PCC
How do the groups compare? Do experienced meditators do it better?
N=12 meditators; hours of lifetime practice.
The task was 4.5 min of focused attention, or loving-kindness meditation, or “choiceless awareness” (aka “resting in the natural state”), compared to an ordinary resting state.
Later replicated in 20 experts vs. 26 novices:
again found PCC/precuneus deactivation in meditators as compared to novices during meditation versus rest
We also found PCC/precuneus deactivation in meditators during meditation versus an active baseline
Reference:  
J. A. Brewer, P. D. Worhunsky, J. R. Gray, Y.-Y. Tang, J. Weber, and H. Kober, “Meditation experience is associated with differences in default mode network activity and connectivity,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A., vol. 108, no. 50, pp –20259, Nov
x = -6
z = 21
Brewer et al PNAS (2011)

30. An fMRI study by Wendy Hasenkamp, PhD
What exactly happens in the brain during focused attention meditation, moment-by-moment?
An fMRI study by Wendy Hasenkamp, PhD

31. Cognitive Dynamics during Focused Meditation
Mind-wandering
(MW)
Default Mode Network?
Focus
Attention Network?
Awareness
of MW
When trying to examine naturalistic fluctuations in cognitive states, meditation can become a really useful paradigm. This study examines the practice of focused attention (shamatha) meditation, which is essentially a form of attention training. As I’m sure you are aware, in this practice, the basic instructions are to try to maintain focus on a single object, such as the breath. [DO QUICK MEDITATION WITH MONKS, or have them do it in morning meditation session – PRESS BUTTON AT MW]
As we just saw, there is actually a very dynamic and fluctuating subjective experience that occurs when one tries to do this – as follows. When attempting to sustain focus on an object such as the breath, an individual will inevitably experience MW. At some time during MW, the practitioner becomes aware that their mind was not on the object, at which point they must disengage from the current train of thought and shift their attention back to the breath, where it stays focused again for some period of time. With practice, people gain an increased awareness of their ongoing mental states.
This is the cognitive framework that this study is based on, and you can see that it involves a repeated switching between MW and perhaps different kinds of attention. I wanted to see if we could leverage the ability of meditators to report on their cognitive states to try to help define brain activity associated with these states. In addition, I wanted to more clearly define what happens in the brain during meditation, as this is often conceived of in the west as a single “state” – all fMRI studies on meditation average brain activity over many minutes, which may gloss over these dynamic cognitive changes.
Shifting Attention
Disengage/Re-focus
 What happens in the brain during focused meditation?

32. Methods 14 meditators from western culture
age 28-66
3 male, 11 female
assessed meditation experience  familiarity with breath-focus meditation
Functional MRI Task: Focus on the breath, whenever you realize your mind has wandered, press the button and return focus to breath (20 min)
Focus
Mind-
wandering
Awareness
of MW
Shifting
Attention
To do this, we asked 14 meditation practitioners (laypeople) to perform 20 minutes of breath-focus meditation in the scanner. Our instructions were just like we just practiced: Focus on the breath, whenever you realize your mind has wandered, press the button and return your focus to breath. Based on the model we just looked at, this would give us some estimation of timing at the Awareness stage. We then used this button-press data to try to get an idea of brain activity during these different phases.
Use button-press data to determine brief conditions related to shifting mental states

33. Approach to Analysis Approach to Analysis Moment of awareness
TR=1.5 sec A
Mind-
wandering
Shifting/
Meditation
Moment of awareness
(button press)
To do the analysis, we essentially have 20 minutes of fMRI data, and then we have button presses indicating the moments when subjects became aware of their mind wandering. We can assume that right before the button press, their minds were wandering (since that’s what they just told us) and that right after, they were returning their focus to the breath. Based on this logic, we divided the data into 3-second bins around the button press to correspond to the proposed cognitive stages.
AWARE
3 sec MW
3 sec
SHIFT
3 sec
FOCUS
3 sec
No interest
6 sec
censored

34. Cognitive References for Conditions
AWARE MW
SHIFT
FOCUS MW A
Focus
Mind-wandering (MW)
Awareness
of MW
Shifting Attention
Disengage/Re-focus
FOCUS
AWARE
So to be clear, we’re trying to match up these conditions in the data with these states in the model. [step through animation] Starting at the moment of awareness (indicated by the button press), we move backward in time and call that mind-wandering, and forward in time to assign the shifting and sustained focus conditions.
SHIFT

35. Contrast: AWARE > MW
Awareness of MW
Contrast: AWARE > MW
AWARE
SHIFT MW
FOCUS A
These results are averaged over the 14 subjects. Let’s first look at brain activations during the AWARE phase. Here we see activations in the anterior insula and the dorsal anterior cingulate. If you remember from before, these areas are part of the attention network, and have been called the salience network. The salience network is thought to be involved in identifying relevant stimuli in one’s environment. So, the function of this network is very much in line with what we think the subjects are doing during this time – namely, detecting the “target” state of mind-wandering. Interestingly, most studies that have looked at this network have used external stimuli (visual targets, etc). However, in this paradigm, the “target” was an internal cognitive state. This means that perhaps the salience network performs a general target detection function, regardless of the type of target.
Bilateral anterior insula and dorsal ACC
salience network: identify relevant stimuli
activation relative to baseline (MW)
activation during motor control

36. Shifting/Re-focusing
Contrast: SHIFT > MW
AWARE
SHIFT MW
FOCUS A
During the SHIFT phase, right after the button press when subjects were returning their attention to the breath, we saw activations in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the right lateral parietal cortex. We saw before that these brain regions are another subset of the attention network known as the executive network. The function of this network is thought to be to re-direct attention to relevant stimuli, which again fits well with what we think subjects are doing: re-directing their attention from whatever they were thinking about… back to the breath.
Fronto-parietal attention networks (right-lateralized)
executive network: respond to stimuli by controlling attention

37. Sustained Focus/Meditation
Contrast: FOCUS > MW
AWARE
SHIFT MW
FOCUS A
During the FOCUS phase, a region within the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex remained active. This region, in addition to being a part of the executive network and involved in directing attention, is also known to be very important for working memory. This function of “keeping a goal in mind” also fits very well with what we imagine subjects are doing during this time – keeping their attention focused on the breath.
Right dorsolateral PFC
executive network: respond to stimuli by controlling attention, working memory, keeping goal in mind

38. Contrast: SHIFT > MW
Mind wandering
Contrast: SHIFT > MW
AWARE
SHIFT MW
FOCUS A
Finally, right before the button press, during MW, we saw elements of the DMN (note the regions of posterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex). This data agrees with the idea that the DMN underlies mind wandering, and here we have identified it using the subject’s own reporting of their experience. In addition to the DMN regions, we also saw other regions here, which are known to be related to planning motor responses. Since this period was right before the button press, activations in these regions also makes sense.
mPFC, posterior cingulate, parahippocampal gyrus
default mode network: memory, planning, imagining
(other, motor-related regions also active, due to button press preparation)

39. Correlation of brain activity with meditation experience
AWARE
SHIFT MW
FOCUS A
seconds
p=0.010
% signal change from baseline
There’s a lot of interest in the field of meditation research about how the amount of time a person has practiced affects various outcomes. Here, we examined whether the estimated number of lifetime hours of meditation significantly affected the activity in these conditions. We saw some significant results during the Shifting phase – one of which is examined here in further detail. Activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC, circled in red) was negatively correlated with practice time, meaning that the more a person has practiced, the less active this region was when they were shifting their attention back to the breath. We also modeled the activity within this region over time, which is plotted here high and low practice between groups. You can see that for subjects in the high practice group, activity in this region drops off within a few seconds of the button press, whereas it persists in those with less experience. This could mean several things. One possibility is that this region was active as apart of mind-wandering (it is a region within the DMN), and people with more experience are more quickly able to disengage it. Overall, this suggests that practice time may effect the way the brain responds, perhaps through neuroplasticity (re-wiring of the brain).
VMPFC:
self & evaluation
 More experience, better at quieting self-processing/evaluation?

40. Summary MW FOCUS AWARE SHIFT
Taken together, these results suggest a pattern of fluctuating neural network activity during focused meditation that can be summarized as follows. MW periods are associated with DMN activity, with sensory and motor regions likely coming online prior to the button press. At the moment when awareness of MW occurs, the salience network becomes strongly active, perhaps because of the detection of the targeted state of MW. Subsequently, the frontoparietal executive network activates, presumably to redirect attention back to the breath, with the dorsolateral PFC then persisting into the maintenance of focused attention meditation. This pattern of shifting activity is consistent with an alternation between the two anticorrelated brain networks, in which DMN activity is associated with MW states, and attentional subnetworks are associated with awareness, shifting and maintenance of attention.
SHIFT
Correlations with practice time suggest experience-dependent neural plasticity

41. A real-time neurofeedback study by Jud Brewer, PhD
Can meditators learn to modify their brain activity if they see it shown on a screen during an fMRI brain scan?
A real-time neurofeedback study by Jud Brewer, PhD

42. fMRI neurofeedback
While lying inside the fMRI scanner, the subject is practicing focused attention on the breath, with eyes open. At the same time he sees on the screen his own brain activation in area PCC.
In the background we show a graph of their brain activation over time, and tell them that this region may be involved in self-referential activation so they can check it from time to time to see if it correlates with their experience.
So if their mind is wandering it might go up, but if concentrated it would go down. Just starting this work so these results are very preliminary, and may not hold up. So far, they report strong correlations with experience. So do the experienced folks, but their activation looks a bit different.

43. Afterwards, participants were asked to described what happened during their meditation inside the scanner…

44. So at the beginning, I caught myself, that I was sort of trying to guess when the words were going to end and when the meditation was going to begin. So I was kind of trying to be like “okay ready, set, go!” and then there was an additional word that popped up and I was like “oh shit” and so that’s the red spike you see there…

45. …and then I sort of immediately settled in and I was really getting into it…

46. …and then I thought “oh my gosh this is amazing it’s describing exactly what I am saying” and then you see that red spike...

47. … and I was like “okay, wait don’t get distracted” and then I got back into it and then it got blue again…

48. …and I was like “oh my gosh this is unbelievable, it’s doing exactly what my mind is doing” and so [chuckles] then it got red again…

49. …So I just find it really funny because … that’s a perfect map of what my mind was going through.

50. Novice Meditator Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4
Thinking about the breath
”focused more on the physical sensation instead of thinking in and out”
3. I felt like that I was on really concentrating on my breathing, but it looks like on the graph that I had a lot of wandering thoughts.
4. I was able to focus on my breathing, the physical sensation, and not thinking of breathing. But I felt like that I had [two] wondering thoughts.
Q: I'm sorry, did you say that you weren't thinking of breathing?
A: Yeah, I was focused more on the physical sensation instead of thinking in and out.
Run 1
Run 2
Run 3
Run 4

51. Experienced Meditator
On run 6, I had a familiar memory image appear, one of a pond, willow tree and fields of my parents farm. I noticed the strong red deflection in response to this, although I don't appear in the image. I went back to the image to see if there was a sense of watcher-subject and noticed that image has a sense of being seen through a child's eyes. The somewhat desolate feeling landscape corresponds to that child's subjectivity. So there is a subject there, even though I never noticed it before, the scanner feedback made me look for it. If you look at run 6 you can see me exploring the image in a long run of red in the middle. Then I remembered I wasn't doing the task so I let it go for a while. Then I started imaginging myself in the future, telling Jud about what I had discovered about childhoold memories, which you can see clearly in the second run of red at the end of run 6.
Experienced Meditator
Run 6
Repeating one’s name
Future thinking
Exploring image
Run 1 is interesting because after several minutes of blue, I wondered if this paradigm actually did measure self-referential processing so I effortfully broke the period of resting in awareness and generated a sense of self by saying my name ”Paul, Paul, Paul" [not his real name] while trying to visualize my face and sense of myself as a subject in the scanner "doing something". This produced a large red spike at the end of the run. OK... it works...interesting.
-On run 6, I had a familiar memory image appear, one of a pond, willow tree and fields of my parents farm. I noticed the strong red deflection in response to this, although I don't appear in the image. I went back to the image to see if there was a sense of watcher-subject and noticed that image has a sense of being seen through a child's eyes. The somewhat desolate feeling landscape corresponds to that child's subjectivity. So there is a subject there, even though I never noticed it before, the scanner feedback made me look for it. If you look at run 6 you can see me exploring the image in a long run of red in the middle. Then I remembered I wasn't doing the task so I let it go for a while. Then I started imagining myself in the future, telling Jud about what I had discovered about childhood memories, which you can see clearly in the second run of red at the end of run 6.
I am sorry that I blew off the directions, but I learned something new and very subtle about those recurring memory-images that I have had for more than a decade. Something I may not have learned otherwise.
On task
Run 1