1. INTEGRAL SYSTEM OR SIMPLE COMBINATION
International Conference 6th Dresden Symposium Hazards – Detection and Management
BORDER RADIATION CONTROL:
INTEGRAL SYSTEM OR SIMPLE COMBINATION
OF INSTRUMENTS AND RULES?
Leonid Kagan, Andrei Stavrov
TSA Systems Ltd., USA

2. Main aims of the ITRAP and ITRAP+10 programs:
ITRAP: “Aim of the study was to work out the technical requirements and practicality of an useful monitoring system at border crossings. The results of the study will be were offered by the IAEA to the Member States as international RECOMMENDATIONS for border monitoring systems ”
ITRAP+10 : “To carry out an evaluation and comparison of the performance of available radiation detection equipment relevant to nuclear security. The results will provide an independent assessment of the available radiation detection equipment on the market and help to ensure common standards at a European level.”

3. Main result of the ITRAP and ITRAP+10 programs:
ITRAP: Main result and lesson of this program is an obvious conclusion: the specialized equipment is required to solve tasks of the border (customs) radiation control.
ITRAP+10: Final report on the current technical level of commercially available equipment used in nuclear security. It will help to define the general performance capabilities of each equipment class. The performance capabilities may be used to develop requirements for future equipment selection activities. No selection of specific instruments will be conducted as part of ITRAP+10. This project cannot provide a comprehensive survey of this fast developing market (ITRAP+20???).

4. Consequences of the ITRAP and ITRAP+10 programs:
 ITRAP: New technical solutions were developed,
various kinds of instruments, detectors, electronics were created. New equipment has not passed serious independent international tests and consequently has not confirmed their new characteristics declared by manufacturers.
ITRAP+10: ???

5. Shell we test these or similar instruments again?

6. Questions and answers :
Will it increase the efficiency of the border radiation control?

7. Questions and answers :
Will it increase the efficiency of the border radiation control? No

8. Questions and answers :
Will it increase the efficiency of the border radiation control? No
Why?

9. Questions and answers :
Will it increase the efficiency of the border radiation control? No
Why?
The effectiveness of using such an equipment depends on rather the operation procedures than equipment characteristics

10. Questions and answers :
Will it increase the efficiency of the border radiation control? No
Why?
The effectiveness of using such an equipment depends on rather the operation procedures than equipment characteristics
What is it necessary to do?

11. Questions and answers :
Will it increase the efficiency of the border radiation control? No
Why?
The effectiveness of using such an equipment depends on rather the operation procedures than equipment characteristics
What is it necessary to do?
To optimize the operation procedures and create an integral system of the border control

12. How the problem looks like now?

13. How the problem looks like now?

14. How the problem looks like now?
How the problem must look like?

15. How the problem looks like now?
How the problem must look like?
To do it, we can use “the PPS approach”

16. PPS (Physical Protection System)
To define Physical Protection System Requirements:
To characterize the facility operations and conditions,
To define the threat spectrum,
To identify the targets of the adversary, and
To identify regulatory requirements.

17. PPS (Physical Protection System)
To characterize facility operations and conditions :
to develop a thorough description of the facility, including the location of the site boundary, building locations, floor plans, structure elevations, and access points,
to describe the processes and operations within the facility and
to identify existing physical protection system elements.

18. Example (airport security post)
Entry for arriving passengers with hand luggage + baggage
Exit for departing passengers with hand luggage + baggage
Control zone inside of territory
of Airport
Entry for departing passengers with hand luggage + baggage

19. Variant of security post
Entry for departing passengers with hand luggage MD
X-Ray
HHMD

20. Description of the airport Description of processes and operations
Optimization of operation procedures and creation an integral system of the airport radiation control:
Description of the airport
Description of processes and operations
Identification of existing elements of control
Definition of the threat spectrum
Identification of the targets of the adversary
Identification of airport regulatory requirements
And!!!
Definition of new requirements
for the radiation control equipment

21. Conclusions
1. Considering airport as an example, it is clear that probability of detection of dangerous radioactive materials will slightly increase as a result of fulfilling the ITRAP+10 and/or similar programs.
2. At the same time the cost of the radiation control system will increase dramatically.
3. It will be possible to overcome these contradictions using of PPS approach.