1. PUBLIC SERVICE VALUES (Cont’d) The “Swivel Service”? October 12 th, 2006

2. The Public Service... “The public service is there to remind elected leaders to do those things we should do but for which there is no immediate political gain.” Former Ontario Premier Bob Rae “The public service is there to remind elected leaders to do those things we should do but for which there is no immediate political gain.” Former Ontario Premier Bob Rae

3. Bureaucratic-Political Conflict what if there is no evidence of conflict between bureaucratic and elected officials? what if there is no evidence of conflict between bureaucratic and elected officials? – are bureaucrats doing their job? i.e. “speaking truth to power” i.e. “speaking truth to power” “...reminding political officials of things they should do but for which there is no immediate political gain” “...reminding political officials of things they should do but for which there is no immediate political gain” – have elected officials been captured by the bureaucracy?

4. The Paradox of Public Service Values bureaucratic domination bureaucratic domination – how serious a problem?? depends on... depends on... –the model of democracy in question!! bureaucratic surrender bureaucratic surrender – how serious a problem?? depends on... depends on... –the model of democracy in question!!...on which side would you err??...on which side would you err??

5. The Not-So-Civil Service: Power Resources and the Relationship Between Ministers and their Senior Civil Servants October 12th, 2006

6. Resources – Senior Bureaucratic Officials expertise expertise – policy – process person-power person-power relationship with other departments relationship with other departments relationship with clientele relationship with clientele

7. Resources -- Ministers political legitimacy political legitimacy expertise expertise – political vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis cabinet vis-a-vis cabinet ability to manage relationship ability to manage relationship outside expertise outside expertise competing lines of advice competing lines of advice relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with public/media relationship with public/media

8. Ministerial Resources and Public Opinion Polling revolution in computer technology revolution in computer technology – costs of public opinion polling have dropped exponential rise in the growth of public opinion polling by government departments exponential rise in the growth of public opinion polling by government departments the role of the minister as the political antenna of the department may be becoming obsolete the role of the minister as the political antenna of the department may be becoming obsolete – senior bureaucrats probably have a better read of public opinion on a given policy issue

9. The Tenure of Ministers (the Constant) “ministerial musical chairs” “ministerial musical chairs” – move often and frequency has increased effects on ministerial power effects on ministerial power – the traditional view ministerial musical chairs weakens the power of minister ministerial musical chairs weakens the power of minister – the counter-traditional view avoids ministerial capture avoids ministerial capture

10. The Tenure of Senior Public Servants (the change!) the revolving deputy ministerial door the revolving deputy ministerial door – move often and frequency has increased effects on deputy ministerial power effects on deputy ministerial power – the traditional view equalizes the relationship between DMs and ministers – both are short-term departmental residents equalizes the relationship between DMs and ministers – both are short-term departmental residents why? why? – an alternative view strengthens the Centre (e.g PCO) strengthens the Centre (e.g PCO) DM becomes representative of the Centre (e.g. PCO) DM becomes representative of the Centre (e.g. PCO)

11. The Tenure of Ministers and their Senior Public Servants changing patterns in the tenure of ministers and deputy ministers... changing patterns in the tenure of ministers and deputy ministers... effects are ambiguous/contradictory effects are ambiguous/contradictory complex interaction between both patterns complex interaction between both patterns power of ministers/DM in new environment is an open empirical question power of ministers/DM in new environment is an open empirical question HOWEVER... HOWEVER... relationships are changing relationships are changing both changes are important in terms of relationships between departments and The Centre both changes are important in terms of relationships between departments and The Centre

13. Cabinet Government what is it? what is it? – collective sharing of executive power how is the structure of cabinet government determined? how is the structure of cabinet government determined? – the Prime Minister who becomes PM? who becomes PM? – prerogatives of the Prime Minister (vis-a-vis cabinet) size and structure of cabinet size and structure of cabinet departmental organization departmental organization cabinet committee structure cabinet committee structure appointments to cabinet appointments to cabinet cabinet agenda cabinet agenda cabinet decisions cabinet decisions

14. Centralized Accountability: Collective Ministerial Responsibility what is “responsible government”? what is “responsible government”? – the executive must maintain the confidence of Parliament what is collective ministerial responsibility? what is collective ministerial responsibility? – all ministers must resign if the cabinet loses the confidence of Parliament what constitutes having the confidence of Parliament? what constitutes having the confidence of Parliament? – what pre-conditions would the operation of collective cabinet ministerial responsibility require?

15. Centralized Accountability: Collective Ministerial Responsibility requirements (enforced by PM) requirements (enforced by PM) – cabinet solidarity – cabinet secrecy cabinet documents exempt from Freedom of Information cabinet documents exempt from Freedom of Information the problem of leaks the problem of leaks why would cabinet ministers agree? why would cabinet ministers agree? price of being in cabinet price of being in cabinet collective self-interest collective self-interest

16. Centralized Accountability (Collective Ministerial Responsibility) and Diffuse Accountability (Individual Ministerial Responsibility) the individual minister and cabinet the individual minister and cabinet collective vs. individual ministerial paradox collective vs. individual ministerial paradox –ministers interest in maximizing their own latitude from cabinet control –ministers interested in maximizing cabinet’s ability to direct other ministries the conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and individual ministerial responsibility the conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and individual ministerial responsibility cabinet/departmental link cabinet/departmental link minister represents department in cabinet minister represents department in cabinet minister represents cabinet to the department minister represents cabinet to the department

17. The Structure of Government: Centralized and Diffuse Accountability Prime Ministerial/Cabinet government is an attempt to ensure political control... Prime Ministerial/Cabinet government is an attempt to ensure political control... – from the centre of government (Prime Minister and Cabinet) – AND over individual departments (Ministers) structure of government is an attempt to balance between collective ministerial responsibility (centralized accountability) and individual ministerial responsibility (diffuse accountability) structure of government is an attempt to balance between collective ministerial responsibility (centralized accountability) and individual ministerial responsibility (diffuse accountability)

18. Centralized Accountability (Collective Ministerial Responsibility) and Diffuse Accountability (Individual Ministerial Responsibility) the individual minister and cabinet the individual minister and cabinet collective vs. individual ministerial paradox collective vs. individual ministerial paradox –ministers interest in maximizing their own latitude from cabinet control –ministers interested in maximizing cabinet’s ability to direct other ministries the conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and individual ministerial responsibility the conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and individual ministerial responsibility

19. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability cabinet structure and operation cabinet structure and operation – size – cabinet committees importance and number importance and number balance between central agencies and line departments balance between central agencies and line departments – line departments – e.g. HRSDC, DFO, Agriculture – central agencies – PCO, PMO, Finance, Treasury Board role of the Deputy Minister role of the Deputy Minister – technically accountable to minister – appointed by PM receives direction from PCO receives direction from PCO