1. security breakthrough INTRODUCING hypervisor memory introspection
Bo Skeel, Chief Evangelist
@Bo_Skeel

2. Root-kit explained
A root-kit is designed to attack the kernel and hide itself at the lowest possible level.
Use cases:
Provide attacker with a backdoor
Bypass authentication and authorization mechanisms
Conceal other malware, like for instance key loggers
Use system to perform attacks on other systems
Modify boot sector, for instance to attack full disk encryption or to intercept encryption keys and passwords
Make system part of botnets that can launch denial-of-service attacks, distribute spam, conduct click fraud, etc.

3. Security trends Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs),
botnets, cyber-espionage heavily rely on:
Rootkits
Kernel exploits
0-day

4. Advanced Persistant Threat (aPT) Action-Flow
• Spear phishing
• Drive-by downloads
• Trojans
3. user-app
payload
• Code injection → Energetic Bear, Epic
Turla, Regin, Zeus, etc.
• API hooking → Dyreza, GameOver…
5. remote control of
victim
• Espionage & data
exfiltration
• Identity theft
• Sabotage
1. infection vector
2. exploit
• CVE → APT28
• CVE → Energetic Bear
• CVE → DarkHotel
4. kernel
payload
• Stealthiness & Persistence →
kernel rootkits (Necurs, TDL), bootkits

5. Why Does Advanced Malware succeed?
Common Malware
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
ISOLATION
kernel controlled

6. Why Does Advanced Malware succeed?
Common Malware
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
ISOLATION
kernel controlled

7. Why Does Advanced Malware succeed?
Common Malware
Advanced Malware
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter .
ISOLATION
kernel controlled
ISOLATION
kernel controlled

8. Why Does Advanced Malware succeed?
Common Malware
Advanced Malware
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
ISOLATION
kernel controlled
ISOLATION
kernel controlled

9. Why Does Advanced Malware succeed?
Common Malware
Advanced Malware
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
ISOLATION
kernel controlled
ISOLATION
kernel controlled
ISOLATION bypassed
Malware has control

10. Why Does Advanced Malware succeed?
Common Malware
Advanced Malware
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
ISOLATION
kernel controlled
ISOLATION
kernel controlled
ISOLATION bypassed
Malware has control

11. Why Does Advanced Malware succeed?
Common Malware
Advanced Malware
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
ISOLATION
kernel controlled
ISOLATION
kernel controlled
ISOLATION bypassed
Malware has control
Advanced attacks evade traditional in-OS security approaches

12. Why Does Advanced Malware succeed?
Security
solution

13. Why Does Advanced Malware succeed?
Security
solution ? ? ?

14. Evasive malware behavior

15. Introducing: Hypervisor memory introspection

16. What is hypervisor memory introspection?
Provide security from outside the guest OS
Not relying on OS for isolation of security services
Not exposed to advanced threats
Direct access to analyse memory of guest OS and applications
Hook memory as non-execute or non-writable using hardware extensions
Hooking & notification must be supported efficiently by CPU
Audit access by code running in guest OS
Write attempts, Execution attempts
Allow or deny attempts – decision provided by security logic

17. What is hypervisor memory introspection?
Extended Page Table (EPT) protected areas
Provide detection of alteration attempts, ensuring
protection of critical code & data
Guest VM
Physical memory space
OS kernel code
data
User mode stacks & heaps
data
Kernel driver code and data
User mode code
data
Critical kernel data
System Service Dispatch Table, Interrupt Descriptor Table, etc.
Extended Page Table (EPT) protected areas
detection of operations & events
(ex. module load, process start, paging structure change, etc.)

18. memory introspection via xen
Implementation A
Hypervisor controlled, hardware enforced
STRONG ISOLATION
dom0
Security domU
Guest VM 1
Guest VM 2
Guest VM N
Introspection
Engine
-----
policy
events
Altp2m + Vm_event Extensions part of Xen 4.6 (ongoing)
OpenXen/Citrix XenServer 4.6 (ongoing)

19. memory introspection via xen
Implementation B
Hypervisor controlled, hardware enforced
STRONG ISOLATION
dom0
Security domU
Guest VM 1
Guest VM 2
Guest VM N
Introspection
Engine
-----
policy
events
Altp2m + Vm_event Extensions part of Xen 4.6 (ongoing)
OpenXen/Citrix XenServer 4.6 (ongoing)

20. Hypervisor memory introspection Xen extensions
PATCHES SUBMITTED BY INTEL
Enables alternate EPT domains via addition of altp2m capability in Xen
HVM Hypercalls to manage altp2m without conflicting with Xen memory management for other use cases
Both, in-guest and out-of guest agents can utilize altp2m capabilities
Enable VMFUNC for in.-guest agents to switch altp2m for various usages
Report guest-specific EPT memory access events via #VE
Enabling CPU acceleration automatically if VMFUNC and #VE CPU enumerated and emulated if not available

21. Hypervisor memory introspection Xen extensions
PATCHES SUBMITTED BY BITDEFENDER
Emulate an instruction and discard the written data to prevent patching
Attach the guest state 8vCPU registers) to the memory sent
Generate VMexits for introspection-relevant Model Specific Register (MSR) accesses by the guest OS
Disable the REP prefix support in the emulator when introspecting
Deny Model Specific Register & Control Register writes by the guest
Introspection specific VMCALL support (hypercall), used when injecting an application into the guest
Support for memory content hiding (compatible with PatchGuard)
Various other clean-ups in the VM event subsystem

22. scenarios memory introspection

23. Memory introspection scenarios
Advanced Malware
Protected by
user-mode introspection
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Protected by
kernel-mode introspection
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
Hypervisor
Introspection
Engine
ISOLATION – HVMI controlled &
Enforced by hardware

24. Memory introspection scenarios
Advanced Malware
Protected by
user-mode introspection
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Protected by
kernel-mode introspection
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
Hypervisor
Introspection
Engine
ISOLATION – HVMI controlled &
Enforced by hardware

25. Memory introspection scenarios
Advanced Malware
Protected by
user-mode introspection
App 1
(office)
App 2
(Browser)
Security
solution
Protected by
kernel-mode introspection
Drivers
OS kernel
Security filter
Hypervisor
Introspection
Engine
ISOLATION – HVMI controlled &
Enforced by hardware

26. User-mode memory Introspection
Monitor user applications (such as web-browsers, Microsoft* Office, Adobe* Reader, …) for
detection of code injection
detection of function detouring
enforcement of generic Write-XOR-eXecute (W⊕X) policy
specific events, e.g. detection of malicious code unpacking
Injection of remediation tools into the guest runtime on-the-fly (no help from ‘within’ guest needed)

27. FIGHTING aPTs with hvmi
USER-MODE HVMI
• Spear phishing
• Drive-by downloads
• Trojans
3. user-app
payload
• Code injection → Energetic Bear, Epic
Turla, Zeus, etc.
• API hooking → Dyreza, GameOver…
5. remote control of
victim
• Espionage & data
exfiltration
• Identity theft
• Sabotage
KERNEL-MODE HVMI
1. infection vector
2. exploit
• CVE → APT28
• CVE → Energetic Bear
• CVE → DarkHotel
4. kernel
payload
• Stealthiness & Persistence →
kernel rootkits (Necurs, TDL), bootkits
UM HVMI is strongly isolated (enforced by hardware) and provides generic detection mechanisms

28. recorded DEMO

29. Typical questions What is the performance cost of HVMI?
Performance emulation software (LoginVSI), show performance impact of less than 2% on response time and latency.
Will HVMI make my hypervisor less stable?
Not at all. We are able to detect all memory instructions related to the hypervisor domain and are not interfering with these functions at all.

30. Whats next? memory introspection
Products will be released H1 2016:
Hypervisor protection for Xen Project, Citrix XenServer and KVM
Solution for physical computers (all operating systems) Will be delivered as a new type of hypervisor, where we are only virtualizing the CPU and the memory.

31. Thank you!