Presentation on theme: "Secure In-VM Monitoring Using Hardware Virtualization Monirul Sharif, Wenke Lee, Weidong Cui, and Andrea Lanzi Presented by Tyler Bletsch."— Presentation transcript:
Secure In-VM Monitoring Using Hardware Virtualization Monirul Sharif, Wenke Lee, Weidong Cui, and Andrea Lanzi Presented by Tyler Bletsch
2 Introduction Problem: Kernel level rootkits can kill security monitoring software Solution: Virtualization allows the monitor to live outside the VM Problem: Out-of-VM monitoring can be very expensive –Why?
3 Out-of-VM monitoring Inspection H Handler C M Monitor code D M Monitor data R Response D P Program data C P Program code K Hook D K Hook data A Adversary program
4 Problem with out-of-VM monitoring Significant performance impact –VM context switch is expensive –Introspection is hypercall-driven: expensive We want a monitor without these problems Performance guarantees: –(P1) Fast invocation: No privilege change for handlers –(P2) Data read/write at native speed: No penalty to access D M or D P
5 Solution: Secure In-VM Monitoring H Handler C M Monitor code D M Monitor data R Response D P Program data C P Program code K Hook D K Hook data A Adversary program
6 Security guarantees Run the monitor inside the VM context, but provide out-of-VM-style security guarantees: –(S1) Isolation of monitor code C M and data D M : Adversary can’t access the monitor at all –(S2) Designated point for switching into C M : There’s only point entry point (tiny attack surface) –(S3) The handler is called iff the hook is triggered: The hook calls the handler; nobody else can –(S4) Behavior of M is not maliciously alterable: No dependency on monitored data or code
7 How to achieve this? Separate address space with a one-way page table for the monitor Small entry/exit gates into this address space –Invocation checker verifies that the call is legit
8 The SIM address space SIM Data/Code The monitor itself Visible only within SIM address space Invocation checker Verifies call chain is legit Visible only in SIM space Entry/exit gates Visible in both Writable only in SIM space Tiny, well crafted Kernel code/data Not executable in SIM space (can't accidentally run insecure code)
9 Changing the address space CR3 register indicates page table directory –Hypervisor controlled To avoid hypercall, use Intel CPU's "CR3_TARGET_LIST" to freely switch between: –P_SHADOW: Process's normal space –SIM_SHADOW: Restricted SIM space
10 Entry/exit gates Only point of entry for SIM address space Entry: –Disable interrupts –Save CPU state to the stack –Switch address space –Re-disable interrupts –Switch stack to a SIM-restricted one –Run invocation checker Exit: –Restore stack, page table, CPU state –Re-enable interrupts –Jump to return point (usually the point of origin)
11 Invocation checker Obviously can't rely on stack Use CPU debug registers to track jump history Lock these registers from modification by VM
12 Security monitor Can't rely on untrusted code –No kernel functions, dynamic libraries, etc. Need to traverse kernel data structures just like the out-of-VM technique (VMI) Hardware access granted by hypervisor API
13 Performance requirements met? (P1) Fast invocation: Yes: No privilege change needed; just a page table switch (P2) Data read/write at native speed: Yes: Pages are mapped, accessed natively
14 Security requirements met? (S1) Isolation of monitor code C M and data D M : Yes: Monitor memory isn't mapped to the process space (S2) Designated point for switching into C M : Yes: Entry/exit points are the only way in (S3) The handler is called iff the hook is triggered: Yes: Hook calls handler; calls pass the invocation checker (S4) Behavior of M is not maliciously alterable: Yes: Untrusted code is non-executable in SIM space
15 Ah, but what if they... Jump into the entry gate after the interrupt disable instruction (CLI)? –It gets re-disabled again after the page table switch Switch to SIM_SHADOW directly? –The next instruction is no longer executable –But what if they do it right before a SIM page? Any page after an unallocated address is made non-executable
16 Implementation Linux KVM host, Windows XP guest To initialize from a trusted boot state, a driver: –Reserves virtual address space for entry/exit gates –Has the hypervisor construct a SIM page table –Loads the security monitor into kernel space and has the hypervisor remap it into SIM space –Informs the hypervisor of each hook and handler; hypervisor generates entry/exit routines accordingly Memory protection: –Don't check every time CR3 is changed, check new page table entries as they are created
17 Evaluation: Monitor invocation Time to enter and exit a no-op handler –SIM: 0.469 μs –Out-of-VM: 5.055 μs Factor of 10.7 improvement
18 Evaluation: Process creation monitor Hook process creation Traverse kernel data to find process name Process must be on whitelist to proceed –If not, skip and return failure Average time for process creation: –Traditional In-VM approach: 3.487 μs –SIM approach: 3.967 μs(+13.7%) –Out-of-VM approach: 28.039 μs(+690.5%)
19 Evaluation: System call tracing Make note of every system call, emit trace every 10,000 calls Macrobenchmarks from PCMark 05 suite BenchmarkBareOut-of-VM overhead SIM overhead Memory Latency10.42 MAcc/s84.58%7.97% HTML Render1.12 pg/s52.42%5.83% File Compress3.4 MB/s3.97%0.59% File Encrypt20.56 MB/s7.85%0.89% File Decrypt78.21 MB/s2.53%0.45% HDD15.29 MB/s41.68%3.74% Text Edit82.73 pg/s128.84%9.64% Average-46.10%4.15%
20 Conclusion SIM: The best of both worlds –Security of out-of-VM solution –Performance of traditional in-VM monitoring
21 Concerns Very difficult to develop monitors –No libraries –No system calls –Porting a full-fledge anti-malware package? Interrupt race condition in entry code? CLI PUSHA MOV EAX, SIM_SHADOW MOV CR3, EAX CLI MOV [P_ESP] ESP MOV ESP, [SIM_ESP] JMP INVOKATION_CHECK Address space switch Normal entry Attacker entry Interrupt now?
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