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* No duty of the engineer is important than his duty to protect the safety and well-being of the public. * We will look into Safety and Risk, We will.

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Presentation on theme: "* No duty of the engineer is important than his duty to protect the safety and well-being of the public. * We will look into Safety and Risk, We will."— Presentation transcript:

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2 * No duty of the engineer is important than his duty to protect the safety and well-being of the public. * We will look into Safety and Risk, We will also examine the nature of accidents and try to determine what the engineer’s role is in preventing accidents and ensuring the safety of the public.

3 2. Safety And Risk * The engineering codes of ethics show that engineers have a responsibility to society to produce products that are safe. * Safety should be an integral part of any engineering design.

4 3. Definitions Safety Safety : freedom from damage, injury, or risk. Risk Risk : the possibility of suffering harm or loss.

5 3.1 Safety vagueBecause to some extent, safety is a value judgment. preciseBecause in many cases we can readily distinguish a safe design from an unsafe one.

6 3.2 Risk Less riskMore risk VoluntaryInvoluntary Bad effects for short termBad effects for long term Expected probabilityUnexpected probability Bad effects ultimately reversible Bad effects ultimately can’t be reversible If there is a threshold for bad effects If there is something with a uniform exposure to risk harm is delayedharm is immediate

7 4. Engineers and Safety *As engineers, how can we be sure that our designs are safe? there are 4 criteria that must be met to help ensure a safe design. First, the minimum requirement is that a design must comply with the applicable laws. Second, an acceptable design must meet the standards of “accepted engineering practice”.

8 Third, alternative designs that are potentially safer must be explored. Fourth, the engineer must attempt to foresee potential misuses of the product by the consumer and must design to avoid these problems. *Once the product is designed, both prototypes and finished devices must be tested. This testing is not just to determine whether the product meets the specifications, It should also involve testing to see if the product is safe.

9 5. Designing for Safety *How should safety be incorporated into the engineering design process? 1. Define the problem. 2. Generate several solutions. 3. Analyze each solution to determine the pros and cons of each. 4. Test the solutions.

10 5. Select the best solution. 6. Implement the chosen solution. * The prudent and ethical thing to do is to spend as much time and expense as possible up front to engineer the design correctly so as to minimize future risk of injury and subsequent criminal or civil actions against you.

11 example on designing for safety : problem in a car 1) define the problem we found that the problem is in the heat engine 2)generate a several solutions a) change the whole engine. b) check the engine and fix the problem in it. 3) analyze each solution

12 a) changing the engine may be higher coast but its easier especially if the problem was hard to find beside changing the whole engine will be more efficient than fixing the problem. b) checking the engine and fixing it will be harder and may take high work compare to the coast difference unless the problem was easy to find and solve. 4) test the solution

13 in some cases the 2nd solution will not be applicable so we must know that too 5) select the best solution in most cases changing the whole engine will be the better way to do.

14 6. Risk-Benefit Analysis *Risk-Benefit Analysis is a technique that engineers sometimes use to help analyze risk and to determine whether a project should proceed. *This technique is similar to cost-benefit analysis. * cost-benefit analysis is tricky because it is frequently difficult to assign realistic dollar amount to altrnatives.

15 *This task is especially difficult in risk-benefit analysis because risks are much harder to quantify and more difficult to but a realistic price tag on. *This can be a useful technique if used as part of a broader analysis, but only if used objectively. *It is important to be sure that those who are taking the risks are also those who are benefiting.

16 7. Accidents *there are many ways in which accidents can be categorized and studied. One method is to group accidents in to 3 types: * Procedural accidents * Engineered accidents * Systematic accidents

17 1- procedural accidents are perhaps the most common and are the result of someone making a bad choice or not following established procedures. 2- engineered accidents are caused by flaws in the design, these are failures of materials devices that don’t perform as expected or devices that don’t perform well under all circumstances encountered. 3- systematic accidents are harder to understand and harder to control, they are characteristic of very complex technologies and the complex organization that are required to operate them.

18 8. Application Case 1 Hurricane Katrina * Katrina started a tropical depression.forming in the Caribbean on 25-8-2005. * its first landfall was in south Florida by category 5. * it moved through the gulf of Mexico by the same category. * it weakened to category 3 status before making landfall along the Louisiana and Mississippi.

19 The states of reports: *decisions made during the original design phase appear to reflect an overall pattern of engineering judgment inconsistent with that required for critical structures. *the design calculations for the 17 th street canal floodwall did not account for the possibility of a gap developing on the canal side of the floodwall as the hydraulic loading on it increased. *The potential for floodwalls to undergo large the formation was evident from a mide-1980s field test performed by the corps.

20 *Because it appears that this information never triggered an assessment of the impact that such a gap would have on the stability of the existing levee and floodwall system …. The ability of any I-wall design in new Orleans to withstand design flood level loading in unknown. *The design calculations did not account for the significantly lower shear strength of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee relative to the strength beneath the levee crest. the profession has known for decades that strengths of soft soils are significantly influenced by overburden pressure. *The stability of levees founded on soft soils remains in question……….

21 *The 17 th street canal floodwall was designed too close to the margins for a critical life-safety structure. *Levees have been built along the river to prevent flooding, often by local entities with no coordination of efforts. *Not until relatively recently was there a centralized coordination of flood control projects along the Mississippi. *This project was provided by the Army Corps of Engineers. *The result of the years of building along the river is an extensive and complex systems of levees, dams, and canals along the length of the river from Minnesota to Louisiana.

22 Case 2 The crash of Valujet flight 592 the valujet maintenance rules made it clear that when the canisters are removed a bright yellow safety cap most be installed on them to insure the explosive charge is not inadvertently set off. *tape was applied where the caps should have gone. *The canisters were placed in five cardboard boxes and left on a shelf in the hanger.

23 Firestone and Ford tire Controversy

24 Manufacturers Ford Explorer is one of the sport utility vehicles (SUV) which equipped by FORD Motors Company and provided with FIRESTONE tires. Firestone Company is a major international supplier of tires which established firstly in USA, but it had been purchased by the Japanese tires manufacturer, Bridgestone.

25 About the Problem In September 2000, Ford Motors Company began to receive reports from some countries about tires’ failure of Ford Explorer car. Most of this reports is from Brazil and Saudi Arabia, Because the temperature that the tires are subjected to can be expected to be relatively high. It is known that the tires must be designrd by engineers using modern engineering tools such as CAD software.

26 About the Problem (Cont.) In addition, Ford must be very concerted about what tires are specified for the vehicles they designed, how they are manufactured, and how they will interact with the car.

27 Problem detection and the main Controversy In May 2000, the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration contacted Ford and Firestone about the high incidence of tire failure on Ford Explorer. Ford found that several models of 15-inch Firestone tires (ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT) had very high failure rates leading the car to rollover, especially those made at Firestone's Decatur and Illinois plant.

28 Samples of Firestone tires

29 Non-ethical Points The first non-ethical problem that both Ford and Firestone had early knowledge of tread separation in Firestone Tires fitted to Ford Explorer vehicles but they aren’t tell NHTSA about that. The Lawyers have argued that both Ford and Firestone knew of the dangers but did nothing, and that specifically Ford knew that the Explorer was highly prone to rollovers, But Ford denies all of these allegations. Ford and Firestone have both blamed the other for the failures, which has led to the severing of relations between the two companies. Firestone has claimed that they have found no faults in design nor manufacture, and that failures have been caused by Ford's recommended tire pressure, In addition to the Explorer's design.

30 Story of a User with this car “ I was traveling at 35 mph on a side street in my 1998 Ford Explorer that is equipped with FIRESTONE WILDERNESS AT tires (Dot #VDHL), I suddenly realized I was sliding into three other cars. Within seconds we all became a mess of steel & plastic. Thank God no one was severely injured, but EVERYONE received plenty of bumps & bruises. I'm like everyone else, I've been trying for weeks to get Firestone to replace my tires. They've sent me letters, we've made phone calls to them, but the only response we get is “they're coming... you just have to be patience.” ” In the Next Slide there are the pictures of the user’s Car.

31 The User’s Car Pics.

32 Failed at speed of 75 MPH

33 Another Victim

34 End of Relation In a 2001 letter to Jacques Nasser, Ford Motor Company Chief Executive, John T. Lampe, Chairman / CEO of Bridgestone/Firestone, announced that Bridgestone/Firestone would no longer enter into new contracts with Ford Motor Company, effectively ending a 100-year supply relationship. A lot of Thanks

35 *Two of the supporttech mechanics marked on the paperwork that the caps had been installed and signed off on the job. *The shipping clerk rearranged the canisters placing some of them end to end in the box.added some bubble pack on top, and sealed up the boxes to this load. *He also added tires, some of them mounted on wheels and probably filled with air. *The valujet ramp agent accepted the load despite the fact that valujet was not certified to carry hazardous wastes such as empty oxygen generators.

36 *The flight copilot also looked at the load and the shipping ticket.but apparently didn’t think that there was a proplem with carrying this cargo together. *The ramp agent and the copilot decided to put the load in the forward hold,which is underneath and behind the cockpit. *The valujet ground crew placed the tires flat on the bottom of the compartment and stacked the five boxes on top of the tires. *The proper safety caps should have been installed.

37 *the safety caps were not installed on the oxygen canisters had they been packed probably, this situation might not have been a problem. *The ramp agent, who was trained to identify improper and hazardous cargo, should not have let this boxes on the airplane. *The copilot, similarly trained, should also have refused to carry this cargo.

38 *Something that generates such intense heat should not have been put in such close proximity to a tire, which burns with very acrid and thick smoke. *The cargo compartment should have had heat and smoke detectors to give the pilot advanced warning of trouble in the hold.

39 Case4:- The Collapse of Hyatt Regency kansas city walkways: Development of this hotel began in 1976 and construction was completed in 1980. In july 1981 during dance party some of the walkways on which people were standing collapsed onto the crowded atrium floor leaving 114 people dead and 185 people injured. Development of this hotel: It is initiated in 1976 by crown center corporation which hired Gillum colaco as the consulting structural engineering they put the plans and specification of the project And in 1978 the construction of the hotel began.

40 The general contractor was eldridge construction company which hired havens steel company as the sub contractor for fabrication of the atrium steel. The originally design called for walkways to be hung from rods connected to the atrium ceiling there will be tow walkways connected to each rod by separate nuts this design was very cost. Havens suggested change in design which lead to cost saving and easier fabrication. In original design each of nuts supported the weight of only one walkway but in the revised design some of the nuts support the weight of tow walkways which doubling the load.

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42 Giluim and associate claimed never have seen any of these changes Nor the eldridge contact them however drawing indicating these changes stamped by them. In 1979 during the construction parts of the roof collapsed,here were investigation repos were sent to the owners and architects assuring them that the atrium design was safe. In the wake of accident: An investigation conducted by Missouri board of architect professional ENGs and land surveyors which resulted in charges of negligence, incompetence an misconduct on the part of gallium and associates and its parent company.

43 The report indicates that the original design was marginally acceptable and didn’t conform to the Kansas city building code and the changes initiated by havens and approved by gillum made the situation worse. Gilluim and associates was also found to be negligent in its investigation of the atrium colaaose during construction and they placed too much reliance on havens. Jack gillum lost his license and gillum and associates lost its license as an engineering firm.

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47 *The ford crown victoria police interceptor was introduced in 1979 and quickly became the best choice for law Implementation agencies throughout the US. *During the late 1990’s the crown victoria police interceptor (CPVI) made up about 85% of all law enforcement vehicles with over 400,000 units in service. *But after several well-publicized accident involving fires resulting from rear-end collisions, many police department halted the purchase of the CPVI. *First, Ford adapted the Crown Victoria for use as a police vehicle and made some modification to make the vehicle suitable for police officers.

48 *But one aspect was not redesigned for police use !, which is the placement of the fuel tank. *The fuel tank was located behind the rear axle, underneath the trunk, which was in a crush zone if the vehicle is hit from behind making it more susceptible to damage. *In addition, the orientation of the tank was in proximity to bolt that protrude from the axle and the suspension. In a collision the tank can be pushed into these bolts, resulting in piercing the tank and spilling gasoline on the ground, and the gasoline often ignites, engulfing the automobile in flames. *It should be noted here that this design met all federal safety standards.

49 *According to the national highway transportation safety administration (NHTSA), from 1991 to 2001, there were 16 police deaths that resulted from Crown Victoria catching fire after being struck from behind. *And there were more complains from different states like Florida, Arizona, etc. asking ford to look into the safety of the Crown Victoria. *In 2001, ford issued a technical service bulletin that suggested some retrofitting of the vehicles, including replacing a hexagonal-shaped bolt near the gas tank with a rounder, smoother one that would less likely to pierce the tank. *Ford did not notify law enforcement agencies of this bulletin, and also expected the local police agencies to pay for these changes.

50 In 2002, a police officer in Arizona was killed in a Crown Victoria after a fire caused by a rear-end crash. after this the state of Arizona canceled a $4 million order for more CVPIs. and as a result of the negative publicity, in 2002 ford announced that it would pay to install shields around the gas tanks and redesign the car. In 2003 ford announced plans to add a fire suppression system onto new cars. unfortunately, existing CVPIs could not be retrofitted with this safety system. In 2003, these problems culminated when the national association of police organization filled a lawsuit agains ford, in addition police departments in florida, ohio, texas, alabama and new jersey have filled a lawsuit agains ford. Since then ford has worked to make the CVPI safer and less susceptible to this type of accident.

51 Also should be noted here that ford has a history of problems associated with gas tank placement in its production. In the 1970s, the ford pinto, a compact car, also had problems with a gas tank. The problems with the pinto are well documented and resulted in numerous lawsuits and huge problems for ford.`

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57 Location Idaho, U.S Construction cost $48,825,000 Height 305 feet (93 m) Length 3,100 feet (940 m) Base width 1,700 feet (520 m) Capacity 288,954,000 m 3 Build by Bureau of Reclamation [had built 300 dams, 250 of them earth fill dam] Teton dam was a conventional earth fill dam, except of the rock in the surrounding canyon walls. About Teton dam

58 Design of Teton dam The core made of compacted fine silt to impervious the flow of water 4 separate layers (Zones 2- 5) of rock and soil were laid to provide structural stability.

59 The problem: The rock was highly fractured, providing passage through which water can pass. The solution: 1. The reclamation cut trenches in the top of the canyon walls. 2. Trenches were 70 f.t deep and extended 1000 f.t into walls. 3. A series of a holes was drilled below the base and it extends 300 f.t. The problem and the solution of canyon walls

60 When the water reach the capacity for the first time, the dam failed. Panel of nongovernmental experts was performed. The panel conclude that water got through the barriers implanted in the canyon by : 1. Passing through a portion of rock that was not plugged by grout. 2. Traveling directly through cracks in the silt. The part that failed was swept downstream and destroyed so it was unavailable for analysis. The disaster

61 The panel says : “the failure was caused not because some unforeseeable fatal combination existed, But because the many combination of unfavorable circumstances inherent in the situation were not visualized, and because adequate defenses were not included in the design”. Among the finding of the panel : There was too much reliance on the grout curtain. The silt used in the core and the trench fill was of inadequate. The trenches in the canyon wall were narrow and steep. There was inadequate provision made for handling leakage. There was inadequate instrumentation to monitor condition in the dam embankment and the canyon walls. The result of failure

62 Teton dam failure - view northwest toward right abutment probably between 10:30 and 11 AM. The leak is the dark brown streak on the dam face near the gray bedrock in the left half of the photo.

63 Teton dam failure -The leak is the muddy brown streak on the dam face near the gray bedrock.

64 Teton dam failure - The hole in the dam face enlarges upward.

65 Teton dam failure - The leak hole has enlarged greatly, and erosion of the bedrock abutment intensified.

66 Teton dam failure - The dam is breached at 11:57 AM, the rush of muddy brown water is violent.

67 Teton dam failure - Water spills unchecked through the breach

68 Teton dam failure - flood waters advancing through rexburg, idaho

69 Teton dam site -that remains of the original dam is the pyramid- shaped hill. The failure occurred on the left (northwest) side of the hill, the cut on the right side was made by engineers to study the internal character of the rock material that made up the dam

70 Teton dam failure - view NW of spillway and bedrock in canyon at teton dam site

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72 Nanotechnology nanotechnology is defined by size. a nanometer is a billionth of a meter (1×10^-9) and the nanoscale ranges from 1 to 100mm. nanotechnology is design and production materials devise and systems that exploit the phenomena of the nanoscale

73 Nanotechnology many people predict that nanotechnology will lead to dramatic advances in health care including drug delivery systems bone repair diagnostic tools and therapies for cancer diabetes and other chronic diseases (A livastaos,2001).

74 Nanotechnology however nano particles also pose health and safety challenge. this concern lies in the fact that surfaces of many materials are highly reactive, whereas the bulk of the material is fairly inert.

75 Nanotechnology so even if the surface is highly reactive a large piece of the material is not particularly reactive this is no longer true when small nano-sized particles are fabricated.

76 Nanotechnology research has shown that some nanoparticle are able to penetrate living cells. medical research are attempting to exploit this property to create new ways to diagnose and cure disease.

77 Nanotechnology however nanoparticle in the environment may pose a health hazard. a nanoparticle transported through the bloodstream to cells within the body might directly attack the cell leading to new diseases.(etc group). or a nanoparticle made from material with a reactive surface might adsorp pollutants or other contaminants directly into cells within a human body.

78 Nanotechnology there are products on the market today that utilize other nanoparticles most notably cosmetics and sunscreens. While products using nanoparticles have al ready been introduced studies regarding the safety of these particles are being un dertaken at several universities and other research labs though today these studies are in their infancy.

79 Nanotechnology What is different about the ethics of nanotechnology ? in many ways there are no differences. We have the same obligation to act responsibly and professionally with nanotechnology as we do with conventional technologies many of the issues associated.

80 Nanotechnology in the past new technologies and materials have generally been introduced without regard to their ethical and societal implications however this is changing now as can be seen by the fact that government agencies funding research in nanotechnology now require that some of the money for these projects be set aside for projects designed to assess potential ethical and societal impacts of nanotechnology.

81 Cellular phones and automotive safety In October of 1993, a Ford Explorer was traveling on a county highway in Suffolk County, New York. The Explorer was equipped with a cellular phone that was mounted on the transmission hump between the front seats. while using the phone the driver took her eyes off the road. The Vehicle crossed over the center dividing line and struck an oncoming car head on.

82 What happened ?!! Three members of a family riding in the other car were severely injured and required extensive hospitalization. As a result of this accident, the victims sued the manufacturer of the cell phone, the company that made the mounting bracket for the phone, and the shop that installed the bracket and the phone.

83 The reason why ??! This case is just one of many traffic accidents that have been caused by drivers whose attention was diverted by using cellular phones were driving. (in our case the main reason is cell phones and the means of mounting them in automobiles)

84 CASE Analysis Define the problem: Using the cell phone while driving convert the attention of the driver. Many researches were done, and the results indicate that the risk of being involved in an accident is four times greater when the driver is using a cell phone.

85 Case analysis Procedural accident: The driver made a bad choice (talking through the cell during driving). Engineering accident: The design was filled with flaws (the location of the mounting).

86 What is the type of the accident in this case ?? Generate several solutions: 1) Design phones in a way so tat they can be operated hands free. 2) Change the way of mounting them.

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