1. HIST2128 Germany, 1871-1933: From Empire to Republic
Weimar‘s foreign policy,
Lecture 19
19 April 2012

2. Genoa Conference (1922)
USA & UK invited G + SU to discuss reparations & EU economic problems:
F rejected participation to avoid discussing G reparations
Separate Treaty of Rapallo between G + SU (‘the 2 outsiders’): No mutual claims from wartime + new diplomatic relations
= Strategic success of G but worsening relations with West
= Strong mistrust by F & GB vs. ‘Ghost of Rapallo’

3. Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929) Founder of the right-liberal
Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP)
(German People’s Party) (1918)
Chancellor & Foreign Minister (1923)
Foreign Minister ( )
Winner of the
Nobel Peace Prize,
together with French Foreign Minister Briand (Dec 1926)

4. Stresemann’s policy = Aimed at renewed big-power position for G
Realistic assessment of G position:
Accepted war defeat + dependence on Allies
Rejected nationalism & confrontation as harmful
Strived to convince Allies of G’s will for peace & for cooperation & for mutual understanding
Tried to have Versailles Treaty revised
= Aimed at renewed big-power position for G

5. Stresemann’s security policy
Aimed at peaceful understanding with F to end Ruhr occupation + to have Versailles Treaty revised
His secret notes to F + GB to achieve guarantee treaties on basis of given territorial situation in West
F generally positive but demanded guarantee treaty also in East (PL) →

6. Improving foreign relations
Dawes Plan & London Conference (1924)
Acceptance by French PM Herriot → evacuation of Ruhr (1925)
Signing of Locarno treaties (1925)

7. Locarno Conference (1925) German-Allied Security Conference
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee: Inviolability of G’s western borders (G, F, B, GB, I)
→ G accepted De-militarisation of Rhineland + gave up permanently Alsace-Lorraine (F) & Eupen- Malmedy (B)
Treaties of Arbitration (G with B, F, PL, CZ)
→ G vs. PL renounced border changes by force but no ‘Eastern Locarno’

8. Locarno Treaties: Results
Most important positive event in foreign politic for Europe since war (Oct 1925):
→ End of G moral & political isolation + return as leading European power with enhanced foreign policy options
→ G as permanent member of League of Nations (Sep 1926)
→ Positive repercussions for G expected too quickly but only successively

9. Treaty with Soviet Union
Strong mistrust in SU on G’s turn to West (Locarno) > Stresemann’s parallel talks > Treaty of Berlin (Apr 1926)
= Mutual neutrality in case of outside & non- provoked attack on SU or G
= Mutual non-participation in economic & financial boycotts vs. SU or G

10. Relations with Poland
No ‘Eastern Locarno’ (1925): No guarantee of G-PL borders by any power
Treaty of Berlin further pressured on PL
Stresemann’s hoped for PL’s economic & financial collapse but PL saved by F
No concessions by PL vs. G: Valuable access to Baltic + nationalist sentiments
= Eastern border still open wound for G

11. Relations with France ‘Spirit of Locarno’ as good start
Hopeful meeting of Stresemann & Briand to solve economic problems in mutual interest but rejected in both countries (Sep 1926)
Briand-Kellogg Pact (‘World Peace Act’) to outlaw aggressive wars: ca. 60 signatories ► major success of Stresemann mediating F-USA (1928)
Minor developments & general stagnation after 1928

12. Young Plan ( )
Allied proposal to replace Dawes Plan to lower burden of reparation:
Fixed final G reparations to 112 bio. $ to pay until 1988 ► 3,5% of annual BIP of G
Required lesser payments in
Ended control of G railways & finance policy
Promised to evacuate occupied G Rhineland from troops
→ Enhanced economic & financial sovereignty for G
→ Opened new perspectives for negotiating better reparation plan later
= Brought indirect & potential future advantages for G

13. Stresemann’s merits
6 years of foreign politics under difficult conditions:
Combined peace & revision policies
Paved way for peaceful alteration of post-war order + brought G out of isolation
Bettered considerably relations of G with former enemies
Achieved UK + US support
Realistic attitude & ready to accept compromises
= Improved position of G in international politics