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Security in Near Field Communication Strengths and Weaknesses
Ernst Haselsteiner, Klemens Breitfuss RFIDSec 06 July 13th, 2006
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Contents What is NFC? Threats & Countermeasures Eavesdropping
NFC Intro What is NFC? Threats & Countermeasures Eavesdropping Data Modification Man-in-the-Middle Secure Channel Key Agreement Eaves- dropping Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Conclusion
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What is NFC? Designed for short distance communication (up to 10 cm)
Contents NFC Intro Designed for short distance communication (up to 10 cm) It’s a contactless card and a contactless reader in one chip It operates at MHz It’s designed for low bandwidth (max speed is 424 kBaud) Applications aimed for are Ticketing Payment Device Pairing Eaves- dropping Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Short Range 13,56MHz RF Link Conclusion
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Some details we need to know…
Contents NFC Intro There are dedicated roles Initiator and Target Any data transfer is a message and reply pair. Eaves- dropping Data Modification Message Initiator Target Reply Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel There are dedicated modes of operation Active and Passive Active means the device generates an RF field Passive means the device uses the RF field generated by the other device Conclusion
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Some details we need to know…
Contents NFC Intro Active Passive Initiator Possible Not Possible Target Eaves- dropping Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Active Passive 106 kBaud Modified Miller, 100% ASK Manchester, 10% ASK 212 kBaud 424 kBaud Secure Channel Conclusion
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Eavesdropping Contents NFC Intro I am sorry, but NFC is not secure against eavesdropping . From how far away is it possible to eavesdrop? Depends…. RF field of sender Equipment of attacker …. Does Active versus Passive mode matter? Yes In active mode the modulation is stronger (in particular at 106 kBaud) In passive mode eavesdropping is harder Countermeasure Secure Channel Eaves- dropping Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Conclusion
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Data Modification Coded “0” Coded “1” Countermeasure Secure Channel
Contents Coded “0” Coded “1” NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Modified Miller Coding, 100% ASK Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Manchester Coding, 10% ASK Secure Channel Conclusion Countermeasure Secure Channel
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Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle Attack Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Alice Bob Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Eve Conclusion
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Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle Attack Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Message Alice Bob Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Eve Conclusion
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Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle Attack Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Message Alice Bob Data Modification Eavesdropping Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Eve Conclusion
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Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle Attack Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Message Alice Bob Data Modification Eavesdropping Man-in-the- Middle Disturb Secure Channel Eve Conclusion
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Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle Attack Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Message Alice Bob Data Modification Eavesdropping Disturb Man-in-the- Middle Eve Secure Channel Conclusion Alice detects the disturbance and stops the protocol Check for active disturbances !
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Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle Attack Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Alice Bob Data Modification Message Man-in-the- Middle Eve Secure Channel Conclusion
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Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle Attack Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Alice Bob Data Modification Message Man-in-the- Middle Eve Secure Channel Conclusion Eve cannot send to Bob, while RF field of Alice is on! Use Active – Passive connection ! Use 106 kBaud !
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Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle Attack Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Alice Bob Data Modification Message Man-in-the- Middle Eve Secure Channel Conclusion
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Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle Attack Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Alice Bob Data Modification Message Man-in-the- Middle Eve Secure Channel Conclusion Alice would receive data sent by Eve Verify answer with respect to this possible attack!
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What we have so far Eavesdropping No protection
Contents NFC Intro Eavesdropping No protection Use a Secure Channel Data Modification Use Secure Channel Man in the Middle Attack Very good protection if Alice uses 106 kBaud Alice uses Active – Passive mode Alice checks for disturbance Alice checks for suspicious answers from Bob Eaves- dropping Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Conclusion
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Secure Channel is easy…
Contents NFC Intro Standard DH Key Agreement Suffers from Man-in-the-Middle issue That’s fine with NFC, because right here NFC really provides protection ! Eaves- dropping Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Conclusion
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Secure Channel is easy…
Contents NFC Intro Standard DH Key Agreement Suffers from Man-in-the-Middle issue That’s fine with NFC, because there NFC really provides protection ! Eaves- dropping Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Eavesdropping Data Modification Man-in-the Middle Secure Channel Conclusion
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Key Agreement – An Alternative
Contents NFC Intro Eaves- dropping Alice Data Modification Bob Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Eve Conclusion
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Key Agreement – An Alternative
Contents NFC Intro Perfect in theory – Obvious to see Needs perfect synchronization between Alice and Bob Amplitude Phase Alice and Bob must actively perform this synchronization Security in practice depends on Synchronization Equipment of attacker Advantages Cheap (requires no cryptography) Extremely fast Eaves- dropping Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Conclusion
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Conclusion NFC does not provide any security by itself
Contents NFC Intro NFC does not provide any security by itself Secure Channel is required Physical properties of NFC protect against Man-in-the-Middle Establishing a Secure Channel becomes easy Eaves- dropping Data Modification Man-in-the- Middle Secure Channel Conclusion
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