Presentation on theme: "NFC Devices: Security and Privacy"— Presentation transcript:
1NFC Devices: Security and Privacy Gerald Madlmayr, Josef Langer, Christian Kantner, Josef ScharingerThe Third International Conference on Availability, Reliability and SecuritySpeaker: Wei-Lun Huang
2Outline Introduction What is NFC ? Technological aspects of NFC Threat ModelThreatsConclusion
3IntroductionNFC (Near Field Communication) is a wireless proximity communication technology.The major advantage of NFC over other wireless communication technology is simplicity.Estimations show that by 2012 there are about 180 million mobile devices equipped with this technology.
4What is NFC ? It’s a two-way communication technology based on RFID. It’s a tag, and also a reader.More point up authenticate of personal than RFID.
7Technological aspects of NFC Reader/Writer Mode (Proximity Coupling Device, PCD)This mode allow the user to retrieve additional information.Peer-to-Peer (Near Field Communication, NFC)This mode allow two NFC enabled devices to establish a bidirectional connection to exchange contacts, Bluetooth pairing information or any other kind of data.Card Emulation (Proximity Inductive Coupling Card, PICC)This mode is useful for payment and ticketing applications for example.
8Architecture of NFC integrated in a mobile device.
9Threat Model – Use cases Use of unique IDExternal mode of secure elementHandset reads external tagData exchange usingInternal mode of secure
11NFC Device Operating Modes – 2/2 Communication FlowOperation ModeCommunicationInterfaceUse case(4) Data exchange usingNFCNFC target providing dataHandset collecting dataPeer (Target)Peer (Init)ISO14443BT/WiFi-ConfigVCard transferdata exchange(5) Internal mode of secureelementSecure elements in the handsetHost Controller ApplicationInternal modeComm. channel to SEOTA provisioningTicket uploadMoney top up
12Threat Model – Components and Trust Levels Host controllerApplications can be given more trust by signing them with a code signing certificate to put them into a different security domain on the handset.NFC controllerThe communication flow between the secure elements and external readers or the host controller can be (re)routed.Secure ElementThe secure element is the only secure place in an NFC device.
13Threat Model – Assets to be protected The User’s privacy and personal information.Address book, short messages e. g.Operability of the device.Voice and data connectivity e.g.Functionality of the host controller and applications in the secure element.Payment, access e.g.Information transferred over the RF link.
14Threats Denial of Service Relay data transferred over the RF Skimming of applications in the secure elementManaging in-device securityTransactions over NFC peer linkIssues due to the fixed unique IDPhishing
15Threats - Denial of Service It is a simply way to occupy the device.Even it is a only error message, the device will still read it.Some kind of mechanism controlled by user to turn on/off of the NFC reader/write functionality.
16Threats - Relay data transferred over the RF The smart card functionality could even be relayed if the battery was removed from the device.This NFC transaction flight mode would be useful in case the device runs out of battery but the user still wants to use it for access or payment.
17Threats - Skimming of applications in the secure element Some feature allows 3rd party players also to see which other applications there are on the secure elements.This is not an issue directly related to the NFC technology but more to the smart card industry.
18Threats - Managing in-device security Applications running on the host controller need to authenticate against the secure element before a communication can be established.Use a certificate based authentication between the application running on the host and the applets in the secure element.
19Threats - Transactions over NFC peer link A plain data link with no security enables attackers to eave drop the communication and/or alter the data over the RF link.Using a certificate based authentication or Diffie - Hellman Key exchange.
20Threats - Issues due to the fixed unique ID As the unique ID is specified in the standard for anti-collision, a simple hardware like OpenPICC simulates an arbitrary ID to spoof someone’s identity.The ID can also be acquired by eaves dropping the communication between the reader and the smart card chip as it is not encrypted.This issue could be bypassed by having a random number for anti- collision as already used for NFC targets and in e-passports ,so it cannot be used for tracking or identification.
21Threats - PhishingAttackers try to mislead users by social engineering.This is a simple and inexpensive way to mislead the user.Using signatures on tags and transporters would be suitable way to overcome this issue.
22Conclusion The standardization is still ongoing. As NFC devices and services do not only rely on a handset but also on lots of different parties, security and privacy issues should be already considered on the bottom level of technology if possible.