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The Role of National Identity in Post-Soviet State Building in the Slavic Core of the CIS Lien Verpoest Institute for International and European Policy.

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Presentation on theme: "The Role of National Identity in Post-Soviet State Building in the Slavic Core of the CIS Lien Verpoest Institute for International and European Policy."— Presentation transcript:

1 The Role of National Identity in Post-Soviet State Building in the Slavic Core of the CIS Lien Verpoest Institute for International and European Policy 16 March 2006

2 Contents & Structure 1.state & nation building after 1991 2.influence of national identity on development NIS Slavic Core of CIS a)Similar background b)Ethnic similarities c)Cultural similarities  BUT: divergent development since 1991

3 Common history Russia: 17 million sq km² 20,000km state borders Montesquieu: ‘autocratic leader’ 18th and 19thC: increasingly autocratic rulers Evolution of state structure in Russian Empire Important Remarks! a.vast territory influenced state building b.‘reforms’ & autocracy hand in hand c.autocratic state structure: centralisation & bureaucratisation  Institutional immobility & state inertia

4 USSR: -anti-autocratic intentions -1930s  totalitarian state -bureaucratisation & centralisation: key issues -institutional immobility & state inertia  State & nationbuilding after 1991

5 National Identity 1.Anthony Smith - national identity: 1. historic territory or homeland 2. common myths and historical memories 3. common mass public culture 4. common legal rights and duties for all members 5. common economy with territorial mobility for all members 2. Benedict Anderson: Imagined Communities -nation = imagined political community (constructed identity) -Romanovs  ‘Great-Russianism’ -official nationalism  Russification -Soviet identity

6 Russia Reforms - reactionary streak (1993) Mid-90s: regional power re-asserting Russia’s role on international stage Putin: centralisation reforms: western democratic institutions But: Russian interpretation  power vertical

7 Ukraine state building ~ growing national consciousness 1989: Popular Movement for Perestroika in Ukraine (Rukh) mass political mobilisation regional bias in membership -majority: ethnic Ukrainians from W-Ukr & Kyiv -appeal in E &S Ukr: limited Experience of Rukh  identity in Ukraine = regionally bound 77% Ukrainian, 17.3% Russian -Western Ukraine - ethnic Ukrainians -Eastern Ukraine - ethnic Russians

8 Statebuilding: institutional confusion hybrid of old & new elements  state inertia Kuchma 1994: -Constitution -focus nationbuilding  state building Elections: identity ~ foreign policy -West Ukraine: pro-western, pro-EU -East Ukraine pro-Russian, pro-CIS Kravchuk 1991: pro-Western program Kuchma 1994: pro-Russ program Kuchma 1999: more pro-Western (EU membership goal 1998)

9 Elections 2004 Yushchenko: pro-Western -supported by US & EU -mainly supported by Western Ukraine Yanukovich:pro-Russian -openly supported by Putin -support from Eastern Ukraine country nationally & ethnically divided over presidency ‘split’ identity  Anthony Smith (historic homeland, common myths & historical memories, common mass public culture, …)

10 Belarus ! little independence before 1991 -Rahvalod dynasty (10th C) -1918 national revival: 1989 – 1993 1989: Belarusian Popular Front National identity: BPF looked West  common history with Lithuania 1991: national symbols -white-red-white flag of 1918 -coat of arms with knight (Pahonya) Problems BPF 1991-1993 discarded civic identity radical ethnic identity  alienated public failed to bridge gap to countryside unsuccessful in elections

11 State Building: Until 1994: virtually no reforms -patrimonial communism, clientelism -Council of Ministers: ‘Party of Power’ elections 1994: Lukashenka surprise winner (80.1%) opposition: ‘100 day grace period’ BUT television and independent media attacked different view on national identity -Russian -referendum

12 Referendum of May 1995

13 Referendum: major success -Soviet style Flag and coat of arms -Soviet textbooks -Russian: state language -(neo-)Soviet symbols and customs State building: referendum 1996 -term from 5 to 7 years -bicameral parliament Lukashenka: ‘last dictator of Europe’ Belarus: -‘The forgotten heart of Europe’ -‘a natural park of communism’ -the black hole of Europe’ -‘a denationalised nation’ -‘a country with a death wish’

14 National Identity in Belarus 1.Lukashenko & ruling class – Anderson’s Imagined Community official nationalism - soviet style symbols Russification Neo-Soviet identity 2. Intelligentsia and young generation: Smith’s National identity homeland/historic territory (Belarus/GDL) shared common myths (independence) common mass public culture (‘Pahonya’, ‘Nasha Niva’) common legal rights and duties for all members (Charta 97) common economy (independent Belarusian economy)

15 Influence of National Identity on State Building shift to authoritarianism  increase in incumbent capacity  regime closureshift to authoritarianism  increase in incumbent capacity  regime closure Lucan A. Way: national identity affects incumbent capacity incumbent capacity  4 criteria: 1.Level of proincumbent manipulation of election process 2.Incumbent monopolization of media 3.Opposition weakness 4.De facto executive control over parliament

16 Shift to authoritarianism – regime closure: Belarus elections manipulated independent media harassed weak opposition de facto control over parliament (1996)  highly closed regime Russia 1999: regime closure increased attacks on independent media centralisation De facto control of parliament Ukraine harrassment of opposition (Gongadze, Yushchenko) electoral manipulation (2004) No full control media or parliament But: regime change in 2004  influence national identity?

17 Anti-incumbent national identity Ukraine strong identity issues resurfaced during elections protests on Maidan Square Belarus hardly independence failed popular mobilisation neo-Soviet identity regime closure  shift to authoritarianism Russia ‘official nationalism’ national identity > success of Russian state Putin: Russia as strong economic & international player  enhanced national identity weak anti-incumbent national identity  regime closure

18 Conclusion strong anti-incumbent national identity ~ regime failure weak anti-incumbent national identity ~ regime closure Discussion elections Ukraine - Belarus -Role national identity? -Absence anti-incumbent national identity in Belarus  no change? -‘split’ national identity: implications for Yushchenko in parl elections?


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