1. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Optimisation of Radiological Protection in ICRP’s New Recommendations Stockholm, 7 December 2006 Lars-Erik Holm

2. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— The System of Radiological Protection Types of exposure situations Types of exposure Identification of the exposed individuals Source-related and individual-related assessments The three fundamental principles of protection Levels of individual dose that require protective action Safety of radiation sources Implementation

3. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Linear-no-threshold (LNT) Model … is the basis for: Averaging and summing of doses The concept of effective dose The concept of collective dose Individual dosimetry Keeping dose records

4. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— The nominal risk estimates are slightly smaller than in 1990, but in the same order of magnitude. The overall risk of 0.05 Sv -1 (0.00005 mSv -1 ) continues to be appropriate for purposes of radiological protection. Summary of Radiation Risks

5. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Principles of Protection Justification – Source related Optimization - Source related Dose limitation – Individual related

6. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Principles of Protection Justification – Source related Optimization - Source related Dose limitation – Individual related

7. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— The Principle of Optimisation of Protection In relation to any particular source, - the magnitude of individual doses, - the number of people exposed, and - the likelihood of incurring exposures where these are not certain to be received should all be kept as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic and societal factors.

8. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— The Evolution of ALARA 1954: reduce exposures to the lowest possible level 1959: keep exposures as low as practicable 1966: keep exposures as low as readily achievable economic and social considerations being taken into account 1973: keep exposures as low as reasonably achievable economic and social considerations being taken into account 1977: keep exposures as low as reasonably achievable economic and social factors being taken into account 2007: keep exposures as low as reasonably achievable economic and societal factors being taken into account

9. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— From Practices to Planned Situations ICRP is moving away from a process-based protection approach to a situation-based approach

10. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Practices and Interventions No procedural difference because in both cases, There is a maximum level of dose above which the regulator will demand action Optimisation of protection will reduce the level of dose at which action is taken No action to further reduce doses below the optimised level of protection

11. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Types of Exposure Situations Planned exposure: situations involving the planned introduction and operation of sources, incl. medical exposure of patients, decommissioning and waste disposal Emergency exposure: unexpected situations that occur during the operation of a planned situation, or from a malicious act, requiring urgent action Existing exposure: situations that already exist when a decision on control has to be taken, incl. natural background radiation and residues from past practices

12. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Reference Levels and Dose Constraints =Values above which one plans not to go, and below which one strives to reduce all actual doses Planned exposure: Dose constraint Diagnostic reference level Emergency exposure: Reference level Existing exposure: Reference level

13. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Reference Levels and Dose Constraints Apply to all situations - The value will depend on the circumstances An integral part of prospectively optimising protection at the source If a relevant constraint or reference level was not complied with - Further protection options must be considered - Not necessarily a failure of protection

14. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— The Use of Dose Constraints PLANNED EXPOSURE SITUATIONS For planned situations: a basic level of protection, less than limits Set for each source to ensure that the dose limits are not exceeded

15. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— For occupational exposure: typically set by operators or, for small companies, by regulatory authorities For public exposure: typically set by regulatory authorities For patients’ comforters and carers: typically set by the medical profession Establishing Dose Constraints PLANNED EXPOSURE SITUATIONS

16. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— The Use of Reference Levels EMERGENCY AND EXISTING EXPOSURE SITUATIONS Prospectively as a level of ambition Retrospectively for assessing the effectiveness of protection Not as a mandatory level that must be achieved

17. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Projected Dose (mSv) Characteristics and Requirements 20 - 100Exceptional situations. Benefit on a case-by-case basis. Information, training and individual monitoring of workers, assessment of public doses. 1 - 20Individual or societal benefit. Information, education and training. Individual monitoring or assessment. 0.01 - 1Societal benefit (not individual). No information, training or individual monitoring. Assessment of doses for compliance. Dose Constraints and Reference Levels Type of Exposure Situation Emergency Existing Planned

18. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Large distributions of individual exposures Often affecting places of living Sometime difficult to control (most often mainly controllable through pathways) Time is a key parameter (step by step approach) In many cases, the level of exposure is driven by individual behaviour Characteristics of Existing Situations

19. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Individual dose level Reference level No. of individuals Step 1Step 2 Step 3 Evolution of the Individual Dose Distribution with Time

20. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Publications 60 and 63 INTERVENTION and no action below ACTION LEVELS Recommend values for the AVERTED dose for SINGLE countermeasures where intervention is almost always justified: Sheltering Administration of stable iodine Evacuation Relocation Restriction to a single foodstuff ICRP 2007 OPTIMISATION below REFERENCE LEVELS Recommends an upper value of the PROJECTED dose (= reference level) received via ALL pathways below which optimisation is applied.

21. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Prospective Preparedness Retrospective Response Reference level Option A Option B Option C Select Option B Dose distribution for which planned protection strategy has been implemented Optimise Focus particular attention on this part of the dose distribution Dose distribution after further optimised protection strategies, if any, have been applied Application of Reference Levels

22. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— 1.Consider each option of a protection measure on its own merits. 2.Consider simultaneously doses that would be incurred via all exposure pathways, some subject to protective actions and some not. 3.If the total residual dose to some individuals is unacceptably high, the feasibility of additional protective measures should be considered. Optimisation Below Reference Levels

23. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Time Reference level mSv/yr Early Intermediate Late Phase 100 10 1

24. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Conclusion – Reference Levels Basically, the same approach as for constraints in planned situations: –Characterizing the exposure situation –Setting a level of ambition (reference level) –Optimizing protection taking into account the prevailing circumstances Iterative process for implementing optimisation General improvement of the quality of protection for existing and emergency situations

25. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— The System of Radiological Protection in the 2007 Recommendations Emphasizes a strong radiation safety culture through iterative review and assessment to optimise radiation doses Optimisation involves evaluating and incorporating measures that tend to lower doses to workers, the public or patients Optimisation also entails consideration of avoidance of accidents and other potential exposures

26. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Optimisation of Protection The optimisation is a forward looking iterative process aimed at preventing exposures before they occur. Optimisation is the responsibility of the operating management, subject to the requirements of the authority. An active safety culture supports the successful application of optimisation by both the operational management and by the authority.

27. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Optimisation of Protection All aspects of optimisation cannot be codified; optimisation is more an obligation of means than of results. The authority should focus on processes, procedures and judgements rather than specific outcomes. An open dialogue must be established between the authority and the operating management to ensure a successful optimisation process.

28. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Practical Implications OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT Develop and provide internal policies, priorities, rules and procedures, to Ensure the existence of a safety culture at all levels of management and the workforce COMPETENT AUTHORITIES Establish clear policies and processes for decision-making regarding the authorisation of proposed activities Regulatory requirements should include the need for an active safety culture in both authority and operating management.

29. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— TG OPIMISATION of PROTECTION The Optimisation Process Optimisation is a forward-looking iterative process aimed at preventing exposures before they occur. Evaluation of exposure situations to identify the need for action Identification of protection options Selection of the best option under the prevailing circumstances Implementation of the protection option Measurement of performances

30. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— For decision-aiding, more information is often necessary, e.g. for the workforce: Number exposed, mean dose, dose range, task-related dose, etc. When, where, how and by whom are exposures received? For decision-making, it may be reasonable to give more weight to doses that are Moderate or high Received in the near future The Collective Dose

31. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Examples of Dose Weighting

32. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— TG OPIMISATION of PROTECTION Selecting Protection Options QUANTITATIVE TOOLS Methodology and tools were developed in the 1980s to compare protection options with multi-attributes and characteristics taking into account ethical, social and economical considerations.They are still valid. ICRP warns against an application of these techniques alone.

33. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Optimisation and BAT For the control of radioactive emissions to the environment the principle of the best available technology, not entailing excessive costs (BAT), may be used. The principles of optimisation and BAT complement each other. The control of exposures in relation to health will be driven by the optimisation of estimated radiation doses.

34. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Optimisation and BAT Optimisation assumes an object of protection and a defined detriment of radiation exposure. An optimisation cannot be carried out as simply when the benefit and detriment cannot be quantified, e.g. in connection with a future release –the probability is difficult to define –the consequences for the environment cannot be quantified using the collective dose. BAT can be used to achieve a high level of protection without quantification of these parameters in greater detail.

35. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Optimisation and BAT THE CASE OF SPENT FUEL REPOSITORY The difficulty of predicting the future development of society makes optimisation difficult –We do not know what the biosphere will look like A minor release is better than a major release, even if the society which is affected is unknown. Therefore, the barrier system must be as robust as possible. Repository barriers fulfilling reasonable safety requirements can be said to meet the BAT requirement.

36. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Optimisation and BAT Protection of human health BAT  optimisationBAT  good protective capabilities and robustness Protection of the environment BAT  good protective capabilities and robustness

37. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Practical Application of Optimisation and BAT Optimisation is a tool to minimise risk using risk (or dose) calculations BAT aims to hinder, limit and delay releases as far as reasonably possible Optimisation and BAT are important regulatory (societal) tools for ensuring an attitude of doing as good as reasonably possible

38. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION —————————————————————————————————— Time Schedule December 2006: Main Commission working on final draft of the new recommendations January 2007: The draft will be put on ICRP’s website as a progress report. March 2007: Adoption of the new recommendations