1. McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Chapter 17: Public Goods and Common Resources

2. 17-2 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Objectives After studying this chapter, you will be able to:  Distinguish among private goods, public goods, and common resources  Explain how the free-rider problem arises and how the quantity of public goods is determined  Explain the tragedy of the commons and its possible solutions

3. 17-3 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia A Free Ride and a Tragedy  Why does government provide some goods and services such as the enforcement of law and national defence?  Is the quantity of government-provided services correct?  Why do common resources where everyone is free to use them result in overuse?  These are some of the questions raised in this chapter.

4. 17-4 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Classifying Goods and Resources  A good or service or a resource is:  Excludable if it is possible to prevent someone from enjoying its benefits.  Nonexcludable if it is impossible (or extremely costly) to prevent someone from benefiting from it  Rival if its use by one person decreases the quantity available for someone else  Nonrival if its use by one person does not decrease the quantity available for someone else

5. 17-5 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Classifying Goods and Resources  A Four-Fold Classification  A private good is both rival and excludable  A public good is both nonrival and nonexcludable  A common resource is rival and non-excludable. It can be used only once, but no one can be prevented from using what is available. Example: ocean fish  Marginal cost is zero when buyers can be excluded and are nonrival. Such a good or service is produced by a natural monopoly.

6. 17-6 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Four-fold Classification of Goods Figure 17.1

7. 17-7 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Classifying Goods and Resources  Two Problems of Public goods  Public goods create a free-rider problem – the absence of an incentive for people to pay for what they consume  Common resource create the tragedy of the commons – the absence of an incentive to prevent the overuse and depletion of a resource

8. 17-8 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  The Benefit of a Public Good  The value of a private good is the maximum amount that a person would pay for one more unit, which is shown by the person’s demand curve.  The value of a public good is the maximum amount that all the people are willing to pay for one more unit of it.  The total benefit of a public good to an individual is the dollar value that a person places on a given level of provision of the good.

9. 17-9 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  The economy’s marginal benefit curve for a public good is the vertical sum of each individual’s marginal benefit curve.  The demand curve for a private good, is the horizontal sum of the individual demand curves at each price.

10. 17-10 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Benefits of a Public Good 0 12 34 20 40 60 80 Lisa's Marginal Benefit 0 1234 20 40 60 80 MB L MB M Max's Marginal Benefit 5 5 Quantity (number of satellites) Marginal benefit (dollars per satellite) Quantity (number of satellites) Marginal benefit (dollars per satellite) Figure 17.2

11. 17-11 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia 20 40 60 80 100 120 Benefits of a Public Good 012345 140 Economy's Marginal Benefit MB Quantity (number of satellites) Marginal benefit (dollars per satellite) Figure 17.2(c)

12. 17-12 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  The Efficient Quantity of a Public Good  The efficient quantity of a public good is the quantity that maximises net benefit—total benefit minus total cost—which is the same as the quantity at which marginal benefit equals marginal cost.  Figure 17.3 illustrates the efficient quantity.

13. 17-13 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia 0000 14 13 2734 3963 410100 51015–5 41 32 23 14 05 The Efficient Quantity of a Public Good QuantityTotal BenefitMarginal BenefitTotal CostMarginal CostNet Benefit (number of(millions(millions of(millions(millions of dollars(millions satellites)of dollars)per satellite)of dollars)per satellite)of dollars) Table 17.3

14. 17-14 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia TB TC MC MB 0 1234 3 7 10 15 01234 2 4.0 55 The Efficient Quantity of a Public Good 2.5 Net benefit $4 billion Efficient Use of resources Total Benefit & Total CostMarginal Benefit & Marginal Cost Quantity (number of satellites) Total benefit and total cost (billions of dollars) Quantity (number of satellites) Marginal benefit (billions of dollars per satellite) Figure 17.3

15. 17-15 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  Private Provision by Market  If a private firm tried to produce and sell a public good, almost no one would buy it.  The free-rider problem results in too little of the good being produced.

16. 17-16 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  Public Provision  Government can tax all the consumers of the public good and force everyone to pay for its provision. Public provision overcomes the free-rider problem.  If two political parties compete, each is driven to propose the efficient quantity of a public good.  A party that proposes either too much or too little can be beaten by one that proposes the efficient amount, because more people vote for an increase in net benefit.

17. 17-17 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  The Principle of Minimum Differentiation  The tendency for competitors to make themselves identical to appeal to the maximum number of clients or voters

18. 17-18 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  The Role of Bureaucrats  Bureaucrats translate the choices of the politicians into programs and control the day-to-day activities that deliver public goods.

19. 17-19 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia TC Bureaucratic Overprovision 0 1234 3 7 10 15 5 TB Efficient provision Goal of public servants Quantity (number of satellites) Total benefit and total cost (billions of dollars) Figure 17.4

20. 17-20 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  Rational Ignorance  The decision not to acquire information because the cost of doing so exceeds the expected benefit.  Voters usually are ignorant about an issue unless that issue perceptively effects the voter’s income.

21. 17-21 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  Two Types of Political Equilibrium  Two types of political equilibrium—efficient and inefficient. These two types of equilibrium corresponds to two theories of government  Social interest theory.  Public choice theory

22. 17-22 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  Why Government is Large and Grows  Government grows because the demand for some public goods is income elastic.  Government might be too large because of inefficient over-provision.

23. 17-23 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Public Goods and the Free-Rider Problem  Voters Strike Back  If government grows too large relative to the value voters place on public goods, there might be a voter backlash that leads politicians to propose smaller government.  Privatisation is one way of coping with overgrown government, and is based on distinguishing between public provision and public production of public goods.

24. 17-24 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Common Resources  The Tragedy of the Commons  The tragedy of the commons is the absence of incentive to prevent the overuse and depletion of a commonly owned resource  The original tragedy of the commons has its origin in England from the 14 th century  A Tragedy of the Commons Today  Overfishing—several species of fish have seriously depleted in stock

25. 17-25 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Common Resources  Sustainable Production  Sustainable production is the rate that can be maintained indefinitely  Total Catch  The sustainable rate of production  Average Catch  This refers to the catch per boat which equals the total catch divided by the number of boats  Marginal Catch  The change in the total catch that occurs when one more boat joins the existing number

26. 17-26 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Common Resources  An Overfishing Equilibrium  Overfishing occurs because individuals boat owners consider their marginal benefit and cost, and ignore the social consequences. Figure 17.6 illustrates.

27. 17-27 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia MPB Why Overfishing Occurs 0 Boats (thousands) Sustainable catch per boat (tonnes per month) Overfishing equilibrium MC 10 0 80 60 40 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Marginal cost per boat Catch per boat Figure 17.6

28. 17-28 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Common Resources  The Efficient Use of the Commons  Its is the use of the resource that maximises its sustainable value  The value of the resource is maximised when the marginal cost of using it equals the marginal social benefit from its use  Marginal Social Benefit  The MSB of a boat is the boat’s marginal catch – the increase in the total catch that results from an additional boat

29. 17-29 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia MSB Efficient use of a Common Resource 0 Boats (thousands) Sustainable catch per boat (tonnes per month) MC 10 0 80 60 40 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Efficient use MPB Figure 17.7

30. 17-30 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Common Resources  Achieving an Efficient Outcome  Three main methods might be used to achieve the efficient use of a common resource  Property rights  Quotas  Individual transferable quotas  An individual transferable quota (ITQ) is a production limit that is assigned to an individual who is free to transfer the quota to someone else

31. 17-31 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Quota MSB Using a Quota to Allocate a Common Resource Efficiently 0 Boats (thousands) Sustainable catch per boat (tonnes per month) MC 10 0 80 60 40 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 MPB Efficient equilibrium Figure 17.8

32. 17-32 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia MC 1 Individual Transferable Quotas to Use a Common Resource Efficiently 0 Boats (thousands) Sustainable catch per boat (tonnes per month) MC 0 10 0 80 60 40 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 MPB Efficient equilibrium Market price of ITQ Figure 17.9

33. 17-33 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Common Resources  Public Choice and the Political Equilibrium  The method a society chooses for coping with a tragedy of the commons is necessarily a public choice and the outcome of a political process  Efficient Political Outcome  ITQs are examples of efficient political outcome as used by Australia and New Zealand to conserve Southern Bluefin tuna in the South Pacific Ocean  Inefficient Political Outcome  The fishing industries in other countries like the USA and Canada has successfully opposed the introduction of ITQs

34. 17-34 McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia END CHAPTER 17