1. THE COALITIONAL PRESIDENTIALISM PROJECT www.area-studies.ox.ac.uk/presidentialism October 15, 2015 The Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Svitlana Chernykh University of Oxford svitlana.chernykh@lac.ox.ac.uk

2. Outline  Evolution of the presidential debate  What do we know about coalition management already  Research objectives  Theoretical claims  Data October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 2

3.  First phase of debate: Linz’s classic arguments  Second phase: Mainwaring, Stepan/Skach, and others add party fragmentation to the mix: the “difficult combination” of presidentialism, multipartism, and stable democracy  Third phase: scholars assail the “difficult combination” argument by detailing coalition formation even in least-likely cases (Deheza, Amorim, Pereira, Altman, Zelaznik, Mejía- Acosta, Martínez-Gallardo, Zucco, etc.)  “Presidentialism can work like parliamentarism” From the “perils of presidentialism” to the coalitional approach

4.  “ Presidentialism can work like parliamentarism” (Negretto/Colomer)  Coalitional politics are the key. Presidents now conceived as formateurs.  Coalition governments almost as common under presidential as under parliamentary regimes  Presidents try to foster the emergence of legislative cartels which will defend the preferences of the executive Where is the debate now?

5. What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 5

6. What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.  The size of the president’s own party matters. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 6

7. What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.  The size of the president’s own party matters.  Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 7

8. What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.  The size of the president’s own party matters.  Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions.  The selection of non-partisan ministers (technocrats) influences governing style. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 8

9. What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.  The size of the president’s own party matters.  Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions.  The selection of non-partisan ministers (technocrats) influences governing style.  Coalitions tend to erode toward the end of the presidential term (lame-duck effect); electoral cycles matter. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 9

10. What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents  The size of the president’s own party matters  Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions.  The selection of non-partisan ministers (technocrats) influences governing style  Coalitions tend to erode toward the end of the presidential term (lame-duck effect); electoral cycles matter  The very existence of a dominant pro-presidential faction in the legislature creates a new meta-cleavage in political life, which can be described very simply as “ins versus outs” or government versus opposition October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 10

11.  Too often institutionally univariate  Too often divorced from local context  Too often ignores the role of informal institutions in presidential governance  Too prone to stake big generalizations on the experience of a single country or region (typically Latin America) Deficiencies of the current debate

12. Objectives of the Project  Uncover and analyze the tools that presidents use to create and manage coalitions in multiparty systems October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 12 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods

13. Objectives of the Project  Uncover and analyze the tools that presidents use to create and manage coalitions in multiparty systems  Assess the consequences of these tools for democratic accountability: this is the tradeoff of governability versus accountability October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 13 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods

14.  Presidents are equipped with a “toolbox” which allows them to initiate and cultivate interparty coalitions  Presidents tend to use five key tools, but in varying admixtures  These tools are imperfectly substitutable  Tradeoffs for democratization: these tools enhance presidential power, but can also erode legislative capacity, horizontal accountability, transparency, and party systems We make 4 related claims Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

15.  Agenda power: legislative powers of the president  Budgetary prerogatives: control over public spending, use of “pork”  Cabinet management: allocation of portfolios among coalition parties  Partisan powers of presidents  Informal institutions: clientelistic, paraconstitutional, and indirectly observable practices that govern executive- legislative relations The five tools in the toolbox Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

16.  Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador)  Ex-USSR (Armenia, Russia, Ukraine)  Africa (Benin, Kenya, Malawi) Cross-regional focus Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

17. Data collected Interviews Objective indicators Case studies 2 successful cases 2 failed cases Budget case study October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods

18.  350 (total) interviews with national legislators  60% members of the coalition  40% members of the opposition  Inside each group, an approximate reflection of the size of sub- groups (constituent parties)  Appropriate mix of party leaders and backbenchers Sample Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

19. The interview sample Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

20. The Questionnaire October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods 12 structured and 10 semi-structured questions 5 main categories of questions: nature of the coalitions in the country, formal and informal tools, presidential powers, personal characteristics and experiences, democracy and accountability Available in 7 languages (English, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian)

21. Preliminary Results