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Institutions: The rules of the game POLI 352A.

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Presentation on theme: "Institutions: The rules of the game POLI 352A."— Presentation transcript:

1 Institutions: The rules of the game POLI 352A

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4 What is an institution? A stable set of rules, routines, and practices that constrain actors’ behavior. Not an organization Formal vs. informal Political institutions are our focus Hard to change

5 Policy making without institutions Balance of social forces (Public opinion, interest groups) Policy choice

6 Policy making through institutions Public opinion Policy choice Interest groups Rules of the game

7 Types of political institutions: Executive-legislative relations Parliamentary system –Executive chosen by legislature –Usually strong executive –Nearly all rich democracies Presidential system –Executive directly elected –Cannot be dismissed by legislature –Legislature strong –U.S. rare OECD example Semi-presidentialism (e.g., France)

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9 Types of political institutions: Electoral rules Majority / plurality –One member per district –e.g., First-past-the-post  Small number of parties Proportional –Multiple members per district –Voters choose parties –Seats proportionate to votes  Lots of parties  Coalition governments

10 Research paper: Choosing countries and policy fields Overall task: (1.) frame a cross-national policy puzzle and (2.) explain it using theoretical tools from course Countries: –Pick two –Any advanced industrialized democracies Policy field –Any field of domestic policy

11 Research paper: Midterm exam Tell me: What are the two countries? What is the policy decision or problem both governments faced? –How much to regulate pollution –How to finance health care –Whether to ban handguns What is the main difference in the choices the two countries made? –E.g., Country A regulated/spent/taxed more than Country B –Explain in 2 or 3 sentences (how much more, in what way, etc.)

12 Institutional regimes MajoritarianProportional Parliamentary United Kingdom, Canada Netherlands, Germany, Sweden Presidential United States, France (semi) Colombia

13 Types of political institutions: Party discipline Depends on: MPs’ career incentives –Promotion –Renomination Consequences of defeating a government bill Electoral system

14 Types of political institutions: Federal vs. unitary Federal state –Strong subnational units –Legislative chamber with regional representation –E.g., Canada, U.S., Germany, Australia Unitary state –Formal power with central government –No chamber of regions –E.g., U.K., France, Ireland, Portugal

15 Institutional consequences: Likelihood of policy change Two extreme cases: United Kingdom –Very few veto points –Cabinet’s decisions likely to become law United States –Presidentialism, weak party discipline, Senate multiply veto points –Policy change much harder

16 Institutional consequences: Immergut on veto points A model paper: Sets up a cross-national puzzle –Identifies divergent outcomes Considers alternative explanations Theorizes veto points Provides evidence on veto points

17 Institutional consequences: Likelihood of policy change More veto points in a political system: The less likely policy change –Also Pierson on federalism as “joint decision traps” The less radical change So…does this mean: Less departure from median voter’s preferences? OR Greater departure from median voter’s preferences?

18 Institutional consequences: Tilting the playing field Different arenas of decision privilege different groups –Immergut example: Doctors stronger in Parliaments than in executives –Pierson example: State-level social policy strengthens business So groups try to shift the arena

19 Institutional consequences: Democratic accountability Remember inattentive voters? Centralized authority clarifies responsibility –E.g., U.K. Fragmented authority obscures responsibility –E.g., U.S.  Institutions affect voters’ capacities for democratic control

20 Lots of veto points  less policy coherence Geographic representation and weak parties  Over-representation of narrow interests Compromise  fragmentation of policy Disciplined parties without geographic bases Compromise can be sensible But may still “water-down” policy ideas Institutional consequences: Coherence of policy change

21 Institutional effects: Summary More veto points  less and less radical policy change Institutions tilt the playing field: every arena favors some interest over others Institutions make it harder or easier for voters to control representatives Institutions shape coherence of policy


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