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C HAPTER 8. The General Election: Campaign Finance and Campaign Strategy  Once the field of candidates has been narrowed through the nomination process,

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Presentation on theme: "C HAPTER 8. The General Election: Campaign Finance and Campaign Strategy  Once the field of candidates has been narrowed through the nomination process,"— Presentation transcript:

1 C HAPTER 8

2 The General Election: Campaign Finance and Campaign Strategy  Once the field of candidates has been narrowed through the nomination process, the scene of the party battle shifts to the general election  Nominations are intraparty struggles, whereas the general election is an interparty struggle that operates in a different type of political environment  In the general election competition, there is normally a higher level of citizen interest, an expanded electorate, larger campaign expenditures, and greater media exposure

3 Financing Elections  Although money is not the only critical campaign resource, without money the basics of a campaign are impossible to obtain, since it is needed to purchase a headquarters, consultants and staff, polls, media advertising, and travel  As the technology of campaigning has become more advanced and the electronic media has become an indispensable part of campaigns, campaign costs have escalated dramatically  The escalated cost of campaigns for House and Senate is shown in Table 8.1

4 Table 8.1. Average Expenditures of House and Senate Candidates, 1986-2004 Election Cycle Average Expenditure Incumbent Average Challenger Average Open Seat Average House of Representatives 1986$259,544$334,386$124,815$431,213 1988$273,380$378,544$119,621$465,466 1990$325,145$422,124$134,465$543,129 1992$409,836$594,729$167,891$439,795 1994$420,132$590,746$225,503$543,464 1996$516,219$678,556$286,582$647,336 1998$547,635$606,915$238,739$748,790 2000$594,691$774,159$295,316$1,115,100 2002$624,110$828,946$255,831$1,044,111 2004$679,320$966,038$261,029$1,407,231 Senate 1986$2,789,360$3,307,430$1,976,286$3,358,295 1988$2,802,690$3,748,126$1,820,058$2,886,383 1990$2,592,163$3,582,136$1,705,098$1,599,792 1992$2,891,488$3,850,323$1,826,251$3,004,464 1994$3,868,298$4,581,199$3,803,230$2,932,537 1996$3,550,866$4,236,694$3,139,479$3,310,759 1998$3,767,087$4,737,372$3,114,238$2,715,954 2000$5,344,611$4,346,427$2,481,378$16,542,755 2002$4,061,791$4,268,889$2,501,111$7,445,833 2004$5,209,710$6,454,615$2,352,692$7,675,294 Source: Federal Election Commission data.

5 Financing Elections  The level of campaign spending is related to the candidates’ chances of winning and the closeness of the contest  Because of the escalating cost of campaigns, the inevitable differences among candidates in their financial resources, there have been periodic demands for regulation of campaign finance  The resulting statutes have used the following methods to regulate campaign finance: 1.Public disclosure of contributions and expenditures 2.Contribution and expenditure limits 3.Public funding of campaigns

6 Public Disclosure  The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) requires that all contributions of $200 or more must be identified and all expenditures of $200 or more must be reported  Candidate Committees must also file periodic preelection reports and a final postelection report with the Federal Election Commission (FEC)  The FEC maintains an online searchable database of candidates, parties, PACs, and donors to increase the transparency of the sources of candidates’ financial support

7 Contribution and Expenditure Limits  Candidates for federal office may raise money from individuals, political action committees (PACs), and party committees: -Individual contribution limits to federal candidates were doubled after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) from $1,000 to $2,000 per campaign -PACs can give no more than $5,000 to any one candidate per campaign -Parties can give no more than $5,000 per campaign to any one candidate in House elections, and no more than $37,000 per campaign and candidate in Senate elections  In addition to direct contributions, party committees are also authorized to make coordinated expenditures on behalf of the party and its candidates (e.g. for polls, media production, and campaign consultants)

8 Figure 8.1. Political Party Contributions and Coordinated Expenditures, 1976-2004 Source: Federal Election Commission - 5 10 15 20 25 30 197619781980198219841986198819901992199419961998200020022004 Millions DemocratsRepublicans 0

9 Contribution and Expenditure Limits  Although political parties are restricted in terms of how much they may spend to support congressional and senatorial candidates, there are no overall spending limits for the candidates’ organizations  There are also no limits on how much of their own money candidates may spend  Because of concern about the growing number of successful self-financed candidates, the BCRA includes a provision which increases the contribution limits if a candidate’s opponent spends a certain amounts of his or her own money on the campaign

10 Independent Expenditures, Issue Advocacy, and Soft Money  Independent expenditures are a campaign activity that is mainly the domain of large, well-funded groups such as the NRA, or the AFL-CIO  Issue advocacy involves public advertising of a specific issue, but not directly promoting, or advocating the defeat of a specific candidate, and is not regulated by the FEC, and thus constitutes a loophole around spending limits  The FECA contained major “soft money” loopholes that enabled individuals, unions, and corporations to evade contribution limits by giving large sums to so called “party building” activities

11 The BCRA: Banning Soft Money and Regulating Issue Advocacy  In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) – the most significant campaign finance legislation since the FECA in 1974  By mandating that the national party committees could only raise and spend money subject to contribution limits, the BCRA effectively eliminated the use of soft money by the parties  Under the BCRA, labor unions or corporations may not contribute to a committee that pays for issue- advocacy advertising identifying a candidate for federal office within 30 days of a primary or within 60 days of a general election  The BCRA also requires all candidates, interest groups, and parties to include a statement of responsibility for their broadcast advertisements

12 Figure 8.2. Party Fund-Raising of Hard and Soft Money, 1992-2004 Source: Federal Election Commission 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 19921994199619982000200220041992199419961998200020022004 DemocratsRepublicans Raised (Millions) Hard MoneySoft Money

13 Political Parties after the BCRA  Given the recent dependence on soft money contributions and issue-advocacy advertisements, changes made by the BCRA threatened to undermine the health of national party organizations  Both parties responded to the BCRA by increasing their emphasis on soliciting contributions subject to limits, which led to significant increases in contributions (Figure 8.3)

14 Figure 8.3. Party Fund-Raising from Small and Large Donors, 2000 and 2004 Source: Federal Election Commission $59.49 $165.77 $91.05 $157.09 $11.04 $43.35 $12.66 $60.85 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2000200420002004 DNCRNC Amount Raised (Millions) Contributions Less Than $200Maximum Contributions

15 Political Parties after the BCRA  Given the recent dependence on soft money contributions and issue-advocacy advertisements, changes made by the BCRA threatened to undermine the health of national party organizations  Both parties responded to the BCRA by increasing their emphasis on soliciting contributions subject to limits, which led to significant increases in contributions (Figure 8.3)  The BCRA provided the parties with the ability to spend unlimitedly on behalf of their candidates  The BCRA also eliminated the transfer of large amounts of soft money from national to state parties

16 PACs and 527s  Political action committees (PACs) are a type of “political committee” with the right to solicit and accumulate funds for distribution to candidates  Prior to the 1960s PACs were largely a labor union phenomenon, but statutory changes in the 1970s spurred an explosion in the number of PACs

17 Figure 8.4. The Growth of Political Action Committees Source: Federal Election Commission

18 PACs and 527s  Political action committees (PACs) are a type of “political committee” with the right to solicit and accumulate funds for distribution to candidates  Prior to the 1960s PACs were largely a labor union phenomenon, but statutory changes in the 1970s spurred an explosion in the number of PACs  Not only the number of PACs has increased, but also their share of the escalating cost of campaigns  One of the most striking characteristics of PAC contribution patterns to House and Senate campaigns is their preference for incumbents

19 Figure 8.5. Amount of PAC Contributions to Incumbents, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidates in House and Senate Elections, 1990-2004 Source: Federal Election Commission $0.00 $50.00 $100.00 $150.00 $200.00 $250.00 $300.00 $350.00 19901992199419961998200020022004 Amount Contributed (Millions) Incumbents Open Seats Challengers

20 Figure 8.6. PAC Contributions Going to Republican and Democratic Candidates for the House and Senate, 1990- 2004 $0.00 $20.00 $40.00 $60.00 $80.00 $100.00 $120.00 $140.00 19901992199419961998200020022004 Amount Contributed (Millions) DemocratsRepublicans

21 PACs and 527s  527 committees are groups existing under section 527 of the tax code, which are tax-exempt and may engage in political activities, but cannot expressly advocate for or against candidates for federal office  Before the 2004 campaign, most 527s were tied to interest groups that also maintained PACs, but in 2004, new 527s emerged that were not necessarily tied to existing interest groups  The new 527 committees received significant funding in the form of large contributions from wealthy individuals, many of which had previously been contributors of soft money to the national parties

22 Public Financing of Elections  The FECA authorizes public funding of general election campaigns for those presidential candidates who qualify and wish to accept the federal subsidy  A candidate who accepts public funding must agree to restrict expenditures to the amount of the federal grant and forego all private fund-raising  Since the public-funding features of the FECA took effect in 1976, every major-party candidate has chosen to accept public funding of his campaign  Clearly, the use of public funding in presidential elections has tended to equalize the resources available to the Republican and Democratic parties

23 The Electoral College  The election of an American president is not a direct popular vote, but rather an indirect election process in which the voters select electors who in turn make the actual choice of a president  In designing this system, the Founders envisioned the presidential electors as a council of wise men who would render an independent judgment on the best person to hold the nation’s highest office  The founders also envisioned a nonpartisan selection process, but the contests for president early became highly partisan, where competing parties run slates of candidates for the positions of presidential electors

24 Allocation of Electoral Votes among the States  Each state’s allocation of electoral votes is determined by its total number of senators and representatives in Congress (DC is entitled 3 votes)  In every state, the candidate who receives a plurality of the state popular vote for president receives all of that state’s electoral votes (Maine and Nebraska use a different system)  To be elected president, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes in the Electoral College (i.e. 270 of the total 538 electoral votes)  If no candidate receives a majority, the winner is chosen among the three candidates who received the largest number of electoral votes by the newly elected House of Representatives

25 Electoral College Tendency to Exaggerate the Popular-Vote Margin of the Winning Candidate  In four instances, the presidential candidate who was the winner of the popular vote failed to gain a majority in the Electoral College  Most public discussion of the Electoral College has focused upon this possibility, but because it has occurred so rarely, Electoral College reform has not been of great concern, but the issue was sparked after the most recent instance – the 2000 election  The most striking example of the extent to which the margin of victory may vary was in 1980, when Reagan won 50.7% of the popular vote and 90.0% of the electoral vote (Figure 8.7)

26 Figure 8.7. Winning Candidate’s Percent of Popular and Electoral Vote, 1976-2004 Source: Office of the Federal Register. 50.1 50.7 58.9 53.4 43 49.2 47.9 50.7 55.2 90.9 97.5 79.2 68.7 70.4 50.04 53.2 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1976 Carter (Dem.) 1980 Reagan (Rep.) 1984 Reagan (Rep.) 1988 Bush (Rep.) 1992 Clinton (Dem.) 1996 Clinton (Dem.) 2000 Bush (Rep.) 2004 Bush (Rep.) Percent Percent of Popular VotePercent of Electoral Vote

27 Encouraging Two-Party Politics  The Electoral College system works to the advantage of the two major parties and to the detriment of minor parties  The combination of a winner-take-all system to determine the allocation of electoral votes and the requirement of a majority in the Electoral College makes it almost impossible for third parties to win a presidential election  Although unable to win, third parties may garner votes that may otherwise have gone to one of the major-party candidates, and may thus have a significant influence on the outcomes of elections

28 Big State versus Small State Advantages  Small states are mathematically overrepresented in the Electoral College because of their over- representation in the House and the Senate  Because of the winner-take-all system, however, it is the large, populous states that mainly benefit from the Electoral College  This means that narrow victories in large states yield a much higher return in terms of electoral votes than do large pluralities in small states (Table 8.3)  Without carrying at least some of these states it is almost impossible for a candidate to be elected

29 Table 8.3. The Impact of State Size on the Electoral College (based on 2000 census figures) State Electoral Votes Percent of Total Electoral CollegeState Electoral Votes Percent of Total Electoral College Smallest States (13) Largest States (10) Vermont30.56California5510.22 Delaware30.56Texas346.32 Montana30.56New York315.76 South Dakota30.56Florida275.02 North Dakota30.56Pennsylvania213.9 Wyoming30.56Illinois213.9 Alaska30.56Ohio203.72 Maine40.74Michigan173.16 New Hampshire40.74New Jersey152.79 Rhode Island40.74North Carolina142.6 Nevada40.74Total25547.4 Idaho40.74 Hawaii40.74 Total458.36

30 Partisan Implications: The GOP “Lock” on the Electoral College Is Picked in 1992 and 1996  In the presidential elections of 1968, 1972, and in the 1980s, Republican strength in the South and in the Mountain states led to a widespread belief that the GOP had a “lock” on the Electoral College, enabling them to focus their campaigns on competitive states  In 1988 Bush carried fourteen states with only 55 percent or less of the popular vote, and in 1992, a sufficient swing of the national sentiment away from the GOP enabled the Democrats to pick the “lock”  Although the 1992 and 1996 election shattered to notion of the GOP’s domination of the Electoral College, the South and West continued to constitute the party’s critical base of support (Figure 8.8)

31 Figure 8.8. Democratic Electoral Victories, 1992 and 1996

32 Tight Electoral College Competition in 2000 and 2004  With the Republicans winning 271 electoral votes and the Democrats 266 in 2000, the nation witnessed the closest Electoral College contest in over a century, and the 2004 election was close as well  This narrow division between the two major parties made clear that in the current era neither party has a “lock” on the Electoral College  Recent elections demonstrate that the Republican Electoral College base is the Mountain, Plains, and southern states, while the Democratic base is in the Northeast, West Coast, and industrial states of the Midwest, providing the potential for highly competitive contests for Electoral College majorities (Figure 8.9)

33 Figure 8.9. Republican Electoral College Victories, 2000 and 2004

34 Reform: Direct Popular Vote versus the Electoral College  Most of the criticism of the Electoral College has been concentrated upon the possibility that the winner of the popular vote might not win the electoral vote and on the “undemocratic” character of the winner-take-all system of allocating electoral votes  Therefore, the great appeal of proposals for direct popular vote is that such a system would assure victory to the winner of the poplar vote  One effect of switching to a direct popular vote system of election would be to reduce the current special importance of the large states, making votes equally important across states

35 Reform: Direct Popular Vote versus the Electoral College (continued)  One concern is that if a simple plurality of the popular vote is required for election, third-party candidates would still have little chance of winning  Another concern is the possibility that in a plurality system, a candidate can be elected with less than 40 percent of the vote – a solution would be to require a runoff election between the top two candidates  Such a system would greatly increase the potential influence of third parties  Another suggested reform would be a proportional allocation of a state’s electoral votes in accordance with each party’s share of the popular vote

36 The General Election Campaign  Every campaign is different, depending on several factors: -who the contending candidates are (e.g. incumbents or not) -the nature of the office being sought (executive, legislative, or judicial) -the level of government (national, state, or local) -the applicable campaign finance and election statutes -the campaign resources of the candidates -the type of nominating campaigns that were conducted -the nature of the constituency -the tenor of times (e.g. which issues are salient to voters)

37 When the Voter Decides  Most voters in presidential elections make up their minds about the candidate for whom they will vote before or during the nominating conventions  A substantial portion of the electorate does not make its decision until after the conventions, and therefore the impact of the campaign can be significant (Figure 8.10)  The one common condition that works against making campaigns decisive is the presence of a popular incumbent president

38 Figure 8.10. Percent of Voters Who Said They Decided on the Presidential Candidate They Voted for after the Conventions, 1976-2004 Source: National Election Studies. 41 31 39 47 46 30 46 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 19761980198419881992199620002004 Percent

39 Incumbency  The resources and privileges of public office tend to enable incumbents to publicize themselves  The self-advertisement efforts of incumbent members of the House in their constituencies have made them well known, and they are normally thought of in positive terms  Incumbent executives are also in a position to claim credit for all the positive things that have occurred, but may also be blamed for negative things  A further advantage of incumbency is the easy incumbents have in raising money

40 Incumbency (continued)  Normally, over 90 percent of the House incumbents gain reelection, while the reelection rate for senators is substantially lower (Figure 8.11)  House incumbents benefit from the relatively homogeneous nature of their districts when compared to the larger and more socially diverse statewide constituencies of Senators  The relatively high level of Senator defeat reflects several factors: -higher levels of interparty competition -higher levels of campaign resources put into these races -higher visibility of Senate contests

41 Figure 8.11. Percent of House and Senate Incumbents Reelected, 1952-2004

42 Majority versus Minority Party Status  Majority party candidates normally place more emphasis on partisan themes than minority party candidates  As the dominant party in terms of the electorate’s party identification since the 1930s, the Democratic Party nationally has more frequently emphasized partisan themes than the Republicans  As partisan appeals have become less effective in presidential elections, the significance in majority/minority status in determining campaign strategy has been reduced

43 Debates  Debates have now become a standard part of presidential campaigns  Presidential debates have generally worked to the advantage of the challenger candidate  Because the media tends to hype the presidential debates and give them prime time coverage, the candidates tend to see them as very important  As a general rule, the candidate who is perceived to have “won” the debate tends to improve in the polls  The history of televised debates shows that the image of the candidates is increasingly important

44 Issues  From the1930s until the 1980 election, Democratic candidates generally had a clear advantage over the Republicans when dealing with domestic issues  Following the bad economic conditions of the last years of the Carter administration, voters began to view the GOP candidate as the best for the economy  The Republicans’ traditional disadvantage on domestic issues was partially offset by an advantage they carried regarding foreign policy  This advantage was reversed in the 1976-1984 elections, when voters perceived the Democratic party to be better for peace  The public’s trust in the parties on certain issues is displayed in Figure 8.12

45 Figure 8.12. Which Party the Public Trusts to Handle Issues, May 2006 Source: The Washington Post/ABC News Poll, May 16, 2006. 61 56 54 52 50 48 46 28 33 34 23 38 34 36 34 41 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Health care Education Federal budget Gas Prices Taxes Economy Situation in Iraq Immigration Terrorism Percent DemocratsRepublicans

46 Figure 8.13. Differences between Liberal and Conservative Democrats on Social Issues, 2005 Source: The Pew Research Center, “Beyond Red vs. Blue: Republicans Divided About Role of Government - Democrats by Social and Personal Values,” May 10, 2005. 92 15 8 34 74 54 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Homosexuality should be accepted by society To be moral it is necessary to believe in God The government should do more to protect morality. Percent Agreeing Liberal DemocratsConservative Democrats

47 Candidate Image  Personal characteristics that voters believe are important tend to vary depending on the condition in which the country finds itself  There is frequent commentary about how candidates manipulate their images through skillful use of the mass media, but candidate images are not easily created and altered  During hard times, effective leadership is a valued characteristic, and other important characteristics include trustworthiness and intelligence (Figure 8.14)

48 Figure 8.14. Vote Choice of Exit Poll Respondents Based on Most Important Personal Quality, 2004 Source: National Election Poll exit survey. 87 79 70 24 9 12 20 29 75 91 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Strong LeaderTakes Clear Stand on Issues Honest/TrustworthyCares About PeopleIntelligent Percent Voting for Candidate BushKerry

49 The Role of Parties in Modern Campaigns  In the modern campaign, the candidate tends to be the focus, not the party, and candidates build a personal campaign organization  Parties do, however, matter, in that they can provide essential and timely financial support and in-kind contributions of services to candidates (Figure 8.15)

50 Figure 8.15. Candidate and National Committee Spending on 2004 Presidential Campaign Source: Thomas B. Edsall and James V. Grimaldi “On Nov. 2, GOP Got More Bang For Its Billion, Analysis Shows,” The Washington Post, December 30, 2004; Page A01. 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Expenditures (Millions) DNC RNC Bush Campaign Kerry Campaign DemocratsRepublicans Grassroots Media Administrative Fundraising Other

51 The Role of Parties in Modern Campaigns  In the modern campaign, the candidate tends to be the focus, not the party, and candidates build a personal campaign organization  Parties do, however, matter, in that they can provide essential and timely financial support and in-kind contributions of services to candidates (Figure 8.15)  A large share of candidates’ and parties’ budgets in national and statewide races is devoted to TV ads, often featuring harsh criticism of the opponent, and it is usually parties and interest groups who run the most negative ads (Figure 8.16)

52 Figure 8.16. Percent of Advertising That Was Positive in Tone by Sponsor, 2000 and 2004 Source: Michael M. Franz, Joel Rivlin, and Kenneth Goldstein, “Much More of the Same: Television Advertising Pre- and Post- BCRA,” in The Election After Reform: Money, Politics, and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,, edited by Michael Malbin. 64.8 43.6 37.2 8.6 0 7.5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 20002004 Percent Positive Candidate AdsParty AdsInterest Group Ads

53 The Role of Parties in Modern Campaigns (continued)  Parties are often instrumental in funding targeted appeals, such as direct mail, during campaigns  Direct mail can also be used as part of larger mobilization efforts (get-out-the-vote efforts), and parties tend to focus particular attention to these as they tend to aid all of the party’s candidates  In attempting to mobilize voters, the parties use a two-step process: finding those who needed to be mobilized, and then contacting potential supporters to encourage them to vote  These efforts have increased markedly (Figure 8.17)

54 Figure 8.17. Percent of Citizens Reporting That They Were Contacted by the Parties, 1972-2004 Source: National Election Studies. 23 28 30 24 31 24 25 24 19 20 25 26 27 35 41 43 29 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 19721974197619781980198219841986198819901992199419961998200020022004 Percent Contacted by Party

55 Election Outcomes  Elections are a culmination of candidates’ campaigns and voters’ decisions, and they are played out as contests for specific offices, in different constituencies, at various times, and therefore combine to produce diverse election outcomes  Despite the fact that Democrats have enjoyed a substantial advantage in party identification for most of the period from 1956 to 2004, the Republicans have been most successful in winning the presidency (Figure 8.18)

56 Figure 8.18. Republican and Democratic Percentage of Popular Vote for President, 1956-2004 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2006.

57 Election Outcomes (continued)  Whatever advantages the Republicans may have had in presidential contests had been substantially offset by Democratic domination of the Congress  The most significant change in regional voting patterns during the second half of the 20 th century was southern realignment (Figure 8.19)

58 Figure 8.19. Democratic and Republican Party Share of Southern Congressional Delegation, 1966-2000 Source: Results of House elections, by party, 1928–2000. (2001). In J. L. Moore, J. P. Preimesberger, & D. R. Tarr (Eds.), Guide to U.S. elections (Vol. 2). Washington: CQ Press.

59 Election Outcomes (continued)  Whatever advantages the Republicans may have had in presidential contests had been substantially offset by Democratic domination of the Congress  The most significant change in regional voting patterns during the second half of the 20 th century was southern realignment (Figure 8.19)  Another phenomenon that has had an impact on Congressional election outcomes is the process of redistricting, since redistricting plans in most cases address the goals of protecting incumbents and gaining a partisan advantage

60 Election Outcomes (continued)  Despite setbacks in presidential politics, the Democratic Party dominated gubernatorial and state legislative elections during most of the Post-World War II era (Figure 8.20)

61 Figure 8.20. Percentage of State Legislatures under Democratic, Republican, and Split Control, 1956-2004 Source: National Conference of State Legislatures.

62 Election Outcomes (continued)  Despite setbacks in presidential politics, the Democratic Party dominated gubernatorial and state legislative elections during most of the Post-World War II era (Figure 8.20)  As part of the 1970s movement to reform state legislatures, salaries were increased, along with a greater professionalization of the legislatures  The greater professionalization lead to both a greater competition for office, and to an increased incumbency advantage

63 The 2006 Midterm Elections  While congressional elections typically revolve around local issues unique to each district and state, occasionally these elections take on a more nationalized character  The 2006 midterm elections were, similar to the 1994 midterm elections, a referendum on the party controlling the presidency and both chambers of Congress  As a result of factors such as the popular disapproval of the Iraq War, Bush’s low approval ratings, and a scandal involving Republican Majority Leader Tom DeLay, Democratic candidates fared particularly well among independents in 2006


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