1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis of EUROCONTROL Concept of Operations 2011 using the FAST method European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation presented by Alexander Krastev EUROCONTROL Safety R & D seminar 25 – 27 October, Barcelona

2. Acknowledgments Ian Ramsay, EUROCONTROL Jacques Beaufays, EUROCONTROL Jose Varela, EUROCONTROL Jos Kuijper, EUROCONTROL Randall De Garis, EUROCONTROL Brian Smith, FAST Michel Masson, FAST Rudi den Hertog, FAST

3. Content Safety assessment of future concepts The FAST and the FAST methodology Eurocontrol Concept of Operations for 2011 ConOps 2011 hazard analysis using FAST methodology Main Findings Safety R & D needs Conclusions

4. Safety Assessment of Future Concepts Key Questions New operational concepts developed in response to the forecasted traffic growth Are the new concepts inherently safe? Do the new concepts bring the required safety improvement? How do concept changes impact on safety of operations? Will SESAR Operational Concept achieve the safety target for 2020?

5. Safety Assessment of Future Concepts Difficulties Concepts descriptions limited to the ideal world Level of detail of available description not sufficient Need for out of box thinking Complex task that requires: Integrated view of changes across all aviation domains Due consideration of interactions and interdependencies Suitable methodology

6. The Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) FAST established in 1999 by the JSSI Steering Group Objective: Develop and implement methods and processes to support the systematic identification and resolution of future hazards in the aviation system All major aviation stakeholder groups and organisations represented FAST developed a prognostic method for future hazards identification

7. The FAST Method The global Air-Ground-Space system considered as a system of systems Focus on the prognostic time domain Augments existing hazard identification techniques Concept of Areas of Change at the core AoC list: 192 entries grouped in 11 categories, e.g. AC_11 Proliferation of heterogeneous aircraft with widely-varying equipment and capabilities FAST handbook available at: http://fast.jrc.it/

8. FAST Core Team Responsibility Commission Expert Teams Advocate the FAST Philosophy Guide FAST Facilitators Customer/ Stakeholder Responsibility Expert Team Responsibility Enhance the FAST Method 3. Assemble an Expert Team 1. Responsible Party Proposes Change(s) to Global Aviation System; recognizes need for systematic prediction of hazard(s) associated with changes and need to design potential hazards out of system or avoid or mitigate hazard(s) 4. Understand Customer Requirements and Future of Interest 10. Inform FAST & Customers Regarding results 2. Define Scope of Expert Team Hazard- Identification Study 9. Formulate Recommendations & Identify Watch Items 8. (optional) Identify Mitigations & Effects of Areas of Change on Mitigations 7. Enrich Hazards by Evaluating Interactions with Areas of Change 5. (optional) Identify Intrinsic Hazards Within Future of Interest 6. Identify Areas of Change Pertinent to Future of Interest Enhance and/or Modify Planned Changes Maintain Futures & Watch Items Maintain Areas of Change Repository The FAST Process

9. Concept of Operations 2011 Description of the ATM System in 2011 - the Main Changes The ATM Components, OIs and System Enablers The ATM Operational Model The Key Enablers – SWIM, the Network Operations Plan and Collaborative Decision Making The Principles of the Layered Planning Process High-Level System Capabilities Business Impact Statements Annexes The Actors – Roles and Responsibilities Operational Scenarios and Use cases ConOps 2011 Content Air Traffic Flow & Capacity Management Airspace Organisation & Management Airspace User Operations Airport Operations Information Management & Services Separation Assurance Synchronisation

10. ConOps 2011 The Change Directions The ConOps 2011 defines the main change directions for the evolution of European ATM: Gate to Gate Flight Management Enhanced Flexibility & Efficiency Responsive Capacity Management to meet Demand Collaborative Airspace Management Extended Levels of Automation & Communication System Wide Information Management Collaborative Decision-Making

11. ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis Objectives Establish a comprehensive list of hazards that may be generated by the implementation of ConOps 2011 Identify hazards which may have a critical impact on ATM safety Validate the applicability of FAST method to assessments of future ATM concepts

12. ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis Approach All FAST process steps covered except Formulate recommendations and identify Watch Items Tailored briefing packs for more efficient preparation Two workshops held (6-9 June and 17-20 July 2006) Excellent mix of expertise in the Expert team Hazard identification performed by teams in break-out sessions lead by facilitators

13. ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis WS 1 Focus Teams analysed ConOps 2011 from three perspectives: AOM / ATFCM ATC and Airport Operations Airspace Users Operations The three phases of the layered planning process addressed strategic pre-tactical tactical Nominal (G2G) Operational scenario used to enrich hazard log Output: ConOps/Scenario related hazard log Network Operations Plan

14. ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis WS 2 Focus Three non-nominal scenarios used for hazard identification Scenario based team composition Brainstorming session for identification of potential mitigation means WS output: Scenario related hazard logs List of safety issues for further study and analysis Oh God, please help me see the future!

15. Main Findings The main ConOps 2011 concept elements could bring a significant safety benefit Need of a balanced and safe in terms of frequency and complexity process of dynamic airspace changes Diversity of aircraft equipment and capabilities is an important safety challenge Safety aspects of human tasks automation deserve particular attention and efforts

16. Safety R&D Aspects (1) Safety issuesR & D needs Design and real time control of complex distributed system with multiple actors Safety related architecture and functionality, integrity and security requirements and procedures for a G2G information management system for ATM Dynamic changes to ATM system components and environment of operation Degree of flexibility that can be safely accommodated by the future ATM system Diversity of systems and aircraft capabilities and performances Principles and requirements for safe transition planning

17. Safety R&D Aspects (2) Safety issuesR & D needs Automation and Human machine interaction Human reliability and performance limitations in operation of systems with different degree of automation: ranging from limited system support to automated decision making. Impact of reallocation of safety roles and responsibilities Assessment methods for advanced Human computer interaction

18. Safety R&D Aspects (3) Safety issuesR & D needs Consistency of planned changes, new concepts and supporting technologies Develop method for integration of safety assessments (safety cases) performed on specific planned changes and concept elements Proactive safety management in early stages of concept development. Safety afforded highest priority in ATM system planning and development Develop efficient mechanism for delivery of safety recommendations to concept designers enabling the shift from technology driven to safety driven automation

19. Safety R&D Aspects (4) Safety issuesR & D needs Proactive safety management in early stages of concept development Improved methodologies for safety assessment of future operational concepts Ensure the achievement of the overall safety target for 2020 Assess innovative SESAR Operational Concept components, e.g. new separation provision techniques

20. Conclusions Methodology Objectives largely met - benefits of safety assessment of operational concepts demonstrated Involvement of all ATM actors is essential: allowing for synergies and shared knowledge Use of operational scenarios considered essential FAST method can be used for safety analysis of future concepts; some fine tuning still needed

21. Conclusions Benefits/Limitations of Concept Assessments Anticipate safety issues right from the concept definition phase Validation of new concepts from safety perspective Source of recommendations for further analysis and research Enable risk informed decision making in the planning and development phases BUT, there are also limitations: Non-linear increase of uncertainties with time New or modified hazards may emerge from specific implementation High level of abstraction

22. Thank you very much for your attention! … possibly a safe option for the future