1. Peace Support Operations
The Canadian Forces
and
Peace Support Operations
Good morning. I’m Col Paul Morneault, Canadian Defence Attache to Malaysia. I am giving this pesentation on behalf of Mike Hanrahan, Director of Peacekeeping Policy, at Canada’s Department of National Defence.
The role of the Directorate of Peacekeeping Policy is:
to develop defence policy related to peacePaul support operations – except those led by NATO -- ; for military support to humanitarian operations; and for defence relations with countries in Africa and the Middle East.
Thus, the responsibilities of our directorate include peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, human security, civil-military cooperation, policy input to rules of engagement and joint Standard Operating Procedures, and interdepartmental / whole of government cooperation.
I’m here to describe Canada’s military experience with peace support operations, past and present.
Colonel Paul Morneault on behalf of Col Mike Hanrahan
Director of Peacekeeping Policy
Department of National Defence
March, 2007

2. Legacy of the 1990’s Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica (Bosnia)
Brahimi Panel Report
Need for robust, cohesive units
Enhanced UNNY thru Situation Centre, Mission Planning and Force Generation Services, Best Practices Unit
Greater roles of civilian experts and gender considerations
Strategic Deployment Stocks and pre-commitment authority
-Experiences during the 1990’s  the perceived failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia frequently cited
-Important lessons for UN peacekeeping operations. Most significant: the 1999 assessments of the failure of the UN to prevent or halt the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. Generated sufficient political will for a much larger assessment of UN’s overall approach to peacekeeping.
-2000: Kofi Annan established the Panel on UN Peace Operations, or the Brahimi Panel. The Brahimi Panel report proposed a change in how the organisation approached peacekeeping and a wide range of reforms to the UN Secretariat.
-These reforms have already had a significant impact on the ability of the organisation to undertake and manage peacekeeping operations.
-UNDPKO can now draw upon a fully functioning Situation Centre, Mission Planning Service, Force Generation Service and learn from its Best Practices Unit.
-More attention to the roles of civilian police, civilian experts and gender considerations in PSOs and post-conflict reconstruction.
-A Strategic Deployment Stocks depot has been established in Brindisi, Italy to ensure that the right equipment is available at the outset of a mission.

3. Peace Support Operations
Global Threats
Transnational actors
Armed
Non-State Actors
Peace Support Operations
-The New Security Framework:
-At this beginning of 21st century, new global security framework is characterized by conflicts and actors that impact not only local regional security but security inside countries abroad. Afghanistan is a very good example of this phenomenon.
-There has been an increase in: the number of “fragile” or “failing” states; concerns about the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons; intractable conflicts in certain “hot spots”; the targeting of civilians; and the spread of global terrorism and trans-national criminal activity.
- Overall, the challenges inherent in today’s security situation often require a response far in excess of the traditional “peacekeeping” mission, which has had an impact upon associated planning and training activities.
Information Security
Fragile States

4. A Growth Industry More missions and more intra-state conflict
1991 to 1996: 24 new PSO missions established
Preceding 43 years total: 18 missions
2006: 19 UN non-UN Military & Observer missions
UN Peacekeepers:
12,500 in 1995; ,000 in 2006
All peacekeepers UN, other (excl Iraq):
120,000
110 UN troop/police contributors today
Top 10 TCCs provide 78% of UN requirements .
-UN missions today includes those in Haiti, DRC, Cote D’Ivoire, Cyprus, the Middle East, Georgia, Sudan (UNMIS) etc
-Non-UN ones include, inter alia: AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan); the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA); the NATO Kosovar Force (KFOR); NATO ISAF (Afghanistan); the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands, etc.
-Top 10 include, in order: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Jordan, Nepal, Ghana, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa

5. Peace Operations = Complexity
Mandates with over 90 tasks
Diversity in skills required to do human rights, DDR, rule of law, etc.
Mission “integration”
Expensive due to size of missions
More troop contributors demand standards
National caveats decrease effectiveness
-There has been a dramatic increase in complexity: more complex mandates, where the mission and its actors are expected to do many more things than observe – they might enforce UNSCRs by force; they may be involved in training and SSR; in DDR and governance; and so on.
-This requires more expertise, more types of actors: military now work with police, and other experts that may include administrators; judges; a variety of policy advisors; child protection experts; mediators; and infrastructure managers.
-And it requires approaches that are very closely coordinated: for UN PSOs this has led to the evolution of “integrated” missions, where the military and civilian aspects are coordinated by a single actor (SRSG) responsible for all aspects. In Canada, this approach has been called “3D” or “whole of government”.
-Increased complexity, often increased numbers of troops and other actors, and sometimes increased length of commitment = more $$
-And changes in who is participating: 7% of UN forces of late have come from the developed world. Recent EU contributions to the expanded UNIFIL in Lebanon will adjust the proportion – but it should be noted the EU extracted significant command and control concessions from the UN before agreeing.
-And we have seen this also as a trend – and not just in UN operations: in the face of this complexity, and the need for support from domestic populations, means governments dictate more and more as to what their national contingents can or cannot do in a PSO. This can impact operational effectiveness and efficiency

6. New Peacekeeping Partners
                                                               
NATO (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan)
OSCE (Balkans, Caucasus)
EU (Bosnia, DRC Ituri and elections)
ECOWAS (Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire)
AU (Burundi, Darfur)
Coalitions of the Willing:
Australian (INTERFET)
UK (Sierra Leone)
France (Cote d’Ivoire)
US (Liberia, Haiti)
-This slide depicts some of the different regional organisations that have become involved in either the military end of peacekeeping or are participating in the wider arena of peace support operations
-Despite the evolution of UN PSOs and the success in implementing many of the UN reforms, the confidence of Western nations in the ability of the UN to undertake difficult peacekeeping missions has not been fully restored. So we see the following initiatives:
- NATO assumed a role in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords, ending UNPROFOR in 1996, and now in Afghanistan.
- The noteworthy success of the Australian-led International Force in East Timor
- The deployment of British paratroopers in July 2000 to reinforce the UN mission in Sierra Leone (the UK refused to have their troops placed under UN command).
-The Economic Community of West African States and ECOMOG: roles in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire.
-The emerging role of the African Union
-The shift towards regional organisations and coalitions of the willing is a trend that has been adopted and reinforced by the UN itself.
-The UN is increasingly relying upon these to undertake very difficult missions requiring robust and coherent responses. E.g. The deployment of French forces to the Ivory Coast and to the EU-led mission in Bunia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the call by Kofi Annan for the US to intervene in Liberia reflect this trend.

7. Foreign Policy Context
-Canadian policy as it relates to peacekeeping has developed in new directions to keep pace with the changing global conditions
-As a matter of general foreign policy, the GoC would prefer international peace and security be pursued through multilateral co-operation, rather than unilateral action.
-Although Canada has been involved in peace operations with non-United Nations organisations such as NATO, Canada believes that the United Nations is the only international organisation with the charter authority to promote peace and security throughout the world.
-That said, Canada will make an assessment of what Peace Support mechanism – UN or other -- would be the best for the mission, while making its decisions about how and whether to participate.
Multilateral rather than unilateral
Peacekeeping is fundamental to the principle of collective security
“All of government”

8. Range of Tools Development aid Confidence building measures
Good governance, assistance
Control / Reform of the security forces
Preventive diplomacy
Sanctions, Control of weapons flows, Embargoes
Police contributions
Military personnel, equipment, training
-To state the obvious, in promoting stabilization, security and peace the military is only one instrument of national power the Government has at its disposal, and often applied where others have failed.
-Many of these might be a part of a PSO.
-This list of tools are not mutually exclusive, and are often combined in a 3-D or integrated approach. The military might help out in some of the areas, such as in provision of assistance to train or reform other security forces.
I am here to speak mainly from the perspective of Canada’s military contributions

9. Defence Policy The Canadian Defence Policy Key Tenets:
World is highly unstable and unpredictable
Canadian Forces mandate:
(a) protect Canadians; (b) defend North America with US; and (c) contribute to international peace and security
Maintenance of multi-purpose, combat-
capable maritime, land and air forces
Terrorism, “fragile/failing” states key challenges
All of government interaction
Increasing military professionalism world-wide
- Recognizes the instability of the international security environment and that we may not know today what threats we may face in the future.
The key roles to be performed by the Canadian Forces
A focus on multilateral cooperation – the UN and NATO for example, and on occasion, coalitions of the willing with like-minded states.
- The need for modern, combat-capable maritime, land and air forces. We won’t replicate every function of militaries but the task of restoring order to a war zone requires armed forces with substantial capabilities.
- Recognizes that we have left the old concepts of traditional peacekeeping behind – they’ve been replaced by much more complex and potentially dangerous peace support missions.
Underscores how DND works with other national agencies and departments in a number of fields – fisheries, counter-narcotics, overseas.
-An increased emphasis on military training assistance. The idea behind this is to assist other countries, which may not have the kind of professional military that Canada has, develop their professional skills and increase their capacity to undertake peace support operations. This in turn, will hopefully increase the number of troops available for peace support operations worldwide.

10. Pers depl with our allies - 15
CF DEPLOYED STRENGTH
Effective 20 Nov 06
NORTH AMERICA
4 PERS
EUROPE
321 PERS
MIDDLE EAST
546 PERS
ASIA
2009 PERS
CARIBBEAN
4 PERS
Asia:  This number will be taken from the Op ATHENA - Pers Summary (Under the Mission Maple Leaf.  Take the TFA Pers state, TFA Strength Total – TSE Strength Total = Asia number
Middle East: This number is the Deployed Establishment of all Middle East Mission + TSE Strength Total
Remainder: These numbers will remain the Deployed Establishment numbers.
SOUTH AMERICA
0 PERS
AFRICA
64 PERS
OUTCAN
Pers depl with our allies - 15
TOTAL: 2948

11. Campaign Assessment Framework
Determinants
Evaluation
ANDS
Afghanistan Compact
Whole-of-Gov’t Assessment
Measures of
Effectiveness
Canada Strategy
CF Campaign Plan
Campaign assessment is also a complex process because the same nexus of determinants contribute to the evaluation process.
CF campaign benchmarks were derived from benchmarks identified in the Afghan National Development Strategy and the Afghanistan Compact, which identified key Government of Afghanistan goals along the governance, development, and security lines of operation. Additionally, the Joint Coalition Monitoring Board (Kabul-based) also articulated a matrix of indicators for use at the strategic level. These benchmarks and indicators, in turn, were used to develop measures of effectiveness and measures of performance for use at the operational and tactical levels respectively to provide an evaluation tool for commanders at all levels.
Evaluation at the tactical level is, for the most part, objectively based on measurable performance: number of patrols, number of schools built, et cetera. At the operational and strategic level, there is a more subjective assessment that seeks to aggregate the objective performance indicators to answer the “so what?” question. Here, the Commander’s use of the operational art allows for an interpretation of data from the tactical level to report on overall campaign progress and to make campaign adjustments, as required, to achieve strategic objectives. 3D partners contribute to this evaluation process, especially where they have resident expertise (such as in the development line of operation).
Trend analysis is an important tool in the assessment process, as is an appreciation of the cyclical nature of operations in the Afghanistan theatre. As well, providing some predictive capability is also useful. Knowing, for example, that an operation is being planned that will put pressure on the Taliban likely means that an objective increase in the number of small arms fire exchanges is probable. In other words, an increase in small arms fire exchanges need not necessarily lead to the conclusion that insecurity is rising – it may instead be indicative of the effectiveness of the operation.
NATO OPLANs
Progress Reporting
Campaign Adjustment
RC (S) Campaign Plan

12. Strategic Lines of Operations 3D Approach – One Equal Team
To strengthen and enhance the architecture of governance, in cooperation with Canadian governmental departments as well as international organizations.
To facilitate the delivery of programs and projects in support of the economic recovery and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Focusing on supporting Canadian governmental organizations, and NGOs whose efforts meet our national objectives.
To conduct full spectrum operations in support of Afghan National Security Forces in order to create an environment which is secure and conducive to the improvement of Afghan life.
GOVERNANCE
DEVELOPMENT
SECURITY

13. Canadian Forces Campaign Plan
CDS INTENT
The CF commitment to Afghanistan is all about helping Afghans: help them move towards self-sufficiency in security, stabilize their country, develop their government and build a better future for their children. Our commitment, as part of a wider Government of Canada and International Community commitments, will aim to achieve effects at three levels: at the national level, by providing mentoring and advisory capabilities; at the regional level, by taking the lead of the multinational brigade; and provincially in Kandahar, by providing a robust battle group and a capable Provincial Reconstruction Team.
The CF Campaign Plan was developed in consultation with DFAIT and CIDA, and draws its main direction from the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the Afghanistan Compact, and the Government of Canada Country Strategy for Afghanistan. It is also influenced by Allied OPLANS such as SACEUR’s OPLAN
The Campaign Plan identifies Lines of Operation and Decisive Points that must be achieved if we are to realize our goal of Afghanistan rejoining the International Community. Broadly speaking, the lines can be called Security, Governance, and Development.
We have thus far achieved NATO Stage III expansion, in which RC (S) shifted from an Operation Enduring Freedom (US-led) effort to a NATO (ISAF-led) endeavour. NATO Stage IV expansion will complete the process of CFC-A and ISAF merger, and will see a shift in emphasis from kinetic to non-kinetic (that is, governance and development) operations.
Security. Eliminate or significantly reduce the operational capability of opposing military forces and their support by the local population. Support Government of Afghanistan’s security forces’ capability to maintain a secure environment.
Governance. Support the Government of Afghanistan’s capability to address its people’s needs and enforce the rule of law throughout its territory whilst reducing illicit trade.
Development. Support the Government of Afghanistan’s capability to reduce poverty, create a viable economy, and address the infrastructure and social priorities of government authorities at all levels.

14. Theatre Support Element (TSE)
TAJIKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
Strategic Advisory Team
CA Afghan National Training Centre (ANTC)
ISAF & CSTC-A Staff Officers
NSE Det (Kabul)
MAZAR-E
SHARIF
Theatre Support Element (TSE)
BAGRAM
AFLD
KABUL
JALALABAD
HERAT
IRAN
KHOWST
AFGHANISTAN
ISLAMABAD
Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-AFG)
1 RCR BG
Provincial Reconstruction Team
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
KANDAHAR
PAKISTAN
INDIA

15. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
A civil-military organisation, task organised to the province.
The Canadian PRT will conduct interdepartmental operations to assist the Government of Afghanistan in extending its authority in order to facilitate the development of a stable, secure environment in the province of Kandahar.
Personnel from MoD, MFA & Development, Police, Corrections (soon) agencies
I mentioned earlier that the PRT in Kandahar represented the operationalization of the ‘whole of government’ approach.
The Canadian PRT includes CF personnel – secure environment
-Foreign Affairs personnel – governance, diplomatic relations with local governing structures and pesonnel
-Canadian International Development Agency personnel – aid projects, includin a particular focus on promoting a secure environment conducive to long-term development: justice reform, police reform, counter-narcotics, the reintegration of disarmed soldiers, community outreach, peacebuilding efforts and conflict resolution.
-The Royal Canadian Mounted Police – Afghan National Police training
-So far, an assessment visit from Corrections Canada, looking at the prison in the region.
-Also hosts development personnel from other national aid agencies
-The military component responds to the military chain of command; civilian components to their national headquarters. While this creates separate CoC on paper, on the ground both the military and civilian elements work together to advance the GoC country strategy and the Afganistan Compact/Natl Devt Strat
-While ‘whole of gov’t’ results in a number of challenges, the need for coherent, integrated action means we must learn lessons to improve our effectiveness together.

16. Afghanistan Today Current Perspective Challenges in Afghanistan
Whole of Government Approach (3D)
Coalition Operations with Canada in the Lead
All about support to GoA and the Afghan People
Challenges in Afghanistan
Classic Counter-Insurgency Op
Insurgents adapt
Takes time
Can’t do it alone
Partnering
Canadian Forces
Best Equipped in Afghanistan
Well Trained
Well Led

17. Trends -Lack of robustness Mechanism Government Security
United Nations
-Legitimacy
-Cost sharing
-Reimbursement
-Lack of robustness
-Slow deployment
Alliances
-Multinational but restricted charters
-Long-term commitment
-Cost-sharing, high over time
-Rapid Response
-Interoperability
-Crisis planning
-Trusted partners
Coalitions
-Immediate response
-Short duration
-Modest total cost
-Ad hoc
-Strong lead nation
-Not sustainable over time
Capacity
Building
-Total control over activity
-Controllable cost over time
-Small investment of specialists
[North America Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)]
We come back to this slide. Remind: 4 types PSO mechanisms, with own strengths
-The UN offers legitimacy as a UNSC decision represents 192 states; and the assessed contributions reduce individual costs. However, the UN still normally only engages when there is peace to keep, even though it has adapted based on the new environment and lessons from the Brahimi report. And, the capacities of TCCs vary WIDELY. Developing nations can involve themselves in UN peace and security operations because the UN provides reimbursement of costs. The developed world tends to use alliances and PSOs. [entrenched in the Canadian psyche]
-Alliances offer multinational/bilateral to deal with common security issues. There is SOME cost sharing. They have SOPs, crisis response headquarters, and interoperability mechanisms. They can respond rapidly and robustly when there is consensus. Alliances: high quality of operating standards/forces [Cdn public understands they exist, not so interested; essential for Cdn defence e.g. NORAD]
-Coalitions: an immediate response to an international crisis that impacts on national interests. Normally ‘off the shelf’ and ad hoc. A strong lead nation is essential. [public support usually high – Haiti -- but can wane if the public doesn’t support the particular issue or Cda is seen as cow-towing to a bigger power]
-Capacity building: Supports our foreign policy objectives, creates more and more capable forces for PSOs (UN, regional, etc). Costs are normally relatively low, and the activities can be chosen / controlled by the GoC. [Not a lot of public interest]

18. Conclusions New security environment = More complex PSOs
Militaries & peace operations also changing
All of Government/Integrated approaches required for success
Full range of mechanisms necessary: choose the right mechanism for the specific task
Canada remains a significant peace and security contributor
-Returning to my points at the beginning
-Hopefully this presentation provides a launching-off point for the group to discuss the utility of each mechanism; to discuss all of these aspects as they apply to Serbia; as well as any improvements or other observations the group wants to make.

19. Questions?