1. UNICEF-EC Child Rights Toolkit Chapter on Social Budgeting
Radhika Gore February 2010
UNICEF-EC Toolkit Background Paper on Social Budgeting Draft Radhika Gore February 19, 2010
It’s great when you have the people cited in your paper reviewing your paper. I’m looking forward to all comments and suggestions. There are several very good budget guides out there –for this one, planning to draw upon what has been done already, and make it relevant and useful to child rights advocates.
In this presentation, what I will present is not how to do “social budgeting” – rather I will take you through the contents and flow of the paper, the intentions behind its structure, the kind of material it draws upon. I’ll just launch straight into it.

2. Overview of the paper What is social budgeting? Audience Aim
Ensure that social priorities and rights are reflected in
- budget allocations
- budget-making , expenditure, monitoring processes
Audience
Non-specialists in economics/public finance, but familiar with general objectives of social budgeting
Concerned with advancing children’s rights
Aim
To function as a reference guide
To briefly give you an idea of how I approached the paper – and I say “I” but really the project has been a collaboration from the start (within different minds/areas of expertise at UNICEF as well as with donors)…most closely with the social policy unit at unicef
The idea was to target a non-specialist audience of practitioners and government officials, civil society groups, who were advocates of children’s rights and had some familiarity with budgeting and public finance, but were seeking to undertake “budget work” from the perspective of their own organizational position/mission/mandate/capacity.
Another phrase to clarify – “budget work” here refers to social budgeting initiatives, or activities to influence the content of budgets and the process of budgeting.
This paper is not a definitive how-to guide, but rather a reference manual. A quick word about what I mean by that….

3. Approach Review literature
Key issues – theory and reality of budgeting
Draw upon practical experience of UNICEF & partners
Highlight strategic entry points
Practical challenges – politics, organizational capacity
Need to document cases
Illustrate with examples
Takeaway – issues, ideas, tools, networks for collaboration
This had to be a reference document for child rights advocates/public officials located in diverse parts of the world and with varying levels of capacity & resources at hand.
Thus, aim was to : survey the literature on the budget – how the budgeting cycle is supposed to unfold and how it actually does, its weaknesses. And to highlight where child rights advocates can attempt to influence the budget.
It also drew upon other UNICEF background papers prepared for the toolkit and other purposes, which helped frame the “principles” section (I’ll come to in a minute) and provided a slew of examples, recently culled and written up, of global efforts on social budgeting.
Second, to draw upon previous work that UNICEF had already done to survey budget initiatives across UNICEF offices – this highlighted the practical challenges that organizations/child rights advocates are likely to face and the range of strategies that they have used. The UNICEF study showed that an environment of openness regarding public information, political willingness to engage civil society in budgets, to consider what budgets mean for children or for gender equality, .. are among the challenges that organizations face --- I’ll touch on this again.
Thirdly, the approach in the paper is to provide examples of how it’s being done by a diverse set of organizations, by govt agencies, UN agencies, citizens’ groups etc. The point is to present key issues, challenges, strategies, and to motivate ideas. SHOW, DON’T TELL
Culled from many different sources
Any awkward language… to be revised

4. Organization of the paper
2 Principles
3 Research and documentation: The budget cycle
Theory and reality of the budget process
4 Practical programming guidance
Challenges faced
Supporting budget work
5 Characterizing budget initiatives: Examples
Impetus, initiation, objectives of budget work
Linking budgets and children’s rights
6 Monitoring guidance
7 Donors’ role
This is the Table of Contents of the paper
I am not going to go thru each of the sections in detail, but rather present highlights and focus on how the chapter unfolds…how it is organized and what to expect from it
Section 2 I will only briefly present
Section 3, I will show the layout and illustrate the kind of information it has
Sections 4, 5, 6 are where the takeaway points are with respect to strategic entry points, ideas, and examples

5. Social budgeting is applied budget work
Principles
Responsiveness to children’s rights
Budget reflects priorities of Convention on the Rights of the Child
Addresses considerations of girls and boys
Social budgeting is applied budget work
Equity
Non-discrimination, social inclusion, attention to power relations
Efficiency
Raising revenues, allocating resources, and achieving outcomes with least distortions and costs
Accountability
Transparent processes, subjected to public scrutiny
Stabilization
Pro-poor countercyclical policies & social protection
The guiding principles for what makes a budget socially responsive, and responsive to children’s rights.
No surprises here:
The CRC, of course, as a key guide. This echoes a key point on the International Budget Partnership website that connects human rights advocacy with budget advocacy – that social budgeting is applied budget work, applying budget analysis to the advocacy of social priorities, not only to improve PFM. Of course, improving PFM will inevitably improve transparency and efficiency, and these are goals in themselves, but they are ultimately the means to address social priorities
Equity – drawing upon perspectives from social development, human rights…equity should be reflected in both content and process – participation, including children’s participation.
Efficiency and accountability…standard in public finance
Another consideration, something that is known to child advocates but perhaps not in the language of public finance, is stabilization - as other papers during this conference have highlighted, this is particularly important during economic downturns.
These principles underlie the motivations behind the budget work that is presented here.

6. Attention shift Budget as main channel to deliver services & donor aid
Attention shift to “…. complex web of actors and institutions involved in the budget process …”
Source: ODI Briefing Paper May 2004
Old Paradigm
New Paradigm
‘Conventional Budgeting’
‘Public Expenditure Management’
Budget process
Budget policies and institutions
Rules
Incentives
Inputs
Outputs/outcomes
Compliance
Performance
Centralized control
Decentralized responsibility
Bureaucratic opaqueness
Transparency and accountability
This is from a 2004 ODI briefing paper that summarizes the new ideas and thinking about public policy and management at the time.
Essential idea is that the restructuring of public services -- by enhancing efficiency, introducing more competition and private market discipline into public administration, transforming bureaucratic culture – was to promote more open, accountable and results- and citizen-oriented governments.
New Zealand, the UK, Sweden and others led the way among developed countries.
These ideas also introduced in civil service reform initiatives in many developing countries.
In budgeting, the focus shifted from the ‘due process approaches’ of conventional budgeting to a wider agenda of ‘Public Expenditure Management’, which highlights the importance
of the complex web of actors and institutions involved in the budget process, and of linking expenditure with measurable results in terms of outputs and outcomes (Box 1).
For example, consider what the World Bank had to say about the Angolan oil company (see excerpt)
For the purposes of the paper, I retained the budget process as a heuristic device – as a way to make it easier to present the material systematically, though I tried to emphasize the role that different actors play and the deviations from the “rules” or “theory” of budgeting

7. The budget cycle Drafting Approval … Execution Audit
3.2.1 Overview of budget formulation by the executive
3.2.2 What can happen in reality
3.2.3 Influencing the budget at the formulation stage
Approval …
Execution
Audit
These ideas about how the budget deviates in reality from the way that it is supposed to operate in theory is reflected in the objectives of many budget initiatives. The three essential ideas are to do with:
Conflict – politics, power, claims over budget resources
Diversity of needs and priorities – how to make the optimal decision
Complexity – opaque and hard to implement laws, drawn out or lop-sided procedures, mean that not everyone and everything gets executed according to policy aims
To give you a sense of how evidence about comparative budget procedures can help to drive home this point, I will show just two slides from this section in the paper.
The first slide is a table based on information from the OECD 2007 budget practices & procedures database.

8. The budget cycle Drafting
Finance ministry - sets economic forecast and spending caps
Executive or line ministries - propose spending plans
Approval
Negotiation between line ministries and legislature
Execution
Line ministries execute budget and keep accounts
Audit
Expenditures subject to an independent audit
These ideas about how the budget deviates in reality from the way that it is supposed to operate in theory is reflected in the objectives of many budget initiatives. The three essential ideas are to do with:
Conflict – politics, power, claims over budget resources
Diversity of needs and priorities – how to make the optimal decision
Complexity – opaque and hard to implement laws, drawn out or lop-sided procedures, mean that not everyone and everything gets executed according to policy aims
To give you a sense of how evidence about comparative budget procedures can help to drive home this point, I will show just two slides from this section in the paper.
The first slide is a table based on information from the OECD 2007 budget practices & procedures database.

9. The budget cycle Drafting
Finance ministry - sets economic forecast and spending caps
Executive or line ministries - propose spending plans
Closed process, lack research capacity, lack data
Approval
Negotiation between line ministries and legislature
Execution
Line ministries execute budget and keep accounts
Audit
Expenditures subject to an independent audit
These ideas about how the budget deviates in reality from the way that it is supposed to operate in theory is reflected in the objectives of many budget initiatives. The three essential ideas are to do with:
Conflict – politics, power, claims over budget resources
Diversity of needs and priorities – how to make the optimal decision
Complexity – opaque and hard to implement laws, drawn out or lop-sided procedures, mean that not everyone and everything gets executed according to policy aims
To give you a sense of how evidence about comparative budget procedures can help to drive home this point, I will show just two slides from this section in the paper.
The first slide is a table based on information from the OECD 2007 budget practices & procedures database.

10. Open Budget Index OBI 2008 Performance No. of countries Countries
Source: 2008 The Open Budget Survey, The International Budget Partnership
OBI 2008 Performance
No. of countries
Countries
Extensive
(Score ) 5
France, New Zealand, South Africa, UK, US
Significant
(Score 61-80) 12
Botswana, Brazil, Czech Republic, Germany, … , Slovenia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden
Some
(Score 41-60) 27
Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, … , Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, …
Minimal
(Score 21-40) 16
Albania, Azerbaijan, Ecuador, … , Niger, Pakistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela
Scant or no information
(Score 0-20) 25
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, … , Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen
Overall 85
The first slide is a table based on information from the OECD 2007 budget practices & procedures database.
This is corroborated by information from the Open Budget Index, which was put together by the IBP
Open Budget Index (OBI). The Open Budget Survey was launched in 2006, and is conducted biennially.
IBP works with CSOs in 85 countries to collect information on and evaluate the degree of access and opportunities for participation that governments provide to the public at the national level.
In order to “measure commitment of the countries surveyed to transparency and to allow for comparisons among countries, IBP created the OBI from the Survey.
The OBI assigns a score to each country based on the information it makes available to the public throughout the budget process” (from IBP website: Since a significant amount of poverty-reducing expenditures take place at the subnational level, the Initiative has begun a new effort to support work on budget transparency and accountability at this level.

11. Budget drafting No 11 37 19 31 Yes, only to parts of the legislature 3
Source: 2007 OECD International Database of Budget Practices & Procedures
Is methodology used for making economic assumptions of the budget publicly available?
OECD members
Non-OECD
Number % No 11 37 19 31
Yes, only to parts of the legislature 3 5
Yes, it is publicly available on request 7 23 20 33
Yes, it is published 14
Other 1 4
Missing answer 2
Total 30
100 61
The first slide is a table based on information from the OECD 2007 budget practices & procedures database.
OECD International Database of Budget Practices and Procedures contains results of
the 2007 OECD survey of budget practices and procedures in OECD countries,
the 2008 World Bank/OECD survey of budget practices and procedures in Asia and other regions, and
the 2008 CABRI/OECD survey of budget practices and procedures in Africa.
Has information on budget institutions from 97 countries, including the 30 OECD member countries and 67 non-members from the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.
Comprehensive source to compare and contrast national budgeting and financial management practices from across the globe.
More than 99 questions cover the entire budget cycle: preparation, approval, execution, accounting and audit, performance information, and aid management within developing countries.
Methodology
Country data was collected on-line using a designated survey website and monitored to follow respondent’s progress. During the first round of the survey in 2007 data from 30 OECD and 8 non-OECD countries was collected. This was followed, in 2008, by a more comprehensively distributed survey supported by CABRI for Africa, and the World Bank for other regions.
Using this method, 64% of the Asian and 77% of the African countries contacted completed the survey in What’s more, few questions were left blank; the average survey response was 95% completed with only little variation across the different sections – a similar figure to that of
OECD countries in While a comprehensive peer review has been conducted for the African data, the review for non-OECD and non-African countries have yet to be completed. In each case the review was shared with the surveyed countries with a request for clarification. However, only respondents are allowed to adjust their responses. Naturally, there is an inevitable trade-off between a survey that respects respondent’s answers and one that is based on real data.

12. The budget cycle Drafting
Finance ministry - sets economic forecast and spending caps
Executive or line ministries - propose spending plans
Closed process, lack research capacity, lack data
Approval
Negotiation between line ministries and legislature
Execution
Line ministries execute budget and keep accounts
Audit
Expenditures subject to an independent audit
These ideas about how the budget deviates in reality from the way that it is supposed to operate in theory is reflected in the objectives of many budget initiatives. The three essential ideas are to do with:
Conflict – politics, power, claims over budget resources
Diversity of needs and priorities – how to make the optimal decision
Complexity – opaque and hard to implement laws, drawn out or lop-sided procedures, mean that not everyone and everything gets executed according to policy aims
To give you a sense of how evidence about comparative budget procedures can help to drive home this point, I will show just two slides from this section in the paper.
The first slide is a table based on information from the OECD 2007 budget practices & procedures database.

13. The budget cycle Drafting
Finance ministry - sets economic forecast and spending caps
Executive or line ministries - propose spending plans
Closed process, lack research capacity, lack data
Approval
Negotiation between line ministries and legislature
Legislature constrained : Lack power to amend, capacity for analysis, timing of process
Execution
Line ministries execute budget and keep accounts
Audit
Expenditures subject to an independent audit
Approval stage: First formal opportunity for legislature to debate the budget
Offers civil society opportunity to intervene, e.g. public hearings
1. Absence of powers of amendment
The legislature may not have sufficient powers of amendment. Amendment powers can be grouped into unrestricted and restricted powers (Krafchik and Wehner, 2004). A legislature with unrestricted powers is able to increase or decrease expenditure and taxation without the consent of the government (p. 5). Examples of legislatures with such powers are the U.S. Congress and legislatures in the Nordic countries. Legislatures with restricted powers can amend the budget within set limits[1]. For example, in the UK House of Commons, the legislature cannot increase expenditure or revenue items, and can only reduce expenditure or abolish a tax or tariff. Only the government, i.e. the executive, can introduce or increase an expenditure or tax.
2. A weak committee system
Legislatures are increasingly realizing the value of consulting with committees[2], which are typically drawn from among specialists within the legislature, in order to improve technical engagement with the budget process (Krafchik and Wehner, 2004, p. 7). There can also be a specific budget committee in addition to the sector committees. For example, in India, the budget has been analyzed by specialist sector committees since However, the joint committees that analyze the resource demands of the ministries and departments “are prohibited by the parliamentary rules to suggest amendments in their reports”, and the committee reports are expected to have only “persuasive power”. (Krafchik and Wehner, 2002, p. 9).
3. Low capacity for budget research
Many legislatures lack a staff of budget analysts. Legislatures and sector committees can benefit from input from independent research units that have expertise on budget-related issues. “Given the size and technical nature of the budget, effective research services are likely to depend on dedicated, specialized personnel…. Some legislatures have small research units that specialize in budget analysis, and some have general research units that can deliver some budget analysis when needed. However, in many legislatures, budget research capacity is negligible or nonexistent” (Krafchik and Wehner, 2004, p. 8; see also Draman and Langdon, 2005).

14. Research and Documentation
Start of budget process
Budget tabled
Legislature approves budget
Source: De Renzio and Wehner (2008)
The red dots indicate the point when the budget is tabled before the legislature.
The above is based on a survey of budget practices in Africa which found that in no country was the budget tabled four months prior to the fiscal year, and in a majority of countries the time frame was two months or less (De Renzio and Wehner, 2009).
In 2008, CABRI and the African Development Bank published a report on Budget Practices and Procedures in Africa. The report analyses the findings of the CABRI and OECD Survey on Budget Practices and Procedures that was conducted in 26 African countries in 2008.
The survey was administered through an online platform by finance ministry officials in participating countries. Each participating country was also requested to respond to peer reviewer comments.
The report provides an overview of (a) budget timelines, (b) budget formulation, (c) parliamentary oversight, (d) budget execution, (e) fiscal transparency, (f) off-budget spending, and (g) aid management.
The survey enables a stocktaking of budget practices and procedures in African countries and a cross-country comparison of these practices.

15. Budget approval
Source: 2007 OECD International Database of Budget Practices & Procedures
Is there a specialized budget research office attached to the legislature?     
OECD members
Non-OECD
Number % No 19 63 39 64
Yes 11 37 16 26
Other 5 8 
Missing 1 2
Total 30
100 61
1. Absence of powers of amendment
The legislature may not have sufficient powers of amendment. Amendment powers can be grouped into unrestricted and restricted powers (Krafchik and Wehner, 2004). A legislature with unrestricted powers is able to increase or decrease expenditure and taxation without the consent of the government (p. 5). Examples of legislatures with such powers are the U.S. Congress and legislatures in the Nordic countries. Legislatures with restricted powers can amend the budget within set limits[1]. For example, in the UK House of Commons, the legislature cannot increase expenditure or revenue items, and can only reduce expenditure or abolish a tax or tariff. Only the government, i.e. the executive, can introduce or increase an expenditure or tax.
2. A weak committee system
Legislatures are increasingly realizing the value of consulting with committees[2], which are typically drawn from among specialists within the legislature, in order to improve technical engagement with the budget process (Krafchik and Wehner, 2004, p. 7). There can also be a specific budget committee in addition to the sector committees. For example, in India, the budget has been analyzed by specialist sector committees since However, the joint committees that analyze the resource demands of the ministries and departments “are prohibited by the parliamentary rules to suggest amendments in their reports”, and the committee reports are expected to have only “persuasive power”. (Krafchik and Wehner, 2002, p. 9).
3. Low capacity for budget research
Many legislatures lack a staff of budget analysts. Legislatures and sector committees can benefit from input from independent research units that have expertise on budget-related issues. “Given the size and technical nature of the budget, effective research services are likely to depend on dedicated, specialized personnel…. Some legislatures have small research units that specialize in budget analysis, and some have general research units that can deliver some budget analysis when needed. However, in many legislatures, budget research capacity is negligible or nonexistent” (Krafchik and Wehner, 2004, p. 8; see also Draman and Langdon, 2005).

16. The budget cycle Drafting
Finance ministry - sets economic forecast and spending caps
Executive or line ministries - propose spending plans
Closed process, lack research capacity, lack data
Approval
Negotiation between line ministries and legislature
Legislature constrained : Lack power to amend, capacity for analysis, timing of process
Execution
Line ministries execute budget and keep accounts
Audit
Expenditures subject to an independent audit
Approval stage: First formal opportunity for legislature to debate the budget
Offers civil society opportunity to intervene, e.g. public hearings
1. Absence of powers of amendment
The legislature may not have sufficient powers of amendment. Amendment powers can be grouped into unrestricted and restricted powers (Krafchik and Wehner, 2004). A legislature with unrestricted powers is able to increase or decrease expenditure and taxation without the consent of the government (p. 5). Examples of legislatures with such powers are the U.S. Congress and legislatures in the Nordic countries. Legislatures with restricted powers can amend the budget within set limits[1]. For example, in the UK House of Commons, the legislature cannot increase expenditure or revenue items, and can only reduce expenditure or abolish a tax or tariff. Only the government, i.e. the executive, can introduce or increase an expenditure or tax.
2. A weak committee system
Legislatures are increasingly realizing the value of consulting with committees[2], which are typically drawn from among specialists within the legislature, in order to improve technical engagement with the budget process (Krafchik and Wehner, 2004, p. 7). There can also be a specific budget committee in addition to the sector committees. For example, in India, the budget has been analyzed by specialist sector committees since However, the joint committees that analyze the resource demands of the ministries and departments “are prohibited by the parliamentary rules to suggest amendments in their reports”, and the committee reports are expected to have only “persuasive power”. (Krafchik and Wehner, 2002, p. 9).
3. Low capacity for budget research
Many legislatures lack a staff of budget analysts. Legislatures and sector committees can benefit from input from independent research units that have expertise on budget-related issues. “Given the size and technical nature of the budget, effective research services are likely to depend on dedicated, specialized personnel…. Some legislatures have small research units that specialize in budget analysis, and some have general research units that can deliver some budget analysis when needed. However, in many legislatures, budget research capacity is negligible or nonexistent” (Krafchik and Wehner, 2004, p. 8; see also Draman and Langdon, 2005).

17. The budget cycle Drafting
Finance ministry - sets economic forecast and spending caps
Executive or line ministries - propose spending plans
Closed process, lack research capacity, lack data
Approval
Negotiation between line ministries and legislature
Legislature constrained : Lack power to amend, capacity for analysis, timing of process
Execution
Line ministries execute budget and keep accounts
Misuse, weak financial management (procurement, delays), corruption , diversion, underfunded programs
Audit
Expenditures subject to an independent audit
Annual accounts are prepared by the executive branch, typically by the finance ministry, and audited, or verified for accuracy, by an independent agency that is specially mandated to oversee public expenditures. In addition to this extra-legislative accountability agency, known as the supreme audit institution (SAI), some ministerial agencies and local governments may also appoint auditors, and the SAI may appoint private auditors to carry some of the work (Ramkumar, 2008). The SAI is known as the auditor general in many countries, and as the Cours des Comptes in francophone countries.
Public sector auditing generally focuses on financial audit and compliance audit.
“In financial auditing the auditor assesses the accuracy and fairness of an organisation’s financial statements.
In compliance auditing the auditor checks whether government revenue and spending have been authorised and used for approved purposes, and whether departments and agencies have conformed to all pertinent laws and regulations” (Wehner and Byanyima, 2004, p. 36).
In addition, audit institutions may also produce “value for money” studies, which study the economy (cost effectiveness), efficiency, and effectiveness of budgetary spending.
The SAI submits the audit report to the legislature. A legislative committee, known as the Public Accounts Committee or PAC, exists in most parliamentary systems

18. Civil society-led monitoring efforts
Malawi
Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education
Produces national aggregation of school budget monitoring
Identifies poorly maintained public school assets
Comments on timing for release of funds
The Philippines
Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government
Began with focus on road infrastructure projects
Exposed discrepancies in government reports
Ensure project funds are used as intended
Project beneficiaries included in monitoring projects
Clear, accessible data is a fundamental problem for CSOs
Examples of local-level expenditure monitoring

19. The budget cycle Drafting
Finance ministry - sets economic forecast and spending caps
Executive or line ministries - propose spending plans
Closed process, lack research capacity, lack data
Approval
Negotiation between line ministries and legislature
Legislature constrained : Lack power to amend, capacity for analysis, timing of process
Execution
Line ministries execute budget and keep accounts
Misuse, weak financial management (procurement, delays), corruption , diversion, underfunded programs
Audit
Expenditures subject to an independent audit
Annual accounts are prepared by the executive branch, typically by the finance ministry, and audited, or verified for accuracy, by an independent agency that is specially mandated to oversee public expenditures. In addition to this extra-legislative accountability agency, known as the supreme audit institution (SAI), some ministerial agencies and local governments may also appoint auditors, and the SAI may appoint private auditors to carry some of the work (Ramkumar, 2008). The SAI is known as the auditor general in many countries, and as the Cours des Comptes in francophone countries.
Public sector auditing generally focuses on financial audit and compliance audit.
“In financial auditing the auditor assesses the accuracy and fairness of an organisation’s financial statements.
In compliance auditing the auditor checks whether government revenue and spending have been authorised and used for approved purposes, and whether departments and agencies have conformed to all pertinent laws and regulations” (Wehner and Byanyima, 2004, p. 36).
In addition, audit institutions may also produce “value for money” studies, which study the economy (cost effectiveness), efficiency, and effectiveness of budgetary spending.
The SAI submits the audit report to the legislature. A legislative committee, known as the Public Accounts Committee or PAC, exists in most parliamentary systems

20. The budget cycle Drafting
Finance ministry - sets economic forecast and spending caps
Executive or line ministries - propose spending plans
Closed process, lack research capacity, lack data
Approval
Negotiation between line ministries and legislature
Legislature constrained : Lack power to amend, capacity for analysis, timing of process
Execution
Line ministries execute budget and keep accounts
Misuse, weak financial management (procurement, delays), corruption , diversion, underfunded programs
Audit
Expenditures subject to an independent audit
Audit agency not empowered to investigate, lacks staff. Delays. Legislature fails to review findings/act on violations
Annual accounts are prepared by the executive branch, typically by the finance ministry, and audited, or verified for accuracy, by an independent agency that is specially mandated to oversee public expenditures. In addition to this extra-legislative accountability agency, known as the supreme audit institution (SAI), some ministerial agencies and local governments may also appoint auditors, and the SAI may appoint private auditors to carry some of the work (Ramkumar, 2008). The SAI is known as the auditor general in many countries, and as the Cours des Comptes in francophone countries.
Public sector auditing generally focuses on financial audit and compliance audit.
“In financial auditing the auditor assesses the accuracy and fairness of an organisation’s financial statements.
In compliance auditing the auditor checks whether government revenue and spending have been authorised and used for approved purposes, and whether departments and agencies have conformed to all pertinent laws and regulations” (Wehner and Byanyima, 2004, p. 36).
In addition, audit institutions may also produce “value for money” studies, which study the economy (cost effectiveness), efficiency, and effectiveness of budgetary spending.
The SAI submits the audit report to the legislature. A legislative committee, known as the Public Accounts Committee or PAC, exists in most parliamentary systems
SAIs may lack skilled staff, financial resources, and infrastructure such as office space and computers. This may result in its inability to detect fraud using information technology and in audit reports not being produced in a timely manner. When the audit results of the previous budget are delayed, they cannot be used to inform decision-making of the subsequent budget. According to the IMF Code of Good Practices for Fiscal Transparency, audited final accounts should be available to the legislature within 12 months of the end of the fiscal year (IMF, 2007). A recent study of budget practices in Africa showed that only in two out of 26 African countries, the audited accounts were published six months or less after the end of the fiscal year (De Renzio and Wehner, 2008). In nine countries in the study, audited accounts were published more than 12 months after the end of the fiscal year.

21. Audit Strategies for the legislature Strategies for civil society
Sub-committees can examine subject areas
Seek input from independent experts
Strategies for civil society
Support legislature by following up on corruption
In South Africa, the Public Sector Accountability Monitor :
obtains details about corruption cases
informs government department
follows up with department a month later
records response and makes it available online

22. Challenges faced So we know what the entry points are
Seen some brief examples of what actors have done
Next section deals with practical challenges
Main takeaway
Not always easy
Openness, data access, expertise, media interest …
But examples accumulating
Documentation?
Evaluation?
Draws upon experience of UNICEF and partners

23. Challenges faced - Openness and priorities of government
Availability of expertise within/outside government
Dominance of finance ministry, IFIs
- Civil society activism and media interest

24. Challenges faced Openness and priorities of government Brazil
history of open public accounts, active civil society
CSOs can examine social expenditures, raise public awareness
Egypt
budget data considered sensitive information
CEE/CIS
gender inequality not perceived as priority in budget reform
India
inroads made by gender budget initiatives
First tasks might be to
convince government of advantages of budget analysis
introduce relevance of social budgeting for children’s rights

25. Challenges faced Establishing credibility in public finance
Finance ministry, IFIs have dominant position regarding:
budget decisions, public finance mgmt, setting economic policy
Availability of expertise
Local knowledge and access, sustainability of budget work
Level of civil society activism
Low civil society participation and media interest/attention
Potential first steps
develop government capacity for analysis
generate evidence
convene decision-makers
identify national research skills and media interest
support channels for public participation

26. Supporting budget work
Strategic guidance
E.g. research design, public outreach strategies
How to apply analytical tools, e.g. Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
Cross-national comparative studies
Building capacity for budget analysis and advocacy
- Institutional partnerships, e.g. leverage relationships with IFIs
Media, parliamentarians, opinion-makers
Knowledge networking, peer review, expert advice
Document knowledge about social budgeting - process and findings
Collaborate to gain complementary expertise and peer review
Exchange experience with other organizations
Strategic guidance
An organizational strategy on social budgeting can help to structure and sustain activities, develop partnerships, obtain resources, and enhance credibility of the organization in public finance management. Forms of support include the following:
Guidance on research design and strategic planning for budget work, for example, on writing Terms of Reference, identifying research questions, and devising public outreach strategies.
Guidance on how to apply analytical tools such as PETS, or link with partners on a major exercise such as a PER.
Coordination of comparative budget studies within and across regions.
Strategy to expand staff with expertise in social policy and economic analysis.
Enabling access to data and expertise
Access to data through standard sources such as the IMF International Financial Statistics database, which reports statistics on international and domestic finance for almost all countries. Comparable and reliable statistics are essential to generate credible analysis.
Institutional partnerships to help position and develop budget work. This could involve building links with organizations such as the World Bank, which have considerable experience in budget analysis.
Building capacity for budget analysis and advocacy
Low levels of expertise in social budgeting, public finance, or economics can constrain the initiation and breadth of an organization’s budget work. Complementing existing organizational knowledge and skills can help to leverage technical and field expertise. This requires training program on budgeting and PFM, and opportunities for staff to use learning events for networking and knowledge exchange.
Educating the media, parliamentarians, and other opinion-makers about the relevance and importance of socially-oriented budget analysis can also improve the political climate in which child rights organizations introduce social budgeting.
Knowledge networking and peer review
Organizations undertaking budget work can benefit from exchanging experiences with, or even simply learning about the experiences of, other organizations with similar objectives and from having their analysis vetted by experts and peers.
Documented knowledge about social budgeting activities
Information on how analysis or advocacy was carried out is useful for organizations that are embarking upon this work. The documentation should cover both the process and findings of the budget activities.
The information should be easily retrievable, particularly from online sources.
Documents should be available in several languages.
Channels for networking, peer review, and expert advice
Connecting with national and international partners who have complementary expertise in public finance, economics, and budget analysis, can create opportunities for collaboration, e.g. on gender budgets.
Partnering with experts in economic analysis can make it easier to introduce the concepts and benefits of social budgeting to ministries of finance.

27. Characterizing budget work
Diversity of approaches
Impetus or initial motivation
strategic response to a crisis
technical analysis or an advocacy effort
convening stakeholders to build consensus and raise awareness
partnership opportunities
Objectives
improving PFM and budgeting procedures
building capacity of government actors
enhancing social inclusion and participation
instituting policy or legislative reform
enabling cross-national tracking of budget openness

28. Impetus Response to a crisis Technical analysis or advocacy effort
Mozambique. End of civil war, 1992, opportunity for PFM reform: modernize legal framework for budgeting, introduce new accounting system, etc.
Technical analysis or advocacy effort
Croatia. Institute of Public Finance, founded 1970, state-funded research organization. Broadened focus to publicly-oriented budget analysis.
Convening stakeholders
Kazakhstan. UNICEF conference in 2007, attended by Ministry of Economy and Budget and Planning, led to informal working group (parliament+govt agencies)
Strategic partnerships
The Philippines. Alternative Budget Initiative. CSOs provide research to draft alternative budget. Legislators push for its incorporation in budget deliberations

29. Objectives Improving PFM and budgeting procedures
Sierra Leone. Analysis of how public finance system impacts children
Building capacity of government actors
Mexico. Legislators received training on budget analysis from national NGO
Enhancing social inclusion and participation
Brazil. Children’s participation for monitoring budget implementation
Instituting policy or legislative reform
South Africa. Costing of Child Justice Bill before it was tabled in the legislature
Enabling cross-national tracking of budget openness
OECD survey of budget practices and procedures in OECD & nonOECD countries

30. Linking children’s rights + budgets
Budget approval
In Brazil, Save the Children Sweden along with local NGOs supported children’s participation in the approval and monitoring of the budget in the city of Fortaleza in the state of Ceara.
Kenya’s Inter-Parliamentary Union held a regional workshop in May 2000 to discuss how the budgetary process was influenced by gender perspectives. Partners included UNICEF and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (see Vergara, 2009).
Audit and performance evaluation
In Ghana, the Northern Ghana Network for Development (NGND) involved communities in assessing the performance of community schools using a scorecard method. NGND also collected information on education expenditure in order to assess the quality of service given the costs. The analysis was used for constructive dialogue between communities and the district education directorate on issues such as school infrastructure and management (see Vergara, 2009).
This is the end of section 5 – ful of examples, by budget stage, and one by capacity building. Here are a couple of examples

31. Monitoring & Evaluation
Debate on aid effectiveness has spurred interest in evidence on results
How does impact evaluation apply to budget initiatives?
Identify results in terms of
Changes in budget allocations
Reform of budget policies and institutions
How to measure impact?
Old Paradigm
New Paradigm
Budget process
Budget policies and institutions
Rules
Incentives
Inputs
Outputs/outcomes
Compliance
Performance
Centralized control
Decentralized responsibility
Bureaucratic opaqueness
Transparency and accountability
Budget initiatives have generally not been evaluated in such a manner. The examples outlined below describe the impact of budget work in terms of a simple gain score at best, or as progressive reforms in budget documents and procedures (e.g. budget priorities for children included in policy statements), or sometimes simply as outputs (e.g. number of legislators trained). Where they do indicate an effect, they are often unable to indicate the magnitude of the effect attributable specifically to the budget initiative. The changes in budget allocations or procedures could be the result of “unrelated factors, such as improvements in the local economy or programs organized by other agencies” (Bamberger, 2006, p. 3). Appendix sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 provide examples of the types of results that have been associated with budget analysis and advocacy efforts.

32. Example: Tracing results
Uganda: Gender responsive budgeting (GRB)
Initiated in 1999 by coalition of women’s rights groups and parliamentarians
Key player: Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE)
Used research, advocacy, activism to influence fiscal policy
Organized GRB skills-building workshops for legislators and technocrats
Invited by Ministry of Finance to participate in budget process
Some achievements
2003: Government included gender and equity in “Budget Call Circular”
2004: MoF with Ministry of Gender, Labour & Social Development prepared guidelines to assist in preparation of sector budgets
2005: MoF organized GRB capacity building of planners and budget officers
Gender policies & indicators strengthened in Poverty Eradication Action Plan
To ensure implementation, gender included in PRS Credit

33. Example: Tracing results
- May be several years before impact is evident as policy or funding change
- Role of other budget advocacy groups?
- Documentation of successes and failures?
Uganda: Gender responsive budgeting (GRB)
Initiated in 1999 by coalition of women’s rights groups and parliamentarians
Key player: Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE)
Used research, advocacy, activism to influence fiscal policy
Organized GRB skills-building workshops for legislators and technocrats
Invited by Ministry of Finance to participate in budget process
Some achievements
2003: Government included gender and equity in “Budget Call Circular”
2004: MoF with Ministry of Gender, Labour & Social Development prepared guidelines to assist in preparation of sector budgets
2005: MoF organized GRB capacity building of planners and budget officers
Gender policies & indicators strengthened in Poverty Eradication Action Plan
To ensure implementation, gender included in PRS Credit

34. Example: Tracing results
Brazil: Municipal Seal of Approval
Encourage municipalities to achieve targeted results in service delivery and disseminate information about these efforts
What the program does
Groups municipalities according to socio-demographic characteristics
Monitors social indicators from baseline study
Gives feed-back to each municipality
Mobilizes children through campaigns and competitions
Makes rules for comparative evaluation of municipalities’ performance
Easier to say what the change was, but can we say exactly why?
Need more work on this …

35. Donor role
New modalities of aid: budget support as opposed to project aid
Implications
If children’s rights viewed as ‘crosscutting’ issue and not already well established in aid programmes, then attention to children’s issues may suffer
Donors could enhance impact of aid if they systematically strengthened country’s systems and practices used for all government expenditures
Align aid interventions with countries’ public finance mgmt system
Decrease use of project implementation units
Provide more and better information on their own aid flows
On average, only 45 percent of aid uses country PFM systems
from 0 percent in Democratic Republic of Congo
to 77 percent in Bangladesh
This is of course more relevant in some countries vs. others, where donor aid is a substantial part of the budget

36. Thank you