1. Strengthening the Weakest Links: An Innovative Approach to Enforcement Conservation International Center for Conservation and Government Enforcement Initiative Anita Sundari Akella December 2004

2. Why Enforcement? Enforcement of PA boundaries, natural resource use rules and regulations is weak Illegal timber trade $150 billion per year Illegal fishing 30% of total catches Illegal wildlife trade $6 – 7 billion per year Innovative conservation strategies are stronger with good enforcement Ecosystem Services Payments Tradable Development Rights PA Creation Why Enforcement?

3. What Are Conservationists Doing About It? Solutions are ad-hoc and often limited to individual sites No methodical analysis of why enforcement is weak No comparison across sites to draw global lessons learned

4. Hire and equip more detection agents Raise fines Conventional Wisdom on Enforcement These strategies, in isolation, are not working!

5. Enforcement: An Economic Perspective Illegal activity is fundamentally an economic issue To deter it, disincentives must be bigger than incentives driving illegal activity Enforcement is also an economic issue

6. ED = P d * P a|d * P p|a * P c|p * Penalty * e -rt Innovation: The Enforcement Economics Approach Where: ED Enforcement Disincentive P d Probability of detection P a|d Probability of arrest given detection P p|a Probability of prosecution given arrest P c|p Probability of conviction given prosecution e -rt discount factor tTime between detection and penalty

7. Only 1% of crimes result in a conviction Risky Business?

8. Applying the theory in practice Bahia, Brazil: Illegal logging, illegal deforestation Selva Maya, Mexico: Illegal wildlife trade Palawan, Philippines: Cyanide/Dynamite fishing Papua, Indonesia: Illegal logging, illegal wildlife trade

9. Incentives to illegally log or deforest: $75.00 Enforcement Disincentive: $6.44 Atlantic Forest BAHIA, BRASIL

10. Selva Maya CHIAPAS, MEXICO Incentives to Illegally Hunt/Trade Wildlife: $191.57 Enforcement Disincentive: $5.66

11. Papua Province INDONESIA Incentives to Illegally Ship Timber: $91,967.36 Enforcement Disincentive: $6.47

12. Calamianes Islands PALAWAN, PHILIPPINES Incentives to Dynamite/Cyanide Fish: $70.57 Enforcement Disincentive: $0.09 Calamianes Islands PALAWAN, PHILIPPINES

13. What does this mean for conservation? For complex reasons, enforcement is abysmal in many of the countries where we work. Less than 1% of environmental crimes result in any penalty whatsoever. When it comes to the environment, CRIME PAYS!

14. Key Challenges Interagency cooperation across enforcement chain Adequate budgetary resources Consistent performance monitoring and adaptive management system for all agencies Regular, ongoing capacity-building programs, jointly developed Strong, clear and adequate laws and policies

15. Priority: Reform Enforcement Policy Increase budget allocation to environmental enforcement agencies across the chain Strengthen, clarify, and consolidate legislation Establish guidelines for inter-agency cooperation and annual performance reporting Create the legal framework for alternative enforcement systems to operate

16. Priority: Implement Adaptive Management Develop standardized data management systems for use across agencies Reach agreement on enforcement statistics (indicators) to be produced annually Train key staff in use of enforcement economics methodology to analyze statistics and develop strategic enforcement strengthening plans Require annual publication (public disclosure) of enforcement performance report

17. Priority: Build Enforcement Capacity Improve performance of detection agents, prosecutors and judges through periodic training Involve all agencies in the process of designing curricula for each audience Take advantage of existing technical assistance partnerships with donor government agencies Incorporate specialized local NGOs, think tanks and institutes