1. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 1 Engine Failure Training Francis Fagegaltier Engine Failure Training Francis Fagegaltier

2. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 2 Fatal Accidents, Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet, 1998 Through 2007: –Total = 90 –Attributed to « System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant) » = 2 Source : Boeing Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents, Worldwide Operations 1959 – 2007 (2007 statistical summary, July 2008) In short, approximately 2% of accidents have an “engine” failure at the root. Although obviously not the major cause of accidents, as part of the global effort for improving the safety level, it is necessary to reduce the likelihood of such cause of accidents. Fatal Accidents, Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet, 1998 Through 2007: –Total = 90 –Attributed to « System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant) » = 2 Source : Boeing Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents, Worldwide Operations 1959 – 2007 (2007 statistical summary, July 2008) In short, approximately 2% of accidents have an “engine” failure at the root. Although obviously not the major cause of accidents, as part of the global effort for improving the safety level, it is necessary to reduce the likelihood of such cause of accidents.

3. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 3 The two main types of “engine related” accidents are the following: –N°1 : uncontained high energy debris (e.g. disk burst). The two main types of “engine related” accidents are the following: –N°1 : uncontained high energy debris (e.g. disk burst).

4. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 4

5. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 5

6. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 6 The two main types of “engine related” accidents are the following: –N°1 : uncontained high energy debris (e.g. disk burst). –N°2 : Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR) Authorities and Engine Industry (Europe and USA) have worked together to reduce the probability of occurrence of the N°1 cause (concept of critical parts). –The N°2 cause is then likely to become the new N°1 (if not already the N°1). The two main types of “engine related” accidents are the following: –N°1 : uncontained high energy debris (e.g. disk burst). –N°2 : Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR) Authorities and Engine Industry (Europe and USA) have worked together to reduce the probability of occurrence of the N°1 cause (concept of critical parts). –The N°2 cause is then likely to become the new N°1 (if not already the N°1).

7. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 7 Obviously, the PSM+ICR cause is not purely technical because human factors play a role in it. Because of the human factors, in order to minimise the probability of occurrence of this cause of accident, training must be considered. –To draw attention on the subject is the first step in such training. Obviously, the PSM+ICR cause is not purely technical because human factors play a role in it. Because of the human factors, in order to minimise the probability of occurrence of this cause of accident, training must be considered. –To draw attention on the subject is the first step in such training.

8. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 8 Following a NTSB recommendation arising from the 13 December 1994 turboprop accident at Raleigh-Durham, FAA requested a report from US Industry (AIA). –The European Industry was associated to this work (AECMA). As a result, a joint AIA/AECMA report was issued. –Among other possible actions, they identified a need for specific training. Following a NTSB recommendation arising from the 13 December 1994 turboprop accident at Raleigh-Durham, FAA requested a report from US Industry (AIA). –The European Industry was associated to this work (AECMA). As a result, a joint AIA/AECMA report was issued. –Among other possible actions, they identified a need for specific training.

9. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 9 What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions – What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –

10. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 10 What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour.

11. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 11 What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. – What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. –

12. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 12 What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. –This translates into 1 IFSD every 100 000 aircraft hours (2 engines). – What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. –This translates into 1 IFSD every 100 000 aircraft hours (2 engines). –

13. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 13 What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. –This translates into 1 IFSD every 100 000 aircraft hours (2 engines). –Pilot flies 1 000 hours per year What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. –This translates into 1 IFSD every 100 000 aircraft hours (2 engines). –Pilot flies 1 000 hours per year

14. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 14 What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. –This translates into 1 IFSD every 100 000 aircraft hours (2 engines). –Pilot flies 1 000 hours per year Conclusion : – What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. –This translates into 1 IFSD every 100 000 aircraft hours (2 engines). –Pilot flies 1 000 hours per year Conclusion : –

15. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 15 What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. –This translates into 1 IFSD every 100 000 aircraft hours (2 engines). –Pilot flies 1 000 hours per year Conclusion : –Statistically, this pilot would experience only 1 IFSD in …. 100 years ! What is currently the safety level with regard to turbofan engines? In order to illustrate, let us take the case of one pilot in a twin engine transport aircraft. Assumptions –Engine In-flight shut-down (IFSD) rate : 5 x 10 -6 per engine hour. This is 1 IFSD every 200 000 engine hours. –This translates into 1 IFSD every 100 000 aircraft hours (2 engines). –Pilot flies 1 000 hours per year Conclusion : –Statistically, this pilot would experience only 1 IFSD in …. 100 years !

16. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 16 The IFSD rate of 5 x 10 -6 per flight hour is based on all events, engine caused or not. Hazardous engine events (e.g. disk burst) represent a very limited part of this rate. Some other events, not classified as hazardous, may be impressive, e.g. bird strikes or fan blade failures. –With effects such as engine surge (flames becoming visible), vibrations, noise, … The IFSD rate of 5 x 10 -6 per flight hour is based on all events, engine caused or not. Hazardous engine events (e.g. disk burst) represent a very limited part of this rate. Some other events, not classified as hazardous, may be impressive, e.g. bird strikes or fan blade failures. –With effects such as engine surge (flames becoming visible), vibrations, noise, …

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18. EATS 2009 - Prague Engine Failure Training Pl. 18 With a so low IFSD rate, how can a pilot be prepared for the effect of a “major” engine failure ? –What kind of training could compensate for the lack of practical experience ? Can a simulator reproduce the effects of a fan blade failure (of course, as experienced in the cockpit through the aircraft structure) ? The first training tool is to provide basic information for awareness raising. –FAA has published a video with a clear message to the pilots: fly the aircraft, deal with the engine event later, when flight is controlled. Air Transport Association and FAA training aid entitled « Airplane Turbofan Engine Malfunction Recognition and Response » With a so low IFSD rate, how can a pilot be prepared for the effect of a “major” engine failure ? –What kind of training could compensate for the lack of practical experience ? Can a simulator reproduce the effects of a fan blade failure (of course, as experienced in the cockpit through the aircraft structure) ? The first training tool is to provide basic information for awareness raising. –FAA has published a video with a clear message to the pilots: fly the aircraft, deal with the engine event later, when flight is controlled. Air Transport Association and FAA training aid entitled « Airplane Turbofan Engine Malfunction Recognition and Response »