1. WHERE IS EMU AND SWEDEN HEADING? Klas Eklund SEB March 1999

2. INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO Global growth 1999 around 2% Very low inflation. Low rates - but they are bottoming Shaky stock markets, volatile currencies But no global depression 1. Emerging markets: Recession in Latin America. Russia has not bottomed yet. But Asia is turning. 2. Negative growth in Japan. Strategic monetary choice 3. US is strong but will slow down; a soft landing 4. Europe is braking, but will recover The Asian deflationary process rolls on. Brazil in dire straits, but global effects less than feared; much was priced in. Different regions pull in different directions.

3. RISKS More severe Brazilian effects What if China and Hong Kong devalue? Regional troubles in Mid East and South Asia Y2K Krugman: “The world is a very scary place” 1. Hard landing in the US. Wall Street crash and ripple effects 2. Failed monetisation in Japan. Yen causes new currency turmoil

4. USA: DEFIES GRAVITY

5. IMBALANCES IN THE USA

6. EMU: A GOOD START Convergence process worked well: A large number of countries, on time, credibility Technically smooth transition to euro Great potential for structural changes and reform –Price transparency –Economies of scale –Less currency volatility –Pressure on taxes But great tests remain –Monetary and fiscal policies –Conflicts between ECB and national politicians –Federalism? Will the SDP governments change the EMU’s role?

7. WHAT WILL THE ECB DO? Many technical problems in getting started: How to measure monetary growth and inflation? How to interpret the targets? Core inflation rate is very low Rates may be lowered if economy slows further –But euro has weakened –Political pressures question ECB’s independence –German wage settlements are too high –American rates have climbed Conclusion: On hold for a while

8. DIFFERING VIEWS OF THE FUTURE

9. THE SWEDISH MODEL IN CRISIS “ The middle way”: Big government, big business and big unions 1970s through 1990s a gradual crack-up of the old model The water-shed: 1989-92: Over-heating, tax reform, real interest rate shock, banking crisis, currency crisis and then budget crisis Out of the crisis: –Resolution of banking crisis –Floating currency –EU membership –Independent central bank –Stricter budget process Now: low inflation, strong budget, but still growth and structural problems

10. GROWTH AND INFLATION

11. INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

12. THE SWEDISH ECONOMY TODAY Currency, banking and budget crises have made the 90s volatile, while Sweden has adapted to Europe After several weak years consumption is finally moving But exports are slowing due to international slowdown In total: Some slackening of GDP, but not severe Slow improvement of labour market… …but structural reforms are badly needed Extremely low inflation, which gradually will pick up Riksbank can stay close to ECB levels. Will it go lower?

13. SWEDISH GDP GROWTH

14. PURCHASING MANAGERS INDEX

15. CONSUMER CONFIDENCE

16. SWEDEN: KEY FORECASTS 1997199819992000 GDP 1,83,02,42,9 Export12,86,95,55,4 Private consumption2,02,72,92,4 Savings ratio0,81,51,31,3 Unemployment 8,06,56,25,9 Wage costs 4,53,54,04,3 Current account2,72,32,21,9 Inflation (CPI) 0,90,40,51,5

17. SWEDEN: M0 and CPI M0 Inflation 8081828384858687888990919293949596979899 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5

18. SWEDISH AND GERMAN REPO RATES

19. RIKSBANK AND ECB INFLATION TARGETS 2 3 1 ECB inflation target Riksbank inflation target

20. THE POLITICAL SCENE The 90s have been turbulent and difficult for governments - and especially for SD Party. The Swedish model has been forced to adapt to Europe 1998: A polarizing election - and a huge loss for SDP A lot of soul-searching in several parties. The all-powerful Prime Minister is openly criticized The parliamentary base of the Government is more fragile now. SDP needs support from two parties or more. SDP co-operates with Left and Greens. Moves left in rhetoric - but is gradually forced to the right by markets and globalization. An untenable situation.

21. THE ELECTION 1998 1998: Per cent and seats Left12.0 43 SDP36.6 131 Greens4.4 16 Centre5.2 18 Liberals4.7 17 Moderates22.7 82 Christ Dem11.8 42 1994: Per cent and seats Left6.2 22 SDP45.3 161 Greens5.0 18 Centre7.5 27 Liberals7.2 26 Moderates22.2 80 Christ Dem4.1 14

22. STRAINS BETWEEN SDP - LEFT Globalisation will put pressure on taxes. Tax bases are becoming more mobile. Hot topic: Exodus of companies The EMU issue is becoming more important by the day Rigid labour market will make lower unemployment difficult to achieve Slippages in the budget? Expenditure ceilings in danger Internal strains inside the SDP and the Left Conclusion: It will be difficult to make the alliance stick - but Mr Persson has still not decided when and how to change horses

23. ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY Expenditure ceilings questioned But the budget numbers are OK Privatization will come MoF under siege. Conflicting power centers are built up. Negotiations on all fronts: Taxes, defense, pensions, nuclear power, labour market & wages Long-term political uncertainty: What is Persson’s strategy? How long will the alliance SDP-left last? When - and how- will SDP switch alliances? Markets are normally nervous in such an uncertain situation. But the EMU process gives strength

24. THE TAX PROBLEM Globalization threatens tax revenue –Flight of financial capital –Increasing brain drain –Even consumption is more mobile Corporate tax is OK, but taxes on mid-managers and experts are becoming an acute problem But slashing taxes on mobile bases is at odds with SDP ideology, redistribution aims and co-operation with left Compromise in the pipe-line? Exceptions for ex-pats, promises of future cuts? Too little too late?

25. DIRECT INVESTMENTS Bn SEK Outflows Net Inflows

26. SWEDISH AND GERMAN BOND YIELDS

27. EUR/SEK

28. WHEN WILL SWEDEN JOIN THE EMU? No decision would mean breaking Maastricht treaty. But in reality, it is a political decision, depends on public opinion - which is turning –EMU has started –SDP governments in Europe –Turn-around of opinion in Denmark –Blair moves –EU chair in 2001 Persson wants to move ahead –Extra SDP congress March 2000 –Referendum or snap election autumn 2000, –ERM-entry late 2000 –membership 1/1 2002?

29. THE SWEDISH ROAD TO EMU 1999 2000 2001 June 13: EU Parliament election. Riksbank analyses ”fair value” of SEK Late autumn: SDP party leadership states its view March: SDP party congress September: Referendum or snap election After that: SEK enters ERM2 Jan 1: Sweden chairs EU Preparations for euro Jan 1, 2002 Sweden enters EMU?

30. THE FORMAL ERM2 DECISION The government decides Swedish entry Formally, Riksbank decides Swedish position on SEK level and band width But in practice the Swedish position must be joint Final decision taken by joint decision by –Ministers of finance in Euro zone –ECB council –ERM2 participants (Denmark & Greece) Decision taken after consultation with EU Commission and Economic & Financial Committee The Riksbank needs one year before EMU entry

31. WHICH ENTRY LEVEL? The Riksbank wants a firm SEK, the Government wants competitiveness The ECB - and the Fins - want a strong SEK EUR/SEK 8.60 a possible level; gives TCW 115 Note that when the SEK is tied to the euro, SEK will follow EUR vs US Weak USD would mean much stronger SEK, tough structural demands. Puts pressure on government to want a weaker SEK The ECB will say EUR/SEK decisive, not USD Negotiations 8.50-9.00. Forecast: 8.60 ERM central parity becomes conversion rate

32. SEK vs TCW Central parity 8.60 EUR/USD 1,44 EUR/USD 1,04

33. SEK vs TCW Central parity 9.00 EUR/USD 1,44 EUR/USD 1,04

34. SEK PROs AND CONs EMU-ERM2-discussion Commercial flows Global diversification of bond portfolios Budget negotiation worries Structural policy deficiencies Global financial turbulence No more support from short rates Swedish portfolio diversification Rapprochement to euro makes SEK less interesting What if EMU opinion turns? + -

35. SEK CONCLUSIONS EMU dominates Riksbank wants SEK to enter ERM Stronger SEK dependent on EMU process U-turn on EMU would give volatility and SEK weakening because of foreign debt, economic policy and capital flows Forecast: SEK TCW interval 124-128 during spring, strengthening towards 119 if EMU-process on track

36. KEY FINANCIAL FORECASTS 990217jun-99sep-99mar-00dec-00 Repo rate3,152,902,902,903,25 10-year yield4,264,254,454,754,85 TCW123,4125,2121,7118,1115,4