1. After the Cold War

2. The Post-Cold War World: 3 periods

3. First Period,1991-2000: Triumph of the West  Triumph of global capitalism  Russia’s transition crisis  The Unipolar Moment: US hegemony at its peak  The Western expansion to the post-communist East  Formation of the global neoliberal regime

4. Second Period, 2001-2008: US Hegemony Tested  The Islamist challenge and the Bush response  Development of a multipolar system  Russia’s resurgence  Relative decline of US hegemony

5. Third Period, 2008-12  The global economic crisis  Creeping bankruptcy and political stalemate in the US  The crisis of European integration  The rise of China as a global power  Reset in Russia’s relations with the West

6. What started in 2013 -14?  The Ukraine Crisis as a manifestation of failed transition from communism  Eruption of the most serious geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West since the early 1980s  a sense of zero-sum game  deadlocked political dialog  Information war  economic war  winding down of Russia-West security cooperation  heightened military preparations on both sides

7. Comparing 1917 and 1991: The Romanov Empire collapsed as a result of a revolution, the elites were overthrown and replaced by new elites as a result of the civil war The Communist elites moved to divide the empire to recast themselves as leaders of independent nation-states –  or of units of the Russian Federation A key reason why the Soviet empire made a relatively quiet exit was because key Soviet elites saw a future for themselves after communism Transition to capitalism would enable most of them to maintain and even enhance their power and privilege

8. Having dissolved the empire, the new elites have been engaged in competition and cooperation between themselves to:  secure their control,  reform their political-economic systems,  find new places in the regional and global orders THIS STRUGGLE OVER THE IMPERIAL SPOILS IS THE ESSENCE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EURASIA Some of them stick together (RF, CIS, GUUAM) Others go their own separate ways, look for new partnerships Meanwhile, many other states are exploring opportunities to expand their influence in Eurasia

9. Death of a Nation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1OyIJtjdpo&list=PL9DB5 9D518AF1454D

10. Contraction of Russian power

12. NATO enlargement, 1949-2004

14. Main changes in Russia’s international role following the end of the Cold War: 1. Reduction of the main parametres of Russia’s power  Territorial losses  Economic depression (loss of 50% of the GDP)  The military crisis  Ideological neutralization  after being a key part of the Global Left for most of the 20 th century, Russia joined the Global (neoliberal) Right 2. Russian society was opened to the impact of global forces with minimal regulation by the state 3. Political affiliation with the West 4. Reluctant acceptance of US hegemony

15. Post-Soviet Russia was no longer a problem for the West in the Cold War sense:  Russia’s abandonment of its Soviet mode became a key enabling factor for the formation of the global neoliberal regime  RUSSIA AS A “NORMAL COUNTRY”: capitalist, cautious, status quo, pragmatic, with limited ambitions, seeking friends everywhere, wary of making enemies

16. RUSSIA AS A PROBLEM AFTER THE COLD WAR The transition crisis: dangerous side-effects of reforms:  The nuclear risks  Possibility of a totalitarian backlash  Potential for civil war  Tensions with new neighbours, attempts to maintain a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space Russia as a US client: no longer counterbalancing the US (not a problem for the US, but a problem for many other states) – or: Russia as a member of coalitions to counterbalance US hegemony (a problem for the US)

17. US objectives vis-à-vis Russia Encourage Russia’s transition to capitalism Prevent Russia from acting as a counterbalance to US Control Russia’ behaviour to keep it congruent with US interests Expand US influence into the post-Soviet space Perspectives outside the US: Many countries would like Russia to play the role of a non- hostile, but relatively independent, actor in international politics Most Russians have the same perspective

18. The economy* GDP, PPP - $2.55 trln. (No.7 in the world) World’s 10 th biggest exporter GDP per capita - $18,100 Real growth rate – 5.6% in 2008, -7.9% in 2009, 4,5% in 2010, 4.3% in 2011, 3.4% in 2012, 1.3% in 2013 Public debt (2013 est.) – 7.9% of GDP Unemployment rate – 5.7% *https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/rs.html *https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/rs.html

21. US National Intelligence Council forecast for the year 2025, unveiled in October 2008, described Russia as one of four rising centers of international power: “In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way — roughly from West to East — is without precedent in modern history.... No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global clout.... Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050.” “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”. Washington: National Intelligence Council, November 2008 - http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html, pp. vi, vii http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html

25. Under Yeltsin, Russia became a capitalist country, but its state was in disarray, and its economy in deep depression Under Putin, Russian capitalism was consolidated through rebuilding of state authority Russia achieved relative stability and recovered the status of a Great Power The costs:  Stymied democratic development  Rise of bureaucratic-oligarchic capitalism deeply integrated with the global economy

26. Russia continues to need major changes Troubles in the global economy have reduced Russia’s economic growth to zero (2014) The Russian economy needs major modernization to compete successfully The post-Soviet Russian state has many flaws and needs major reforms to help meet the challenges faced by Russia The Russian society is deeply split by social inequality

27. Social inequality, OECD data, Dec. 2011

31. The challenges  Modernization of the economy – from hydrocarbons to hi-tech  Rebuilding infrastructure  Social investments: health, education, other social programs to improve quality of life Growing realization that these challenges cannot be met within the neoliberal model of economic management

32. Since Putin’s coming to power in 2000, Russia has been in a conservative phase  The new ruling class is determined to maintain its wealth and power  A soft authoritarian regime with elements of democracy  Rising influence of the Russian Orthodox Church  Rejection of some elements of Western liberalism

33. The bureaucracy is bigger, more powerful, more corrupt, and less accountable Among the bureaucrats, security and military elites have gained commanding positions Competition between them and other elites Rule of law remains very weak

34. Levada Center opinion poll, November 2012:  57% - Russia needs reforms  20% - need for decisive change in the system of government  10% - ready to live under “existing stability”  19% - the rulers are doing enough to reform the state

35. Russia cannot cope with its challenges without reforming the state  No effective governance without accountability  No accountability without rule of law  No rule of law without electoral democracy

36. The political upheaval of 2011-12  Putin’s decision to return to the Kremlin  Elections and protests  The mobilization of opposition forces  Defection of liberals from the Putin coalition  Putin’s counterattack  The new political uncertainty  The Putin resurgence

37. 2015: No alternative to Putin (Russian opinion polls): http://www.levada.ru/15-01- 2015/alternativa-vladimiru-putinu http://www.levada.ru/15-01- 2015/alternativa-vladimiru-putinu

38. Russia’s foreign policy compass

39. http://urbandemographics.blogspot.ca/2012/08/the-worlds-shifting- centre-of-gravity.html

40. The Western vector - US, EU, NATO The Eastern vector – Asia-Pacific The Southern vector - the Muslim world, India The Northern vector - the Arctic

45. Pew Research global poll, March-May 2013 http://www.pewg lobal.org/2013/0 9/03/global- opinion-of- russia-mixed/

49. Globescan poll of Russians, April 2009: http://surveys.globescan.com/bbc_russia09/http://surveys.globescan.com/bbc_russia09/

51. The main elements of Russian foreign policy thinking  Primacy of national interests  Attempts to increase the degree of national sovereignty  Wariness of Western support of opposition forces in Russia  A drive for re-integration of Eurasia  Multivector foreign policy – active engagement with other international actors  The Eastward drift  Primacy of trade and investment issues  Growing security concerns and major investments in military power  Readiness for international cooperation to work out joint solutions to problems

52. Russia’s military budget Mid-1980s – defence spending accounted for 15-17% of Soviet GDP Massive cuts following dissolution of USSR in 1991 Steady rise since 2000 – by 15-25% a year In 2006, a new state armaments program, which will span 2007-2015, was adopted Price tag: 4.9 trillion rubles (US$186 billion). 63% is to be allocated for the procurement of modern weapons and equipment 27% towards defense research and development. 2012 – defence spending accounted for 4.4% of Russia’s GDP (SIPRI est.)

53. NATORussia Tanks12,33222,950 APCs31,42025,080 Submarines8466 Principal surface combatants 19457 Bomber/fighter ground attack 1,9051,648 Deployable military personnel 3,579 mln.1,200 mln. (+ active reserve of 0.75 mln.) Military spending, 2010 $1,085 trln.$56 bln. http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/5084/4/zPr oject%20finished%2026.01.pdf

57. Russia’s place on the Global Firepower Index: http://www.globalfirepower.com/co untries-listing.asp http://www.globalfirepower.com/co untries-listing.asp

58. Russian elite interests The oligarchy – the upper crust of the new capitalist class, product of the post-communist transformation  Most important sources of wealth: oil, gas and arms  Dependent on the West, primarily the US  Dependent on the Russian state, wants to rationalize it  Needs traditional foreign policy assets of the USSR  Assertive in the political sphere  Seeks economic opportunities worldwide  Intertwined with state bureaucracy

59. The bureaucrats  The “enforcers” (siloviki) – military and security elites  Determined to get upper hand over the oligarchs, get their property  Institutionally and traditionally suspicious of the West  Interested in a restoration of a stronger and more authoritarian Russian state, but on a capitalist basis  Federal civilian bureaucracy  Interested in whatever protects and increases their power  Regional bureaucracies, regional foreign policy interests

60. The national bourgeoisie  Well below the ranks of the oligarchy  Gets little from the West  Feels dominated by the oligarchs  Is nationalist and protectionist The politicians  1990s: liberals, communists, nationalists, “United Russia” – the ruling party under Putin  The Westernizer-Eurasianist divide – and synthesis