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Japan Strikes. Japanese military leaders were possibly the most irresponsible leaders of the War. They moved Japan into a war they could not hope to win,

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Presentation on theme: "Japan Strikes. Japanese military leaders were possibly the most irresponsible leaders of the War. They moved Japan into a war they could not hope to win,"— Presentation transcript:

1 Japan Strikes

2 Japanese military leaders were possibly the most irresponsible leaders of the War. They moved Japan into a war they could not hope to win, if their foes fought to the end.

3 Summer 1941—Japanese military has only enough fuel for a few months. Japan wanted the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies. Problem…The Philippines were in its path.

4 FDR put 50 B-17 Flying Fortresses on the islands as a deterrent to the Japanese. Japan was going to attack these aircraft, but planned to attack somewhere else first.

5 Japanese Imperial Navy—Commander, Isoroku Yamamoto Insists on a surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. If successful, he believed it would give Japan 2 years to build up defenses.

6 Late November 1941—Japanese carrier fleet was ready to set sail for Hawaii. The attack was scheduled for December 7, 1941—the surprise was complete.

7 Traveling under strict radio silence and screened from view by a large weather front, the Japanese battle fleet—six aircraft carriers, two battleships, two cruisers, and nine destroyers— remained undetected until it came within 200 miles of the Hawaiian Islands.

8 Japan launches its attack from carriers 200 miles from Pearl Harbor. 353 dive bombers, fighter (Zeroes), and torpedo planes attacked in two waves. It was early (8:00 a.m.) Sunday morning, and nobody at Pearl expect a thing.

9 The Japanese struck boldly against moored battleships in the harbor and U.S. airfields. The Japanese pilots knew exactly where they were going because spies on the islands had given them elaborate and detailed scale models of the base, including Battleship Row.

10 Because it was Sunday morning, most of the U.S. naval personnel were ashore, and most of the antiaircraft defenses were unmanned. At 7:49 AM local time, the attack began— and by 8:12, much of the fleet had been damaged or sunk.

11 A second wave of bombers arrived at nine o'clock to finish what the first wave had started. In a little more than an hour, the United States fleet was severely crippled.

12 Battleships—West Virginia, Tennessee, Nevada, Oklahoma, Arizona…damaged or sunk. Battleforce Flagship California…damaged.

13 Only 16 U.S. planes escaped the destruction. 2,400 soldiers and sailors were killed….with 3,000 more seriously wounded.

14 Japanese had achieved complete surprise in crippling the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Two days later, on December 9, the United States declared war on Japan.

15 The U.S. Army's Hawaii Department was charged with coastal defenses on the islands in 1941. "It was a matter of common knowledge that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was the hotbed of espionage in Oahu." Gen. Charles Herron.

16 In large part, the attack on Pearl Harbor was so successful because Japanese spies, under cover of "diplomatic" posts, were able to blend easily with the large Japanese population on the islands and in the process gather valuable intelligence.

17 One such diplomat, for example, was Takeo Yoshikawa, who openly arrived in Hawaii by ship on March 27, 1941. Yoshikawa was a trained spy assigned to the Japanese consulate on Oahu. He took a second-story room that gave him a view of Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, where the American air fleet was based.

18 He made notes, took photos, chartered small boats and planes. He even mailed back home postcards with aerial views of Pearl Harbor that helped planners construct mock-ups used to train bomber pilots for the raid.

19 He observed, for example, that there tended to be a large number of ships in port on Saturdays and Sundays, fewer on weekdays. He also observed American air patrols, noticing that they tended rarely to fly to the north.

20 As early as January 27, 1941 Joseph Grew, the U.S. ambassador in Japan, reported to Secretary of State Hull that the embassy had learned from Japanese sources that a mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned in case hostilities broke out.

21 The United States had broken the Japanese diplomatic code (called Purple), so war planners from the FDR on down knew that spies had been reporting on the fleet deployment in Hawaii.

22 In the weeks and days before the attack, encrypted diplomatic traffic became heavier, and increasingly ominous. On November 19, for example, American codebreakers intercepted a message from Tokyo to diplomatic posts in Washington, D.C., and several West Coast cities. The message instructed these offices to destroy all codes, coding machines, papers, and the like if they heard the words "East Wind Rain" (Higashi No Kazeame) in the daily weather forecast. On Thursday, December 4, the United States intercepted the so-called "winds message." Even on the morning of December 7, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall sent an urgent warning to commanders in the Pacific that intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages strongly suggested an attack was imminent.

23 Military signalmen, however, could not raise Pearl Harbor on military channels, so the message was sent by slower commercial cable. By the time it arrived, Japanese planes were in the air over Pearl Harbor.

24 Given this flood of intelligence, historians and military analysts question why the military failed to take steps to defend Pearl Harbor. One answer might lie in the flood of messages intercepted. Few of the hundreds of intercepted diplomatic messages specifically mentioned Pearl Harbor. Those that did—requests for information on fleet deployment at Pearl, for example—were part of general requests for similar information about numerous American bases in the Pacific.

25 The Japanese didn’t follow up the attack with more air strikes. The Japanese didn’t try to invade Hawaii, when they could have easily succeeded in December.

26 The Japanese neglected to capture or destroy the oil storage depots. This would allow the U.S. to continue to fuel its carrier groups in the Pacific.

27 Most importantly—they missed all of the U.S. aircraft carriers which were out at sea on December 7, 1941. Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown—would all come back to haunt the Japanese.

28 December 8, 1941—FDR goes to Congress to ask for a Declaration of War. “Yesterday, December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infamy…” Congress grants the Declaration of War December 9, 1941.

29 December 10, 1941—Hitler and Mussolini declare war on the United States. U.S. declares war on Germany and Italy in response. Japanese sink British battleships HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales.

30 Defeat Germany first and fight defensively against Japanese. Once Germany was defeated, then turn full attention toward crushing the Japanese military.

31 December 1941—Japanese attack and claim all areas in the western Pacific Ocean. Hours after Pearl Harbor—Philippine U.S. bases are attacked….35 B-17’s are destroyed.

32 Early January, 1942—U.S. forces retreat from Manila to the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor Island. In fierce fighting, the Americans and Filipino soldier are taking a beating. Commander General Douglas MacArthur is ordered off the islands— “I shall return….”

33 U.S. soldiers are forced to fight it out—many starving and disease ravaged. Americans are force to surrender—treated horribly at the hands of the Japanese.

34 April 9, 1942—78,000 Americans surrender to the Japanese on Bataan. Those captured are marched 65 miles—10,000 die, Bataan Death March By late May the defenders of Corregidor had surrendered.

35 The April 1942 air attack on Japan, launched from the aircraft carrier Hornet and led by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle, was the most daring operation yet undertaken by the United States in the young Pacific War.

36 Though conceived as a diversion that would also boost American and allied morale, the raid generated strategic benefits that far outweighed its limited goals.

37 The raid had its roots in a chance observation that it was possible to launch Army twin-engined bombers from an aircraft carrier, making feasible an early air attack on Japan. The technically-astute Doolittle to organize and lead a suitable air group.

38 The modern, but relatively well-tested B-25B "Mitchell" medium bomber was selected as the delivery vehicle and tests showed that it could fly off a carrier with a useful bomb load and enough fuel to hit Japan and continue on to airfields in China.

39 Gathering volunteer air crews for an unspecified, but admittedly dangerous mission, Doolittle embarked on a vigorous program of special training for his men and modifications to their planes. The new carrier Hornet was sent to the Pacific to undertake the Navy's part of the mission

40 So secret was the operation that her Commanding Officer, Captain Marc A. Mitscher, had no idea of his ship's upcoming employment until shortly before sixteen B-25s were loaded on her flight deck.

41 Joined in mid-ocean on 13 April by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey's flagship Enterprise, which would provide air cover during the approach, Hornet steamed toward a planned 18 April afternoon launching point some 400 miles from Japan

42 Before dawn on 18 April, enemy picket boats were encountered much further east than expected. These were evaded or sunk, but got off radio warnings, forcing the planes to take off around 8 AM, while still more than 600 miles out.

43 Most of the sixteen B-25s, each with a five-man crew, attacked the Tokyo area, with a few hitting Nagoya. Damage to the intended military targets was modest, and none of the planes reached the Chinese airfields (though all but a few of their crewmen survived).

44 The Japanese high command was deeply embarrassed. Three of the eight American airmen they had captured were executed. Combined Fleet commander Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, they also resolved to eliminate the risk of any more such raids by the early destruction of America's aircraft carriers, a decision that led them to disaster at the Battle of Midway a month and a half later.

45 The Battle of the Coral Sea was fought between the Japanese and Allied navies from May 4 through May 8, 1942 in the Coral Sea, about 500 miles northeast of Australia.

46 In the spring of 1942, Japanese forces planned to invade southern New Guinea, a move designed to knock Australia and New Zealand out of the war. The Allies, including the U.S., Australia, and Great Britain, gathered a large fleet to thwart the invasion.

47 After several days of searching and skirmishing, the Japanese and Allied fleets found each other on May 8 and each sent aircraft to attack the other. Both air attacks occurred at about the same time approximately 200 miles apart with both sides suffering moderate losses.

48 The most significant Allied loss during the battle was the sinking of the American carrier, USS Lexington. That evening, with the battle roughly a draw, both sides retreated but would meet again a month later at the decisive Battle of Midway, 3,000 miles away in the Hawaiian Islands.

49 The Battle of the Coral Sea was important for several reasons. It was the first pure carrier-vs-carrier battle in history as neither surface fleet sighted the other. Though a draw, it was an important turning point in the war in the Pacific because, for the first time, the Allies had stopped the Japanese advance. Before the battle, the Japanese had enjoyed a continual string of victories while afterwards, it suffered an almost continual series of defeats, including at Midway, a major American victory.

50 Shortly after the Battle of the Coral Sea, many called it one of the most important naval battles in world history and, at the time, it probably was.

51 Sixty years later, the battle is still widely known throughout Australia with many Aussies referring to it as, "The battle that saved Australia." For most Americans, however, the Battle of the Coral Sea has faded into obscurity.

52 Isoroku YamamotoPearl Harbor Zeroes Hickam Field Joseph Grew Japanese code Purple Higashi No Kazeame Battleship Row Enterprise, Hornet, Yorktown Bataan PeninsulaCorregidor Island Douglas MacArthurBataan Death March James DoolittleB-25 “Mitchell” bombers Coral SeaU.S.S. Lexington


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