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Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

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Presentation on theme: "Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)"— Presentation transcript:

1 Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

2 Effects of sanctioning system in social dilemma Positive effects: A sanctioning system enhances cooperation (e.g., Yamagishi, 1986) Negative effects: A sanctioning system as an addictive drug: The more of it we have, the more we depend on it (Taylor, 1987).

3 Negative effects of a sanctioning system A sanctioning system makes people believe that they cooperate for external incentives. ↓ The sanctioning system reduce intrinsic motivation to cooperate and trust for other people. ↓ People need severer sanctions to cooperate.

4 Negative effects of a sanctioning system (cont’d) An external sanctioning system is a coercer. Coercion by itself may let people attribute their cooperation to external factors. ↓ Reduction of intrinsic motivation to cooperate Question: Is it same for an internal sanctioning system ?

5 Coercion vs. Commitment When members voluntarily introduce a sanctioning system, they may regard others (and themselves) as cooperation seeker rather than punishment avoiders. ↓ An internal sanctioning system is a commitment rather than a coercion. ↓ Reduction of intrinsic motivation to cooperate

6 Purpose of this study Examining negative effects of an external / internal sanctioning system. H0: Two sanctioning systems equally reduce intrinsic motivation to cooperate. H1: An external sanctioning system more greatly reduce intrinsic motivation than an internal sanctioning system.

7 Experimental Design Removing Sanctioning Paradigm (Mulder & van Dijk) Three-person group play social dilemma game. Social Dilemma trials with a sanctioning system Social Dilemma trials without a sanctioning system Phase 1: manipulation Phase 2: measurement of intrinsic cooperation

8 Experimental Design (cont’d) External Sanction Condition SD trials with a sanctioning system SD trials without a sanctioning system Internal Sanction Condition SD trials without a sanctioning system SD trials with a chance to vote Control Condition SD trials without a sanctioning system A sanctioning system is to be introduced by a majority vote. (In fact, the system is introduced always)

9 Summary: Prediction 1. In Phase 1, cooperation rates in external / internal sanctioning condition are higher than in control condition. 2. In Phase 2, cooperation rates in external sanctioning condition is lowest. External incentives Attribution to external factors

10 Preliminary Results Cooperation rates (two sessions in each condition) Phase 1Phase 2

11 Preliminary Results Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition) Phase 1Phase 2 1. In Phase 1, cooperation rates in internal sanctioning condition are highest. Unexpected results

12 Preliminary Results Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition) Phase 1Phase 2 2. In Phase 2, cooperation rates in external sanctioning condition is lowest. However, cooperation rates in internal sanctioning condition is much lower than in control condition. Unexpected results

13 Preliminary Results Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition) Phase 1Phase 2 It may be too early to draw a conclusion (we run only two session), but we have to consider why our prediction is not supported by now.

14 Thank You !


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