1. Challenges to UN emergency preparedness, humanitarian coordination & response to nuclear detonation events Study released in summer 2014 Carried out in cooperation with UNDP and OCHA Study carried out by UNIDIR (Borrie and Caughley)

2. Oslo conference summary point #1: “It is unlikely that any state or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in an adequate manner and provide sufficient assistance to those affected. Moreover, it might not be possible to establish such capacities, even if it were attempted.” Led to peer-reviewed UNIDIR research, funded by governments of Norway and Ireland.

3. 3 Questions 1.What would happen if a NWD event occurred? 2.What points of reference and procedures does the UN have? 3.Bearing in mind the answers to these questions… currently, what could – or would – the UN-coordinated humanitarian system do?

4. Humanitarian cluster system Figure courtesy of IASC

5. About risk Risk is “the probability of an event multiplied by its consequences”.  NWD events in populated areas are low probability / high consequence  Low probability events are not no probability events  We assume the risk of a NWD event to be greater than zero, but don’t quantify it.  We don’t take a view on whether a single or multiple NWD event is more likely.

6. Important Nuclear weapon detonation events (NWD):  Have certain things in common with  Civil nuclear/radiological emergencies  Sudden onset major natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes, tsunamis, mass fires  But they are different in important ways  Great numbers of people with 3 rd degree burns, multiple trauma  Radiation sickness, fallout etc.

7. Courtesy of Christopf Wirz, Spiez Lab

8. Blast Thermal radiation (heat)  Many fires Prompt radiation Radioactive fallout Other effects incl flash and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) Fear, disruption etc  Blast and heat effects will cause the greatest harm and destruction. Effects

9. Our research indicates Huge variation in potential scenarios in which nuclear weapon detonation events could occur. However, the Oslo conference finding appears to be valid in most plausible scenarios involving a nuclear weapon detonation event in a highly populated area. Findings associated with such a “reality check”….

10. 1.The current level of awareness within the humanitarian system is low about the specificities of NWD or its ability to respond to them. 2.For the UN to be called upon presupposes the situation is already beyond a state’s capacity to respond effectively to assist the victims (i.e widespread harm has already occurred / is occurring). 3.The UN is unlikely to be able to offer coordinated humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath  Could make a difference in several ways though, including in longer term thru IASC cluster system 6 main findings (1)

11. 4.At present there are several major challenges to prompt and effective use of the humanitarian cluster system in the context of a NWD event. 5.Threat of further detonations could vastly complicate humanitarian decision making. 6.The best approach is prevention  However, UN could plan for the likely challenges of ‘lower-end’ NWD events since this could make a difference to level of overall suffering: we would argue it has a duty to do so. 6 main findings (2)

12. i.Give focused attention to the issue in the IASC ii.Assign responsibility to an IASC task team, and invite IACRNE to participate iii.Study and simulate varied NWD scenarios with a view to humanitarian response iv.Include representative NWD scenarios in future revisions of plans for large, complex, sudden-onset disasters v.Review current capacities and plans Study findings suggest the humanitarian system consider the following:

13. iv.Prompt relevant humanitarian and specialized agencies (e.g. IAEA, WHO, CTBTO) to clarify their mandates, policies, roles and capabilities with a view to response to NWD events. v.Lend thought to how inter-state processes could impinge on timely humanitarian response  « Winging it is not a plan » Study findings suggest states consider the following:

14. Knowledge for Action Full study is available at: www.unidir.org/illusionofsafety Available in PDF for free, or printed copies can be ordered There will also be an article on the study in the Sept/Oct 2014 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists