1. Operation Red Wings Afghanistan 28 June 2005
INTRO: Identify that the operation was officially called “RED WINGS” but has been misidentified as “RED WING” in many instances.
Pictures: United States Navy file photo of Navy SEALs operating in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. From left to right, Sonar Technician (Surface) 2nd Class Matthew G. Axelson, of Cupertino, Calif; Senior Chief Information Systems Technician Daniel R. Healy, of Exeter, N.H.; Quartermaster 2nd Class James Suh, of Deerfield Beach, Fla.; Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class Marcus Luttrell; Machinist’s Mate 2nd Class Eric S. Patton, of Boulder City, Nev.; and Lt. Michael P. Murphy, of Patchogue, N.Y. With the exception of Luttrell, all were killed June 28, 2005, by enemy forces while supporting Operation Redwing.
photo : US Navy (released)
Primary Sources:
- Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10
- Ed Darack, “Operation Red Wings: What Really Happened.” Marine Corps Gazette, January 2011, pp
Additional Sources:
- Legal Lessons Learned From Iraq and Afghanistan Vol 1
- CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement, June 2005

2. Agenda Background Compromise Scenario ROE Discussion Geography
Command Structure
Goal / Plan / Mission
Background information
Compromise Scenario
Options
ROE Discussion

3. Background
Operation Red Wings was a 2/3 Marine operation, that included SEALs during the opening phase.
At the time, the SEALs were part of the CJSOTF-A (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan).
Naval Special Warfare Task Unit
Seal Team
Based at Bagram Airfield.
CJTF-76
CJSOTF-A
NSWTU
2/3 Marines

4. Geography
Mountainous, arid country above tree line with no/little vegetation.
Hindu Kush mountain range along Pakistan border.

5. Geography
View from a Black Hawk, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, June 2005.

7. Goal Disrupt anti-Coalition militia (ACM) activity in the region
Focus on the “Mountain Tigers” led by Ahmad Shah.
Estimated ACM members.
“Capture or kill” mission
Ahmad Shah then considered a high-value Taliban target in this area due to IED strikes.
Operation Red Wings was a 2/3 Marine operations, that included SEALs during the opening phase.
Photo of Ahmad Shah from
Mountain Tigers cell west of Asadabad

8. The Plan (Slide 1 of 3) 2/3 Marines original plan:
Six-man scout/sniper team occupy observation posts under cover of darkness.
Main assault would occur at night.
Remain in area for weeks conducting various missions (patrolling, HA, medical).
No illumination, so required SOF helicopter assets.
Plan changed…….
The plan would have a six-man Marine Scout / Sniper team walk under cover of darkness to the first of two designated observation posts near the summit of Sawtalo Sar (MAP), from where the Marines could get "eyes on" individual target structures within each of the NAIs, positively identify Shah and his men, and then radio the exact location of the targets. The main assault would occur at night (for maximum surprise), and as the intel evolved with the development of the operation, that night looked more and more like one with virtually no lunar illumination (late in the month of June, 2005), requiring the battalion to utilize the aviation assets of the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment (Airborne), AKA "The Night Stalkers." The main assault would have a team of twenty Marines from 1st Platoon, Company E, 2/3 raid the identified target structures, inserted by MH-47s of the 160th, while a company sized element would provide outer and inner cordon, they too inserted by MH-47s of the 160th. After taking down Shah's cell, Marines would remain in the area for weeks, undertaking a variety of presence missions (general patrols, medical capability, and general humanitarian assistance), and then wind down the operation. This was similar to the Stars model, only they would simply task a SOF aviation element, not a ground element.
Source:

9. The Plan (Slide 2 of 3)
Helicopter assets available to the Marines could not operate in low illumination environments.
To get SOF helicopters, SOF commanders wanted SOF ground force involvement .
Surveillance team changed to 4 SEALs.
However, during the time when 2/3 was relieving 3/3, other command echelons were turning over--commands at the senior level of the coalition in Afghanistan, including both of conventional forces and of special operations forces. These new commanders adhered to a much stricter interpretation of special operations doctrine, and would not allow 2/3 to have access to special operations aviation assets unless they included a SOF ground unit for the opening phases of the operation--and handed command and control over to SOF during these first phases. In order to proceed with the operation, the battalion was forced to include a special operations ground unit. Conventional Army aviation assault support (troop and equipment transport) available to the Marines in their joint environment could not, by doctrine, operate in those low lunar illumination conditions, otherwise, the Marines would have used conventional aviation and maintained solid command and control over all phases of the fully conventional operation.
Source:

10. The Plan (Slide 3 of 3) Insert SR team at night by helicopter.
Insertion point within 1 mile of a populated area.
SEALs would then conduct the direct action portion of the raid, and Marines would provide cordon security.
SEAL Pre-Mission Briefing Map
As a result, the battalion kept their overall plan, but the surveillance team of the initial phase would not be Marine Scout Snipers walking in under cover of darkness, rather, a four-man Navy SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team, who chose to insert by helicopter (at night) to a location within just one mile of a populated area (although sparsely populated, populated nonetheless). This was a substantial deviation to the plan, as the original reconnaissance and surveillance team for Red Wings was to be a standard Marine Scout / Sniper team "plussed up" with two other Marines for added security, and battalion planners felt that a helicopter insert would compromise the mission by revealing coalition force presence in this area. The plan then had U.S. Navy SEALs conducting the direct action portion of the raid with U.S. Marines undertaking the cordon portions of the operation. The Marines would then continue with their original plan after the raid. The details of the planning of Red Wings are comprehensively discussed in VICTORY POINT.
Source:

11. The Mission 27 June 27 2005 -- “Redwings is a go!”
4 SEALs inserted by helicopter at night on June 2005.
Established initial observation post.
Settled in to begin their mission.
Did we mention the geography? Little to no cover to hide…..

13. SEAL Background Team members:
LT Michael Murphy
HM2 Marcus Luttrell
STG2 Matthew “Axe” Axelson
GM2 Danny Dietz
Previous engagements with anti-coalition militia (ACM) members in Afghanistan.
Previous combat experience in Iraq.
Border control to stop influx of armed terrorists coming from Pakistan/Aghanistan.
The men were: Mr. Luttrell, a hospital corpsman second class at the time; Gunner's Mate Second Class Danny Dietz; Sonar Technician Second Class Matthew Axelson; and Lt. Michael Murphy, the officer in charge and one of Mr. Luttrell's closest friends. They were on a reconnaissance mission, trying to locate a guerrilla commander who was aligned with the Taliban.
On numerous SR missions – he describes their job as “looking for the misfit, the one man in the village who did not fit in, the hit man of the Taliban who was plainly not a farmer”
Source: Lone Survivor

14. Compromise What do you do?
SEALs discovered by three unarmed civilians with around one hundred goats
One youth: approximately 14 years old.
“No Taliban.”
Luttrell believes that they are goat herders from high country.
What do you do?
The goats all have little bells around their necks.
Detained the three
Attempted to contact headquarters – no response
Starts discussion of options
Source: Lone Survivor

15. Options Discussed Option 1: Kill the civilians
Problem: What to do with the goats & means of disposing of the bodies or others coming to look for them.
Option 2: Turn them loose
Problem: Possibly disclosing position & jeopardizing mission.
According to Luttrell, the SEALs had a discussion about what they should do.
Source: Lone Survivor
What about any other options??? You should discuss others such as tying up the goat herders and leaving them, or letting them go and moving to an exfil location (mission compromise = mission ends).

16. Discussion Why vote? Why or why not? Discuss: leadership
military discipline
law of war training

17. Decision and Results The vote:
Dietz abstains; Murphy discussed both sides;
“Axe” says kill; Luttrell says free;
Goat herders released –SEALs move to a better defensive position and prepared for possible compromise of their mission.
Approx 40 minutes later…SEALs attacked by between 30 and 40 ACM fighters.
According to Luttrell in Lone Survivor:
Axelson – voted to kill
Danny Dietz – abstained (didn’t care)
LT Murphy – pointed out the issues with the bodies and the goats – either way they would be discovered.
Discussion: Whether they would be considered murderers – (p. 203), and how they could end up in jail. “Deep in my warrior’s soul I knew it was nuts to let these goatherds go.”
Page 202 “The strictly correct military decision would stil be to kill them without further discussion, because we could not know their intentions.
Two souls: Christian soul to free them and militarily soul to execute the three Afghans.
Source: Lone Survivor
NOTE: according to individuals who reviewed Luttrell’s after action report (AAR), there was no vote.

18. Questions What training could have resolved this discussion?
ROE?
Law of Armed Conflict?
Other?
Who should have provided that training?
Judge Advocate?
Commander?
Could any training have prevented the SEALs from even considering this vote?

19. Specific Legal Training Prior to “Red Wings”
NSWTU Judge Advocate
Assigned to the NSWTU
Conducted pre-mission legal briefs prior to all SEAL missions, including law of armed conflict.
Briefed both the mission ROE and self-defense ROE to the SEALs on June.
CJSOTF-A Command Judge Advocate
Discussed the mission and self-defense ROE during the final pre-mission brief at CJSOTF-A on 26 June.
ROE and law of armed conflict briefings, discussions, and training all included unclassified self-defense authorities and actions when facing hostile acts and/or demonstrated hostile intent.
ROE / LOAC discussed combatants and threats against whom deadly force could be used.
Source: both the then-assigned NSWTU and CJSOTF-A judge advocates who reviewed this presentation.

20. ROE
Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.
Source: JOINT PUB. 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

21. CJTF-76 ROE Card (front side)
Version published in May 2004.

22. CJTF-76 ROE Card (back side)
Backside of the ROE card showing various training vignettes.

23. ROE 2005 OEF mission ROE Always retained the right of self defense
Required positive ID and “LIT”
Slightly different from OIF ROE
Always retained the right of self defense
According to Luttrell “Our rules of engagement in Afghanistan specified that we could not shoot, kill, or injure unarmed civilians.”
PID = positive identification
LIT = likely and identifiable threat

24. OEF ROE Particulars
PID: A reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target.
“likely and identifiable threat” - certain enemy forces who pose a likely and identifiable threat to friendly forces could be considered hostile and engaged and destroyed.
Source: Legal Lessons Learned From Iraq and Afghanistan Vol 1 (p. 96 & 100)
For the ROE in effect in June
The LIT standard was created with this and other related scenarios in mind: CENTCOM wanted friendly forces to have the authority to engage potential—not yet imminent or actual—threats that might arise during the conduct of specifically assigned missions. Thus, LIT was neither a declaration of hostility nor a restatement of SROE self-defense principles; it was an aggressive, self-defense-based ROE measure that fell
in between the two extremes.
So did the goat herders fall into this category??????

25. Luttrell’s Thoughts on ROE
Liberal politicians and media create ROE.
“However, from the standpoint of the U.S. soldier, Ranger, SEAL, Green Beret, or whatever, those ROE represent a very serious conundrum. We understand we must obey them because they happen to come under the laws of the country we are sworn to serve. But they represent a danger to us; they undermine our confidence on the battlefield in the fight against world terror. Worse yet, they make us concerned, disheartened, and sometimes hesitant.”
Source: Lone Survivor
ROE in general – p. 37
“Looking back, during our long journey in the C-130 to Afghanistan, I was more acutely aware of a growing program which faces U.S. forces on active duty in theaters of war all over the world. For me, it began in Iraq, the first murmurings from the liberal part of the U.S.A. that we were somehow in the wrong; brutal killers, bullying other countries; that we who put our lives on the line for our nation at the behest of our government should somehow be charged with murder for shooting our enemy.
“It’s been an insidious progression, the criticisms of the U.S. Armed Forces from politicians and from the liberal media, which knows nothing of combat, nothing of our training, and nothing of the mortal dangers we face out there on the front line. Each of the six of us in that aircraft en route to Afghanistan had constantly in the back of our minds the ever-intrusive rules of engagement.
“These are drawn up for us to follow by some politician sitting in some distant committee room in Washington, D.C. And that’s a very long way from the battlefield where a sniper’s bullet can blast your head, where the slightest mistake can cost your life, where you need to kill your enemy before he kills you.
“And those ROE are very specific: we may not open fire until we are fired upon or have positively identified our enemy and have proof of his intentions. Now, that’s all very gallant. But how about…when a bunch of guys wearing colored towels around their heads and brandishing AK-47s come charging over the horizon straight toward you? Do you wait for them to start killing your team, or do you mow the bastards down before they get a chance to do so?
“That situation might look simple in Washington, where the human rights of terrorists are often given high priority. And I am certain liberal politicians would defend their position to the death. Because everybody knows liberals have never been wrong about anything. You can ask them. Anytime.
“However, from the standpoint of the U.S. soldier, Ranger, SEAL, Green Beret, or whatever, those ROE represent a very serious conundrum. We understand we must obey them because they happen to come under the laws of the country we are sworn to serve. But they represent a danger to us; they undermine our confidence on the battlefield in the fight against world terror. Worse yet, they make us concerned, disheartened, and sometimes hesitant.
“I can say from first-hand experience that those rules of engagement cost the lives of three of the finest U.S. Navy SEALs who have ever served. I’m not saying that given the serious situation, those elite American warriors might not have died a little later; but they would not have died right then, and in my view would almost certainly have been alive today.
“I am hopeful that one day soon, the U.S. government will learn that we can be trusted. We know about bad guys, what they do, and, often, who they are. The politicians have chosen to send us into battle, and that’s our trade. We do what’s necessary. And in my view, once those politicians have elected to send us out to do what 99.9 percent of the country would be terrified to undertake, they should get the hell out of the way and stay there.
“…I realize I am not being specific, and I have no intention of being so. But these broad brushstrokes are designed to show that the rules of engagement are a clear and present danger, frightening young soldiers, who have been placed in harm’s way by their government, into believing they may be charged with murder if they defend themselves too vigorously I simply do not want to see some of the best young men in the country hesitating to join the elite branches of the U.S. Armed Services because they’re afraid they might be accused of war crimes by their own side, just for attacking the enemy.
“And I know one thing for certain. If I ever rounded a mountainside in Afghanistan and came face to face with Osama bin Laden, the man who masterminded the vicious, unprovoked attack on my country, killing 2,572 innocent American civilians in New York on 9/11, I’d shoot him dead, in cold blood. At which point, urged on by an outraged American media, the military would probably incarcerate me UNDER the jail, never mind IN it. And then I’d be charged with murder.
“Tell you what. I’d still shoot the sonofabitch.”

26. Luttrell’s Thoughts on ROE
“The truth is, any government that thinks war is somehow fair and subject to rules like a baseball game probably should not get into one”
“Faced with the murderous cutthroats of the Taliban, we are not fighting under the rules of Geneva IV article 4. We are fighting under the rules of Article mm…”
The other side doesn’t have rules – and so US Soldiers “have an extra element of fear and danger when [they] go into combat against the Taliban or al Qaeda – the fear of our own, the fear of what our own navy judge advocate general might rule against us, the fear of the American media and their unfortunate effect on American politicians. We all harbor fears about untrained, half-educated journalists who only want to justify their salaries and expense accounts.
Source: Lone Survivor (p.170)

27. Luttrell’s Thoughts on ROE
Developed by politicians:
- “the ever-intrusive rules of engagement”
- “very long way from the battlefield “
“And those ROE are very specific: we may not open fire until we are fired upon or have positively identified our enemy and have proof of his intentions”
p. 170
Source: Lone Survivor

28. US SROE Regarding Self Defense
A commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to defend that commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or hostile intent.
Force used should not exceed that which is necessary to decisively counter the hostile act or intent and ensure the continued safety of US forces or other persons and property they are ordered to protect.
US forces may employ such force in self-defense only so long as the hostile force continues to present an imminent threat.
Source: CJCS, INSTR A, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES,(15 Jan. 2000), which were in effect at the time of the RED WINGS operation.
See 2005 CJCS SROE instruction for changes…..

29. ROE Lessons Learned (Slide 1 of 3)
Failure to understand the distinction between mission accomplishment ROE and self-defense became apparent in both OEF and OIF…
…when considerable time and effort was spent attempting to create training packages aimed at developing a specific level of identification before either returning fire or taking other actions in response to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.
Source: Legal Lessons Learned From Iraq and Afghanistan Vol 2 (p. 131)
While Luttrell makes no reference to ROE training – the stated confusion on PID could have contributed to Luttrells’ version/statements on the ROE as he viewed it “after the fact” and how he perceived that the ROE complicated their mission.
In the book Lone Survivor, Luttrell clearly understands they were able to target key Al Qaeda leaders – but referenced not being able to shoot until being fired upon. This statement clearly shows a fundamental misunderstanding between the mission ROE and self-defense ROE.
The question then becomes – was there a self defense issue with regard to the goat herders????

30. ROE Lessons Learned (Slide 2 of 3)
This training should have emphasized the law of war concepts of necessity and proportionality, which apply to self-defense situations, rather than on developing a level of identification required under the ROE for offensive operations that does not apply to self-defense situations.
What many training packages failed to recognize, or appreciate, is that supplemental ROE measures do not apply to, or limit, the obligation to take all appropriate actions in self-defense.
Source: Legal Lessons Learned From Iraq and Afghanistan Vol 2 (p. 131)
While Luttrell makes no reference to ROE training – this confusion on ID could have contributed to Luttrells’ version of ROE and how it complicated their mission.
In the book he clearly understands they were able to target key Al Qaeda leaders – but referenced not being able to shoot until being fired upon. Appears to be a disconnect between self defense…..
The question then becomes – could you make a self defense case????

31. ROE Lessons Learned (Slide 3 of 3)
The mixing of mission accomplishment supplemental ROE concepts and self-defense concepts may prove dangerous for two critical reasons:
(1) it unnecessarily complicates self-defense and creates the potential for hesitation; and
(2) it creates uncertainty and confusion at the tactical level which can foster an attitude of acting independently whenever rules seem to stand in the way of mission accomplishment.
Source: Legal Lessons Learned From Iraq and Afghanistan Vol 2 (p. 131)
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, misuse of the term rules of engagement (ROE), led to significant confusion and frustration for operators and judge advocates (JAs) alike. Perhaps the most common example of the confusion created by imprecise use of ROE is illustrated when training units or briefing staff members on ROE. Invariably, the initial focus is the Secretary of Defense/President of the United States (SECDEF/POTUS) approved supplemental measures published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and promulgated by the responsible combatant commander.
Hypothetical scenarios are often posed with the ultimate question of whether a service member may fire at someone or something. Often in these scenarios, the solution is not found in the applicable supplemental ROE, but rather in the U.S. self-defense policy and procedures which are based on the principles of necessity—identifying either a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent—and proportionality It is imperative to ensure commanders, as well as the service members who execute the commander’s plans, understand what ROE are as well as what they are not, and further that supplemental ROE measures apply only to the use of force for mission accomplishment and do not affect or limit the application of force in self-defense.715

32. Blogs/Book Reviews
A review of a wide variety of blogs demonstrated a widespread perception that ROE hinders mission accomplishment
Many soldiers “added” that ROE often cost American lives
A few soldiers took offense at placing the blame on ROE – and indicated that even “regular” soldiers practiced what to do if compromised – a common occurrence in that terrain.
Points to a possible breakdown – are soldiers missing the message? Or is blaming this on politicians a way to live/deal with survivor guilt?
Customer reviews on Amazon.com -
Customer Review
  16 of 25 people found the following review helpful: Underwhelming, October 11, 2007
By Middle Of Somewhere I respect Luttrell and what he did, I don't respect the fact that he has used his story, in part, to push an obvious agenda. I spent a year in Eastern Afghanistan as an infantryman and have been on OPs (observations posts) that were compromised. In Afghanistan it's virtually impossible not to be compromised. In these instances, murdering (I am not going to mesh words by calling it anything else) Afghan civilians was never an option. There are legitimate concerns about the ROE (rules of engagement), but this is not one of them. In no way is it ever permissible to shoot unarmed civilians based upon the assumption that they might bring harm upon you later on. Contrary to some people's perception, combat is not an "anything goes" environment where soldiers can shoot first and ask questions later. Nor should it be. The ROE exists for a specific reason, and it has nothing to do political correctness. I'll spare anyone a lecture about the more subtle points of counterinsurgency tactics; but if anyone is curious about why we have a ROE, they should read General Petraeus' (remember him?) book, which makes the best and most articulate case for the ROE. I am not sure why Luttrell chose to blame a political ideology for what happened to his team, but I was disappointed that he would claim that, if but for the liberals, it would ever be morally or legally acceptable to shoot unarmed civilians. The fact that the Afghans most likely went on to compromise their position is simply a hard fact of fighting an insurgency. Luttrell surely was aware of this when he volunteered to join a high speed unit that was created to operate in exactly these circumstances, and I'd be surprised if the SEALs had not planned for this exact contingency in depth. As an infantry scout, I know we considered, planned, and rehearsed actions upon contact and actions upon soft compromise. To the inevitable flames that will be incoming, I'll say that I usually don't believe in second guessing the actions of the people in the field. However, Luttrell chose to publish his story and was paid to do so. That puts this manner in the public square and opens the issue up for discussion. Thus, while I respect Luttrell, I found the book to be a bit heavy handed for my taste. I would have personally enjoyed it more if Luttrell would have simply told his story with less bluster and political commentary.

33. Observations What if they chose option 1? Media concerns?
Public perceptions?
Moral considerations?
Legal ramifications (criminal punishment)?

34. Rest of the Story… LT Murphy used cell phone to call for help
Awarded Medal of Honor
Murphy, Dietz & Axelson were killed
Dietz and Axelson each awarded the Navy Cross
Rescue team killed by RPG fired by hostile forces.
Most SEALs killed in single incident.
Luttrell escaped and was rescued by a local Afghan shepherd.
Evaded ACM forces for several days before returning to US forces
Murphy moves out into the open to get a cell phone signal because his COMM wasn’t working. According to Luttrell he was shot in the abdomen but still returned to the position to continue the fight.

38. The Rescue Pentagon releases names of men killed in helicopter crash
Special Ops member rescued in Afghanistan
Pentagon releases names of men killed in helicopter crash
Monday, July 4, 2005; Posted: 9:53 a.m. EDT (13:53 GMT)
(CNN) -- One member of a U.S. special operations reconnaissance team missing in Afghanistan since Tuesday has been rescued, a U.S. official told CNN.
The team member "evaded the enemy and was successfully rescued by U.S. forces," said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity.
No other details were released because the search for other members of the team continues, the official said.
A helicopter crashed Tuesday while bringing reinforcements to the team, killing all 16 service members aboard.
Source:
U.S. officials say the commandos kept up a running fire fight with their pursuers for more than two miles. The known survivor recalls seeing two of his friends shot. At one point he blacked out, possibly from a mortar round landing close by. When he regained consciousness, two of his teammates--Petty Officer 2nd Class Danny Dietz, 25, and Lieutenant Michael Murphy, 29--were dead, and a third had vanished in the darkness and fog. The surviving SEAL dragged himself at least another mile up into the mountains. It was there he was found four days later by Gulab the shepherd.
After taking the SEAL to Sabari-Minah, Gulab called a village council and explained that the American needed protection from Taliban hunters. It was the SEAL's good fortune that the villagers were Pashtun, who are honor-bound never to refuse sanctuary to a stranger. By then, said Gulab, "the American understood that we were trying to save him, and he relaxed a bit."
The Taliban was not so agreeable. That night the fighters sent a message to the villagers: "We want this infidel." A firm reply from the village chief, Shinah, shot back. "The American is our guest, and we won't give him up as long as there's a man or a woman left alive in our village." As a precaution, the villagers moved the injured commando out of Gulab's house and hid him in a stable overnight, until it was safe for Gulab to make the six-hour trek down to the U.S. base at Asadabad and report that the SEAL--by then the subject of an intense search--was alive. Sometime later, Gulab went back to his village and then returned to Asadabad with the commando, this time reuniting the wounded and weary SEAL with his jubilant comrades.

39. How the Shepherd Saved the SEAL MONDAY, JUL
How the Shepherd Saved the SEAL MONDAY, JUL. 11, 2005 By TIM MCGIRK/KABUL
A crackle in the brush. That's the sound the Afghan herder recalls hearing as he walked alone through a pine forest last month. When he looked up, he saw an American commando, his legs and shoulder bloodied. The commando pointed his gun at the Afghan. "Maybe he thought I was a Taliban," says the shepherd, Gulab. "I remembered hearing that if an American sticks up his thumb, it is a friendly gesture. So that's what I did."
Consider this: the Afghan was willing to help the SEAL, and the SEAL wanted his help, but just days earlier the SEAL wanted to kill a similar shepherd who compromised their position.

40. April 16, 2008
Ahmad Shah (AKA Mullah Ismail) killed in a shootout with Pakistani police.
One of three M4s pillaged by Ahmed Shah and his cell during the REDWINGS ambush. (Photo courtesy
of author.)
Source: “Operation RED WINGS, What really happened?” by Ed Darack

41. Conclusion Outcome was not a result of the ROE.
Under the circumstances, killing the civilians would have been a crime.
Pre-mission legal training was conducted; commanders must train ROE.
Results due more to lack of proper communications, planning, Command and Control, and “fog of war.”

43. Questions