1. Ten Years of Failed Transition to Democracy: the struggle between modernity and feudalism in Mexican society March 31, 2011 A personal point of view of Antonio Puron Research seminar

2. | 1 Feels very hot! What is the temperature??

3. | 2 Will change thermostat setting No air. Damn thing is broken! What to do????

4. | 3 Feedback control loop in physical systems Output SYSTEM Sensor Control system Actuator Input Set point Externalities

5. | 4 Society is the most complex dynamic system Social behavior SOCIETY Social feeling and comfort POWER GROUPS Values/behaviors Public policies Input Goals Externalities Social control mechanisms

6. | 5 Feedback control loop of our political complex dynamic system is broken Social behavior SOCIETY Social feeling and comfort POWER GROUPS Values/behaviors Public policies Input Goals Externalities Social control mechanisms Oligarchies Disconnect Disconnects

7. | 6 My argument Contrary to generalized belief 2000 did not signal Mexico’s transition to a democratic political system. We are in significant risk of backtracking. The current state of the political forces is of stressed equilibrium. Central in how this situation unfolds in the near future is society’s willingness -for the first time in our history- to understand, create consensus, adopt and muster the courage to embrace modernity, to conceive the free individual as the source of political legitimacy and power, and to establish limits to de jure and de facto interest groups. A.The so-called “2000 transition” was not centered around the adoption of democratic values, but rather in ousting the PRI and achieve fair, clean and competed elections. Once in power PAN’s agenda was of incrementalist evolution rather that a break from the past B. Fox and Calderón were unsuccessful in driving an institution-building agenda out of lack of vision, imagination, courage, circumstances or outright opposition form traditional or new political actors C.Today’s dominant political forces are anti-democratic and disarticulated from the citizenry, resulting in a suboptimal stable equilibrium dominated by oligarchic groups that have captured many of our institutions and control or co-opt a passive body politic. Outside actors, such as organized crime, are actively trying to influence them with various degrees of success D. Our institutional and legal infrastructure has significant internal inconsistencies, is inflexible and archaic. Rule of law is an oxymoron if the law has been what the strongman du jour wished E. At the heart of the problem lie the citizens’ core values. Reared in feudal and corpora- tist traditions and having aspirations that are sufficed under the current arrangement for the majority of the people, only few groups understand and desire liberal democracy

8. | 7 A. The so-called “2000 transition” was not centered around the adoption of democratic values 1.PRI system legitimacy was destroyed 2.Fox was given the benefit of the doubt 3.By 2000 fair, clean and contested elections were “a given” benefiting from the huge investments done since 1990 4.PAN failed to secure congressional majorities

9. | 8 Towards party membersTowards the people Quid pro quo Political and economic upward mobility Economic and power rewards Quid pro quo Improvement of economic and social conditions Peace “Tolerable” situations Breaks in quid pro quo Lack of mechanisms to solve disputes Ineffectiveness to co-opt the losers Breaks in quid pro quo Repression Economic mismanagement Corruption Catatonic government Electoral fraud in 1988 PRI system legitimacy was destroyed

10. | 9 Towards party membersTowards the people Quid pro quo A “fair” chance at extraordinary political and economic upward mobility as long as you remained disciplined: and loyal to chain of command (the president, your boss) and party as supreme value Significant economic and power rewards (special treatment in society, often with life-long concessions and handouts) Quid pro quo Continued improvement of economic and social conditions specially to those inside and pliant to the system Generalized peace in the realm “Tolerable” situations for those outside the system, specially in taxation, dispensation of justice and corruption and bribery Breaks in quid pro quo Lack of mechanisms to solve philosophical disputes inside PRI: technocrats vs. social issues-solvers (“politicos”) Ineffectiveness to co-opt the losing side and keep it inside the party, resulting in PRD splintering to the left in 1987-88 Breaks in quid pro quo 1968 popular repression Economic mismanagement from 1970 to 1988 resulting in hyperinflation and generalized lowering of living standards Out-of-control corruption Catatonic government reaction to the 1985 earthquake Perception of widespread electoral fraud in 1988 presidential elections (the only that mattered) PRI system legitimacy was destroyed

11. | 10 HeydayMismanagementLegitimacy lost Gridlock Chamber of Deputies HeydayMismanagementLegitimacy lost Gridlock Presidential election PRIPAN/rightPRD/left Power Balance and Gridlock PRI left splinters into PRD

12. | 11 Voter participation in presidential elections Total votes Proportion of population with voting rights* PRI PAN/right PRD/left * Women voted since 1953. Voting age was lowered to 18 in 1970 Heyday Mismanagement Legitimacy lost Gridlock

13. | 12 Party SenateChamber of Deputies 2000-200620002003 PAN PRI PRD Partido Verde Others 47 59 16 5 1 207 208 53 16 148 203 97 17 35 PAN failed to secure congressional majorities

14. | 13 B. Fox and Calderón were unsuccessful in driving an institution-building agenda 1.Legislative agenda didn’t tackle substantive issues 2.New players had increased power with little accountability to constituents 3.Less party discipline: alliances and defections 4.To prevent PRI comeback, PAN + PRD alliances have formed around personalities, not issues 5.However party discipline in Congress traditionally has been very high

15. | 14 Quality of democracy agenda Rating* 1-low 5-high TrendFox initiatives Calderón initiatives 1.Rule of law 2.Participation 3.Competition 4.Vertical accountability 5.Horizontal accountability 6.Respect to civil and political freedoms 7.Equality 8.Responsiveness 2.8 2.2 2.5 1.3 3.8 2.5 2.0 Energy Labor Electoral Zapatista Fiscal Airport Oportunidades Enciclomedia Mortgages /housing Penal Fiscal Public servants pensions Social security Security Refinery Pemex governance Labor * Ratings based on personal assessment by Antonio Puron, according to Introduction of “Assessing the Quality of Democracy”, L. Diamond and L. Morlino Successful initiatives in bold Legislative agenda didn’t tackle substantive issues

16. | 15 Actors that have gained political independence (years tenure, reelection) Source of powerHow nominated How office is gained Governors (6, No R) Majors of most important municipalities (3, No R) Heads of congressional commissions and co-ordinations (3 house, 6 senate, No R) Heads of major unions, most of the former PRI federal workers (often practically for life, R) Discretionary fiscal funds Legislative agenda Budget negotiation Political horse-trading Discretionary funds Votes for funds Control of congressional groups Party Cúpula decision Cúpula decision Union Cúpula decision Simple majority Inter-party Cúpula negotiation Internally “supervised” election by union members New players had increased power with little accountability to constituents

17. | 16 PAN PRD PRI Puebla Hidalgo Coah TBD Oaxaca Mexico ? Sinaloa ex-PRI Durango ex-PRI Guerrero ex-PRI Zacatecas ex PRD San Luis Potosi ex PAN public servant Winner in bold Alliance Defection Ver, Yuc, Chih Less party discipline: alliances and defections 2009-10

18. | 17 PRI wins as incumbent Very effective as challenger capturing defections 90 % effectiveness No anti- PRI alliance No candidate defections PRI wins as incumbent by landslides CHIH, YUC, TAMP, QR, TLAX VER Landslides Close call Candidate defections PRI captures defection and wins as challenger ZAC from PRD SLP, AGS from PAN Miffed PRD PAN seating govn and public servant PRI has defection and loses as challenger GRO to PRDMiffed PRI PRD + PAN alliance Defectors from incumbent PRI PRI wins DGO close callMiffed PRI PRI loses SIN close callMiffed PRI Candidates from alliance PRI wins as incumbent HGOPAN candidate PRI loses as incumbent OAX PUE PRD candidate PAN candidate PRI loses effectiveness as incumbent 40 % effectiveness PAN + PRD alliances have formed around personalities, not issues 2009-2010

19. | 18 Party discipline in Congress still is very high PAN PRD PAN PRI SOURCE: J. Weldon, 2010 PRD Index of party discipline - LXI Congress PRI 1 percentage of times voting in the way dictated by party whip

20. | 19 C. Today’s dominant political forces result in a suboptimal stable equilibrium dominated 1.Three main oligarchic power groups 2.Cúpulas control access to power 3.Major electoral “counter-reform” enacted as a constitutional amendment in 2007 4.No incentive for change 5.Survival of small parties based on selling-out to highest bidder 6.Exclusionary rules within oligopolies

21. | 20 * Formally PRI sector, not union Unions Political parties Business PRI PAN PRD PVEM Panal Convergencia Trabajo Petroleum Electricity Social security Teachers Universities Bureaucracy Urban services Mexico City CTM Congreso del Trabajo Telefonistas CNC* - campesinos. Consejo Coordinador Empresarial Consejo Mexicano Hombres Negocio Coparmex Concanaco Canacintra Civil society/ electorate Outside influence groups : church, drug lords Three main oligarchic power groups

22. | 21 Electorate G1G2G3Gn Cúpula Mechanisms to reach power: Closed/controlled by cúpula, proportional representation Slivered within power groups Obscure Funded by taxes Shielded from challenge Selectorates disarticulated with electorate Control mechanisms: Handouts Corruption Repression Prohibition by law Modus operandi within cúpula: Closed/controlled Obscure Horse-trading Shielded from challenge Disarticulated with electorate Legitimacy? Cúpulas control access to power breaking feedback mechanisms

23. | 22 Elements of electoral counter-reform Reshaping of “permanent” IFE council allowing parties to define who should be “independent” members Free access to electronic media by established parties (other media, internet left out) Prohibition of “negative” campaigns (criteria to be interpreted by IFE) Prohibition of private party access to electronic media on political issues (criteria to be interpreted by IFE) Ceilings of expenditures on political campaigns Mechanisms to sanction parties and private citizens Exhaustive control and detail (by far the most extensive in Latin America)

24. | 23 No incentive for change – restrictions on political marketplace imposed by cúpulas Cúpulas have opposed measures that would make them more accountable to a “feedback cycle” from the electorate, ensuring permanence of the inner circle under unsupervised rules. The political process has been laden with rules that restrict participation in the political marketplace and make it more rigid: No-reelection at any level of government Unsupervised primaries Unsupervised use of public funds by political parties Prohibition of private funding to political parties Unwillingness to reduce proportional representation deputies/senators currently assigned on a discretionary basis by party leaders Severe restriction to criticism of parties in media Prohibition of purchases of media time for political statements by private agents Prohibition of independent candidacies Stringent rules limiting political party formation Limited possibilities of “iniciativa popular” (e.g. propositions on ballots)

25. | 24 Congress and political parties are disarticulated from citizens Number of chambers in Congress Number of members in Congress Duration of terms Deputies enact laws Deputies approve budget Who is majority party in Congress Can name a federal deputy Have interest in Congress debates Have tried to reach a MOC* Think it is useful to reach a MOC* Feel represented by a political party Feel represented by the executive SOURCE: Mexican Congress, 2003 Percent of respondents who know 2003 * Member of Congress

26. | 25 Funding rules ensure continued recognition for PRI, PAN, PRD even though citizens do not feel represented. New entrants are kept out. SOURCE: IFE http://www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFEv2/DEPPP/PartidosPoliticosyFinanciamiento/ DEPPPfinanciamiento/financiamientopublicopartidosnacionales /Fina-Publico-PPN-1997-2010.pdfhttp://www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFEv2/DEPPP/PartidosPoliticosyFinanciamiento/ Recognition Percent Federal funding 97-09 Percent Represents me PRI PAN PRD PT PVEM CONV PANAL

27. | 26 Mexico Uruguay Argentina Brazil SOURCE: Aplicación de la Reforma Electoral de 2007/2008, International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 2009 Electoral infrastructure and processes are very costly Cost per effective vote US$/vote Avg. 13 Lat- Am countries

28. | 27 D. Institutional and legal infrastructure with significant internal inconsistencies, inflexible and archaic 1.Internal inconsistencies in constitution 2.Constitutional reforms are often incomplete 3.Constitutional review is only nascent, amparo used to block expeditious justice 4.Resolutions of the Supreme Court or TEPJF are not carried out 5.Political and business actors and populace can break the law with no consequences 6.Procurement of justice is random, inefficient, biased and unreliable 7.General distrust of justice institutions 8.Structured in a way that makes change nearly impossible 9.SCJN persistently refuses to hear arguments about constitutional inconsistencies, arguing procedural questions

29. | 28 Internal inconsistencies in constitution and legal framework O riginal text of 1917, which had logical inconsistencies from its inception, has been reformed 433 times Examples of impossible-to-meet guarantees defined at constitutional level: –Housing for every “worker” –Health and food for everyone (no nuances) –Mandatory high-school –Prohibits gobernantes (¨people in government) to participate in election processes –Contending parties cannot speak badly about their adversaries –Prohibits freedom of speech for individuals in media –Prohibits political action outside established parties

30. | 29 Due process is not followed in majority of judicial cases Self-incriminated on the spot Lawyer absent when interrogated Not informed of right to a phone call Not informed of right to remain silent SOURCE: La Reforma Penal: La Guerra Util, Marien Rivera, CIDAC, 2010 Difference between investi- gation and trial not informed Percent of convicts serving prison terms 2009 Roughed or hurt by police

31. | 30 Procurement of justice is random, inefficient, biased and unreliable 98% of crimes go unpunished Only 6 % of crimes are denounced/reported Most never get investigated Most suspects aren’t indicted 92% of accusations lack evidence 95% of defendants are found guilty and sentenced 93% of defendants never see their judges Trial duration takes months/years Though a constitutional right, presumption of innocence isn’t followed Due process isn’t regularly followed No oral/recorded trials No juries.

32. | 31 E. At the heart of the problem lie citizens’ core values. 1.Mexico has never experienced democracy 2.Mexicans at large are fiercely nationalistic, proud of key corporatist/feudal characteristics of the current system and have ingrained anti-liberal beliefs 3.Growing disenchantment with the current experiment with democracy 4.Groups that understand and believe in liberal democracy and citizen action, while influential and increasing in number, are still in clear minority, and are blocked form the political marketplace by the current power oligopolies 5.There are no leaders within the current power oligopolies that have liberal-democratic convictions, willing to risk their survival and political success on these values (in the way of Mandela and Felipe Gonzalez) 6.Thus, the inner circle cúpulas, holding the office and the purse don’t answer to citizens–or need to-, can remain in power on their own volition and have no incentives to change the system. The electorate doesn't have the organization, conviction or courage to bring cúpulas to account

33. | 32 Electorate G1G2G3Gn Cúpula Mechanisms to reach power / electorate feedback Legitimacy and control mechanisms Modus operandi within cúpula Mexico has never experienced democracy

34. | 33 PeriodAccess to powerLegitimacy and tools of power SelectoratesPermea bility Role of electorate Pre- Columb ian Dynastic War Beliefs, traditions and religion Violence Wise men Aristocracy Very lowinexistent ColonialMandate from metropolis Spanish aristocracy Force Grants, monopolies, concessions Spanish king and court Very lowInexistent Indepen -dence Caudillismo War Force Yearning for independence War leadersMilitary, intellectu al elite Limited to elites Early XIX Caudillismo War Force Yearning for peace Caudillo inner circle Military, intellectu al elite Limited to elites Refor- ma Caudillismo War Brief period of liberalism in cúpula Nationalism, patriotism Dismantling of established powers, struggle conservatives-liberals Party leadershipMilitary, intellectu al elite More spread, but still limited to elites DiazCaudillismo Dictatorship Force Peace and prosperity Diaz and inner circle Inner circle Rubber-stamp Revolu- tion Caudillismo War Force Brutal leadership Military leadersInner circle Limited to options put forth by winners PRICaudillismo Succession “contract” within cúpula (presidential appointment tapado) Corporatist handouts Peace in realm Tolerable corruption Repression President “consulting” revolutionary family Within PRI sectors Rubber-stamp 2000 transi- tion Infighting within parties through internal processes shielded from public scrutiny Yearning for change Perception of honesty Chance at bat No witch hunt Current cúpula leaders Within oligopolic sectors Limited selection within offerings by cúpulas

35. | 34 Mexicans at large are fiercely nationalistic, proud of key corporatist/feudal characteristics of the current system and have ingrained anti-liberal beliefs. Extreme nationalism Convinced of governmental mismanagement, but reluctant to allow private ownership /management / association Admiration of people that game the system Meritocracy is cruel Government handouts are free Rich individuals “must have robbed”. Wealth is evil. Risk taking is bad Content with bad quality public services as long as they are free Markets are misunderstood

36. | 35 Mexicans at large are fiercely nationalistic, proud of key corporatist/feudal characteristics of the current system and have ingrained anti-liberal beliefs. Extreme nationalism, while longing for US-style prosperity Convinced that icons of governmental control are mismanaged, but reluctant to allow private ownership/management/association (petroleum-Pemex, electricity-CFE, education-SENTE, public transportation-Metro, health-IMSS, higher education-UNAM, many others): –Convinced of corruption in unions and “public managers/servants” –Unwilling to allow private, let alone foreign, control of large swathes of economic activity. “Loss” of Mexican banking industry still thought of as mandated (conspiracy by Washington-IMF-imperialists) –Public ownership of some of these entities creates sense of pride –perhaps only sense of pride- in the international context, particularly Pemex –Assumption that entitlements requires operation through governmental bureaucracies, because private operation may be more efficient but skims the public enterprise and is corrupt Admiration of people that game the system: selling or inheriting plazas (government union slots), working in government payroll (“el que no vive en el presupuesto vive en el error”) even by purchasing positions from the union, pensions before 50, holding two simultaneous government jobs, paying mordida -for slots in street vending, avoiding fines or to settle in public or private property-, influence trafficking, crony capitalism concessions Meritocracy is cruel, begging for and getting concessions from powerful people is the way to climb Belief that government handouts are free, without any consideration for taxpayers. Government, particularly Federal, is responsible for people's problems, specially for “those with less or disadvantaged” (campesinos, single mothers, the old, landless, natural disaster victims) Profound belief that rich individuals “must have robbed”. Wealth is evil. Risk taking is bad, either to acquire wealth or better lifestyles (e.g. migrants or businessmen) can either find sorrow -and eventually see the light, humiliated but wiser- or be crooks or cease to be Mexicans Are content with bad quality public services as long as they are free (eg. public education, electricity, municipal services), but complaint bitterly when prices/tariffs are brought to economic equilibrium. Assumption is that government responsibility is to subsidize or provide them for free Markets are misunderstood (goods, services, political interchange), and believed to be capitalist-tools

37. | 36 Mexicans are conservative, nationalistic and ambivalent about US (admire its economic power not its democracy) Support capital punishment Support same-sex marriage Support legalizing marijuana Are pro-choice Attend religious services Admire US economy/wealth Admire US society-government Think Mexicans in US have better quality of life Afraid Mexicans in US lose identity Very important to protect Mexican identity in front of US Would migrate to US (illegally) SOURCE: Rethinking North America, EKOS, 2004, Consulta Mitofsky http://www.consulta.mx/ Percent of respondents 2007 30%

38. | 37 Corruption in values involves many day-to-day situations Lying if no one gets hurt Cheating in exams Stupid to respect law if there are no consequences Free-rides in public transport Taking gifts for favors Buying scalped tickets Evade VAT- no invoice Buying pirate merchandizes Money for public services Cheating in taxes Paying mordida -avoid a ticket Stealing power from grid SOURCE: Transparencia Mexicana, 2007 Percent of respondents agreeing that statement is right 2007 richpoor

39. | 38 A sense that “others/system” are corrupt Who is most corrupt? Index Politicians Deputies Police Judges Union leaders Public servants Business people Merchants Newsmen/commentators Military Teachers Priests Myself 9.0 8.7 8.3 8.0 7.6 7.5 6.7 6.5 5.8 5.7 4.9 3.3 SOURCE: Transparencia Mexicana, 2007 Why, who is to blame? % Politicians and public servants are corrupt Laws are not respected All of us are to blame Laws were made for the benefit of the powerful Other reasons Don’t know 36 23 15 7 14 4 What to do? % Public education Organize civil society Punish/reward mechanisms Change laws, make them easier 36 30 21 13

40. | 39 No confidence in institutions Church IFE SCJN Business President Banks Senators Parties SOURCE: Mitofsky 2010 Universities Army Media Unions Deputies Police

41. | 40 Weakly identified Strongly identified Not at all No confidence in political parties Identification with a political party SOURCE: Encuesta Nacional en Viviendas Del 25 al 30 de noviembre de 2005 IdentifiedNot identified Strong Weak PAN PRI PRD Positives minus negatives 1 (%) 1 Percent of respondents with positive feelings minus negative feelings

42. | 41 No confidence in unions - 2005 1 Percent of respondents with positive feelings minus negative feelings SOURCE: Encuesta Nacional en Viviendas Del 25 al 30 de noviembre de 2005 Positives – negatives (% of people) 1 Where do you work? Social security leaders Education leader (EEG) Petroleum leaders Unemployed-62%-15% Government-36%-28% Parastatal-62%-67% Private employee -66%-35% Own business -60%-31% Independent-78%-30% Average-62%-25% Political affiliation Social security leaders Education leader (EEG) Petroleum leaders PAN-68%-9% PRI-53%-9% PRD-43%-41% Other-100%+100% None-69%-36% Don’t know-45%-50% Average-62%-25%

43. | 42 Distrust of the rich and the legal system Higher education Elementary No studies SOURCE: Encuesta de valores, CIDAC Tufts University, 2011 Percent of respondents 2011 High school “Law is made for powerful people, and to protect them” Rich skim the rest For rich to exist there must be poor Poor must be helped Rich have to help poor Percent of respondents 2011 Moral obligation of rich serf value system

44. | 43 Mexican student performance in pisa is very low, particularly in public schools Math scores PISA 2006 FUENTE: OECD, INEE 300350400450500550 Kyrgistan Qatar Tunez Brasil Argentina Jordania Colombia Montenegro Bulgaria Rumania Tailandia Chile Indonesia Turquia Uruguay Colombia Serbia Israel Italia Grecia Portugal Croacia EUA Rusia Azerbaijan España Noruega Lux Hungría Polonia Latvia Lituania Inglaterra Francia Irlanda Suecia Alemania Eslovenia Austria Islandia Rep Checa Dinamarca Estonia Australia Bélgica N. Zelanda Japón Lich. Macao Canadá Suiza Holanda Corea Hong Kong Finlandia Taipei 300350400450500550 OAX TAB COAH CAMP BCS PUE TLX PROM PUBL MICH Q.R. VER YUC NAY BCN TAM SIN DGO SON ZAC SLP GTO HGO CHIH DF JAL MEX CHIS QRO MOR AGS NL 90 %80706050403020105 % Average PISA score Percentage of students above acore MEX PRIVADAS 90 %80706050403020105 % Public Private

45. | 44 ENLACE SCORES 2010 – Third grade math and Spanish average Frequency percent Score 1 Source: SEP Public Private 1 Math and Spanish weighted average 3.0 % 1 in 33 517.5 537.2 602.6

46. | 45 Satisfied with low-quality free public services It’s free Good teacher quality Student socio-economic level More liberal than private Sports and culture School safety Only one that offers curriculum I want Languages Other SOURCE: Parametría http://www.parametria.com.mx/DetalleEstudio.php?E=4254 What is the most important characteristic of public education? 2010

47. | 46 Government employee distribution 2006 Administration and clerical Education Health Armed forces Total 1.4 / 1.73.3 / 1.70.8 / 3.9 0.4 / 0.02.4 / 1.60 / 5.5 1.4 / 0.2~0 / 0.20 / 0.5 0.6 / 1.600 Total FederalStateMunicipal 3.8 / 3.55.7 / 3.50.8 / 9.9 5.5 / 7.3 2.8 / 7.1 1.4 / 0.9 0.6 / 1.6 10.3 / 17.0 Economically active population (EAP) 42,0 / 141,7 million / % EAP Source: Sistema de cuentas nacionales, Informe de gobierno, BLS Large segments of population fall under governmental payroll and handout systems

48. | 47 Low satisfaction with democracy SOURCE: Latinbarometro 2010 Percent respondents answering very satisfied + satisfied Uruguay Chile Brazil Venezuela Panamá Ecuador Costa Rica Colombia Nicaragua Paraguay Honduras Bolivia Argentina Dominican R. El Salvador Peru Guatemala México Latin America

49. | 48 Economically have progressed since 1997 However, Juan Perez uncritically conceives representatives as a top-down force In 2000 a democracy was not born, instead a societal control structure died (alas, not completely) Our conundrum: how to create a citizen’s mindframe around a diverse, fragmented society, with ordinary -no statesmen/supermen- representatives F. This suggests several potential alternative scenarios in the next five to ten years: 1) “Crisis and regression” 2) “3 yards and a cloud of dust” 3) “Dragged to modernity” 4) “Waiting for Superman … or … perhaps for Lex Luthor” 5) “Twitter democracy” G. Several no-regrets moves and some game-changing bold courageous actions

50. | 49 None of the above means that we haven’t progressed since 1997, when PRI lost control of Congress. Indeed we have a population that is mostly middle class and better off than even 10 years ago. However, the average Juan Perez still conceives his/her representatives as a top-down force that exerts state rights on the populace, and not in terms of free individuals that empower representatives capable of restricting their personal freedoms (“no taxation without representation”). In 2000 a democracy was not born, instead a societal control structure did die, with all the consequences of such a momentous event. We have indeed advanced in “electoral” democracy, not in citizen’s democracy. Our conundrum: how to create a citizen’s mindframe around a diverse, fragmented society, with ordinary -no statesmen/supermen- representatives, agreeing on matters of mutual benefit espousing few cast-in-stone convictions (how to make respect for freedom and tolerance be in the list?) F. This suggests several potential alternative scenarios in the next five to ten years: 1) “Crisis and regression”, 2) “3 yards and a cloud of dust”, 3) “Dragged to modernity”, 4) “Waiting for Superman … or … perhaps for Lex Luthor” and 5) “Twitter democracy” G. There are several no-regrets moves and some game-changing bold courageous actions that should be relentlessly pursued by civil society in the short term

51. | 50 “Cúpula” Inner-circle Oligarchy Corporatist groups Middle class Base of pyramid How far down does the “feedback control loop” reaches, or needs to reach? Are these cartel oligarchies? What are the core values of each circle? Role of freedom?

52. | 51 F. Potential alternative scenarios in the next five to ten years: 1.“Crisis and regression” - though probably not to the status quo ex ante 1997 2.“3 yards and a cloud of dust” – just keep working through the system, be realistic, small gains with lots of pain will eventually get us there 3.“Dragged to modernity” – advancements in technology and globalization – mainly exposure to democratic cultures- will make it inevitable. Can the US tolerate a failed democracy in Mexico? 4.“Waiting for Superman … or … perhaps for Lex Luthor” – can we risk emergence of a Mandela … or a Chavez? 5.“Twitter democracy” – Ground-roots movement of dissatisfied citizens aided by technology

53. | 52 G. Several no-regrets moves, and a few game-changing bold courageous actions Key strategic thrusts No-regrets easier movesGame changers Increase accountability to citizens of government at all levels Supervision of public action and denunciation (citizen’s observatories) NGO support and proliferation Exert action within oligopolies (realpolitik) Public record of notarized campaign promises Opening of the political marketplace: –Reelection –Citizens’ candidacies –Other Sue government in international courts Public trials, video recording, juries Public judicial review Election of independent justice officials Mandate transparency in funding and internal processes of political parties Foster participation in public forums: freedom of speech and advertising, elimination of rules restricting access Foster a modern liberal conviction and culture: conceive the free, responsible, individual as the source of political legitimacy and power Small-scale private actions that drive out public action (e.g.. educational projects outside public schooling, charities, etc.) Bring tariffs of public services to balance with costs Open choice in selection of public services (education, health, insurance) – voucher, other providers Case examples of communities with bottom-up democratic processes at municipal level

54. | 53 In closing … It is more than culture vs institutions. It is about mindsets and behaviors. Of the polity … and of the elites. Either we accept passive acceptance of “legacy system” Or act as free individuals, shaping institutions, wrestling them away from oligarchies Is freedom our most cherished value? Is it universal? Can we bring the majority of Mexicans to this conviction?

55. | 54 In closing … This is not an argument of culture vs. institutions. It is deeper. It is about freedom as a fundamental value. If we assume passively that we are born into a “legacy system”, that we have to accept the hand we were dealt in our here-and-now, and abide with resignation our condition of serfs to those groups that have captured political power, because we can't in practice dislodge them using institutional avenues available to us. If the only route to improve and reshape institutions is by becoming members of the “inner group”, and that that group is impenetrable to the common citizen, we find ourselves in a blind alley Alternatively, if we believe that this is about human beings’ perceptions of their self as free individuals first and foremost, demanding social respect to this initial condition of freedom, and consequently embarking actively in the conception and workings of social institutions, participating and shaping them; and if necessary wrestling away those that may have been captured by closed groups to their personal benefit. Is freedom the most cherished value? Is it universal? Can we bring the majority of Mexicans to this conviction?

56. Ten Years of Failed Transition to Democracy: the struggle between modernity and feudalism in Mexican society March 31, 2011 A personal point of view of Antonio Puron Research seminar

57. | 56 A. The so-called “2000 transition” was not centered around the adoption of democratic values, but rather in ousting the PRI and achieve fair, clean and competed elections. Once in power PAN’s agenda was of incrementalist evolution rather that a break from the past 1.PRI system legitimacy was destroyed 2.Fox was given the benefit of the doubt 3.By 2000 fair, clean and contested elections were “a given” 4.PAN failed to secure congressional majorities B. Fox and Calderón were unsuccessful in driving an institution-building agenda out of lack of vision, imagination, circumstances, courage or outright opposition form traditional or new political actors 1.Legislative agenda didn’t tackle substantive issues 2.New players had increased power with little accountability to constituents 3.Less party discipline: alliances and defections 4.If goal is to prevent PRI comeback, PAN + PRD alliances are effective weapons in gubernatorial races 5.However, party discipline in federal Congress is very high C. Today’s dominant political forces are anti-democratic and disarticulated from the citizenry, resulting in a suboptimal stable equilibrium dominated by oligarchic groups that have captured many of our institutions and control or co-opt a passive body politic. Outside actors, such as organized crime, are actively trying to influence them with various degrees of success 1.Three main oligarchic power groups 2.Cúpulas control access to power 3.No incentive for change 4.Survival of small parties based on selling-out to highest bidder 5.Exclusionary rules in oligopolies 6.Major electoral “counter-reform” enacted as a constitutional amendment in 2007

58. | 57 D. Our institutional and legal infrastructure has significant internal inconsistencies, is inflexible and archaic. Rule of law is an oxymoron if the law has been what the strongman du jour wished 1.Internal inconsistencies in constitution 2.Constitutional reforms are often incomplete 3.Constitutional review is only nascent 4.Resolutions of the Supreme Court or TEPJF are not carried out 5.Political and business actors and populace can break the law with no consequences 6.Procurement of justice is random, inefficient, biased and unreliable 7.General distrust of justice institutions E. At the heart of the problem lies the electorate’s core values. Reared in feudal and corporatist traditions, uneducated, and having aspirations that are sufficed under the current arrangement for the majority of the people, only few groups understand and desire liberal democracy 1.Mexico has never witnessed democracy 2.Mexicans at large are fiercely nationalistic, proud of key corporatist/feudal characteristics of the current system and have ingrained anti-liberal beliefs 3.Growing disenchantment with the current experiment with democracy 4.Groups that understand and believe in liberal democracy and citizen action, while influential and increasing in number, are still in clear minority, and are blocked form the political marketplace by the current power oligopolies 5.No realistic possibility to compete outside the current party system 6.Mostly participating through NGOs 7.Risk-takers migrating internationally 8.There are no leaders within the current power oligopolies that have liberal-democratic convictions 9.Thus, the inner circle cúpulas, holding the office and the purse don’t answer to citizens–or need to-, can remain in power on their own volition

59. | 58 A. The so-called “2000 transition” was not centered around the adoption of democratic values, but rather in ousting the PRI and achieve fair, clean and competed elections. Once in power PAN’s agenda was of incrementalist evolution rather that a break from the past 1.PRI system legitimacy was destroyed. Break in implicit contract between PRI governments and party/citizenry undermined the “governments of the revolution” 2.Fox was given the benefit of the doubt. Vicente Fox and PAN capitalized on the general sentiment of tiredness with PRI. This conviction of the electorate emerged almost without reflection on what would come next as long as there wouldn’t be economic disruptions and with the certainty that almost anything had to be better. The winners were given the benefit of the doubt under the assumption that they represented a “safe bet” by virtue of having been a long-time disciplined and “decent” opposition, respectful of institutional processes, and with the expectation that they would not embark in risky and wild courses of action that would plunge the country into economic chaos, which was still very much in the memories of many in the electorate 3.By 2000 fair, clean and contested elections were “a given”, benefiting from the huge investments done since 1990 (voter census, ID, etc.) and on the creation of the independent electoral authority ran by citizens, which grew to be the most-credible institution in the public’s eyes. This perception changed dramatically after 2006 protest by AMLO 4.PAN failed to secure congressional majorities. As a result it had to settle on an incrementalist evolution agenda rather that a break from the past

60. | 59 B. Fox and Calderón were unsuccessful in driving an institution-building agenda out of lack of vision, imagination, circumstances, courage or outright opposition form traditional or new political actors 1.Legislative agenda didn’t tackle substantive issues. Fox and Calderón initiatives did not tackle issues in a systematic way and weren’t able to reach agreement in Congress 2.New players had increased power with little accountability to constituents. Additionally, Fox and Calderón, have had to contend with a series of players that emerged in the face of diminishing presidential power and with access to discretionary funds provided by new fiscal income distribution rules 3.Less party discipline: alliances and defections. Party discipline, enforced in the past through strong clientelar mechanisms, is increasingly difficult to exercise. This is a welcome development in and of itself, however, it has not been dovetailed with a bottom-up exercise of internal party democracy. Procedures to solve differences inside each party, and mechanisms to allow transparent political marketplaces are weak. After 2009 governors and central party bigwigs strong-arm nomination processes to impose their own favorites/loyalists, resulting in defections of the “popular but rejected” from one party to another in a contest of personalities, not programs, and confusing the electorate on what are the fundamental tenets of the major (and in practice only available) parties. 4.If goal is to prevent PRI comeback, PAN + PRD alliances are an effective weapon in gubernatorial races. PAN + PRD stand a chance against PRI. The question is what is the program/platform? It’s become a contest of personalities 5.However party discipline in Congress traditionally has been very high allowing central cúpula control

61. | 60 C. Today’s dominant political forces are anti-democratic and disarticulated from the citizenry, resulting in a suboptimal stable equilibrium dominated by oligarchic groups that have captured many of our institutions and control or co-opt a passive body politic. Outside actors, such as organized crime, are actively trying to influence them with various degrees of success 1.Three main power groups. The consolidation of 3 groups around cúpulas whose power is gained through selectorates that have no accountability to the electorate: a) Leadership of political parties, b) Union leaders c) Business representatives. Their leaderships are small and overlap, oftentimes pushing the agenda of their principal allegiance 2.Cúpulas control access to power. Main players in cúpulas have all mechanisms available to control access to power, and to extract resources to fund it and to make this arrangement permanent. We’ve locked the door to our prison, and thrown the keys far away … only an enlightened guard will get us out 3.No incentive for change. Political cúpulas have opposed measures that would make them more accountable to a “feedback cycle” from the electorate, ensuring permanence of the inner circle under unsupervised rules. The political process has been laden with rules that restrict participation in the political marketplace and make it more rigid: no-reelection at any level of government, unsupervised primaries, unsupervised use of public funds by political parties, prohibition of private funding to political parties, unwillingness to reduce proportional representation deputies/senators currently assigned on a discretionary basis by party leaders, severe restriction to criticism of parties in media, prohibition of purchases of media time for political statements by private agents, prohibition of independent candidacies, stringent rules limiting political party formation, limited possibilities of “iniciativa popular” (e.g. propositions on ballots), among others. Granted, some of them may be warranted, but the main thrust is to restrict participation.

62. | 61 4.Survival of small parties based on selling-out to highest bidder. Alliances not issue- based, but on retaining certification. Alliances done with all big 3 parties depending on jurisdiction. Some unions (e.g. teachers) formed a party big enough for federal certification thus obtaining funds and selling out to the highest bidder of the big 3 5.Exclusionary rules in oligopolies. Within any single institution/enterprise membership in a single union is compulsory. No access to political marketplace outside existing political parties. No representation outside mainstream business organizations 6.Major electoral “counter-reform” enacted as a constitutional amendment in 2007. As a reaction to post-electoral conflict in 2006, Main political parties, through Congress, stripped the electoral authority (IFE) of substantial elements of its independence and supervisory roles, devolving them to Congress and to the established political parties. Removal of “non- compliant” councilors and appointment of councilors compliant to big 3 party wishes. Evolution of IFE to minutiae supervision in baroque regulation

63. | 62 D. Our institutional and legal infrastructure has significant internal inconsistencies, is inflexible and archaic. Rule of law is an oxymoron if the law has been what the strongman du jour wished 1.Internal inconsistencies in constitution. The original text of 1917, which had logical inconsistencies from its inception, has been reformed 433 times 2.Constitutional reforms are often incomplete. Frequently no accompanying laws and regulations are enacted 3.Constitutional review is only nascent. Particularly, no due process with respect to electoral law. The Supreme Court handed over most of its power to the Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación (TEPJF). At times both bodies declare themselves “incompetent” and refuse to review cases due to procedural problems 4.Resolutions of the Supreme Court or TEPJF are not carried out. Several instances of political actors refusing to abide by final resolutions of the Judicial branch. Several high- profile political actors proclaim that “unfair laws aren’t binding”, even when the courts have judged on the matter 5.Political and business actors and populace can break the law with no consequences. High-profile actors, party leaders, union leaders and businessmen can, and do, break the law without their adversaries -or authorities- initiating judicial processes, or get off-the-hook due to lack of a substantiated cases. Informality and tax evasion are the rule 6.Procurement of justice is random, inefficient, biased and unreliable. 98% of crimes go unpunished. Only 6 % of crimes are denounced/reported. Most never get investigated. Most suspects aren’t indicted. 92% of accusations lack evidence. 95% of defendants are found guilty and sentenced. 93% of defendants never see their judges. Trial duration takes months/years. Though a constitutional right, presumed innocence isn’t followed. Due process isn’t regularly followed. No oral/recorded trials. No juries. 7.General distrust of justice institutions. Police, MP (district attorneys), judges, prison system and law dispensation in general is avoided and regarded as corrupt

64. | 63 E. At the heart of the problem lies the citizens’ core values. Reared in feudal and corporatist traditions, uneducated, and having aspirations that are sufficed under the current arrangement for the majority of the people, only few groups understand and desire liberal democracy 1.Mexico has never witnessed democracy. At no time in pre-Columbian, Colonial, XIX century, Revolutionary, PRI-Post-Revolutionary, or Transition history has the electorate had a chance to experience, even demand, democracy based on a concept of free individuals as the source of political legitimacy and power 2.Mexicans at large are fiercely nationalistic, proud of key corporatist/feudal characteristics of the current system and have ingrained anti-liberal beliefs. Extreme nationalism, while longing for US-style prosperity Convinced that icons of governmental control are mismanaged, but reluctant to allow private ownership/management/association (petroleum-Pemex, electricity-CFE, education-SENTE, public transportation-Metro, health-IMSS, higher education-UNAM, many others): –Convinced of corruption in unions and “public managers/servants” –Unwilling to allow private, let alone foreign, control of large swathes of economic activity. “Loss” of Mexican banking industry still thought of as mandated by Washington –Prone to believe in a grand conspiracy by Washington-IMF-imperialistic clique –Public ownership of some of these entities creates sense of pride –perhaps only sense of pride- in the international context, particularly Pemex –Assumption that entitlements requires operation through governmental bureaucracies, because private operation may be more efficient but skims the public enterprise and is corrupt Admiration of people that game the system: selling or inheriting plazas (government union slots), working in government payroll (“el que no vive en el presupuesto vive en el error”) even by purchasing positions from the union, pensions before 50, holding two simultaneous government jobs, paying mordida -for slots in street vending, avoiding fines or to settle in public or private property-, influence trafficking, crony capitalism concessions

65. | 64 Meritocracy is cruel, begging for and getting concessions from powerful people is the way to climb Belief that government handouts are free, without any consideration for taxpayers. Government, particularly Federal, is responsible for people's problems, specially for “those with less or disadvantaged” (campesinos, single mothers, the old, landless, natural disaster victims) Profound belief that rich individuals “must have robbed”. Wealth is evil. Risk taking to acquire wealth or better lifestyles (e.g. migrants or businessmen) can either find sorrow -and eventually see the light, humiliated but wiser- or be crooks or cease to be Mexicans Are content with public services of bad quality as long as they are free (eg. public education, electricity, municipal services), but complaint bitterly when prices/tariffs are brought to economic equilibrium. Assumption is that government responsibility is to subsidize or provide them for free Markets (goods, services, political interchange) are misunderstood, and believed to be capitalist- tools 3.Growing disenchantment with the current experiment with democracy Mexico has the lowest level of support for democracy among major Latin-American democracies according to Latinbarometro Blame for current status quo (slow growth, violence, feeling of stagnation, falling in international standing) is placed squarely on “politicians” and “public servants” who are regarded as self- serving crooks Nostalgia for strong leadership is increasing No understanding that the citizens themselves are responsible for their leaders 4.Groups that understand and believe in liberal democracy and citizen action, while influential and increasing in number, are still in clear minority, and are blocked form the political marketplace by the current power oligopolies No realistic possibility to compete outside the current party system Mostly participating through NGOs Risk-takers migrating internationally, to our loss, at the top and the bottom of society

66. | 65 5.There are no leaders within the current power oligopolies that have liberal-democratic convictions, willing to risk their survival and political success on these values (in the way of Mandela and Felipe Gonzalez): Transparent bottom-up processes that would allow leaders and mandates to emerge form citizen groups Willing to push a modern agenda that risks political power 6.Thus, the inner circle cúpulas, holding the office and the purse don’t answer to citizens– or need to-, can remain in power on their own volition and have no incentives to change the system. The electorate doesn't have the organization, conviction or courage to bring cúpulas to account. We are stuck in a suboptimal stable equilibrium

67. | 66 Cartel parties ORGANIZATION AND PARTY DEMOCRACY The Emergence of the Cartel Party Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair ABSTRACT Many recent discussions of the decline of party are predicated on the assumption that the Duverger socialist mass-party model is the only model for parties. We contend that this assumption is misconceived, that the mass-party model is only one, temporally limited and contingent model, and that it is necessary to differentiate notions of adaptation and change from notions of decline or failure. Following an analysis of how various models of party can be located in terms of the relationship between civil society and the state, we contend that the recent period has witnessed the emergence of a new model of party, the cartel party, in which colluding parties become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state (the party state) to ensure their own collective survival. Finally, we suggest that the recent challenge to party is in fact a challenge to the cartel that the established parties have created for themselves.

68. | 67 SOURCE: Latinbarometro 2009, http://mexicopolitics.wordpress.com/2009/12/14/poll-weak-support-for-democracy-in-mexico/ Growing disenchantment with the current experiment with democracy

69. | 68 Regard for institutions 2005 Church Positives – negatives % SOURCE: Encuesta Nacional en Viviendas Del 25 al 30 de noviembre de 2005 Army Media IFE CNDH TRIFE SCJN President Business Congress Unions Parties Police ParastatalIndep.JoblessSelf-empl.Avg. Private employ Govt.