Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Bureaucracy in the Field Khurram Butt David Bell Topic 9.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Bureaucracy in the Field Khurram Butt David Bell Topic 9."— Presentation transcript:

1 Bureaucracy in the Field Khurram Butt David Bell Topic 9

2 HeadyArmstrongWallis Picard Tarrow Wallis Baker Greene Armstrong Heady Bureaucracy in the field Local Govt. / Local Administration Decentralization / Devolution Authoritarianism / Culture Inter-Govt Relations Sectoral Implications Rural Development / Community Development Elite Theory Mills Turner & Hulme Mills Orwell Fried Bureaucracy in the Field – Literary Map

3 “Shooting the Elephant” by George Orwell in Green and Walzer (1969), “The Political Imagination in Literature” A political essay by Orwell that draws on his experience as a Colonial Official in India and Burma A political essay by Orwell that draws on his experience as a Colonial Official in India and Burma Story of a police officer in Burma who feels compelled to shoot a rogue elephant Story of a police officer in Burma who feels compelled to shoot a rogue elephant Does so because he does not want to appear ‘indecisive or cowardly’ in front of the native Burmese Does so because he does not want to appear ‘indecisive or cowardly’ in front of the native Burmese Backdrop: imperialist-native tension; both sides feel hatred, distrust and resentment Backdrop: imperialist-native tension; both sides feel hatred, distrust and resentment

4 “Shooting the Elephant” by George Orwell in Green and Walzer (1969), “The Political Imagination in Literature” Not just a story about shooting an elephant but also “… the tragedy, violence and farce of imperialism” Not just a story about shooting an elephant but also “… the tragedy, violence and farce of imperialism” An example of Orwell’s anti-imperialist and anti-authoritarian stance An example of Orwell’s anti-imperialist and anti-authoritarian stance The essay is both political and metaphorical The essay is both political and metaphorical Social structure in which individuals are considered to be governable and manipulateable, depersonalized unitsSocial structure in which individuals are considered to be governable and manipulateable, depersonalized units Dilemma of the man who tries to be his free and true self in a system that asks him to be an automatonDilemma of the man who tries to be his free and true self in a system that asks him to be an automaton

5 “Shooting the Elephant” by George Orwell in Green and Walzer (1969), “The Political Imagination in Literature” Orwell’s abhorrence for the ‘unfree’ society Orwell’s abhorrence for the ‘unfree’ society Society that does not let the individual be his ‘off duty’ selfSociety that does not let the individual be his ‘off duty’ self “The unfree leader” “The unfree leader” I perceived in this moment that when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys. He becomes a sort of hollow, posing dummy … For it is the condition of his rule that he shall spend his life in trying to impress the “natives,” and so in every crisis he has got to do what the “natives” expect of him. He wears a mask, and his face grows to fit it. I had got to shoot the elephant. I perceived in this moment that when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys. He becomes a sort of hollow, posing dummy … For it is the condition of his rule that he shall spend his life in trying to impress the “natives,” and so in every crisis he has got to do what the “natives” expect of him. He wears a mask, and his face grows to fit it. I had got to shoot the elephant.

6 Bureaucracy in the Field “Men” that occupy positions where decisions “mightily affect” daily life of “ordinary” people “Men” that occupy positions where decisions “mightily affect” daily life of “ordinary” people Control major hierarchies and organizations Control major hierarchies and organizations Big corporationsBig corporations “machinery of the state”“machinery of the state” Direct the militaryDirect the military Strategic positions of social structureStrategic positions of social structure Mills, Charles Wright (1959). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press

7 Bureaucracy in the Field The level below the elites: The level below the elites: “Professional politicians”—Congress“Professional politicians”—Congress “Pressure groups”“Pressure groups” “upper classes” of municipalities“upper classes” of municipalities “Professional celebrities”“Professional celebrities” Not leading powerful institutions Not leading powerful institutions Influence masses—gain ear of the powerful Influence masses—gain ear of the powerful Very Rich, Chief Execs, Military, Political Very Rich, Chief Execs, Military, Political Constant military threat-all political and economic actions are viewed according to a military definition of realityConstant military threat-all political and economic actions are viewed according to a military definition of reality

8 Bureaucracy in the Field Very Rich—Corporate Rich Very Rich—Corporate Rich Two explanations for the fact of the very rich Two explanations for the fact of the very rich “something demonic”—exploitation, murder, legal strategies, etc“something demonic”—exploitation, murder, legal strategies, etc Economic and political structureEconomic and political structure “Private appropriations” from public resources “Private appropriations” from public resources Land for railroadsLand for railroads ShipbuildingShipbuilding Military supply contractsMilitary supply contracts

9 Bureaucracy in the Field Wealth “perpetuates” and monopolizesWealth “perpetuates” and monopolizes Men—80%-90% of US wealthMen—80%-90% of US wealth American citizens, raised in the cities, eastern US, highly educated—primarily Ivy League (mostly Harvard and Yale)American citizens, raised in the cities, eastern US, highly educated—primarily Ivy League (mostly Harvard and Yale)

10 Bureaucracy in the Field Where do they come from? (con’t) Where do they come from? (con’t) Protestants (50% Episcopalians, 25% Presbyterians)Protestants (50% Episcopalians, 25% Presbyterians) Major economic fact: “accumulation of advantages”Major economic fact: “accumulation of advantages” Inherited wealth Inherited wealth “Economic politicians” in business “Economic politicians” in business “power of property” and corporate structure“power of property” and corporate structure

11 Bureaucracy in the Field Chief Executives Chief Executives Were portrayed as “efficient, straightforward, and honest”Were portrayed as “efficient, straightforward, and honest” Other views considered them much lessOther views considered them much less Very Rich and Chief Executives are interrelated in the business work of property and privilegeVery Rich and Chief Executives are interrelated in the business work of property and privilege

12 Bureaucracy in the Field Growth and interconnections of businesses have paved the way for a sophisticated executive elite Growth and interconnections of businesses have paved the way for a sophisticated executive elite Class-wide property, not specificClass-wide property, not specific “Interlocking Directorate”“Interlocking Directorate” Their decisions determine the national economy Their decisions determine the national economy Also, the public policy measures to defend their privilegesAlso, the public policy measures to defend their privileges

13 Bureaucracy in the Field Chief Executives are the top stratum of corporations Chief Executives are the top stratum of corporations Advise, consult, and receive information from operational managers—second stratumAdvise, consult, and receive information from operational managers—second stratum American prototype of Chief Executives— Owen Yong, GE American prototype of Chief Executives— Owen Yong, GE Corporation was a public institutionCorporation was a public institution Executives, public trusteesExecutives, public trustees Big corporations-”institutions”, not thought of as a private businessBig corporations-”institutions”, not thought of as a private business Trade associations = corporate church, moral restrainerTrade associations = corporate church, moral restrainer

14 Bureaucracy in the Field The Political Directorate—political outsiders representing the corporate rich p235 The Political Directorate—political outsiders representing the corporate rich p235 Legal, managerial, financial expertsLegal, managerial, financial experts Executive centers of government decisions—”political directorate of the power elite” Executive centers of government decisions—”political directorate of the power elite” Not professional bureaucrats nor party politiciansNot professional bureaucrats nor party politicians

15 Bureaucracy in the Field The American Politician The American Politician “valuable originator” and “cheap tool”“valuable originator” and “cheap tool” “high statesman” and “dirty politician”“high statesman” and “dirty politician” “public servant” and “sly conniver”“public servant” and “sly conniver” “regularly enacts a role in political institutions” and considers it a primary activity“regularly enacts a role in political institutions” and considers it a primary activity

16 Bureaucracy in the Field Political outsiders – absence of genuine bureaucracy Political outsiders – absence of genuine bureaucracy Organized hierarchyOrganized hierarchy Skills and authorities Skills and authorities Constrained by specialized tasks Constrained by specialized tasks Servants have no ownership or authority Servants have no ownership or authority It is the authority of the office It is the authority of the office Salary is the sole payment Salary is the sole payment

17 Bureaucracy in the Field There is not, nor ever has been, a “genuine civil service” There is not, nor ever has been, a “genuine civil service” Reliable civil service careerReliable civil service career Independent bureaucracy above political party pressureIndependent bureaucracy above political party pressure

18 Bureaucracy in the Field Governmental decentralization— Scandinavian “field laboratory” Governmental decentralization— Scandinavian “field laboratory” Characteristics of “decision making” and “political control” in advanced economic and social welfare systemsCharacteristics of “decision making” and “political control” in advanced economic and social welfare systems Local authorities gain administrative responsibility Local authorities gain administrative responsibility Political authority for priorities and policies remain a central levelPolitical authority for priorities and policies remain a central level Picard, Louis A. (1983). Decentralization, “Recentralization” & “Steering Mechanisms”: Paradoxes of Local Government in Denmark in Polity, Vol 15, No. 4, pages

19 Bureaucracy in the Field Decentralization in response to citizens demand for better service Decentralization in response to citizens demand for better service Assumed there will be local political controlAssumed there will be local political control Increased local duties, swift increase in local bureaucratic structures Increased local duties, swift increase in local bureaucratic structures Problematic local participation and political controlProblematic local participation and political control “recentralized” policy-making“recentralized” policy-making “steering mechanisms” to ensure an egalitarian, high quality of social service“steering mechanisms” to ensure an egalitarian, high quality of social service

20 Bureaucracy in the Field Corporatist—beyond area/function dichotomy Corporatist—beyond area/function dichotomy Reduction in the areal administrator not necessarily an increase in functional administrationReduction in the areal administrator not necessarily an increase in functional administration Could be an increase in “peak” organizational controlCould be an increase in “peak” organizational control Branches of the state working in association as an interest group directly influencing the process of government Branches of the state working in association as an interest group directly influencing the process of government

21 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Who are they?Who are they? American-men that control major hierarchies and organizations (Mills 4, ) American-men that control major hierarchies and organizations (Mills 4, ) Big corporations, machinery of the state, direct the military, strategic positions of social structureBig corporations, machinery of the state, direct the military, strategic positions of social structure All political and economic actions are viewed according to a military definition of realityAll political and economic actions are viewed according to a military definition of reality Politics has declined as a genuine and public debate of alternative decisionsPolitics has declined as a genuine and public debate of alternative decisions The economy: permanent-war and private- corporation, “military capitalism”The economy: permanent-war and private- corporation, “military capitalism”

22 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Very Rich-Corporate Rich Very Rich-Corporate Rich Economic and political structure of AmericaEconomic and political structure of America “Private appropriations” from public resources“Private appropriations” from public resources Wealth perpetuates and monopolizesWealth perpetuates and monopolizes

23 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Traditional Elite Regimes: Monarchy, aristocrats; religious legitimization (Heady 313, 314) Traditional Elite Regimes: Monarchy, aristocrats; religious legitimization (Heady 313, 314) Orth-traditional regimes-longer history, ruling family relying monarchical claim for legitimacyOrth-traditional regimes-longer history, ruling family relying monarchical claim for legitimacy Example: Saudi Arabia Example: Saudi Arabia Emphasized rapid industrialization and providing public service Emphasized rapid industrialization and providing public service Cautious reformers, severely curtailing political activity, main the political status quo Cautious reformers, severely curtailing political activity, main the political status quo These regimes have a lower prospect for survival These regimes have a lower prospect for survival

24 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Neo-traditional regimes-less common but more recent (Heady 315)Neo-traditional regimes-less common but more recent (Heady 315) Example: Iran Example: Iran From religious legitimizing sources From religious legitimizing sources Religious orthodoxy-overarching public policy goal Religious orthodoxy-overarching public policy goal Usual modernizing goals are secondary Usual modernizing goals are secondary More activist in advancing announced goals More activist in advancing announced goals Uncertain future Uncertain future Prospects for survival dependent on the competence and effectiveness of bureaucratic officialsProspects for survival dependent on the competence and effectiveness of bureaucratic officials

25 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Bureaucracy Bureaucracy The political directorate (Mills , 241)The political directorate (Mills , 241) Relied on by traditional regimes for survival (Heady 315)Relied on by traditional regimes for survival (Heady 315) as instrumentalities of desirable change and inhibitors of unwanted change as instrumentalities of desirable change and inhibitors of unwanted change dependent on bureaucratic competence and effectiveness dependent on bureaucratic competence and effectiveness

26 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Bureaucracy Bureaucracy One man rule systemsOne man rule systems Example: Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia (Chin system) Example: Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia (Chin system) Personalist-single individual dependent on a professional bureaucracy (Heady 321) Personalist-single individual dependent on a professional bureaucracy (Heady 321) Leader from military background Leader from military background

27 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Bureaucracy Bureaucracy One man rule systemsOne man rule systems Chin & Nomenklatura Systems-Russia 18th and early 19th century secretary/governor (Armstrong 256, 257) Chin & Nomenklatura Systems-Russia 18th and early 19th century secretary/governor (Armstrong 256, 257) “God and Tsar in the oblast (province)” “God and Tsar in the oblast (province)” Commanding regular military units in his province Commanding regular military units in his province All types of civil activity and economic development impacted by military All types of civil activity and economic development impacted by military The Tsarist governor was balanced by party secretaries attached to the military units The Tsarist governor was balanced by party secretaries attached to the military units

28 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Bureaucracy Bureaucracy Collegial Bureaucratic Elite Systems—CorporatistCollegial Bureaucratic Elite Systems—Corporatist Example: Indonesia, Thailand, Ghana, UK Example: Indonesia, Thailand, Ghana, UK British political system-“Government by Committee” (Armstrong 272, 273) British political system-“Government by Committee” (Armstrong 272, 273) Oxbridge socialization system—collegial decision-making was made smooth and attractive Oxbridge socialization system—collegial decision-making was made smooth and attractive Group of individuals: often professionals bureaucrats from military (Heady 327, 328) Group of individuals: often professionals bureaucrats from military (Heady 327, 328) Military oligarchy Military oligarchy Corporatist regimes Corporatist regimes Collegiality over hierarchy Collegiality over hierarchy

29 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Pendulum systems (Heady 346, 372)Pendulum systems (Heady 346, 372) Significant feature of political environment of some developing countries Significant feature of political environment of some developing countries Pattern established swing between bureaucratic elite and polyarchal competitive regimes Pattern established swing between bureaucratic elite and polyarchal competitive regimes Examples: Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, Costa Rica, Botswana, Singapore, IsraelExamples: Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, Costa Rica, Botswana, Singapore, Israel

30 Bureaucracy in the Field Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Elite Theory—Authoritarianism and Culture Pendulum systems (Heady 346, 372)Pendulum systems (Heady 346, 372) Polyarchal competitive regimes Polyarchal competitive regimes Political competitionPolitical competition Well-organized political groupingsWell-organized political groupings Probability of significant shift in power relationshipsProbability of significant shift in power relationships Without disrupting the systemWithout disrupting the system

31 Bureaucracy in the Field Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration Territorial representation vs Functional Representation (Tarrow 4, 5, 16)Territorial representation vs Functional Representation (Tarrow 4, 5, 16) Territorial-choice by area; Functional- based on professional, class, and interest organizationTerritorial-choice by area; Functional- based on professional, class, and interest organization

32 “Major Traits of Prefectoral Systems” by Robert C. Fried, in Nimrod, Raphaeli (1967), “Readings in Comparative Public Administration” Prefectoral versus Functional Systems Prefectoral versus Functional Systems General rep. of central govt. in various regions of the national territory / no such rep.General rep. of central govt. in various regions of the national territory / no such rep. Central ministries command counterparts in the field through the Prefect / direct line of commandCentral ministries command counterparts in the field through the Prefect / direct line of command Central govt. control: more penetrating, administrative rather than legislative, and unified under Prefect / less penetrating, legislative rather than administrative, and dispersed among central and field unitCentral govt. control: more penetrating, administrative rather than legislative, and unified under Prefect / less penetrating, legislative rather than administrative, and dispersed among central and field unit

33 “Major Traits of Prefectoral Systems” by Robert C. Fried, in Nimrod, Raphaeli (1967), “Readings in Comparative Public Administration” Common characteristics of prefectoral systems Common characteristics of prefectoral systems National territory is divided into various areasNational territory is divided into various areas Each area has an appointed high functionary representative of and responsible to the central govt.Each area has an appointed high functionary representative of and responsible to the central govt. Civil career functionary or political appointee who may be dismissed or transferredCivil career functionary or political appointee who may be dismissed or transferred Not resident of or native to area he governsNot resident of or native to area he governs Supervised by a specialized central deptSupervised by a specialized central dept

34 Bureaucracy in the Field Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration Territorial: autonomous jurisdictions with parliamentary/legislative representation (U.S., Britain, French, Italy) Territorial: autonomous jurisdictions with parliamentary/legislative representation (U.S., Britain, French, Italy) Functional: national and local level Functional: national and local level Functional centralization is about policy makingFunctional centralization is about policy making Interest groups, including social and economic councils or advisory bodiesInterest groups, including social and economic councils or advisory bodies Formal and informalFormal and informal Influential on policyInfluential on policy Interests channeled through legislative representationInterests channeled through legislative representation Functional increasingly edging classical territorial representation to the sideFunctional increasingly edging classical territorial representation to the side

35 Bureaucracy in the Field Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration Political links of central governments and territorial subunits in industrial nations (Tarrow 2, 3, 12)Political links of central governments and territorial subunits in industrial nations (Tarrow 2, 3, 12) Linkage between territorial and high levels of government cut across economic dependence, administrative stratification, cultural differences between levels Linkage between territorial and high levels of government cut across economic dependence, administrative stratification, cultural differences between levels Deep functional cleavages cut through vertical hierarchies of different levels of government Deep functional cleavages cut through vertical hierarchies of different levels of government These links speak about cohesion—not only cleavages and financial dependency These links speak about cohesion—not only cleavages and financial dependency

36 Bureaucracy in the Field Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration IGR predominantly are actions of officials working out policy (Baker 165, 167, 174)IGR predominantly are actions of officials working out policy (Baker 165, 167, 174) Process mediated through multiple decision structures Process mediated through multiple decision structures Multiple institutional connections involve territorial authority and functional responsibilities Multiple institutional connections involve territorial authority and functional responsibilities Concept of IGR formed in terms of human relations and behavior Concept of IGR formed in terms of human relations and behavior Modifying forces in unitary systems: multiple decisions structures, political movements of organized groups, administrative decentralization/devolution Modifying forces in unitary systems: multiple decisions structures, political movements of organized groups, administrative decentralization/devolution

37 Bureaucracy in the Field Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Local Government and Administration Great Britain: no territorial government bodies subordinate to the central authorities— tradition of local autonomy is strong (Armstrong 270)Great Britain: no territorial government bodies subordinate to the central authorities— tradition of local autonomy is strong (Armstrong 270) Basic device of central intervention: grants and inspections Basic device of central intervention: grants and inspections Inspector not rooted in a locality Inspector not rooted in a locality For at least two generations the colonial territories were the more influential—impacting central administration development For at least two generations the colonial territories were the more influential—impacting central administration development

38 Wallis, Malcolm (1989), “Bureaucracy: Its Role in Third World Development” Local Government Local Government Important to find an appropriate balance between autonomy and controlImportant to find an appropriate balance between autonomy and control Local government is one channel through which people may participate in decision- making within their areas (districts, etc.)Local government is one channel through which people may participate in decision- making within their areas (districts, etc.) Why: Pragmatic & Ethical Why: Pragmatic & Ethical Dev. projects and programs fail because people most affected are not allowed to participate in planning or implementationDev. projects and programs fail because people most affected are not allowed to participate in planning or implementation Tool for political education of lay peopleTool for political education of lay people Ethical for people to have a say in what affects themEthical for people to have a say in what affects them

39 Bureaucracy in the Field Community and Rural Development Community and Rural Development Traditional elite regimes—difficulties in penetrating the community (Heady 315)Traditional elite regimes—difficulties in penetrating the community (Heady 315) Reforms to address difficulties embraced reluctantly if at all Reforms to address difficulties embraced reluctantly if at all Prefectural role in development (Armstrong 262, 263)Prefectural role in development (Armstrong 262, 263) Quasi-aristocratic models: generalist outlook can hinder development Quasi-aristocratic models: generalist outlook can hinder development Bourgeois specialization can hinder development Bourgeois specialization can hinder development Line administration in the field: face-to-face with concrete needs Line administration in the field: face-to-face with concrete needs France and Russia: prefect to bring resolve in original and personal manner France and Russia: prefect to bring resolve in original and personal manner

40 Wallis, Malcolm (1989), “Bureaucracy: Its Role in Third World Development” Local govt. structures Local govt. structures Depend on the ideology of the regime in powerDepend on the ideology of the regime in power Colonial rule left its marks in South Asia and AfricaColonial rule left its marks in South Asia and Africa Problems: weak revenue base; staffing issues; autonomy versus centralizationProblems: weak revenue base; staffing issues; autonomy versus centralization Field Administration Field Administration Administrative activity outside of the capitalAdministrative activity outside of the capital FAs work for the central govt. but are responsible for a part and not whole of the stateFAs work for the central govt. but are responsible for a part and not whole of the state On the spot admin., avoids paralysis due to over-centralization, provides accurate infoOn the spot admin., avoids paralysis due to over-centralization, provides accurate info

41 Bureaucracy in the Field Decentralization/Devolution Decentralization/Devolution Need to address practical political barriers to authority transfer to local (Picard 567)Need to address practical political barriers to authority transfer to local (Picard 567) Demand for better administrative responses to citizens-assumes local political controlDemand for better administrative responses to citizens-assumes local political control Political bargaining between national and sub- national interest—both centralize and decentralize (Baker 167, 168, 176)Political bargaining between national and sub- national interest—both centralize and decentralize (Baker 167, 168, 176) Corporatism-organized interest groups of centralized and bureaucratic administrative entities (Picard 541, 542) Corporatism-organized interest groups of centralized and bureaucratic administrative entities (Picard 541, 542) Peak associations to speak for groups and directly impact service to the public Peak associations to speak for groups and directly impact service to the public

42 Turner and Hulme (1997), “Governance, Administration & Development” Decentralization Decentralization Territorial or functional transfer of authority to perform some service to the public from individual/agency in central govt. to some other other individual/agency that is closer to the public being servedTerritorial or functional transfer of authority to perform some service to the public from individual/agency in central govt. to some other other individual/agency that is closer to the public being served Central govt. to local govt : Devolution ( within formal political structures) Central govt. to local govt : Devolution ( within formal political structures) From HQ of ministry to its district offices: Deconcentration ( within public admin. Structures) From HQ of ministry to its district offices: Deconcentration ( within public admin. Structures) Parastatal airline sold to private sector: Privatization ( from state to non-state agency) Parastatal airline sold to private sector: Privatization ( from state to non-state agency)

43 “Major Traits of Prefectoral Systems” by Robert C. Fried, in Nimrod, Raphaeli (1967), “Readings in Comparative Public Administration” Integrated versus Unintegrated Prefectoral Integrated versus Unintegrated Prefectoral Locus of authorityLocus of authority Authority largely deconcentrated from central ministries to prefects; prefect is hierarchically superior to technical experts in the province Authority largely deconcentrated from central ministries to prefects; prefect is hierarchically superior to technical experts in the province Authority largely reserved to the specialist functional officials (direct chain of command) Authority largely reserved to the specialist functional officials (direct chain of command) CommunicationCommunication Prefect is the sole channel of communication between functional depts. in capital and those in the field Prefect is the sole channel of communication between functional depts. in capital and those in the field Prefect is neither the normal nor the only channel Prefect is neither the normal nor the only channel Auxilliary ServicesAuxilliary Services Prefecture houses all or most of the state field offices and provides them administrative services Prefecture houses all or most of the state field offices and provides them administrative services Technical services in the province don’t depend on the prefect; central govt. provides or themselves Technical services in the province don’t depend on the prefect; central govt. provides or themselves

44 “Major Traits of Prefectoral Systems” by Robert C. Fried, in Nimrod, Raphaeli (1967), “Readings in Comparative Public Administration” Integrated versus Unintegrated Prefectoral Integrated versus Unintegrated Prefectoral AreasAreas State services use the prefecture’s area of operations State services use the prefecture’s area of operations Functional services, organized independently, use varying sets of areas Functional services, organized independently, use varying sets of areas EchelonsEchelons Regional offices between prefecture and central ministries are rare Regional offices between prefecture and central ministries are rare Regional offices, with direct operational responsibility and/or supervisory authority over provinces common Regional offices, with direct operational responsibility and/or supervisory authority over provinces common Local GovernmentLocal Government Prefect is the CEO of the provincial self-government unit Prefect is the CEO of the provincial self-government unit Separate executive authority runs provincial self- government unit Separate executive authority runs provincial self- government unit

45 Turner and Hulme (1997), “Governance, Administration & Development” Why decentralize Why decentralize Political education (intro to lay people)Political education (intro to lay people) Training in political leadership (prospective pool of leaders)Training in political leadership (prospective pool of leaders) Political stability (increases trust in govt. through increased participation)Political stability (increases trust in govt. through increased participation) Political equality (increased participation deconcentrates power)Political equality (increased participation deconcentrates power) Accountability (more accessible to people)Accountability (more accessible to people) Responsiveness (accuracy of info)Responsiveness (accuracy of info)

46 Bureaucracy in the Field Decentralization/Devolution Decentralization/Devolution French example: modify prefectural system to a role of monitoring local authoritiesFrench example: modify prefectural system to a role of monitoring local authorities Unitary systems—national functions and co- government moved to shared power modelsUnitary systems—national functions and co- government moved to shared power models It is inconclusive that local policy choices are limited by more central control of financing (Tarrow 10-13)It is inconclusive that local policy choices are limited by more central control of financing (Tarrow 10-13) Examples: France, Italy, Norway Examples: France, Italy, Norway Local governments can access capital markets (e.g. bonds) Local governments can access capital markets (e.g. bonds) Pluralism of urban political systems—influence of a variety of local and central groups Pluralism of urban political systems—influence of a variety of local and central groups Centralization of expenditures is a neutral indicator of relative power Centralization of expenditures is a neutral indicator of relative power

47 Wallis, Malcolm (1989), “Bureaucracy: Its Role in Third World Development” Problems of bureaucracy in the field Problems of bureaucracy in the field Poor selection of personnelPoor selection of personnel Unsympathetic attitudes of top mgmt. towards conditions under which field officers workUnsympathetic attitudes of top mgmt. towards conditions under which field officers work Weak communication channels between HQ and the fieldWeak communication channels between HQ and the field Conflicting directives from different parts of the HQ machinery causing confusion in the fieldConflicting directives from different parts of the HQ machinery causing confusion in the field Over-frequent transfers of personnelOver-frequent transfers of personnel Poor conditions of servicePoor conditions of service Structural problems (death by committee!)Structural problems (death by committee!) No single formula for success in tech. areasNo single formula for success in tech. areas

48 Bureaucracy in the Field

49

50

51


Download ppt "Bureaucracy in the Field Khurram Butt David Bell Topic 9."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google