1. 1 Presented at the 52 nd Annual Fall Training Conference “Changing Landscapes in Emergency Management” Association of Minnesota Emergency Managers Breezy Point, Minnesota by Dennis S. Mileti, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus University of Colorado, Boulder September 18, 2012

2.  How can we:  Get warnings to everyone  Reduce public action delay time  Motivate appropriate public actions for….. Dennis S. Mileti September 20122

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16.  Time to impact:  None, minutes, hours, days  Audience to address:  Single (one audience)  Multiple (different actions/populations at same time)  Protective action recommendations:  Single (one action)  Overlapping (multiple actions at same time)  Sequenced (different actions in a row) Dennis S. Mileti September 201216

17.  Reasonable conclusions about:  1. Public warning response behavior  2. Warning system reliability & preparedness  Based on:  Findings from 50 years of research Dennis S. Mileti September 201217

18. ABOUT THE RESEARCH Dennis S. Mileti September 201218

19.  Half-century social science research:  Hazards & disasters research literature  U.S. emphasis--but not exclusively  Protective actions studied:  Some a lot, others a little, some not at all  Example events studied:  Natural: Hurricane Camille, Mt. St. Helens  Terrorism: World Trade Center 1993 & 9/11  Hazardous Materials: Mississauga, Nanticoke  Technology: Three Mile Island  Building Fire: MGM Grand, Cook County Hospital 19Dennis S. Mileti September 2012

20.  REFERENCES: 350 page annotated bibliography available at:  http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/publications/informer/infrmr2/pubhazbibann.pdf 20Dennis S. Mileti September 2012

21.  REFERENCES: 150 entry bibliography available at:  http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/library/BuildingsEvacBib2007.doc 21Dennis S. Mileti September 2012

22.  Studies on “hypothetical” events:  Can yield wrong response conclusions:  Situational determinants of behavior NOT operating  Preferences & intentions = little predictive weight  Useful for some specialized topics, e.g.,  Which words are/aren’t understandable  Studies of “actual” events:  Yield more realistic response conclusions:  Situational determinants of behavior ARE operating  Real people & events = real warnings & response Dennis S. Mileti September 201222

23. DEFINITIONS (for presentation purposes) Dennis S. Mileti September 201223

24.  Definition:  Get people’s attention  Old fashioned approach:  Air raid sirens  Modern approach:  CMAS (linked to IPAWS & EAS)  Use cell phones & other mobile devices to get people’s attention & provide messages Dennis S. Mileti September 201224

25.  Definition:  Emergency information that motivates timely & appropriate public behavior  Alerting & warning are different:  Alerting = get people’s attention  Warning = motivate behavior  Distinction being blurred in today’s world Dennis S. Mileti September 201225

26. TWO SIDES TO THE BEHAVIOR COIN Dennis S. Mileti September 201226

27.  Public warning response is predictable:  About 40% explained variance (as good as it gets)  Key factors that predict it are known:  Apply across hazards & events  Mathematically modeled (tested & retested)  Public warning response behavior:  Varies across events because of variation in the factors that influence it  Is malleable & somewhat manageable:  By managing the factors that influence it  Some people will always do the wrong thing 27Dennis S. Mileti September 2012

28.  Research also includes:  Predicting the behavior of warning providers  The “sender” part of warnings  Based on historical event investigations  Influences on warning provider behavior:  Relatively well understood  Variation across events  Is malleable and manageable:  Also by managing factors that influence it Dennis S. Mileti September 201228

29. PUBLIC RESPONSE BEHAVIOR Dennis S. Mileti September 201229

30.  “Objective” reality for people = what they think is real  What people think comes from interacting with others  Most people go through life thinking they’re safe  Warnings tell them they’re not & consequently  Compel most people to mill around:  Interact with others & get more information & search for confirming information to form new ideas about safety & risk  “Milling” (some call it “sense-making”) intervenes between warning receipt & protective action-taking  Results in public protective action-taking delay  Part of being human & will never change Dennis S. Mileti September 201230

31.  Human beings are…..  “the hardest animal of all on the planet to warn”  An “exaggerated” example:  While all the forest animals are running away from the flames…..most people are talking about it with neighbors, looking at TV coverage, texting, & rubber necking trying to find out what it means & deciding what to do  Creates a public response gap:  Few are skilled at shortening the time people spend delaying protective action resulting in some unknowingly doing things that increase it Dennis S. Mileti September 201231

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34.  Audience factors impact what people hear, how they interpret it & what they do:  Statuses (gender, sex, age, ethnicity, SES)  Roles (children, family united, pets, kinship)  Not just demographics:  Experience, knowledge, perceptions & beliefs  Environmental and social cues  Effects of audience factors vary:  S ignificant but not large with poor warning messages  Many weaken in presence of strong warning messages  Some constrain communication & response:  Special needs sub-populations (unique effects)  Special communication channels (for sub-populations) Dennis S. Mileti September 201234

35.  What to say (5 topics matter most):  WHAT (Guidance): What to do & how to do it  WHEN (Time): When to begin & complete the protective action  WHERE (Location): Who should & shouldn’t do it using clear geographical boundaries  WHY (Hazard): The event, the consequences & how the protective action reduces them  WHO (source): Who’s giving the message:  No single credible source, name a panel of sources Dennis S. Mileti September 201235

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37.  How to say it (5 attributes matter):  CLEAR: Simply worded  SPECIFIC: Precise & non-ambiguous  ACCURATE: Timely, accurate & complete  CERTAIN: Authoritative & confident even in face of uncertainty  CONSISTENT:  Externally: Explain changes from past messages & differences from what others are saying  Internally: Never say “attack will occur soon, don’t worry” Dennis S. Mileti September 201237

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39.  This is a MANDATORY EVACUATION ORDER from the Yellow County Sheriff’s Department AND Fire Authority. There’s a high risk of CATASTROPHIC MUDSLIDES & DEBRIS FLOWS due to rain on BURNT SLOPES. After consulting with the U.S. Geological Survey and the National Weather Service, WE issue a mandatory evacuation order for the following people in Yellow County:  If you LIVE IN or ARE IN an area BELOW or NEAR burnt slopes, evacuate now. Do not delay. This is a MANDATORY EVACUATION ORDER. Evacuate. Evacuate NOW.  What we mean when we say evacuate is: GET OUT OF ALL CANYONS, and get out of them NOW.  If you don’t live in or aren’t in an area below or near burnt slopes, you don’t need to do anything. 39Dennis S. Mileti February 2011

40.  If you have CHILDREN IN A SCHOOL located in a canyon:  DO NOT GO THERE TO GET THEM. They won’t be there when you arrive.  All school children in all canyon schools are currently being evacuated to (insert the name, address, and telephone number).  You can pick them up there once you have completed your own evacuation. 40Dennis S. Mileti February 2011

41.  There’s HIGH RISK of catastrophic mudslides and debris flows due to rain on BURNT SLOPES:  Mudslides and debris flows could occur NOW, and they could be large enough to COMPLETELY BURY homes, roads, and lives.  They can occur WITHOUT NOTICE.  The amount of rain needed to start a catastrophic mudslide or debris flow is SMALL. Don’t think you’re safe because the rainfall you see is slight.  The risk of catastrophic mudslides and debris flows below all burnt slopes in all Yellow Country is REAL. 41Dennis S. Mileti February 2011

42.  If you LIVE IN or ARE IN an area BELOW or NEAR burnt slopes EVACUATE NOW.  Evacuate WITHOUT DELAY. Evacuate NOW.  This is a MANDATORY EVACUATION ORDER.  There’s a Red Cross shelter at Monroe High School in the town of Yellow.  Bring your pets and keep them with you. Larger animals can be brought to the Yellow County Fairgrounds.  If you have questions or require assistance, please call 123-456- 7890.  New information will be made available as it becomes available on this same station/channel. 42Dennis S. Mileti February 2011

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44.  Headline (160 character limit)  Nuclear explosion in downtown Denver. High radiation levels in air and blowing in the direction of the wind. Take shelter indoors immediately!  Description (description + instruction = 160 word limit)  A nuclear explosion occurred at 1:00 PM in downtown Denver. Radiation is in the air, blowing in the wind, and falling to the ground. Exposure can be deadly and cause illness. Dennis S. Mileti September 201244

45.  Instruction (description + instruction = 160 word limit)  You can increase your chances of surviving and reducing injury by IMMEDIATELY going inside the nearest tall building, basement, underground garage or tunnel and staying there. Shelters of brick, concrete, and earth will give the most protection. If you are in a different kind of building, stay there unless you can reach a better shelter in a few minutes or less. DO NOT EVACUATE. Drivers should stop their cars and take shelter. You will receive less radiation inside than outside no matter how fast you drive. If you are not in the area, STAY OUT. Keep listening to the media for more instructions. We will ask you to take other actions later. This “Shelter Order” is based on advice from nuclear scientists and local, state, and federal emergency managers. Dennis S. Mileti September 201245

46.  Number of communication channels:  More channels work better than fewer channels  Some subpopulations need unique channels  Type of communication channels:  Personal delivery channels work best  Channel “diversity” (multi-media) helps too  Frequency of communications:  The more its repeated & heard the better:  Repetition fosters confirmation which yields taking action Dennis S. Mileti September 201246

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48. 48 STATUS ROLES EXPERI- ENCE CUES INFO RECEIVED MILLING KNOW- LEDGE PERCEIVED RISK ACTION INFO BELIEF Dennis S. Mileti February 2011

49. 49 STATUS ROLES EXPERI- ENCE CUES INFO RECEIVED MILLING KNOW- LEDGE PERCEIVED RISK ACTION IINFO BELIEF Dennis S. Mileti February 2011

50.  Models are represented by equations:  Called “simultaneous multiple regression equations”  Equations enable us to determine:  Effect of every factor while controlling for the effects of everything else (good science)  The result is:  Distinguish between what’s really important & what isn’t  When to get excited:  When different studies reach the same conclusions  That’s where we are with research on public response to warnings for hazardous events 50Dennis S. Mileti February 2011

51. X4 = β 41X1 + β 42X2 + β 43X3 + e4 X5 = β 51X1 + β 52X2 + β 53X3 + β 54X4 + e5 X6 = β 61X1 + β 62X2 + β 63X3 + β 64X4 + β 65X5 + e6 X7 = β 71X1 + β 72X2 + β 73X3 + β 74X4 + β 75X5 + β 76X6 + e7 *Averill, J. D., D.S. Mileti, R.D. Peacock, E.D. Kuligowski, N. Groner, G. Proulx, P.A. Reneke, and H.E. Nelson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications. Report NCSTAR 1-7, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD. Available at: http://wtc.nist.gov/NISTNCSTAR1-7.pdf 51Dennis S. Mileti February 2011

52.  Not just about official warning messages:  Public gets information from many sources  Public in an “information soup” when warned:  Many formal & informal information sources  Some information is correct & some is not  Inconsistencies slow protective action-taking  What works best = deliver warnings and manage the soup:  Put good information in & take bad information out Dennis S. Mileti September 201252

53.  Managed warning information includes:  Use evidence-based messages (pre-scripted & vetted)  Take audience factors into account for delivery  Actions to reduce public milling & response delay  Match messages across information providers  Distribute messages repetitively over diverse channels  Send the messages to other providers + JIC  Inform people not at risk to reduce “response creep”  Monitor public response (people at & not at risk)  Listen for wrong information & then  Re-warn with adjusted messages based on what people are + aren’t doing, wrong information, & any changed protective actions recommendations plus  Q & A provide & staff a call-in number Dennis S. Mileti September 201253

54.  Even great warning messages:  Aren’t silver bullets that work well on their own  Messaging impacts public response most effectively when:  “Its a process of public messaging & information management based on plans, procedures and training”  Bottom line:  Emergency communication planning works, not planning doesn’t work quite as well Dennis S. Mileti September 201254

55. WARNING PROVIDER BEHAVIOR Dennis S. Mileti September 201255

56.  Warnings come from a system of people, agencies & organizations:  A systems perspective helps “see” all the parts  System-level preparedness helps to:  Design, plan, train & exercise to create a more “highly reliable integrated warning system”  In place long before an actual event occurs Dennis S. Mileti September 201256

57. 57 DETECTION Monitoring Risk Detection Data Assessment & Analysis Prediction Informing MANAGEMENT Interpretation Decision to Warn Warning Content & Protective Action Selection Warning Method & Channel Response Monitoring Warning Feedback PUBLIC RESPONSE Interpretation Confirmation & Milling Response Warn Others RISK Natural Environment Technological Civil Dennis S. Mileti September 2012

58. 58 RISK Nature Technology Terrorists & more DETECTION Scientific Agencies Law Enforcement (Police, DHS, CIA, FBI) Public MANAGEMENT Government (Local, State, Tribal) Building Operators RESPONSE General Public Racial & Ethnic Minorities Visitors & Transients Special Needs Groups Organizations & Facilities Dennis S. Mileti September 2012

59.  Warning system failures can occur anywhere in the system:  Many links across functions & actors  Historical examples of non-failures & failures  Reasons for historical failures documented  Warning preparedness:  Integrates all parts of the system resulting in a “more reliable” system with lower odds of failing Dennis S. Mileti September 201259

60.  SYSTEM DESIGN FLAWS:  Warning system design, preparedness, training lacking  Un-reliable system linkages, e.g., detectors to managers  Actor’s personality not removed with procedures  Fail safe solutions for technological problems missing  Problems of non-communication not addressed  MESSAGING FLAWS:  Evidence-based messages not used  Everyone at risk not reached  People not at risk not communicated to  Repetitive message dissemination absent  Message management missing Dennis S. Mileti September 201260

61.  The link between:  Risk detectors & local warning providers  Ready local warning providers to receive information from risk detectors with:  “Planned triggers & procedures” about when to warn and what public protective actions to recommend to whom  Ad hoc approaches have historically been a root cause of warning system failures Dennis S. Mileti September 201261

62.  Warning messages should be short  People may panic  One-way delivery is communication  People will understand the message  Messages can’t be changed  There’s one public  A credible message source exists  People blindly follow instructions  One channel delivery works  Great messages guarantee great response Dennis S. Mileti September 201262

63.  Don’t confuse with preparedness education  Pre-event public “warning” education :  Doesn’t much influence response in an actual event  Why: warning response is largely determined “in situ”  Use to teach people:  Hazard exists, warning system & source, etc.  And to acquaint people with:  Protective actions, e.g., don’t pick kids up at school  In other words:  It can prime the public by removing surprises and reducing confusion in future warning events Dennis S. Mileti September 201263

64.  Community warning metric:  Assess research knowledge implementation  Measured in several UASI areas:  Washington, D.C., New York, & Los Angeles  Key findings:  Application lags behind knowledge  What is applied is done so unevenly  Narrowing the gap:  Plan development & training for practitioners  Modernized guidance  Pre-scripted (& pre-vetted) warning messages Dennis S. Mileti September 201264

65. GAME CHANGERS Dennis S. Mileti September 201265

66.  New approaches & new technology:  CAP (Common Altering Protocol)  IPAWS (Integrate Public Alert & Warning System)  CMAS (Commercial Mobile Alert System)  All hold great promise  Message length limited:  By carrying capacity of local distribution systems, e.g., Emergency Alert System (EAS) character limits  Research is needed Dennis S. Mileti September 201266

67.  “Sirens in our pockets”  Combines alerting & warning:  Blurs distinction (calls them both alerting)  Message length limits:  90 characters (not words) long (not long)  Holds promise & raises hypotheses:  Decrease diffusion time?  Increase milling & response delay time?  Enhance risk personalization?  Research is needed Dennis S. Mileti September 201267

68.  Won’t change some things:  How people are “hard wired”  Strong impact of message factors on public response behavior  Will change other things (hypotheses):  Accelerate milling, confirmation, informal notification  How public response can be monitored  Evidence so far = is mixed (about actual use)  Role & use likely to change over time  Holds promise  Research is needed Dennis S. Mileti September 201268

69. END NOTES Dennis S. Mileti September 201269

70.  We only “hit the highlights”:  More could be said about everything:  This was a speech (not a course)  Social science knowledge can’t:  Provide guarantees about public response or  Solve all public warning & response problems  But it can:  Help solve some problems and  Point to planning & training needs Dennis S. Mileti September 201270

71. “ The key determinant of public warning response has more to do with what public information providers say to the public than anything to do with the public itself” Dennis S. Mileti September 201271

72. QUESTIONS? dennis.mileti@colorado.edu 303-520-3400 Dennis S. Mileti September 201272