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1 رَبِّ اشْرَحْ لِي صَدْرِي وَ يَسِّرْلِي اَمْرِي وَ احْلُلْ عُقْدَةً مِنْ لِسَانِي يَفْقَهُوا قَوْلِي.

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Presentation on theme: "1 رَبِّ اشْرَحْ لِي صَدْرِي وَ يَسِّرْلِي اَمْرِي وَ احْلُلْ عُقْدَةً مِنْ لِسَانِي يَفْقَهُوا قَوْلِي."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 رَبِّ اشْرَحْ لِي صَدْرِي وَ يَسِّرْلِي اَمْرِي وَ احْلُلْ عُقْدَةً مِنْ لِسَانِي يَفْقَهُوا قَوْلِي

2 مدرس مدرس : جناب جناب آقاي آقاي دکتر دکتر علوي علوي راد ارائه ارائه کنندگان : زمستان زمستان 1382 سازمان سازمان مديريت مديريت و برنامه ‌ ريزي برنامه ‌ ريزي کشور رضا کريمپور کارشناس دفتر حراست عليرضا توتونچي کارشناس ارشد مهندسي و برنامه ‌ ريزي حمل ‌ ونقل – عمران کارشناس امور قراردادها دفتر امور فني علي تبار کارشناس ارشد مهندسي سازه – عمران معاون دفتر تدوين ضوابط و معيارهاي فني Case 14

3 Arthur A. Thompson, The University of Alabama John E. Gamble,University of South Alabama Case 14

4 از ديدگاه 2 فکر،تصورکلي 3 دستور 4 روش، مشي 5 نتايج 6 توزيع ‌ کنندگان 7 خرده ‌ فروش 8 واسطه،دلال 9 افزايش ‌ نرخ 10 وابسطه 11 موجودي،مايه 12 سود 13 کوشش ‌ کردن 14 کافي 15 زيربنا 16 رقيب 17 پايه،اساسي 18 وسيع،پر 19 سياهه کالا،فهرست اموال در سال 1984 ، در سن 21 سالگي، ميشل دل شرکت رايانه ‌ اي دل را بر مبناي ديدگاه و تفکر تجاري ساده ‌ اي بنا نمود : “ مي ‌ توان رايانه ‌ هاي شخصي را با درخواست مشتري ساخت و مستقيماً به وي ارسال نمود ”. ميشل دل باور داشت که روش توليد او دو نتيجه را بدنبال دارد : 1 ) دور زدن واسطه ‌ ها و خرده ‌ فروشان، باعث حذف افزايش قيمت ناشي از خرده ‌ فروشي مي ‌ شود 2 ) توليد به سفارش مشتري باعث مي ‌ شود تا هزينه و ريسک وابسطه به حمل ‌ ونقل بسته ‌ هاي بزرگ قطعات و کالاي تمام شده ، کاهش ‌ يابد. In 1984, at the age of 21, Michael Dell founded Dell Computer with a simple vision 1 and business concept 2 that personal computers could be built to order 3 and sold directly to customers. Michael Dell believed his approach 4 to PC manufacturing had two advantages 5 : (1).by­passing distributors 6 and retail 7 dealers8 eliminated the markups 9 of resellers, and (2) building to order greatly reduced the costs and risks associated 10 with carrying large stocks 11 of parts, components, and finished goods 12.

5 از ديدگاه 2 فکر،تصورکلي 3 دستور 4 روش، مشي 5 نتايج 6 توزيع ‌ کنندگان 7 خرده ‌ فروش 8 واسطه،دلال 9 افزايش ‌ نرخ 10 وابسطه 11 موجودي،مايه 12 سود 13 کوشش ‌ کردن 14 کافي 15 زيربنا 16 رقيب 17 پايه،اساسي 18 وسيع،پر 19 سياهه کالا،فهرست اموال مادامي که در سال ‌ هاي آغازين ، شرکت دل کوشش مي ‌ کرد تا بعضي اوقات استراتژي خود را بازنگري نمايد يا زيربناي محکمي بسازد و درمقابل رقباي معروف ‌ تر خود اعتبار تجاري کسب نمايد، روش توليد سفارشي و فروش مستقيم آن شرکت براي مشتريان در حال ازدياد اواسط دهه 1990 ، همچنانکه فروش جهاني رايانه ‌ ها رکورد جديدي ايجاد نمود ، مورد خوشايند واقع شد و مهم آنکه اين استراتژي براي شرکت حاشيه هزينه ‌- منفعت مهمي در مقابل رقبا ايجاد کرد. رقبايي که در حجم وسيع رايانه توليد نموده و تعداد زيادي از رايانه ‌ هاي آنان نزد واسطه ‌ ها و خرده ‌ فروشان بدون خريدار باقي ماند. While Dell Computer sometimes struggled 12 during its early years in trying to refine its strategy, build an adequate 14 infrastructure 15, and establish market credibility against better-known rivals 16, its build-to- order and sell-direct approach proved appealing to growing numbers of customers in the mid-1990s as global PC' sales rose to record levels. And, just as important, the strategy gave the company a substantial 17 cost and profit-margin advantage over rivals that manufactured PCs in volume and kept their distributors and retailers stocked with ample 18 inventories 19.

6 از به دنبال 21 بدست آوردن 22 کاهش جزئي 23 رشد از ابتداي 1998 شرکت Dell پس از Compaq Computer و IBM در بازار PC امريکا 12 % را بخود اختصـاص داده بود، در حالي که اين سهـم در دنيا بالغ بر 6 % مي ‌ شد.( رجوع به جدول 1) البته روز بروز Dell سهـم بيشتري از بازار جهـاني را تصاحب کرد. در چند دوره گذشته بيشترين رشد بازار اين شرکت در اروپـا بود، اما از اوايل سال 1998 عليرغم کـاهش جزئي فروش PC's ، اين شـرکت با رشدي 35 درصدي مواجه شد. Going into 1998, Dell Computer had a 12 percent share of the PC market in the United States, trailing 20 only Compaq Computer and IBM, which held first and second place in the market, respectively. Worldwide, Dell Computer had nearly a 6 percent market share (see Exhibit I). And the company was gaining 21 market share quickly in all of the world's markets. The company's fastest growing market for the past several quarters was Europe. Even though Asia's economic whoes in the first quarter of 1998 resulted in a slight decline 22 in Asian sales of PC's, Dell's sales in Asia rose percent.

7 از منافع ، سودآوري 25 ثبات ، وقار در سالهاي قبل از 1998 سايت اينترنتي Dell با ميانگين روزانه 5 مليون دلار و سالانه 5/1 ميليارد دلار فروش روبرو بوده است. سودآوري شرکت از 4/3 ميليارد دلار در 1994 به 3/12 در 1997 رسيد.( با نرخ رشد مرکب 53 %) ارزش سهام Dell از 23 سنت در سال 1990 به 83 دلار در 1998 افزايش يافت.( % رشد ) اين شرکت در طول دهه 90 داراي سهامي با عمکرد مطلوب و با ثبات بوده است. Dell's sales at its Internet Web site were averaging $5 million a day and were expected to reach $1.5 billion annually by year-end Dell Computer had 1997 revenues 24 of $12.3 billion, up from $3.4 billion in 1994—a compound average growth rate of 53 percent. Over the same period, profits were up from $140 million to $944 million— an 89 percent growth rate. Since 1990, the company's stock price had exploded from a split-adjusted price of 23 cents per share to $83 per share in May 1998—a 36,000 per­cent increase. Dell Computer was the top-performing big company stock so far during the 1990s and seemed poised 25 to become the stock of the decade.

8 از اصلي، عمده معرفي محصولات اصلي Dell Dell's principal products included desktop PCs, notebook computers, work­stations, and servers. The company also marketed a number of products made by other manufacturers, including CD-ROM drives, modems, monitors, networking hardware, memory cards, storage devices, speakers, and printers.

9 از منافع ، سود محصولات و خدمات اين شرکت در بيش از 140 کشور فروش داشته است. فروش PC با 65 % بيشترين سهم را در سودآوري Dell داشته و سهم منافع حاصل از فروش نوتبوک، سرور و... بالغ بر 33 % بوده است. در اوايل سال 1998 شرکت داراي کارمند بود. The company's products and services were sold in more than 140 countries. Sales of desktop PCs accounted for about 65 percent of Dell's total revenues; sales of notebook computers, servers, and workstations accounted for about 33 percent of revenue 27. In early 1998, the company had 16,000 employees.

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11 از سفارش پستي 2 تمبري که در قبال خريد کالا هديه مي دهند 3 اشتراک 4 ثبت نام نمودن 5 پزشکي مقدماتي 6 غرق شدن 7 خوابگاه 1 سفارش پستي 2 تمبري که در قبال خريد کالا هديه مي دهند 3 اشتراک 4 ثبت نام نمودن 5 پزشکي مقدماتي 6 غرق شدن 7 خوابگاه پيشينه شرکت مايکل دل در سن 13 سالگي از کار فروش پستي تمبر با درآمد ماهانه 2000 دلار آغاز نمود. در 16 سالگي در امر فروش اشتراک Houston Post وارد شد و در 17 سالگي اولين ماشين BMW خود را خريداري نمود. او در دانشگاه تگزاس از سال 1983 مشغول تحصيل شد. عليرغم ميل والدين که پزشکي را براي او مي ‌ پسنديدند، او در دنياي کامپيوتر غوطه مي ‌ خورد و در خارج خوابگاه به فروش قطعات کامپيوتر مشغول شد. COMPANY BACKGROUND At age 13, Michael Dell was running a mail-order 1 stamp-trading 2 business, complete with a national catalog, and grossing $2,000 per month. At 16, he was selling subscriptions 3 to the Houston Post, and at 17 he bought his first BMW with money lie had earned. He enrolled 4 at the University of Texas in 1983 as a premed 5 student (his parents wanted him to become a doctor) but soon became immersed 6 in computers and started selling PC components out of his college dormitory 7 room.

12 از سهميه 9 جزئي، خرده فروشي 10 مازاد 8 سهميه 9 جزئي، خرده فروشي 10 مازاد او RAM و Disk drive براي کامپيوترهاي IBM He bought random-access memory (RAM) chips and disk drives for IBM PCs at cost from IBM dealers, who often had excess supplies on hand because they were required to order large monthly quotas 8 from IBM. Dell resold the components through newspaper ads (and later through ads in national computer magazines) at percent below the regular retail 9 price.

13 از آوريل 1984 فروش بالغ بر دلار در ماه گرديد. مايکل دل با خروج از دانشکده ، يک شرکت کامپيوتري تاسيس نمود و فروش کامپيوتر و قطعات کامپيوتري را دنبال کرد. او کامپيوترهاي خود را از خرده ‌ فروشها تهيه نموده، پس از ارتقاء و بروز کردن، آنها را بفروش مي ‌ رساند. استراتژي او يعني فروش مستقيم به مصرف ‌ کننده نهايي ، موجب حذف واسطه ‌ ها و جلوگيري از افزايش قيمت بخاطر واسطه ‌ گري شده، ‌ به نحويکه اين شرکت قادر شد درحدود 40% زير قيمت کامپيوترهاي IBM کامپيوتر جمع نمايد. By April 1984 sales were running about $80,000 per month. Dell dropped out of college and formed a company, PCs Ltd., to sell both PC components and PCs under the brand name PCs Limited. He obtained his PCs by buying retailers' surplus stocks at cost, then powering them up with graphics cards, hard disks, and memory before reselling them. His strategy was to sell directly to end users; by eliminating the retail markup, Dell's new company was able to sell IBM clones (machines that copied the functioning of IBM PCs using the same or similar components) at about 40 percent below the price of an IBM PC.

14 از استراتژي کاهش قيمت موفقيت آميز بود و ضمن جذب خريداران هوشيار ، رشد سريع را نيز در پي داشت. در سال 1985 اين شرکت با تعداد محدود 40 کارمند ، توليد و جمع کردن کامپيوترها را انجام مي ‌ داد و مايکل مجبور بود روزانه 18 ساعت کار نمايد. اين امر درآمدي بالغ بر 33 ميليون در سال 1986 را نتيجه داشت. The price discounting strategy was successful, attracting price- conscious buyers and producing rapid growth. By 1985, the company was assembling its own PC designs with a few people working on six- foot tables. The company had 40 employees, and Michael Dell worked 18-hour days, often sleeping on a cot in his office. By the end of fiscal 1986, sales had readied $33 million.

15 از During the next several years, however, PCs Ltd. was hampered by a lack of money, people, and resources. Michael Dell sought to refine the company's business model, add needed production capacity, and build a bigger, deeper management staff and corporate infrastructure while at the same time keeping costs low. The company was renamed Dell Computer in 1987, and the first international offices were opened that same year.

16 از In 1987 Dell added a sales force to serve large customers, began selling to government agencies, and became a public company—raising $34.2 million in its first offering of common stock. Sales to large customers quickly became the dominant pan of Dell's business. By 1990 Dell Computer had sales of $388 million, a market share of 2-3 percent, and an R&D staff of over 150 people. Michael Dell's vision was for Dell Computer to become one of the top three PC companies.

17 از Thinking its direct sales business would not grow fast enough, in 1990—93; the com­pany began distributing its computer products through Soft Warehouse Superstores (now CompUSA). Staples (a leading office-products chain). Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, and Price Club (now Price/Costco). Dell also sold PCs through Best Buy stores in 16 states and through Xerox in 19 Latin American countries.

18 از But when the company learned how thin its margins were in selling through such distribution channels, it real­ized it had made a mistake and withdrew from selling to retailers and. other intermedi­aries in 1994 to refocus on direct sales. At the time, sales through retailers accounted for only about 2 percent of Dell's revenues.

19 از Further problems emerged in Dell reportedly had $38 million in second-quarter losses that year from engaging in a risky foreign- currency hedging strategy. Also, quality difficulties appeared in certain PC lines made by the company's contract manufacturers, profit margins declined, and buyers were turned off by the company's laptop PC models.

20 از To get laptop sales back on track, the company took a charge of $40 million to write off its laptop line and suspended sales of laptops until it could get redesigned models into the marketplace. The problems resulted in losses of $36 mil­lion for the company's fiscal year ending January

21 از Because of higher costs and unacceptably low profit margins in selling to individu­als and households. Dell did not pursue the consumer market aggressively until sales on the company's Internet site took off in 1996 and Management noticed that while the industry's average selling price to individuals was going down. Dell's was going up—people who were buying their second and third computers, who wanted powerful computers with multiple features, and who did not need much technical support were choosing Dell.

22 از It became clear that PC-savvy individuals liked the conve­nience of buying direct from Dell, ordering exactly what they wanted, and having it delivered to their door within a matter of days. In early 1997, Dell created an internal sales and marketing group dedicated to serving the individual consumer segment and introduced a product line designed especially for individual users.

23 از By late 1997, Dell had become the industry leader in keeping costs down and wringing efficiency out of its direct sales and build-to-order business model. Industry observers saw Dell as being in strong position to capitalize on several forces shaping the PC industry—sharp declines in component prices, rapid improvements in PC tech­nology and growing customer interest in having PCs equipped with the power, com­ponents. and software they wanted.

24 از Exhibit 2 through Exhibit 5 contain a five-year review of Dell Computer's financial performance and selected financial statements contained in the company's 1998 annual report.

25 از MICHAEL DELL Michael Dell was widely considered one of the mythic heroes within the PC industry and was labeled "the quintessential American entrepreneur" and "the most innovative guy for marketing computers in this decade." He was the youngest CEO ever to guide a company to a Fortune 500 ranking. His prowess was based more on an astute com­ bination of technical knowledge and marketing know-how than on being a techno- wizard. In 1998 Michael Dell owned about 16 percent of Dell Computers common stock, worth about $10 billion.

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27 از Once pudgy and bespectacled, Michael Dell wore expensive suits and contact lenses, ate only health foods, attended executive seminars at Stanford, and was a fre­quent speaker at industry conferences. He lived in a three-story square-foot home on a 60-acre estate. The company's glass-and-steel headquarters building in Round Rock, Texas (an Austin suburb), had unassuming, utilitarian furniture, abstract art, framed accolades to Michael Dell, laudatory magazine covers, industry awards plaques, bronze copies of the company's 11 patents, and a history wall that contained the hand-soldered guts of the company's first personal computer.

28 از In the company's early days Michael Dell hung around mostly with the company's engineers. He was so shy that some employees thought he was stuck up because he never talked to them. But people who worked with him closely described him as a lik­able young man who was slow to warm up to strangers.2 He was a terrible public speaker and wasn't good at running meetings. A Business Week reporter labeled him Walker's tutelage. Michael Dell became intimately familiar with all pans of the busi­ness. overcame his shyness, learned to control his ego, and fumed into a charismatic leader with an instinct for motivating people and winning their loyalty and respect. When Walker had to leave the company in 1990 because of health reasons. Dell turned to Morton Meyerson. former CEO and president of Electronic Data Systems, for advice on how to transform Dell Computer from a fast-growing medium-sized com­pany into a billion-dollar enterprise.

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32 از Though sometimes given to displays of impatience and a strong temper. Michael Dell usually spoke in a quiet, reflective manner and came across as a person with maturity and seasoned judgment far beyond his age. He became an accomplished pub­lic speaker. He delegated authority to subordinates, believing that the best results came from "[turning] loose talented people who can be relied upon to do what they're sup­posed to do." Business associates viewed Michael Dell as an aggressive personality, an extremely competitive risk-taker who had always played close to the edge. Moreover. the people he hired were aggressive and competitive, traits that translated into an aggressive, competitive, intense corporate culture with a strong sense of mission and dedication.

33 از Developments in Early 1998 Dell's sales were up strongly in the first quarter of 1998, even in product areas where the company had previously lagged, pushing its global market share to 7.9 percent and its U.S. share to 11.8 percent. Unit shipments were 1.6 million units, compared to in the first quarter of In laptop PCs. Dell moved into third place in U.S. sales and fifth place worldwide. And it climbed into second place in higher-margin products like servers and Windows NT-based workstations. Dell announced the for­mation of an alliance with Data General Corporation to enter the market for data stor­age equipment.

34 از In the first quarter of about half of the industry7 *s PC sales consisted of com­puters selling for less than S Dell's average selling price was S2.500 per unit, down 9 percent from the prior quarter. The company was planning to broaden its prod­uct line to include lower-priced PCs equipped with Intel's low-end Celeron chip; Dell's new budget models were priced in the S 1,200 range.

35 از COMPETING VALLE CHAIN MODELS IN THE PERSONAL COMPUTER INDUSTRY When the personal computer industry first began to take shape in the early 1980s, the founding companies manufactured many of the components themselves—disk drives, memory chips, graphics chips, microprocessors, motherboards, and soft­ware. Believing that they had to develop key components in-house. companies built expertise in a variety of PC- related technologies and created organizational units to produce components as well as to handle final assembly. While certain "non-critical" items were typically outsourced. if a computer maker was not at least par­tially vertically integrated and an assembler of some components, then it was not taken seriously as a manufacturer.

36 از But as the industry grew. technology advanced quickly in so many directions on so many parts and components that the early personal computer manufacturers could not keep pace as experts on all fronts. There were too many technological innovations in components to pursue and too many manufacturing intricacies to master for a vertically integrated manufacturer to keep its products on the cutting edge. As a consequence, companies emerged that specialized in making particular components. Specialists could marshal enough R&D capability and resources to either lead the technological develop­ments in their area of specialization or else quickly match the advances made by their competitors. Moreover, specialist firms could mass-produce a component and supply it to several computer manufacturers far cheaper than any one manufacturer could fund the needed component R&D and then make only whatever smaller volume of compo­nents it needed for assembling its own brand of PCs.

37 از Thus, in recent years, computer makers had begun to outsource most all compo­nents from specialists and to concentrate on efficient assembly and marketing of their brand of computers. Exhibit 6 shows the value chain model that such manufacturers as Compaq. IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Packard-Bell used in the 1990s. It featured arm's-length transactions between specialist suppliers, manufacturer/assemblers, dis­tributors and retailers, and end- users. However, Dell, Gateway, and Micron Electronics employed a shorter value chain model, selling direct to customers and eliminating the rime and costs associated with distributing through independent resellers.

38 از Building to order avoided (a) having to keep many differently-equipped models on retailers* shelves to fill buyer requests for one or another configuration of options and compo­nents and (b) having to clear out slow-selling models at a discount before introducing new generations of PCs. Selling direct eliminated retailer costs and markups (retail dealer margins were typically in the 4 to 10 percent range). Dell Computer was far and away the world's largest direct seller to large companies and government institutions. while Gateway was the largest direct seller to individuals and small businesses. Micron Electronics was the only other PC maker that relied on the direct sales and build-to-order approach for the big majority of its sales.

39 از DELL COMPUTER'S STRATEGY Dell Computer's strategy was built around a number of core elements: build-to-order manufacturing, mass customization, partnerships with suppliers, just-in-time compo­nents inventories, direct sales, market segmentation, customer service, and extensive data and information sharing with both supply partners and customers. Through this strategy, the company hoped to achieve what Michael Dell called "virtual integra­tion"—a stitching together of Dell's business with its supply partners and customers in real time such that all three appeared to be part of the same organizational team.5

40 از Build-to-Order Manufacturing and Mass Customization Dell built its computers, workstations, and servers to order: none were produced for inventory. Dell customers could order custom-built servers and workstations based on the needs of their applications. Desktop and laptop customers ordered whatever con­figuration of microprocessor speed, random access memory (RAM), hard-disk capac­ity. CD-ROM drive, fax/modem, monitor size. speakers, and other accessories they preferred. The orders were directed to the nearest factory. Until recently Dell had oper­ated its assembly lines in traditional fashion, with workers each performing a single operation. An order form accompanied each metal chassis across the production floor:

41 از drives, chips, and ancillary items were installed to match customer specifications. As a partly assembled PC arrived at a new workstation, the operator, standing beside a tall steel rack with drawers full of components, was instructed what to do by little red and green lights flashing beside the drawers. When the operator was finished, the compo­nents where automatically replenished from the other side of the drawers and the PC chassis glided down the line to the next workstation. However, Dell reorganized its plants in 1997, shifting to "cell manufacturing" techniques whereby a team of workers operating at a group workstation (or cell) assembled an entire PC according to cus­tomer specifications. The result had been to reduce assembly times by 75 percent and to double productivity per square foot of assembly space. Assembled computers were tested, then loaded with the desired software, shipped, and typically delivered within five to six business days of the initial order.

42 از EXHIBIT 6 Comparative Value Chains of PC Manufacturers Traditional PC Industry Value Chain (utilized by Compaq Computer,IBM,Hewlet-Packard,most others) Manufacture of PC Components by suppliers Service and support activities provided to PC users by resellers (or some PC makers – IBM to PC users) Purchases by PC users Sales and marketing activities of resellers to sell inventories of PC’s on hand Assembly of PC’s by PC makers (to fill orders from suppliers and keep distribution channels stocked)

43 از Manufacture of PC Components by suppliers Service and support activities provided to PC users either by PC maker (via telephone,fax,or ) or by independent service providers Purchases by PC users Customized assembly of PC’s by PC makers as orders from PC buyers come in Build-to-Order/Direct Sales Value Chain (employed by Dell Computer,Gateway, and Micron Electronics)

44 از This sell-direct strategy meant, of course, that Dell had no in-house stock of fin­ished goods inventories and that, unlike competitors using the traditional value chain model (Exhibit 6), it did not have to wait for resellers to clear out their own invento­ries before it could push new models into the marketplace. (Resellers typically oper­ated with days' inventory.) Equally important was the fact that customers who bought from Dell got the satisfaction of having their computers customized to their particular liking and pocketbook.

45 از Dell had three PC assembly plants—in Austin. Texas: Limerick. Ireland: and Penang. Malaysia. The company was constructing another plant in Ireland to serve the European market as well as a new plant in China (the company expected the market for PCs in China to soon be huge). Both of the new plants were expected to come into use at the end of 1998.

46 از Partnerships with Suppliers Michael Dell believed it made much better sense for Dell Computer to partner with reputable suppliers of PC parts and components rather than to integrate backward and get into pans and components manufacturing on its own. He explained why: If you've got a race with 20 players all vying to make the fastest graphics chip in the world, do you want to be the 21si horse, or do you want to evaluate the field of 20 and pick the best one?

47 از Management believed long-term partnerships with reputable suppliers yielded several advantages. First, using name-brand processors, disk drives, modems, speakers, and multimedia components enhanced the quality and performance of Dell's PCs. Because of the varying performance of different brands of components, the brand of the com­ponents was as important or more important to some buyers than the brand of the over­all system. Dell's strategy was to partner with as few outside vendors as possible and to stay with those vendors as long as they maintained their leadership in technology, performance, and quality.

48 از Second, because Dell committed to purchase a specified per­centage of its requirements from each of its long-term suppliers. Dell was assured of getting the volume of components it needed on a timely basis even when overall mar­ket demand for a particular component temporarily exceeded the overall market sup­ply. Third, Dell's formal partnerships with key suppliers made it feasible to have some of their engineers assigned to Dell's product design teams and for them to be treated as pan of Dell. When new products were launched, suppliers' engineers were stationed in Dell's plant.

49 از If early buyers called with a problem related to design, further assembly and shipments were halted while the supplier's engineers and Dell personnel corrected the flaw on the spot.7 Fourth, Dell's long-run commitment to its suppliers laid the basis for just-in-time delivery of suppliers' products to Dell's assembly plants in Texas, Ireland, and Malaysia. Some of Dell's vendors had plants or distribution centers within a few miles of Dell's Texas assembly plant and could deliver daily or even hourly if needed. To help suppliers meet its just-in-time delivery expectations. Dell openly shared its daily production schedules, sales forecasts, and new-model introduction plans with vendors.

50 از Michael Dell explained one aspect of the information- sharing relationship with sup­pliers as follows: We tell our supplier? exactly what our daily production requirements are. So it's not. "Well, every two weeks deliver to this warehouse, and we'll put them on the shelf, and then we'll take them off the shelf." It's. "Tomorrow morning we need and deliver them to door number seven by 7 am.

51 از Dell also did a three-year plan with each of its key suppliers and worked with suppli­ers to minimize the number of different stock-keeping units of pans and components in designing its products.

52 از Why Dell Was Committed to Just-in-Time Inventory Practices Dell's just-in-time inventory emphasis yielded major cost advantages and shortened the time it took for Dell to get new generations of its computer models into the marketplace. New advances were coming so fast in certain computer pans and components (particularly microprocessors, disk drives, and modems) that any given item in inventory was obsolete in a matter of months, sometimes quicker. Having a couple of months of component inventories meant getting caught in the transition from one genera­tion of components to the next.

53 از Moreover, there were rapid-fire reductions in the prices of components—most recently, component prices had been falling as much as 50 percent annually (an average of 1 percent a w'-eek). Intel, for example, regu­larly cut the prices on its older chips when it introduced newer chips, and it intro­duced new chip generations about every three months. And the prices of hard-disk drives with greater and greater memory capacity had dropped sharply as disk drive makers incorporated new technology that allowed them to add more gigabytes of hard-disk memory very inexpensively.

54 از The economics of minimal component inventories were dramatic. Michael Dell explained: If I've got 11 days of inventory and my competitor has 80 and Intel comes out with a new 450-megahenz chip. that means I'm going lo get to market 69 days sooner. In the computer industry, inventory can be a pretty massive risk because if the cost of materials is going down 50 percent a year and you have two or three months of inventory versus eleven days. you've got a big cost disadvantage- And you're vulnerable to product transitions, when you can get stuck with obsolete inventory.

55 از Collaboration with suppliers was close enough to allow Dell to operate with only a few days of inventory for some components and a few hours of inventory for others.

56 از Dell supplied data on inventories and replenishment needs to its suppliers at least once a day—hourly in the case of components being delivered several times daily from nearby sources. In a couple of instances. Dell's close partnership with vendors allowed it to operate with no inventories. Dell's supplier of monitors was Sony. Because the monitors Sony supplied with the Dell name already imprinted were of dependably high quality (a defect rate of fewer than 1,000 per million). Dell didn't even open up the monitor boxes to test them.

57 از Nor did it bother to have them shipped to Dell's assem­bly plants to be warehoused for shipment to customers. Instead, utilizing sophisticated data exchange systems. Dell arranged for its shippers (Airborne Express and UPS) to pick up computers at its Austin plant, then pick up the accompanying monitors at the Sony plant in Mexico, match the customer's computer order with the customer's monitor order, and deliver both to the customer simultaneously. The savings in time. energy, and cost were significant.

58 از The company had. over the years, refined and improved its inventory-tracking capa­ bilities and its procedures for operating with small inventories. In Dell had $2.6 billion in sales and $342 million in inventory. In fiscal year it had $12.3 billion in sales and $S233 million in inventory—an inventory turn ratio of seven days. By com­parison, Gateway, which also pursued a build-to-order strategy, had 1997 sales of $6.3 billion and inventories of $249 million—an inventory turn ratio of 14 days. Compaq had inventories of $l.57 billion at year-end and 1997 sales of $24.6 billion (thus turning its inventories about every 23 days). Dell's goal was to get its inventory turn down to three days before the year 2000.

59 از Direct Sale?

60 از Selling direct to customers gave Dell firsthand intelligence about customer prefer­ences and needs, as well as immediate feedback on design problems and quality glitches. With thousands of phone and fax orders daily. $5 million in daily Internet sales, and daily contacts between the field sales force and customers of all types, the company kept its finger on the market pulse, quickly detecting shifts in sales trends and getting prompt feedback on any problems with its products. If the company got more than a few similar complaints, the information was relayed immediately to design engineers.

61 از When design flaws or components defects were found, the factory was notified and the problem corrected within a matter of days. Management believed Dell's ability to respond quickly gave it a significant advantage over rivals, particu­larly over PC makers in Asia. That made large production runs and sold standardized products through retail channels. Dell saw its direct sales approach as a totally customer-driven system that allowed quick transitions to new generations of compo­nents and PC models.

62 از Despite Dell's emphasis on direct sales, industry analysts noted that the company sold percent of its PCs through a small, select group of resellers.11 Most of these resellers were systems integrators. It was standard for Dell not to allow returns on orders from resellers or to provide price protection in the event of subsequent declines in market prices. From time to lime. Dell offered its resellers incentive promotions at up to a 20 percent discount from its advertised prices on end-of-life models. Dell was said to have no plans to expand its reseller network, which consisted of about dealers.

63 از 14463

64 از Market Segmentation To make sure that each type of customer was well served. Del] had made a special effort to segment the buyers of its computers into relevant groups and to place man­agers in charge of developing sales and service programs appropriate to the needs and expectations of each market segment. Until the early 1990s, Dell had operated with sales and service programs aimed at just two market segments—(1) corporate and gov­ernmental buyers who purchased in large volumes and (2) small buyers (individuals and small businesses). But as sales look off in these segments were subdi­vided into finer, more homogeneous categories (see Exhibit 7).

65 از In percent of Dell's sales were to business or government institutions and of those 70 percent were to large corporate customers who bought at least $l million in PCs annually. Many of these large customers typically ordered thousands of units at a time. Dell had hundreds of sales representatives calling on large corporate and insti­tutional accounts. Its customer list included Shell Oil. Exxon. MCI. Ford Motor, Toyota. Eastman Chemical, Boeing. Goldman Sachs. Oracle. Microsoft. Woolwich (a British bank with S64 billion in assets). Michelin. Unilever, Deutsche Bank. Sony, Wal-Mart, and First Union (one of the 10 largest U.S. banks).

66 از However, no one cus­tomer represented more than 2 percent of total sales. Because corporate customers tended to buy the most expensive computers. Dell commanded the highest average selling prices in the industry—over S1.600 versus an industry average under SL400.

67 از Dell's sales to individuals and small businesses were made by telephone, fax, and the Internet. It had a call center in the United States with toll-free lines: customers could talk with a sales representative about specific models, get information faxed or mailed to them. place an order, and pay by credit card. Internationally. Dell had set up six call centers in Europe and Asia that customers could dial toll free.12 The call cen­ters were equipped with technology that routed calls from a particular country to a par­ticular call center.

68 از Thus, for example, a customer calling from Lisbon. Portugal, was automatically directed to the call center in Montpelier. France, and connected to a Portuguese-speaking sales representative. Dell began Internet sales at its Web site (www.dell.com) in almost overnight achieving sales of $l million per day. In 1997 Internet sales reached an average of S3 million daily, hitting S6 million some days during the Christmas shopping period. In the first quarter of 1997.

69 از Dell's Internet sales averaged nearly $4 million daily: and the company expected that 1998 sales at its Web site would reach S1.5 billion. The fastest growing segment of Dell's international segment was on the Internet in Europe, where sales were running at a weekly volume ofS5 million in early Internet sales were ramping up rapidly from Asian buyers. In early Dell's Internet sales were about equally divided between sales to indi­viduals and sales to business customers. Nearly 1.5 million people visited Dell's Web site weekly to view information and place orders, about 20 times more than called to talk with sales representatives over the telephone.

70 از In 1997, 31 percent, or S3.8 billion, of Dell's sales came from foreign customers. Europe, where resellers were strongly entrenched and Dell's direct sales approach was novel, was Dell's biggest foreign market. Dell's European sales were growing at 50 percent annually. The market leader in Europe was Compaq, with a 14.8 percent mar­ket share, follow/ed by IBM with 8.3 percent. Dell with 7.8 percent. Hewlett-Packard with 7.6 percent, and Siemens Nixdorf (Germany > with 5.6 percent. In Britain, which Dell had entered in the laic 1980s. Dell had a 12 percent share, trailing only Compaq. Sales of PCs in Europe were expected to reach million in 1998 and 28.5 million in Total European sales in 1997 were 39.7 million units.

71 از Customer Service Service became a feature of Dell's strategy in 1986 when the company began provid­ing a guarantee of free on-site service for a year with most of its PCs after users com­plained about having to ship their PCs back to Austin for repairs. Dell contracted with local service providers to handle customer requests for repairs; on-site service was pro­vided on a next-day basis. Dell also provided its customers with technical support via a toll-free number, fax. and e- mail.

72 از Customer Service Dell received close to messages monthly requesting service and support and had 25 technicians to process the requests. Bundled service policies were a major selling point for winning corporate accounts. If a customer preferred to work with his or her own service provider. Dell gave that provider the training and spare pans needed to service the customer's equipment.

73 از Selling direct allowed Dell to keep close track of the purchases of its large global customers, country by country and department by department—information that cus­tomers found valuable. Maintaining its close customer relationships allowed Dell to become quite knowledgeable about its customers' needs and how their PC network functioned. Aside from using this information to help customers plan their PC needs and configure their PC networks.

74 از Dell used its knowledge to add to the value it deliv­ered to its customers. For example. Dell recognized that when it delivered a new PC to a corporate customer, the customer's PC personnel had to place asset tags on it and then load the software from an assortment of CD- ROMs and diskettes—a process that could take several hours and cost $200-$300.

75 از Dell's solution was to load the customer's software onto one of its own very large Dell servers at the factory and. when a particular version of a customer's PC came off the assembly line. to use its high- speed server network to load that customer's software onto the PC's hard disk in a few seconds. If the customer so desired. Dell would place asset tags on the PC at the factory. Since Dell charged customers only an extra $15 or $20 for the software-loading and asset-tagging services, the savings to customers were considerable.

76 از One large customer reported sav­ings of $ annual!} from having Dell load its software and place asset tags on its PCs at the factory.14 In about 2 million of the 7 million PCs Dell sold w/ere shipped with customer-specific software already loaded on the PCs.

77 از Corporate customers paid Dell fees to provide support and service. Dell then con­tracted w4th third-party providers to make the necessary service calls. When a cus­tomer with PC problems called Dell. the call triggered two electronic dispatches—one to ship the needed pans from Dell's factory to the customer sites and one to notify the contract service providers to prepare to make the needed repairs as soon as the parts arrived.15 The service providers sent the bad parts back to Dell.

78 از Dell then endeavored to diagnose what went wrong and what could be done to see that the problem wouldn't happen again. Problems relating to faulty components or flawed components design were promptly passed along to the relevant supplier, who was expected to improve quality control procedures or redesign the component. Dell's strategy was to manage the flow of information gleaned from customer service activities both to improve prod­uct quality and speed execution.

79 از Dell had plans in place to build Application Solutions Centers in both Europe and North America to assist its customers and independent software providers in migrating their systems and applications to Intel's new next-generation. 64-bit computing tech­nology. Dell was partnering with Intel. Microsoft, Computer Associates, and other prominent PC technology providers to help customers make more effective use of the Internet and the latest computing technologies.

80 از Dell. which used Intel microprocessors exclusively in its computers, had been a consistent proponent of standardized Intel-based platforms because the company believed those platforms provided customers with the best total value and performance. Dell management considered both Intel and Microsoft as long-term strategic partners in mapping out its future.

81 از In recent months Dell. following Compaq's lead. had created a capital services group to assist customers with financing their PC networks.

82 از Virtual Integration and Information-Sharing But what was unique about Dell's latest incarnation of its strategy was how the company was using technology and information-sharing with both supply partners and customers to blur the traditional arm's-length boundaries in the supplier-­ manufacturer-customer value chain that characterized Dell's earlier business model and other direct-sell competitors. Michael Dell referred to this feature of Dell's strategy as ''virtual integration."16 On-line communications technology made it easy for Dell to communicate inventory levels and replenishment needs to vendors daily or even hourly.

83 از Boeing offers an example of how the lines were becoming blurred between Dell and its customers. Boeing. which had Dell PCs. was served by a staff of 30 Dell employees who resided on-site at Boeing facilities and were intimately involved in planning Booing's PC needs and the configuration of Boeing's network. While Boeing had its own people working on what the company's best answers for using PCs were. Dell and Boeing personnel worked closely together to understand Boeing's needs in depth and to figure out the best ways to meet those needs.

84 از A number of Dell's corporate accounts were large enough to justify dedicated on-site teams of Dell employees. Customers usually welcomed such teams, preferring to focus their time and energy on the core business rather than being distracted by PC purchasing and servicing issues.

85 از In addition to using its sales and support mechanisms to stay close to customers, Dell had set up a number of regional forums to stimulate the flow of information back and forth with customers. The company formed Platinum Councils composed of its largest customers in the United States, Europe. Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region: regional meetings were held every six to nine months.17 In the larger regions, there were two meetings—one for chief information officers and one for technical personnel.

86 از As many as 100 customers and 100 Dell executives and repre­ sentatives. including Michael Dell himself, attended the three-day meetings, at which Dell's senior technologists shared their views on the direction of the latest technological developments, what the flow of technology really meant for cus­tomers. and Dell's plans for introducing new and upgraded products over the next two years.

87 از There were also breakout sessions on such topics as managing the transi­tion to Windows NT. managing the use of notebooks by people out in the field, and determining whether leasing was better than buying. Customers were provided opportunities to share information and learn from one another (many had similar problems) as well as exchange ideas with Dell personnel. Dell found that the infor­mation gleaned from customers at these meetings assisted in forecasting demand for the company's products.

88 از Dell had developed customized internet sites (called Premier Pages) for its largest global customers: These sites gave customer personnel immediate on-line access to purchasing and technical information about the specific configurations of products that their company had purchased from Dell or that were currently authorized for purchase.18 The Premier Pages contained all of the elements of Dell's relationship with the customer—who the Dell sales and support contacts were in even country where the customer had operations, detailed product descriptions, what software Dell loaded on each of the various types of PCs the customer purchased, service and war­ranty records, pricing, and the available technical support.

89 از Dell was readying Premier Page software improvements for introduction in the second half of 1998 with even greater functionality. One new feature made it easy for a customer to specify what types of machines and options their personnel should be authorized to purchase. Other features included allowing customer personnel to access detailed information about Dell products on-line, view all the different machines and options the customer had authorized for its personnel, obtain the price of the particular PC they wanted, place an order, and have the order automatically routed to higher- level managers for approval.

90 از These features eliminated paper invoices, cut ordering time, and reduced the internal labor needed to staff corporate purchasing functions. Dell was said to have the most comprehensive Web-based PC commerce capability of any PC vendor. The company's goal was to generate 50 percent of its sales on the Internet within the next two or three years by setting up Premier Pages for virtually all of its large customers and adding more features to further improve functionality. So far, customer use of Premier Pages had boosted the productivity of salespeople assigned to these accounts by 50 percent.

91 از The company also gave its large customers access to Dell's own on-line internal technical support tools, allowing them to go to enter some information about their system, and gain immediate access to the same database and problem- solving information that Dell's support personnel used to assist call-in customers.20 This tool was particularly useful to the internal help-desk groups at large companies.

92 از Demand Forecasting Management believed that accurate sales forecasts were key to keeping costs down and minimizing inventories, given the complexity and diversity of the company's product line. Because Dell worked diligently to maintain a close relationship with its large corporate and institutional customers, and because it sold direct to small cus­tomers via telephone and the Internet, it was possible for the company to keep a fin­ger on the pulse of demand— what was selling and what was not. Moreover, the company's market segmentation strategy paved the way for in-depth understanding of its customers' evolving requirements and expectations.

93 از Having credible real-time information about what customers were actually buying and having first hand knowl­edge of large customers' buying intentions gave Dell strong capability to forecast demand. Furthermore, Dell passed that knowledge on to suppliers so they could plan their production accordingly. The company worked hard at managing the flow of information it got from the marketplace and seeing that it got to both internal groups and vendors in timely fashion.

94 از Forecasting was viewed as a critical sales skill. Sales-account managers were coached on how to lead large customers through a discussion of their future needs for PCs, workstations, servers, and peripheral equipment. Distinctions were made between purchases that were virtually certain and those that were contingent on some event. Salespeople made note of the contingent events so they could follow up at the appro­priate time. With smaller customers, there was real-time information about sales, and direct telephone sales personnel often were able to steer customers toward configura­tions that were immediately available to help fine-tune the balance between demand and supply.

95 از Research and Development Company management believed that it was Dell's job to sort out all the new technol­ogy coming into the marketplace and help steer customers to options and solutions most relevant to their needs. The company talked to its customers frequently about "relevant technology," listening carefully to customers" needs and problems and endeavoring to identify the most cost-effective solutions. Dell had about 1,600 engi­neers working on product development and spent about S250 million annually to improve users* experience with its products—including incorporating the latest and best technologies, making its products easy to use and devising ways to keep costs down.

96 از The company's R&D unit also studied and implemented ways to control qual­ity and to streamline the assembly process. Much time went into tracking all the new developments in components and software to ascertain how they would prove useful to computer users. For instance, it was critical to track vendor progress in making longer-lasting batteries because battery life was important to the buyers of portable computers. Dell was the first company to put lithium ion batteries with a life of 5.5 to 6 hours in all of its laptop models.

97 از Advertising Michael Dell was a strong believer in the power of advertising and frequently espoused its importance in the company's strategy. Thus. Dell was the first computer company to use comparative ads. throwing barbs at Compaq's higher prices. Although Compaq won a lawsuit against Dell for making false comparisons. Michael Dell was unapologetic. arguing that "[the ads were] very effective. We were able to increase customer awareness about value."21 Dell insisted that the company's ads be communicative and forceful, not soft and fuzzy.

98 از The company regularly had prominent ads in such leading computer publications as PC Magazine and PC World, as well as in USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, and other business publications. In the spring of the company debuted a multi-year worldwide TV campaign to strengthen its brand image.

99 از Entry info Server? Dell entered the market for low-end PC servers (those priced under $25.000) in the second half of The company had opened a square-foot plant dedicated to server production, trained telemarketers to sell servers, assigned 160 sales reps with systems know-how to big customer accounts, and recruited a staff of systems experts to help the sales reps.

100 از It had contracted with companies such as Electronic Data Systems, which had in-depth systems and networking expertise, to help provide ser­vice to large customers with extensive server networks. Dell's server plant used "cell" manufacturing instead of an assembly line to permit faster product updates and keep costs low: there were 30 cells at the plant, each with a self-contained work team that performed the entire assembly process from a kit of components and a customized motherboard.

101 از چندين 2 منظور،هدف 3 شخصيت حقوقي، شرکت 4 حاشيه ( سود ) 5 موثر، ملاک عمل 6 جنس، نوع 7 بطور برجسته 8 کمک هزينه دادن 9 کاربران 10 خنثي کردن 11 مورد انتظار، پيش ‌ بيني شده 12 درآمد، فايده ورود شرکت دل به توليد سرورها چندين علت در بر داشت. استفاده از سرورها در شرکت ‌ ها و سازمان ‌ ها در حال توسعه و رشد بود. حاشيه سود روي سرورها بالا بود. مهم ‌ تر آنکه، قيمت سرور، ملاک تعيين ‌ کننده ‌ اي براي انتخاب آن نبود. بدليل آنکه نياز به سرورها بيشتر بخاطر چگونگي کيفي خدمت رساني، پشتيباني و نرم ‌ افزار آنها بود. برخي از رقباي شرکت دل، از جمله شرکت کامپک، حاشيه سود بزرگي را روي سرورهاي خود گذارده بودند تا بتوانند از اين طريق رايانه ‌ هاي شخصي و قابل حمل توليدي خود را ارزانتر از شرکت دل بفروش رسانده و شرکت ‌ ها را از دل به سوي خود جلب نمايند. بنا به نظر ميشل دل : براي خنثي کردن آن خط مشي بايد وارد بازار سرور بشويم. پيش ‌ بيني شد که فروش سرورها تا سال 2001 به حدود 50 % کل درآمد شرکت برسد. Dell's entry into servers had several 1 purposes 2. The use of servers by corporate 3 customers was growing rapidly. The margins 4 on servers were large. Moreover, purchase price was not as significant 5 a factor in selecting which brand 6 of server to buy because servers required far more in the way of service, support, and software. Several of Dell's rivals, most notably 7 Compaq, were using their big margins on server sales to subsidize 8 price cuts on desktops and notebooks in an attempt to win corporate PC accounts 9 away from Dell. According to Michael Dell. "To neutralize 10 that Dell needs to be in the server market." The company expected 11 that sales of servers would grow to about 50 percent of corporate revenues 12 by 2001.

102 از تکيه داشتند 2 باور نکردني استراتژي توليد به سفارش مشتري و فروش مستقيم کالا قيمت مناسبتري را نسبت به رقبا نتيجه داد. تخمين زده مي ‌ شد که سرورهاي رقبايي مانند کامپک، آي. بي. ام، هيولت پکارد، که همگي وابسته به شبکة خرده فروشان بودند، دراري قيمتي 15 تا 20 درصد بيشتر از سرورهاي شرکت دل باشند. به هر حال تحليل ‌ گردان باور نمي ‌ کردند که شرکت دل بتواند همسنگ خرده فروشان به سرورهاي مشتريان خدمت ‌ رساني و پشتياني دهد. Dell's build-to-order and sell-direct strategies gave it a significant pricing advantage over rivals. Servers from such competitors as Compaq. IBM. and Hewlett-Packard, all of which relied 1 on networks of resellers, were estimated to cost 15 to 20 percent more than Dell servers. However, analysts were skeptical 2 about whether Dell could provide the same quality of service and support to server customers that resellers could.

103 از در مقابل اين احساس، شرکت دل عوامل فروش ميداني و دفتري خود را تا 600 نفر تقويت کرد و گروه مشاوري را براي خدمت رساني در محل مشتريان ايجاد نمود. براي مشترياني که نياز به تجمع و پشتيباني سيستم وسيعي داشتند، شرکت دل با متخصصان سيستم که فروشنده رايانه نبودند، مانند شرکت سيستمهاي اطلاعات الکترونيکي و آتور اندرسن همکاري نمود. To counter 1 that perception 2, Dell had bolstered 3 its field sales and support staff to 600 employees 4 and created an in-house 5 consulting 6 group to assist 7 customers. For customers that required extensive 8 system support and integration 9, Dell partnered 10 with systems experts 11 that were not resellers 12, such as Electronic Data Systems and Arthur Andersen. 1 در مقابل 2 احساس، ادارک 3 تقويت کرد 4 مستخدم 5 در محل، داخلي 6 مشاوره 7 مساعدت 8 وسيع، بزرگ 9 تجميع شده 10 همکاري کرد 11 کارشناسان، متخصصان 12 واسطه، خرده فروش

104 از نزديک شونده ( درآينده ) 2 سالانه 3 خانگي 4 نفوذ 5 تطميع، ترقيب 6 معقول، مستدل 7 داراي نفوذ و قدرت پيشرفت ‌ هاي اخير در صنعت رايانه براورد شده که در سال 1997 ، 250 ميليون رايانه درحال استفاده بوده است و فروش رايانه ‌ ها به حدود 100 ميليون عدد در سال رسيده ‌ است ( تصوير شماره 8 ). ميشل دل معتقد بود که در ده سال آينده از 1.4 ميليارد رايانه استفاده خواهد شد. اگر به سال 1998 بازگرديم،برآورد ميشد که نفوذ رايانه ‌ هاي خانگي به 45 درصد برسد که 5 ميليون عدد از ميزان خريد خانگي 1997 بيشتر بود. با شروع کاهش قيمت رايانه به زير 1000 دلار، افراد زيادي قيمت آنرا براي خريد معقول دانستند. تحصيل، کاسبي و وجود فرزند در خانواده، سه عامل قوي در خريد رايانه ‌ هاي خانگي بود. برآورد مي ‌ شد که تا سال 2000 نفوذ رايانه ‌ هاي شخصي به منازل از مرز 50 درصد نيز فراتر برود. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PC INDUSTRY There were an estimated 250 million PCs in use in 1997 and sales of PCs were approaching million annually 2 (see Exhibit 8). Michael Dell believed there would be 1.4 billion PCs in use within 10 years. Going into 1998, household 3 penetration 4 of PCs was estimated to be 45 percent. There were over 5 million new PC-owning households in Many lured 5 by the introduction of reasonably 6 equipped 6 sub- $1.000 PCs. The three most influential 7 factors in home ownership of PCs were education, income, and the presence of children in the household. Household penetration was expected to exceed 50 percent by the year 2000.

105 از کاهش ، نزول 2 مرحله نهايي رقابت تعدادي از عوامل موثري که در سال 1998 بر بازار رايانه اثر گذارد عبارت است از : کاهش قيمت قطعات قسمت ‌ ها ، بحران اقتصادي برخي از کشورهاي آسيايي، کاهش قابل پيش ‌ بيني در رشد صنعت ، تلاش رقباي شرکت دل براي تولد به سفارش مشتري، توسعه ادامه ‌ دار در فناوي رايانه و حرکت برخي از توليدکنندگان رايانه براي حضور تجاري در بازار بجاي فروش رايانه به مشتري. A number of factors were affecting the competitive structure of the world market for PCs in 1998: declining 1 component prices, the troubled economies of several Asian countries, potential showdowns 2 in the industry growth rate, the attempts of Dell's rivals to shift to build-to-order manufacturing, continuing advances in PC technology, and the moves of several PC makers to expand into marketing more than just PCs to their customers.

106 از مخصوصاً 2 نمايشي ، مهيج 3 توسعه سريع ، پيشرفت سريع ، مثل بمب صدا کردن کاهش قيمت قطعات؟ کاهش سريع قيمت برخي از قطعات رايانه ( مخصوصاً : ديسک خوانها، حافظه ‌ ها و پردازشگرها ) که از سال 1997 شروع شده بود به سازندگان رايانه اجازه داد تا بصورت مهيجي قيمت رايانه ‌ هاي خود را از کمتراز 1500 دلار که در سال 1998 سروصداي زيادي بپا کرد نيز بيشتر کاهش دهند. کامپک ، آي. بي. ام ، هيولت پکارد و برخي توليدکنندگان ديگر رايانه شروع به فروش رايانه ‌ هايي با قيمت کمتر از 1000 دلار در سال 1997 نمودند. در دسامبر 1997 براي اولين بار ، قيمت ميانگين خريد يک رايانه روميزي به کمتر از 1300 دلار رسيد. تخمين زده شده است که حدود نصف رايانه ‌ هاي فروخته شده در سال 1998 قيمتي کمتر از 1500 دلار داشته است. Declining Component Price? Sharp drops in the prices of a number of PC components (chiefly 1, disk drives, memory chips, and microprocessors) starting in late 1997 had allowed PC makers to dramatically 2 lower PC prices—sales of PCs priced under $1.500 were booming 3 by early Compaq, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and several other PC makers had begun marketing sub-$ 1,000 PCs in In December 1997, the average purchase price of a desktop computer fell below $1,300 for the first time. It was estimated that about half of all PC sales in 1998 were of computers carrying price tags under $1.500.

107 از سوق داده شده 2 جذب کردن 3 صرف ‌ نظر کردن 4 از رده خارج 5 گفته شده 6 طرفداري کردن 7 مجهز رشد تعداد فروش دستگاهها به سمت رايانه ‌ هاي با قيمت کمتر از 1000 دلار کشيده شده ‌ بود. رايانه ‌ هاي با قيمت کمتر باعث جذب بيشتر خريداران جديد و همچنين خريداراني که براي بار دوم و سوم براي بروز نمودن دستگاه ‌ هاي خود به بازار مراجعه مي ‌ کردند شد تا رايانه ‌ هاي از رده خارج که با دامنه قيمت 2000 تا 3000 دلار بفروش مي ‌ رسيدند جاي خود را به رايانه ‌ هاي قدرتمندتر و مجهزتر ارزانتر بدهند. Growth in unit volume was being driven 1 largely by sub- $1,000 PCs. The low prices were attracting 2 first-time buyers into the market and were also causing second- and third-time PC buy­ers looking to upgrade to more powerful PCs to forgo 3 top-of-the-line 4 machines priced in the traditional 5 $2.000-$3.500 range in favor 6 of lower- priced PCs that were almost as powerful and well-equipped 7.

108 از چند منظوره 2 پيشتر 3 سود،فايده 4 نزول شديد ، سقوط 5 اوايل 6 تخفيف ، کاهش قيمت 7 موجودي ، در انبار 8 قفسه رايانه ‌ هاي قابل حمل قوي و چند کاره که پيشتر در نوامبر 1997 در قيمت ‌ هاي 4000 تا 6500 دلار بود، به قيمت 2000 تا 4500 دلار در آوريل 1998 رسيد. بدليل تخفيف در رايانه ‌ هاي فروخته نشده گران قيمت که هنوز در انبارها و فروش ‌ گاههاي خرده فروشان بود، سود بسياري از توليدکنندگان رايانه در اوايل سال 1998 سقوط کرد. Powerful, multifeatured 1 notebook computers that had formerly 2 sold for $4.000 to $6.500 in November 1997 were selling for $2.000 to $4,500 in April The profits 3 of many PC makers slipped 4 in early because of the need to discount 6 unsold higher-priced machines still in inventory 7 and on retailers shelves 8.

109 از EXHIBIT 8 Actual and Projected Worldwide Shipments of PCs Year PC Volume million million million million million million million (projected) Source: International Data Corporation.

110 از پريشاني، بحران 2 رکود 3 ارزشمندي 4 پول رايج 5 تنومند، قوي مشکلات اقتصادي در آسيا بحران اقتصادي در برخي از کشورهاي آسيايي ( از جمله : ژاپن، کره جنوبي، تايلند و اندونزي ) باعث برجاگذاشتن رکود بزرگي در فروش آسيايي رايانه ‌ ها شد. اگرچه پيش ‌ بيني مي ‌ شد که فروش رايانه ‌ ها در آسيا اندکي افزايش خواهد يافت لکن برخي از تحليل ‌ گران تخمين مي ‌ زدند که اين مقدار به کمتر از ميزان سال 1997 برسد. افزايش قابل توجه ارزش دلار در مقايسه با پول رايج مناطق آسيايي باعث شد تا رايانه ‌ هاي آمريکايي براي مشتريان اين منطقه گرانتر جلوه ‌ گر شود. در مقايسه ، فروش در آمريکا و اروپا عمدتاً به علت کاهش قيمت رايانه ‌ ها کاملاً رواج داشت. Economic Problems in Asia Economic woes 1 in a number of Asian countries (most notably. Japan, South Korea. Thailand, and Indonesia) were putting a big damper 2 on PC sales in Asia. Asian sales of PCs in 1998 were expected to grow minimally, if at all. and some analysts expected unit volume to fall below 1997 levels. Sharp appreciation 3 of the U.S. dollar against Asian currencies 4 had made U.S.-produced PCs more expensive to Asian buyers. In contrast, sales in the United States and Europe were quite robust 5, mainly because of lower PC prices.

111 از اندک ‌ شدن، تحليل رفتن 2 شاهدان، ناظران، مميزان 3 کمک ‌ کردن، مساعدت نمودن 4 احتمالاً توليدکنندگان ديسک ‌ خوانها و بردهاي مدارچاپي که در آسيا فراوانند ، فشار اين کاهش قيمت و تحليل رفتن حاشيه سود را متحمل شدند. مميزان صنعت تخمين مي ‌ زدند که شرايط رقابتي بازار رايانه آسيا - پاسيفيک به رشد بازار شراکتي چهار، پنج بازيگر اقتصادي کمک کرد و احتمالاً باعث خروج توليدکنندگان رايانه ‌ اي شد که نتوانستند رقابت سودمندي داشته ‌ باشند. Disk-drive manufacturers and the makers of printed circuit boards, many of which were in Asia, were feeling the pressures of declining prices and skimpy 1 profit margins. Industry observers 2 were predicting that competitive conditions in the Asian-Pacific PC market favored 3 growing market shares by the top four or five players and the likely 4 exit of PC makers that could not compete profitably.

112 از کمال، اشباع 2 از پيش گفته، جلوه ‌ گر شده 3 دهه 4 حمل ‌ ونقل دريايي 5 رشدکرده، افزايش ‌ يافته کاهش رشد قيمت اکثر مميزان صنعتي کاهش جهاني فروش رايانه ‌ ها را در سال 1998 هشدار مي ‌ دادند، يک مقدار بخاطر مشکلات اقتصادي آسيا و مقداري نيز به خاطر نزديکي بازار رايانه ‌ ها به حد اشباع. پيش ‌ بيني مي ‌ شد که شاخص ‌ هاي رشد صنعت براي باقيمانده دهه به حداکثر سالانه 15 درصد برسد که از ميانگين 20 درصدي دهه 1990 تا 1996 کاهش داشت. به هر حال، در سال 1997 رايانه ‌ هاي حمل شده با کشتي آمريکا با رشد 21 درصدي به 31 ميليون دستگاه رسيد که بسيار بيشتر از تخمين تحليل ‌ گران صنعتي بود. فروش رايانه ‌ هاي سرور سريعترين قسمت رشد صنعت رايانه ‌ ها را تشکيل مي ‌ داد. در سال 1997 درآمدها بازاي 5/10 ميليارد دلار براي حمل ‌ ونقل دريايي و يا 7/1 ميليون دستگاه به 35 درصد جهش داشت. Slowing Industry Growth Most industry observers were warning of a global slowdown in the sales of PCs in 1998, partly due to the economic difficulties in several Asian countries and partly due to the potential for market maturity 1 for PCs. Industry growth rates were projected 2 to be close to 15 percent annually for the remainder of the decade 3, down from the average annual growth rate of 20 percent during the period. However, U.S. shipments 4 of PCs in 1997 had risen 5 21 percent, to 31 million units, a much higher rate than most industry analysts had expected. Sales of servers were the fastest growing segment of the PC industry; in 1997 revenues jumped 35 percent, to $ 10.5 billion, on shipments of 1.7 million units.

113 از موجودي، کالاي انبار شده 2 آغاز، ابتکار 3 بازچيني شده 4 کارخانه ‌ ها تلاشهايي براي تقليد از استراتژي شرکت دل رقباي شرکت دل ( کامپک، آي. بي. ام. ، پکارد بل ان. اي. سي. و هيولت پکارد ) درحال تغيير وضعيت تجاري خود به سوي روش توليد به سفارش مشتري بودند تا از اجناس انباري خود کاسته و سريعاً مدل ‌ هاي جديد را به بازار ارائه نمايند. کامپک روش توليد به سفارش مشتري خود را در جولاي سال 1997 با اميد کاهش هزينه ‌ ها به ميزان 10 تا 12 درصد ، آغاز کرد. کارخانه ‌ هاي منتاژ بازچيني شده شرکت کامپک مي ‌ توانست رايانة خاصي را ظرف مدت سه تا چهار ساعت جمع ‌ نموده و نرم ‌ افزارهاي دلخواه را در 6 دقيقه نصب نمايد. برنامه شرکت پکارد بل ان. اي. سي. به مشتريان اجازه مي ‌ داد تا تلفني درخواست خود را ارائه نمايند. Attempts to Clone Dell's PC Strategy Dell's competitors—Compaq, IBM, Packard Bell NEC, and Hewlett- Packard—were shifting their business models to build-to-order manufacturing to reduce their inventories 1 and speed new models to market. Compaq launched its build-to-order initiative 2 in July 1997 and hoped to cut costs by 10 to 12 percent. Compaq's revamped 3 assembly plants 4 could turn out a custom-built PC in three to four hours and could load the desired software in six minutes. Packard Bell NEC's program allowed customers to place orders by phone.

114 از نسخه برداري، کپي 2 روش 3 تحويل،تسليم 4 برنامه ‌ ها 5 تهيه ‌ کننده، تامين ‌ کننده 6 هماهنگي 7 متقابل،دوجانبه 8 متصل ‌ کردن 9 همکاري 10 تحول، انتقال ولي هر سه دريافتند که تقليد از روش شرکت دل مشکل مي ‌ باشد. بخاطر مدت زماني که لازم است تا برنامه ‌ هاي تحويل بموقع جنس از تامين کنندگان قطعات براي هماهنگ کردن متقابل برنامه ‌ هاي توليدتوسعه يابد و همچنين حرکت تدريجي به سمت قطعات جديدي که در بازار ارائه مي ‌ شد. همکاري وسيعي مورد احتياج بود تا تحول فناوري ناچيزي برنامه ‌ ريزي شود. کامپک و هيولت پکارد 18 ماه براي روش توليد به سفارش مشتري برنامه ‌ ريزي نمودند و پيش ‌ بيني مي ‌ شد که 18 ماه و يا ماه ‌ هاي بيشتري مورد نياز باشد تا به کاهش موجودي انباري و هزينه کالاها برسند. But all three were finding that it was hard to duplicate 1 Dell's approach 2 because of how long it took to develop just-in-time delivery 3 schedules 4 with suppliers 5, to coordinate 6 their mutual 7 production schedules, and to shift smoothly to next-generation pans 8 and components as they appeared on the market. Extensive collaboration 9 was needed to plan smooth technology transitions 10. Compaq and Hewlett-Packard had spent 18 months planning their build-to-order strategies and expected it would take another 18 or more months to achieve their inventory and cost-reduction goals.

115 از خرده ‌ فروشان 2 تهيه ‌ ديدن،آماده ‌ سازي 3 سفارش ‌ داده ‌ شده 4 همکار، شريک 5 زير قيمت 6 پيکربندي در همان زمان، شرکت ‌ هاي خرده فروشي تاندي، شهر رايانه، کامپ يو. اس. آ. ، آفيس ماکس و وال مارت به بازار فروش مستقيم و توليد به سفارش مشتري وارد شده ‌ بودند. کامپ يو. اس. آ. براي مشتريانش در 134 شعبه، دو سري رايانه روميزي را از طريق تلفني، پايگاه اينترنت و يا فروشگاههاي همکارش با شعار 200 دلار کمتر از قيمت شرکت دل ، آماده نموده بود. وال مارت از طريق قرارداد با يک توليدکننده در پايگاه اينترنتي خود اقدام به فروش رايانه ‌ هاي به درخواست مشتري نموده ‌ بود. At the same time, such computer retailers 1 as Tandy Corporation's Computer City, CompUSA, OfficeMax. and Wal-Mart had gotten into the build-to-order and sell-direct business. CompUSA was offering 2 customers two lines of desktop computers that could be ordered 3 at any of its 134 stores, by phone, at its Web site, or through its corporate 4 sales force: its goal was to undercut 5 Dell's price by $200 on each configuration 6. Wal-Mart was offering build-to-order PCs made by a contract manufacturer at its Web site.

116 از درخواست 2 با اطلاع 3 تغييرات جزئي ملاحظه شد که شرکت دل استراتژي صحيحي را براي پاسخ ‌ دهي به مشترياني که بخوبي از فناوري رايانه آگاهي داشتند اتخاذ نمود و مي ‌ دانست آنها چه درخواست ‌ ها و نياز به چه ابزارهايي دارند و از تفاوت ‌ هاي جزئي قيمت ‌ هاي مارک ‌ هاي ديگر بدور بود. بقول يک تحليل ‌ گر صنعتي : شرکت دل هدف هرکسي است. مهم نيست شما درباره جه کسي در صنعت صحبت مي ‌ نماييد، شرکت دل تابلو زدن به هدف است. Dell was seen as having the right strategy to appeal 1 to customers well versed 2 in PC technology who knew what options and features they wanted and who were aware of the price differentials 3 among brands. According to one industry analyst. "Dell is everybody's target. No matter who you talk to in the industry. Dell is the brand to beat."

117 از توسعه دادن 2 شيب نزولي، سقوط 3 جمع ‌ شدن، چروک شدن 4 ناخالص، خام 5 واداشتن، برانگيختن 6 خط توليد تحرک توليدکنندگان رايانه به سمت توسعه اين تجارت چنديک از سردمداران مطرح در صنعت رايانه، تغييراتي را در اواخر 1997 و اوايل 1998 ايجاد نمودند تا سوددهي را بهبود ببخشند. سقوط سريع قيمت رايانه ‌ ها، حاشيه ‌ هاي سود ناخالص را جمع نموده ‌ بود و شرکت ‌ هايي مانند کامپک، گيت ‌ وي، هيولت پکارد و آي. بي. ام را واداشته ‌ بود تا به رايانه ‌ ها به عنوان دروازه ‌ اي به ايجاد يک خط توليد بزرگ ‌ تر بنگرند. The Moves of PC Makers to Broaden 1 Their Business Several leading players in the PC industry made moves in late 1997 and early 1998 to expand into selling more than just PCs in an effort to improve profitability. The sharp declines 2 in the prices of PCs had crimped 3 gross 4 profit margins and prompted 5 such companies as Compaq, Gateway, Hewlett- Packard, and IBM to view selling PCs as an entree to providing a bigger lineup 6 of products.

118 از وراي،عبور از 2 ايجاد کرد 3 تجهيزات 4 نتيجه ‌ دادن، حصول 5 درآمد 6 مجموعه، بقچه 7 نگهداري 8 رفع نقص براي عبور از مرز يک سازندة رايانه ساده، در اواخر سال 1997 کامپک شرکت تجهيزات ديجيتالي را ايجاد نمود که بوسيله يکسري سرويس ‌ هاي رايانه ‌ اي به اشخاص حقوقي ( شرکت ‌ ها، سازمان ‌ ها...) درآمدي بالغ بر 6 ميليارد دلار را ايجاد نمود. در سال 1998 شرکت گيت ‌ وي اعلام نمود که مجموعه ‌ اي را براي رايانه ‌ هاي شخصي و خانگي خود، مشتمل بر نرم ‌ افزار، سخت ‌ افزارهايي مانند چاپگر و اسکنر، نگهداري و خدمات رفع نقص و حتي سرويس اينترنت ارائه مي ‌ دهد. To move beyond 1 simple PC manufacturing, Compaq in late 1997 acquired 2 Digital Equipment 3 Company (DEC), which derived 4 $6 billion in revenues 5 from providing a range of PC services to corporate customers. Gateway announced in May 1998 that it would start bundling 6 into the sale of its PCs to individuals and households a wide range of software, peripheral devices like printers and scanners, maintenance 7 and troubleshooting 8 services, and even its own Internet service.

119 از chief executive officer مدير عامل 2 مشخص کردن 3 علايق 4 مشغوليات 1 chief executive officer مدير عامل 2 مشخص کردن 3 علايق 4 مشغوليات تِد وايت ، مدير عامل گيت ‌ وي تشريح نمود : “ ما به ارتباط با مشتريان خود بيش از رايانه ‌ ها اهميت مي ‌ دهيم. ما با سود 5 درصدي روي هر رايانه 1500 دلاري به 75 دلار دست ‌ مي ‌ يابيم ولي اگر بتوانيم از طريق دسترسي اينترنت 3 دلار در ماه اخذ کنيم، 100 دلار ديگر در سه سال ديگر کسب مي ‌ نماييم. سه سال از هم ‌ اکنون. من فکر نمي ‌ کنم که فروش رايانه به تنهايي، به کسي اجازه دهد تا تجارت بزرگي انجام دهد. گيت ‌ وي شروع به سوال از خريداران رايانه خود نمود تا به مهمترين علايق و مشغوليت ‌ هاي آنان پي برد؛ اگر يک نفر مشتري ابراز علاقه به باغباني يا ورزش ويا سرمايه ‌ گذاري کرده ‌ بود، گيت ‌ وي مجموعه نرم ‌ افزاري متناسبي را بهمراه رايانه به وي تحويل مي ‌ داد. Gateway's CEO 1 Ted Waitt explained: "We're about customer relations a lot more than we are about PCs. If we get a 5 percent margin on a $1,500 PC. we make $75. But if we can make $3 a month on Internet access, that's another $100 over three years. Three years from now. I don't think just selling PC hardware will allow anyone to have a great business." Gateway had begun asking customers ordering a PC to identify 2 their major interests 3 and hobbies 4 ; if a customer identified gardening or sports or investing, Gateway offered to include related software packages with the PC.

120 از اعلام کردن، آگهي دادن 2 اجاره دادن 3 سرمايه ‌ گذاري 4 به هم جور کردن، وصله 5 سهم 6 عمده، اصلي 7 قسمت، تکه همچنين گيت ‌ وي برنامه ‌ اي را براي اجاره و يا فروش اقساط ماهيانه رايانه ‌ ها يه اشخاص و استفاده ‌ کنندگان خانگي اعلام نمود با اين اميد که پس از اتمام دوره اقساط، رايانه ‌ هاي قديمي با رايانه ‌ هاي قوي ‌ تر در دوره ‌ اي جديد جايگزين گردد. هيولت پکارد و آي. بي. ام، هر دو به بازار رايانه به عنوان وصله ‌ اي به ديگر تجهيزات و خدمات خود به مشتريان مي ‌ نگريختند. فروش سرورها و چاپگرها، سهم عمده ‌ اي از درآمد و سود شرکت هيولت پکارد را تشکيل مي ‌ داد. آي بي ام قسمت بزرگي از درآمد خود را از طريق فروش رايانه ‌ هاي بزرگ ، نرم ‌ افزار و سرويس ‌ هاي فني و پشتيباني بدست مي ‌ اورد. Gateway had also announced 1 a plan to lease 2 PCs to individuals and households and to finance 3 PCs on low monthly payment plans in hopes of getting the customer to trade in the old PC for a new PC later when the lease expired or the last payment was made. Both Hewlett-Packard and IBM had always viewed the PC business as pan 4 of a larger portfolio 5 of products and services they offered customers. A substantial 6 portion 7 of Hewlett-Packard's revenues and profits came from sales of servers and printers. IBM derived a big portion of its revenues from mainframe computers, software, and technical and support services.

121 از نما، جلوه 2 عمده 3 منابع 4 توانايي، قابليت، استعداد نمايي از برخي از رقباي صنعت رايانه رقباي اصلي شرکت دل در بازار جهاني استراتژي ‌ ها و منابع بالقوه ‌ اي داشتند. PROFILES 1 OF SELECTED COMPETITORS IN THE PC INDUSTRY Dell's principal 1 competitors in the global PC market had varying 2 strategies and resource 3 capabilities 4.

122 از Compaq Computer (www.compaq.com) Compaq was the world's leading PC manufacturer, with a global market share of approximately 13 percent. It had overtaken IBM to become the market leader in PCs in Compaq had revenues of $24.6 billion and profits of $1.9 billion in Compaq's strategy was to sell almost exclusively through resellers—distributors and PC retailers, particularly large computer stores like CompUSA. It was starting to build computers to order and operate its factories with smaller inventories of parts and com­ponents, but it had to soft-pedal direct sales so as not to alienate its worldwide reseller network. Because Compaq had bigger components inventories than Dell and because its resellers sometimes had sizable inventories of Compaq's models on hand, Compaq was slower than Dell in getting new generations of its PCs into the marketplace. کامپک Compaq was the world's leading PC manufacturer, with a global market share of approximately 13 percent. It had overtaken IBM to become the market lea

123 از Compaq Computer (www.compaq.com) Compaq offered a full line of desktop PCs. from sub-$ 1,000 PCs to top-of-the-line models. It was the most aggressive seller of PCs priced under $ and in recent months had averaged over a 60 percent share of the sub-$ segment. It also offered a broad line of laptop PCs. but its 9 percent share of the laptop segment put it in third place behind Toshiba, the global market leader in laptop PCs (with a 20 percent share), and IBM (with an 11 percent share). Compaq shipped a total of 10 million desktop and laptop PCs worldwide in 1997, up from 7.2 million in Compaq was also the mar­ket leader in PC servers priced under $ and was a strong third (behind IBM and Hewlett-Packard) in low-end or entry servers (those priced under $ ). Compaq executives expected that sales of PCs to individuals and households would continue to account for about 15 percent of revenues, sales of desktop PCs to corporate customers would fall from 48 percent of revenues in 1997 to about 32 percent in 2000, and sales of servers and workstations would grow to 50 percent of revenues from 35 percent in Compaq's goal was to have $50 billion in revenues in on hand, Compaq was slower than Dell in getting new generations of its PCs into the marketplace. Compaq was the world's leading PC manufacturer, with a global market share of approximately 13 percent. It had overtaken IBM to become the market lea

124 از Compaq Computer (www.compaq.com) Compaq's market strength was greatest among Fortune 1000 companies; it had weaker penetration in the small and medium business segments. To combat the volume discounts that Dell and other direct vendors typically used to help win the accounts of small and medium businesses. Compaq had recently begun working more closely with its resellers on special pricing to make the Compaq brand more competitive in the bid­ding process. To boost its subpar 3 percent share of the Japanese market for PCs. Compaq had recently signed a deal that gave Canon Sales Company exclusive distri­bution and sales rights to Compaq's consumer-oriented Presario models. on hand, Compaq was slower than Dell in getting new generations of its PCs into the marketplace. Compaq was the world's leading PC manufacturer, with a global market share of approximately 13 percent. It had overtaken IBM to become the market lea

125 از Compaq Computer (www.compaq.com) In early.1998, Compaq acquired floundering Digital Equipment Company (DEC) for S9.6 billion, a move intended to turn Compaq into more of a full-spectrum global supplier of computer hardware and services and put it into better position to challenge IBM as a "global enterprise computing company." DEC had 1997 revenues ofS13 bil­lion (versus S14.5 billion in 1996) and net earnings of S 141 million (versus a loss of S112 million in 1996). The merged companies would have combined revenues of $37.6 billion, making Compaq the second largest computer company in the world. كامپيوتر Compaq در اوايل 1998 ، شركت Compaq يك شركت تجهيزات ديجيتالي را ( به نام DEC) به مبلغ 6/9 ميليارد دلار خريداري كرد تا اينكه شركت خود را به يك شركت جهاني تمام و كمال خدمات و سخت افزار كامپيوتري تبديل كند و در چالش با IBM در موقعيت خوبي قرار دهد. در سال 1997 DEC در آمد 13 ميليارد ي ( در مقابل درآمد 5/14 ميلياردي در سال 1996 ) و در آمد خالص 141 ميلون دلاري ( در مقابل ضرر 112 ميليون دلار سال 1996) داشت. ادغام شركتها و درآمد 6/37 ميليارد دلاري ، كامپك را به دومين شركت بزرگ كامپيوتري در دنيا تبديل كرد. 1

126 از Compaq Computer (www.compaq.com) DEC considered itself to be a "network solutions company" with strengths in multi- vendor integration. Internet security, continuous computing, high-availability data, and high-performance networked platforms. Its chief products were large servers (those priced over $ l million), entry servers (those priced under S ), large computers and workstations, and personal computers (55 percent of revenues). Services accounted for 45 percent of revenues (about S6 billion): DEC had engineers and support people in the field working with customers (Compaq had sales and support people in the field, many of whom spent much of their time servic­ing retailers of Compaq PCs). dec's gross margins on services averaged 34 percent, compared to Compaq's 25 percent margins on PC sales. Compaq's corporate cus­tomers had been requesting the company to provide more service for years. شركت DEC خود رابعنوان " شركت حلال مشكلات شبكه " بانقاط قوت در تلفيق چند گانه فروش ، امنيت اينترنتي ، محاسبات مستمر ، داده هاي با توانايي بالا و پلات فرمهاي شبكه اي با عملكرد بالا مي داند. محصولات اصلي آن عبارت از SERVER هاي بزرگ ( باقيمت بيش از يك ميليون دلار ) ، SERVER هاي ورودي ( با قيمت كمتر از دلار ) ، كامپيوترهاي بزرگ و ايستگاههاي كاري و كامپيوترهاي شخصي ( 55 درصد درآمدها ) بود. خدمات در حدود 45 درصد درآمدها ( درحدود 6 ميليارد دلار ) بود. DEC در حدود مهندس و پرسنل پشتيباني در كار با مشتري داشت ( شركت كاپك حدود 8000 پرسنل فروش و پشتيباني در اين زمينه دارد ) 1

127 از Compaq Computer (www.compaq.com) In May 1998, Compaq announced plans to cut about 15,000 jobs at DEC when the acquisition was completed; the layoffs were expected to come mainly in DEC's per­ sonal computer division, portions of its sales force, and corporate computer opera­ tions—where there were significant overlaps with Compaq's business. DEC had a total of employees, down from a peak of in the 1980s. Despite recent work­force downsizings, DEC still employed about 65 percent more people than Compaq to produce about half the volume of sales revenues. DEC management indicated that the company's selling, general, and administrative costs of $3.18 billion in 1997 (24 per­cent of total 1997 revenues) would likely be cut in half following the merger. Compaq had selling, general, and administrative expenses of $2.95 billion on sales of $24.6 bil­lion in 1997 (equal to 12 percent of revenues). كامپيوتر Compaq در ماه مي 1998 شركت كامپك طرح هايي را اعلام كرد تا درحدود شغل را در DEC كاهش دهد كه عمدتا در بخش كامپيوترهاي شخصي DEC ، نيروي فروش و عمليات كامپيوتري شركتي بوده است. DEC درحدود كارمند داشت كه از دهه 1980 كه كارمند بود ، تقليل پيدا كرده است. عليرغم كوچك كردن تشكيلاتي اخير خود ، شركت DEC هنوز حدود 65 درصد از شركت Compaq بيشتر پرسنل دارد. مديريت DEC نشان داد كه هزينه هاي اداري ، عمومي و فروش شركت با 18/3 ميليارد دلار در 1997 ( 24 درصد كل درآمدهاي 1997 ) احتمالا با ادغام آتي به نصف كاهش مي يابد. شركت كامپك در حدود 95/2 ميليارد از 6/24 ميليارد دلار فروش سال 1997 خود را به هزينه هاي اداري ، عمومي و فروش اختصاص داد ( يعني حدود 12 درصد درآمدها ) در ماه مي 1998 شركت كامپك طرح هايي را اعلام كرد تا درحدود شغل را در DEC كاهش دهد كه عمدتا در بخش كامپيوترهاي شخصي DEC ، نيروي فروش و عمليات كامپيوتري شركتي بوده است. DEC درحدود كارمند داشت كه از دهه 1980 كه كارمند بود ، تقليل پيدا كرده است. عليرغم كوچك كردن تشكيلاتي اخير خود ، شركت DEC هنوز حدود 65 درصد از شركت Compaq بيشتر پرسنل دارد. مديريت DEC نشان داد كه هزينه هاي اداري ، عمومي و فروش شركت با 18/3 ميليارد دلار در 1997 ( 24 درصد كل درآمدهاي 1997 ) احتمالا با ادغام آتي به نصف كاهش مي يابد. شركت كامپك در حدود 95/2 ميليارد از 6/24 ميليارد دلار فروش سال 1997 خود را به هزينه هاي اداري ، عمومي و فروش اختصاص داد ( يعني حدود 12 درصد درآمدها ) 1

128 از Compaq Computer (www.compaq.com) Compaq believed that DEC's expertise in networking and information systems inte­gration. coupled with the combined product lines, would give it an advantage with large corporate customers over companies like Dell that offered mainly PC-related ser­vices. Compaq also believed that DEC's worldwide service and support capabilities would help it win corporate business for PCs, workstations, and servers away from IBM. (Prior 10 the Compaq-DEC merger. Dell had contracted with DEC's service organization to maintain its PowerEdge line of servers at a number of corporate accounts; Dell was expected to sign Unisys or Wang to replace DEC.) كامپيوترهاي Compaq شركت كامپك اعتقاد دارد كه تخصص DEC در تلفيق سيستمهاي اطلاعات و شبكه بهمراه خطوط تركيبي توليد بعنوان مزيت آن محسوب مي گردد كه بر شركتهاي نظير شركت DELL دارد. شركت كامپك همچنين معتقد است كه خدمات جهاني و توانايي هاي پشتيباني آن كمك كرده تا تجارت PC ، ايستگاههاي كاري ( Woke station ) و SERVER ها را در دست بگيرد. 1

129 از IBM (www.ibm.com) IBM was considered to be a "computer solutions" company and operated in more seg­ments of the overall computer industry than Dell. PC sales accounted for $15.7 billion of IBM's 1997 revenues of $68 billion. IBM had 1997 sales of S1.3 billion in work­stations: $4.3 billion in entry servers (those priced under S ). where it was the market leader: and $6.0 billion in midrange servers (those priced between $ and $l million), where it was also the market leader. The company had for many years been the global leader in mainframe computers, and it derived S39.3 billion in revenues from providing technical service and support to customers—the company had technical support personnel in the field to service customers. In 1997 IBM introduced a long-awaited generation of mainframe computers based on PC-type microprocessors that offered the speed of traditional mainframes at lower purchase and operating costs. IBM شركت IBM بعنوان يك شركت " حل مشكلات كامپيوتري " تلقي مي شود و خيلي بيشتر از شركت DELL در بخشهاي صنعت كلي كامپيوتر عمل كرده است. فروش كامپيوترهاي شخصي IBM در سال 1997 درحدود 7/15 ميليارد دلار از كل مبلغ 68 ميليارد دلار بود. شركت IBM درحدود 3/1 ميليارد دلار فروش در زمينه ايستگاههاي كاري و ¾ ميليارد دلار در زمينه SERVER ورودي داشته است. همچنين درحدود 60 ميليارد دلار در زمينه Midrange server ( باقيمت هاي بين 100 هزار دلار و يك ميليون دلار داشته كه بعنوان پيشتاز در كامپيوترهاي مادر بود و در حدود 3/39 ميليارد دلار درآمد از خدمات فني و پشتيباني به مشتريان كسب كرد 1

130 از IBM (www.ibm.com) During the 1990s IBM had experienced 2 percent annual revenue growth—rev­ enues rose from $69.7 billion in 1990 to $78.5 billion in Net income ofS6.1 bil­lion in 1997 was barely above the 1990 level of $6.0 billion and well below the company's record earnings of $6.6 billion in The company was struggling to re­invent itself as the growing use of PCs continued to erode corporate dependence on mainframe computers. IBM's sales of computer hardware were flat: its fastest growing businesses were in services and software. To boost its growth potential and add attractive new products 10 its lineup, the company had purchased spreadsheet software pioneer Lotus Development in 1995 for $3.5 billion and Edmark. a publisher of edu­cational software for children, in Also in 1997, IBM sold its ownership interest in Prodigy (an on-line service provider that had once enjoyed a dominant position against rival America Online) for $250 million after investing $1.2 billion. در خلال سالهاي دهه 1990 ، از درآمدي سالانه اي معادل 2 درصد برخوردار گرديد و درآمدهاي آن از 7/69 ميليارد دلار در سال 1990 به 5/78 ميليارد دلار در سال 1997 افزايش يافت. در آمد خالص 1/6 ميليارد دلار در سال 1997 حدود 6 ميليارد دلار بالاتر از سال 1990 بود در حاليكه درآمدهاي شركت در سال 1984 حدود 6/6 ميليارد دلار بود. به اين اساس كمپاني با استفاده روزافزون استفاده از Pc ها مواجه گرديد كه كليه اين افزايش وابستگي تنگاتنگي با كامپيوترهاي Main From داشت. اما فروش سخت افزار IBM از روند مشابهي پيروي نمود. بيشترين رشد تجاري مربوط به خدمات و نرم افزار بود. اين شركت با توجه به استفاده مستمر از pc ها ( كامپيوتر هاي شخصي ) بمنظور رفع وابستگي به كامپيوترهاي بزرگ مادر ( Mainframe ) تلاش مي كند تا خود را بازسازي كند. فروش سخت افزار كامپيوتري شركت IBM داراي ركود بود ، اما سريع الرشد ترين تجارت آن در زمينه خدمات و نرم افزار بوده است. اين شركت براي افزايش رشد بالقوه خود و نيز افزودن محصولات جالب و جديد در سال 1995 در حدود 5/3 ميليارد دلار نرم افزار خريداري كرده است. همچنين در سال 1997 ، شركت IBM سود مالكيت را با خدمات online به مبلغ 250 ميليون دلار پس از سرمايه گذاري 2/1 ميلياردي فروخته است. 1

131 از IBM (www.ibm.com) IBM's market share in PCs was eroding—it had lost more market share in the 1990s than any other PC maker. Its main strengths in PCs were in laptop computers and in desktop sales to corporate customers, many of which also had IBM mainframe computers and had been longtime IBM customers. IBM was regarded as a high-cost pro­ducer of PCs and, traditionally, had commanded a premium price for its PCs. IBM saw notebook computers as the key to winning corporate accounts due to the need of many corporate personnel for mobile computing capability. IBM سهم IBM در بازار فروش Pc ها در حال كاهش بود، در دهه 1990 اين كمپاني بخش زيادي از سهم خود را در بازار از دست داد. مهمترين نقطه قوت Pc هاي IBM فروش كامپيوترهاي لاب تاپ و ديسك تاپ به شركت هاي كامپيوتري بود كه مدتهاي مديدي خريدار IBM Mainframe بودند. IBM به اين مسئله توجه داشت كه Pc هاي توليد شده او، داراي قيمت زيادي مي باشد و بصورت سنتي باعث افزايش مستمر قيمت Pc ها مي گردد. IBM نشان داد گه كامپيوتر هاي Notbook با توجه به استقبال شركت ها فروش بسيار خوبي خواهند داشت. 1

132 از IBM (www.ibm.com) The company's laptop PCs, while highly rated for their performance features and quality, were typically higher priced than comparably equipped models of rival sellers. IBM competed against PC rivals by emphasizing confidence in the IBM brand and the company's long-standing strengths in software applications, service, and technical support. IBM had responded to the direct- sales inroads Dell had made in the corporate market by allowing some of its resellers to custom-assemble IBM PCs to buyer specifications: it was hoping this effort would cut costs up to 10 percent. IBM's PC division was believed to be operat­ing at breakeven or a slight loss in the first quarter of IBM كمپاني IBM به دليل عملكرد بسيار مثبت و ارايه كامپيوترهايي با كيفيت بسيار بالا، كامپيوترها و تجهيزات با قيمت هاي بالاتري را وارد بازار نمود. IBM با فروشندگان Pc رقابتي را آغاز نمود كه اين موضوع با تاكيد بر اعتماد بر كيفيت محصولاتي كه با مارك IBM ارايه مي شد آغاز شد و بر اين اساس ارايه انواع نرم افزارها، خدمات و حمايت هاي تكنيكي در دستور كار قرار گرفت. IBM به به فروش مستقيم محصولات Pell واكنشي نشان داد و به بعضي از مشتريان خود اجازه داد تا قطعات ارايه شده Pc IBM را مجدداً سوار نمايند. اين تلاشها اين اميدواري را بوجود آورد كه مي‌توان به اين وسيله قيمت را تا 10 درصد تنزل داد. IBM عقيده داشت كه با اينكار مي توانست ضررهايي كه در سه ماهه نخست سال 1998 متحمل شده بود را جبران نمايد. 1

133 از Hewlett-Packard (www.hp.com) Dell regarded Hewlett-Packard (H-P) as a strong competitor because of H-P's global leadership in printers (a 52 percent market share), strong reputation with corporate customers in most all pans of the world, and growing strategic emphasis on the PC segment. Since 1995 H-P's share of the PC market had been rising almost as quickly as Dell's. H-P was co-designing the next- generation microprocessor with Intel— code-named the Merced and scheduled for introduction in late 1999 and full-market rollout in 2000.H-P's partnership with Intel on the Merced was expected to put H-P on the cutting edge of PC technology for the next several years and boost its brand image in PCs. on hand, Compaq was slower than Dell in getting new generations of its PCs into the marketplace. Compaq was the world's leading PC manufacturer, with a global market share of approximately 13 percent. It had overtaken IBM to become the market lea

134 از Hewlett-Packard (www.hp.com) H-P marketed its PC line through resellers that had the capability to deliver orders to major corporate accounts within 12 to 24 hours. Despite rapidly growing sales, H-P's PC division had not yet achieved profitability; the division recorded a small loss in the first quarter of 1998.H-P was the market leader in revenue, units, and growth in the Windows NT-based workstation market. Compaq was a close second. H-P marketed over products that included desktop and notebook PCs, printers, workstations, servers, digital cam­eras, scanners, calculators, storage devices, networking software and equipment, test and measurement equipment, and medical electronics products. Hewlet-Packavd خط توليد HP با استفاده از توانايي هاي خود اكثر خدمات و تجهيزات ساير شركت ها را بر عهده گرفت. عليرغم رشد بسيار سريع فروش آن، Pc هاي HP هنوز به سودآوري نرسيدند و به همين دليل در سه ماهه نخست سال 1998 دچار ضرر شدند، اما مجدداً HP رهبري بازار را در دست گرفت و با رشد windows و Nt رشد فروش آن مجدداً آغاز شد. Compaq was the world's leading PC manufacturer, with a global market share of approximately 13 percent. It had overtaken IBM to become the market lea

135 از Gateway (www.galeway.coni) Gateway, formerly called Gateway 2000, was a South Dakota- based company with 1997 revenues of $6.3 billion and profits of $ 110 million. Founder and chairman Ted Waitt, 34, who wore his hair in a ponytail. owned 46 percent of the company; his brother owned 9 percent. Waitt had dropped out of college in 1985 to go to work for a computer retailer in Des Moines. Iowa: after nine months, he quit to form his own company. The company, operating out of a bam on his father's cattle ranch, sold add-on pans by phone for Texas Instruments PCs. In the company, using its own PC design, started selling fully-equipped PCs at a price near that of other PC makers. Gateway كه قبلاً Gateway خوانده مي شد، يك كمپاني مستقر در داكوتاي جنوبي بود كه در سال 1997 در آمدي معادل 3/6 ميليارد دلار و سودي معادل 110 ميليون دلار داشت. بنيان گذار و رئيس اين شركت Ted waitt بود كه 34 سال سن داشت و مالك 46 درصد از سهام شركت بود، برادر او نيز 9 درصد سهام شركت را بخود اختصاص داده بود. Waitt در سال 1985 از كالج فارغ تحصيل شد و براي كار به يك مركز فروش كامپيوترهاي دسته دوم در Des Moines رفت و پس از 9 ماه از آنجا استعفا داد و كمپاني خود را تاسيس نمود. كمپاني او كار خود را در مزرعه پدرش بنانها و قطعات دسته دوم را توسط تلفن بفروش رساند. كمپاني در سال 1987 ، با استفاده از طراحي Pc ، شروع به فروش تجهيزات كامل Pc ها با قيمتي معادل ساير توليد كنندگان Pc نمود. 1

136 از Gateway (www.galeway.coni) Sales took off and in 1991 Gateway topped Inc. magazine's list of the nation's fastest growing private companies. The company went public in achieving sales of $l.7 billion and earnings of $151 million. The company had differentiated itself from rivals with eye-catching ads: some featured white-and-black-spotted cows while others fea­tured company employees (including one with Waitt dressed as Robin Hood). GATEWAY فهرست مجله شركت GATEWAY در سال 1991 كشورهايي را كه بيشتر رشد را در بخش خصوصي داشته اند را ارايه داد. اين كمپاني در سال 1993 دولتي گرديد و به فروش معادل 7/1 ميليارد دلار و در آمدي معادل 151 ميليون دلار رسيد. كمپاني خود را از كمك هاي eye- Catching مجزا نمود 1

137 از Gateway (www.galeway.coni) Despite growing at a rate of nearly 38 percent annually since Gateway was struggling to achieve acceptable profitability— the company's profit margin had eroded steadily from a high of 9.6 percent in 1992 to only 1.7 percent in Gateway, like Dell, built to order and sold direct. But its market strengths were concentrated in the individual, small-business, and school segments, where it outsold Dell. It was the mar­ket leader in the education segment. Gateway عليرغم رشد 38 درصد سالانه از سال 1993 GATEWAY سعي نموده است به سود قابل قبولي برسد ، با اين وجود سود نهايي كمپاني يطور مستمر 6/9 درصد در سال 1992 بود اما در سال 1997 به 7/1 درصد تنزل نمود.GATEWAY مانند Dell ، ساخت و فروش مستقيم خود را در دستور كار قرار داد. اما بازار عمدتاً در دست افراد خاص متمركز بود وفروشندگان كوچك Dell را محدود نمودند. اين فروشندگان كوچك رهبري و هدايت و آموزش خريداران را بر عهده گرفتند. 1

138 از Gateway (www.galeway.coni) At the beginning of 1997 Gateway's consumer line of desktop PCs was priced on average 12 percent below comparable Dell con­ sumer models: by December 1997, Dell had an average price advantage of 5 percent over Gateway in the consumer segment. One of Gateway's strategies to boost profit margins was to strengthen its appeal to medium-sized and large corporations. The company had recently hired 80 salespeople to court new corporate customers and was strengthening its efforts to sell to corporate customers through dealers as well. Gatway در اوايل سال 1997 ، مشتريان pc هاي Gateway براي خريد كامپيوترهاي قابل حمل 12 درصد كمتر از مدل هاي DELL پول پرداخت مي كردند ، در دسامبر سال 1997 ، ميانگين قيمت كامپيوتر هاي DELL 5 درصد بيشترازمشتريان Gateway بود. يكي از استراتژي هاي ارتقا سود نهايي و تقويت عرضه توليدات pc هاي متوسط براي شركت هاي بزرگ بود. البته شركت اخيرا " 80 نفر را براي تقويت فروش گامپيوتر به مشتريان شروع نموده است. 1

139 از Gateway (www.galeway.coni) Gateway had entered the server segment in 1997 by purchasing Advanced Logic Research, Inc. (ALR). ALR's server manufacturing facility in California began mak­ing servers for Gateway for direct sale to Gateway customers. However, in 1998 ALR was continuing to make ALR servers for sale through its network of resellers. Gatway شركت Gateway در سال 1997 با خريد شركت پژوهشي Advanced logic (AlR), وارد بازار گرديد. شركت Alr سرورهايي در كاليفرنيا توليد مي كند و آنها را براي Gateway ارايه مي دهد تا بطور مستقيم به مشتريان عرضه نمايد. هر چند در سال 1998 ALR در حال ادامه دادن توليد شبكه اي از سرورها و فروش آنها بوده است. Compaq was the world's leading PC manufacturer, with a global market share of approximately 13 percent. It had overtaken IBM to become the market lea

140 از Toshiba Toshiba was a $48-billion Japanese electronics and electrical equipment manufacturer with 303 subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide; it ranked as the world's 37th largest cor­poration in terms of revenues. Its Toshiba America Information Systems division was the leading vendor in the U.S. market for portable computers, with a 20.4 percent share in توشيبا توشيبا يك توليدكننده 48 ميليارد دلاري ابزار آلات الكترونيكي و الكتريكي بود كه 303 شعبه در سراسر جهان دارد و به عنوان يكي 37 شركت بزرگ بر اساس در آمد در سطح جهان طبقه بندي مي شود. شعبه بخش سيستم هاي اطلاعات توشيبا آمريكا فروشندگان را در بازار آمريكا براي كامپيوترهاي قابل حمل هدايت مي نمايد كه حدود 4/20 درصد سهم بازار را در سال 1997 در اختيار داشته است. شعبه بخش سيستم هاي اطلاعات توشيبا آمريكا فروشندگان را در بازار آمريكا براي كامپيوترهاي قابل حمل هدايت مي نمايد كه حدود 4/20 درصد سهم بازار را در سال 1997 در اختيار داشته است. 1

141 از Toshiba The division offered the widest array of portable PCs of any manufacturer, selling both direct and through dealers and having a commanding lead over rivals in both chan­nels. In addition to Toshiba portable PCs in all price ranges, the division also marketed desktop PCs, disk drives, plain-paper copiers, facsimile systems, voic systems. digital key telephones, optical-fiber modems, and digital cameras under the Toshiba brand name. Headquartered in Irvine, California, it had $4 billion in annual sales. توشيبا اين بخش انواع pc هاي قابل حمل توليد كنندگان را ارايه داده و فروش آنها بصورت مستقيم و غير مستقيم صورت مي گيرد. افزون بر اين pc هاي قابل حمل toshiba در انواع قيمت ها و دسك تاپ pc ها ، در ايوديسك ، چاپگر ، سيستم فاكس ميل ، سيستم mail voice وجود تلفن هاي ديجيتالي ، مدوم هاي فيبري اوپتكال و دوربين هاي ديجيتالي با نام تجاري توشيبا وجود دارند ، ستاد مركزي آن در trvine كاليفرنيا است كه سالانه 4 ميليارد دلار فروش دارد. 1

142 از Providers of House-Label Brands There were about resellers of generic, or "white-box," PCs in North America alone. This house-label segment constituted a $7.6-billion market in the United States and Canada, representing shipments of 6.4 million units and 30 percent of sales through resellers. No single no-name brand, however, accounted for more than 0.25 percent market share, and most accounted for far less. Generic PCs assembled in "screwdriver shops" had been a pan of the PC business since its inception—Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs launched Apple from a garage using purchased components. Rising technological savvy about how PCs worked and the widespread availability of individual components made it fairly easy for an enterprising operation to assemble a generic PC. فروشندگان دسته دوم توليد كنندگان كامپيوترهاي داراي برچسب خانگي در حال حاضر حدود 35 هزار فروشندگان دسته دوم جنريك يا PC هاي جعبه سفيد در آمريكاي شمالي وجود دارند. اين توليد كنندگان خانگي داراي بازاري معادل 6 الي 7 ميليارد دلار در ايالات متحده و كانادا هستند كه اين ميزان حدود 4/6 ميليون واحد كالاها يا 30 درصد كل فروش ، فروشندگان دسته دوم را تشكيل مي دهد. هر چند هيچ نام تجاري براي آنها وجود ندارد ، اما حدود 25 درصد سهم بازار در دست آنها است و pc هاي جنريك كه در فروشگاههاي screwdriver جمع شدند ، طيف گسترده اي از تجارت pc ها را در دست دارند، steve wozniak و steve jobs با apple و با استفاده از خريد اجزا آن شروع نمودند. ارتقاي فن آوري در خصوص چگونگي كاركرد pc ها و افزايش دسترسي به اجزاي متعدد كامپيوتر براي بسياري از شركت ها جمعبندي و ساخت pc ها را تسهيل نموده است. توليد كنندگان كامپيوترهاي داراي برچسب خانگي در حال حاضر حدود 35 هزار فروشندگان دسته دوم جنريك يا PC هاي جعبه سفيد در آمريكاي شمالي وجود دارند. اين توليد كنندگان خانگي داراي بازاري معادل 6 الي 7 ميليارد دلار در ايالات متحده و كانادا هستند كه اين ميزان حدود 4/6 ميليون واحد كالاها يا 30 درصد كل فروش ، فروشندگان دسته دوم را تشكيل مي دهد. هر چند هيچ نام تجاري براي آنها وجود ندارد ، اما حدود 25 درصد سهم بازار در دست آنها است و pc هاي جنريك كه در فروشگاههاي screwdriver جمع شدند ، طيف گسترده اي از تجارت pc ها را در دست دارند، steve wozniak و steve jobs با apple و با استفاده از خريد اجزا آن شروع نمودند. ارتقاي فن آوري در خصوص چگونگي كاركرد pc ها و افزايش دسترسي به اجزاي متعدد كامپيوتر براي بسياري از شركت ها جمعبندي و ساخت pc ها را تسهيل نموده است. 1

143 از Providers of House-Label Brands To keep costs and prices low, the makers of generic PCs typically incor­porated components from low-end suppliers and their products did not match name-brand PCs in performance and dependability. White-box PCs appealed mainly to very price- conscious buyers: most businesses that had tried generic brands had learned the hard way that the cheapest PC was not always the least expensive in the long run due to problems with quality and reliability.Roughly two-thirds of the resellers who built their own systems for sale under their own brand also carried name brands. In 1998 resellers expected the sales of generic PCs to rise to about 35 percent of their total PC sales. براي پايين نگهداشتن هزينه ها و قيمت ها ، سازندگان pcs بطور مشخص توليدات خود را با نام تجاري pc ها خريداران با هوش را جذب مي نمايد. بيشتر تجارت ها كه داراي اسامي تجاري بوده اند آموخته بودند كه ارزان ترين pc ها در بلندي را مدت هميشه با مشكلات كيفيت و قابليت اعتماد همراه بودند. تقريبا " دو سوم فروشندگان مجدد كه سيستم خود را براي فروش جمعبندي نموده اند بر اساس اسامي تجاري ، آن را به فروش رسانده اند. در سال 1998 ، فروشندگان مجدد انتظار داشتند كه قيمت فروش pc ها حدود 35 درصد از كل قيمت PC را شامل مي شود. براي پايين نگهداشتن هزينه ها و قيمت ها ، سازندگان pcs بطور مشخص توليدات خود را با نام تجاري pc ها خريداران با هوش را جذب مي نمايد. بيشتر تجارت ها كه داراي اسامي تجاري بوده اند آموخته بودند كه ارزان ترين pc ها در بلندي را مدت هميشه با مشكلات كيفيت و قابليت اعتماد همراه بودند. تقريبا " دو سوم فروشندگان مجدد كه سيستم خود را براي فروش جمعبندي نموده اند بر اساس اسامي تجاري ، آن را به فروش رسانده اند. در سال 1998 ، فروشندگان مجدد انتظار داشتند كه قيمت فروش pc ها حدود 35 درصد از كل قيمت PC را شامل مي شود. 1

144 از پايان


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