1. Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role, Structure and Activities
Presentation by
Mr Roald Næss, Former Chairman of the NSG, at
a Seminar in Bali, 2 November, 2006

2. Purpose of the presentation
Contribute to a broader understanding of the NSG and its non-proliferation activities as part of an overall effort to promote dialogue and cooperation between NSG participants and non-NSG participants
This is consistent with:
“Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament” (1995 NPTREC)
UNSC Resolution 1540 (OP 9)
The purpose of my presentation is to contribute to a broader understanding of the NSG and its activities as part of an overall effort to promote dialogue and cooperation between NSG participants and non-NSG participants.
This is consistent with the decision (no. 2) on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference where Paragraph 17 of that document states that "transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.”
It is also consistent with paragraph 9 of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which “calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation” so as to address the threats posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. What is the NSG all about?
The NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports
What is the NSG all about?
An answer to this question could be summarized as follows:
read slide

4. What is the aim of the NSG Guidelines?
ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly
facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms
Now, the aim of the NSG Guidelines can be summarized in two brief points:
read slide

5. The origins of NSG
NPT
negotiated in the 1960th, entered into force in 1970
rests on three fundamental pillars:
non-proliferation
nuclear disarmament
peaceful use of nuclear energy
Let me say a few words about the origins of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The Mother of the NSG is the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, NPT, which was
negotiated in the 1960th, entered into force in 1970
rests on three fundamental pillars:
non-proliferation
nuclear disarmament
peaceful use of nuclear energy

6. NPT and nuclear trade Article III.2
“Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article”
The NPT had, and still has, implications on nuclear trade.
As you can see it contains a reference to particular goods which shall be subject to export controls, and
it triggers safeguards.
In addition important to note that the article does not define the term “especially designed and prepared”.

7. The Zangger Committee Established in 1971
Mandate - limited to interpreting Article III.2 of the NPT
Published a “Trigger List” and the Zangger guidelines in 1974
list of items which would “trigger” safeguards in the recipient State
guidelines (“common understandings”) governing the export, direct or indirect, of those items to NNWS that are not party to NPT
The NPT is - as most international treaties - a compromise document with some articles left open for interpretation, and after the entry into force of the treaty, supplier countries initiated a discussion on how they could harmonise their understandings of the export control commitment under article III.2 of the treaty.
This was the beginning of the Zangger Committee which was established in The mandate of the Zangger Committee is limited to interpreting Article III.2 of the treaty.
In 1974 the Committee published a ”trigger list” and the Zangger guidelines.
The ”trigger list” was a list of items which would trigger safeguards in the recipient State, and the guidelines (”common understandings”) are governing the export, direct or indirect, of those items to NNWS that are not party to NPT.

8. The Nuclear Suppliers Group
Triggering event: The nuclear explosion by India in 1974
Seven supplier countries* met in London to discuss how they could further strengthen their non-proliferation efforts
Agreed on the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, published by the IAEA in 1978 (INFCIRC 254)
*Canada, France, UK, USA, Soviet Union,
Fed. Republic of Germany and Japan
However, the trigger list and the Zangger guidelines did not suffice, and following the Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974, major nuclear suppliers met in London to discuss how they could further strengthen their non-proliferation efforts. The group, or the London Club, as it became to be know, agreed on the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, published by the IAEA in 1978 (INFCIRC 254).
These guidelines should be applied to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities.

9. Prevailing misunderstandings
NSG is not an international organization, or an internationally legally-binding agreement
NSG does not conduct export control
NSG does not have a Secretariat or a common budget
I will return to the guidelines in a short while, but let me first briefly comment on some prevailing misunderstandings of what the NSG is.
NSG is not an international organization with an address, telephone number and a bank account, or an internationally legally-binding agreement.
NSG does not conduct export control
that is the sole responsibility of each Participating Government on the basis of their national legislation and practices – building, however, on the agreed Guidelines, including the Technical Annexes as established by the Group.
NSG does not have a Secretariat or a common budget
Also add that the NSG has no official connection to the IAEA
however, the IAEA publishes the Guidelines and control lists;
the NSG Chair has had informal discussions with the IAEA and its DG

10. NSG Guidelines Part 1
Governs the export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. These items include:
nuclear material,
nuclear reactors and equipment therefor,
non-nuclear material for reactors,
plants and equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and heavy water production,
technology associated with each of these items
NSG Guidelines Part 1, also known as the Trigger List governs the export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use.
These items include
nuclear material,
nuclear reactors and equipment therefor,
non-nuclear material for reactors,
plants and equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and heavy water production,
technology associated with each of these items.
The control lists (annexed to the guidelines) describe in detail which items are controlled under the guidelines.

11. NSG Guidelines Part 1
Export of the commodities and the related technology from the Trigger List is prohibited:
to any non-nuclear weapons state which does not have a legally binding commitment for full scope safeguards with the IAEA, or
if the exporting country is not satisfied that the export will be used for peaceful purposes

12. NSG Guidelines Part 1
A Non-proliferation Principle is included in the Part 1 Guidelines and states that:
”Suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related technology identified in the trigger list only when they are satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or to be diverted to acts of nuclear terrorism”
A non-proliferation principle has been included in the Part 1 Guidelines. This principle states that
Read slide

13. NSG Guidelines Part 1
There are two exceptions to the prohibitions of Part 1:
if the export is deemed essential for the safe operation of an existing safeguarded facility (must be an Imminent Radiological Danger); or
if the export is under the “grandfather” provisions (April 3, 1992 for original members and time of membership of subsequent members)

14. NSG Guidelines Part 2
Governs the export of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials and technologies
Export of the controlled commodities and technologies is prohibited:
to any NNWS for use in nuclear explosive activity, or in an un-safeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle facility
if there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or if the export would be contrary to nonproliferation objectives
if there is a risk of diversion to terrorist acts
There are no exceptions to the prohibitions of Part 2
NSG Guidelines, Part 2, governs the export of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials and technologies.
These are items that can make a major contribution to an un-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but that have non-nuclear uses as well.
Export of the controlled commodities and technologies is prohibited:
read slide
The control lists (annexed to the guidelines) describe in detail which items are controlled under the guidelines.
There are no exceptions to the prohibitions of Part 2.

15. Policy recommendations
Policy recommendations to be implemented by PGs relate to:
Conditions of supply
Assurances of peaceful uses
Retransfer procedures
Consultations in specific circumstances
Exchange of information in regard to potential proliferation activities
The Guidelines also include a number og measures and policy recommendations that should be implemented by Participating Governments. These relate to:
Conditions of supply
Assurances of peaceful uses
Retransfer procedures
Consultations in specific circumstances
Exchange of information in regard to activities of potential proliferation concern.

16. Structure of the NSG NSG Plenary Consultative Group
governing and decision making body of NSG issues
decisions by consensus
Consultative Group
working body
submits recommendations to the Plenary
Information Exchange Meeting
forum for exchange of information on proliferation trends and concerns
The NSG Plenary is the governing and decision making body of NSG issues.
It may delegate decision-making authority to the CG on certain issues.
Takes its decisions by consensus.
The Plenary allows the NSG Chair standing authority to call intersessional consultations.
The Consultative Group is the working body of the NSG.
The CG meets regularly between the annual plenary meetings and it submits recommendations to the Plenary.
Information Exchange Meeting takes place during the Plenary week.
IEM is an important forum for exchange of information on proliferation trends and concerns.
Chaired by the host country.

17. Structure of the NSG NSG Chair Chairman of the Consultative Group
nominated by host country of the annual Plenary and elected by the Plenary at the opening session
presides from opening session in his/her country to opening session in next year’s Plenary
represents the NSG in external matters
Chairman of the Consultative Group
individual appointed for 1 year (renewable)
Point of Contact
Permanent Mission of Japan in Vienna
assists the chairs and hosts meetings
NSG Chair is nominated by host country of the annual Plenary and elected by the Plenary at the opening meeting Presides from opening session in his/her country to opening session in next year’s Plenary.
The Chair represents the NSG in external matters.
Assisted by outgoing and incoming Chairs – and the CG Chair. Former, present and future chairs form the troika.
Chairman of the Consultative Group is individual appointed for 1 year (renewable).
A PG nominates the candidate.
Point of Contact is the Permanent Mission of Japan in Vienna.
POC is responsible for the distribution of documents.
Is assisting the chairs and hosting meetings, including CG, extraordinary plenary meetings and intersessional consultations.

18. NSG Participation: A new Participating Government should:
be able to supply items
adhere to and act in accordance with the Guidelines
have in force a legally-based domestic export control system
be a party to the NPT, other non-proliferation agreements, and have in force full-safe safeguards agreement with IAEA
support efforts towards non-prolififeraton of WMDs
Over the years the number of Participating Governments has increased to 45. Croatia was welcomed as the 45th PG at the 2005 Plenary meeting, while Estonia, Lithuania, Malta and China joined the group in 2004.
Several factors have to be considered by PGs when dealing with the possible acceptance of a government as a new Participating Government. A new PG should:
be able to supply items covered by the Annexes to Parts 1 and 2 of the Guidelines (includes transit items)
adhere to and act in accordance with the Guidelines
have in force a legally-based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines
be a party to the NPT, the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco or Bangkok or an equivalent international nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and, as appropriate, have in force full-safe safeguards agreement with IAEA
be supportive of international efforts towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles

19. Recent developments of the NSG
Strengthening the NSG Guidelines
Countries of concern (Iran and North Korea)
Transparency and outreach activities
NSG/India relations
Main focus over the past years has been on four issues:
Strengthening the NSG Guidelines
Countries of concern Iran
Transparency and outreach activities
NSG/India relations

20. Strengthening the Guidelines
Vienna 2002: How to prevent and counter the threat of diversion of nuclear exports to nuclear terrorism?
agreed to several comprehensive amendments to strengthen the Guidelines
Göteborg 2004: Adopted a ”catch-all” mechanism in order to control the export of nuclear related items that are not on the control lists
The Guidelines, including the Annexes, are constantly subject to review in order to ensure that they are up to date and effective in relation to the proliferation threats. Of the recent developments of the NSG I would like to start with the
Extraordinary Plenary Meeting in Vienna in December At this meeting Participating Governments discussed how to prevent and counter the threat of diversion of nuclear exports to nuclear terrorism and the Plenary agreed to several comprehensive amendments to strengthen the Guidelines. At the same time it was also emphasised that effective export controls are an important tool to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Plenary meeting in Göteborg 2004 decided to adopt a ”catch-all” mechanism in order to control the exsport of nuclear related items that are not on the control lists, when such items are or may be intended for use in connection with a nuclear weapons programme.
Plenary also welcomed UNSC Resolution 1540 and its recognition of the importance of export controls to non-proliferation efforts, as well as its decision that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including end-user controls.

21. Strengthening the Guidelines
Oslo 2005: Adopted several measures
a procedure towards suspending through national decisions nuclear transfers to countries that are non compliant with their safeguard agreements
supplier / recipient state should elaborate measures to evoke fall back safeguards if the IAEA can no longer undertake its safeguard mandate in a recipient state
existence of effective export controls in the recipient state as a criterion of supply for nuclear material, equipment and technology (Part 1) and a factor for consideration for dual-use items and technologies
At the Oslo Plenary the PGs adopted, inter alia, the following measures:
the establishment of a procedure towards suspending through national decisions nuclear transfers to countries that are non compliant with their safeguard agreements;
the supplier and the recipient states should elaborate appropriate measures to evoke fall back safeguards if the IAEA can no longer undertake its safeguard mandate in a recipient state;
to introduce the existence of effective export controls in the recipient state as a criterion of supply for nuclear material, equipment and technology (Part 1) and a factor for consideration for dual-use items and technologies.
The Plenary also
reiterated their firm support for the NPT, and, while noting that the 2005 Review Conference did not reach a substantive outcome,
affirmed the NSGs continued determination to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in the face of new challenges;
called on states to exercise extreme vigilance and make best efforts to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contribute to nuclear weapons programmes;
reiterated their firm support for the UNSC Resolution 1540 and stated its readiness to co-operate in the ongoing process to fully implementing this resolution.

22. Strengthening the Guidelines
Brasilia 2006: Adopted some amendments to strengthen the Guidelines, and agreed to
continue discussions of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply
continue discussions with a view to agree on further strengthening of the NSG Guidelines with respect to enrichment and reprocessing technologies
enhance information exchange in all aspects
continue contact with non-participants and relevant organisations in the framework of the NSG outreach programme
At the 2006 Plenary the Participating Governments adopted some amendments to the Guidelines, including an amendment to include valves especially designed or prepared for gas centrifuge enrichment plands. The Plenary also agreed to continue:
discussions of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply
discussions with a view to agree on further strengthening of the NSG Guidelines with respect to enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
The Participating Governments also agreed
to enhance information exchange in all aspects
to continue contact with non-participants and relevant organisations in the framework of the NSG outreach programme.

23. Countries of concern Situation in DPRK Situation in Iran
Chairman’s Statement on DPRK of 12 Nov 2006
Busan Plenary Statement of 2003
“..call on all States to exercise extreme vigilance to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contribute to North Korea’s nuclear weapons effort”
Situation in Iran
Extraordinary Plenary Meeting 19 October 2005
Supported efforts undertaken elsewhere

24. NSG outreach programme
Transparency efforts in the margins of the IAEA General Conference and visits to capitals
Promote the NSG’s objectives in contacts with India, Pakistan and Israel
Dialogue with Organisations (IAEA, UNSC 1540 Committee, OSCE)
Seminars

25. NSG/India relations Several discussions held in the Consultative Group
US has provided PGs with extensive information
Information meeting hosted by India in Vienna in October 2006
No decision discussed or taken by the NSG

26. Thank you for your attention