1. ”

2. Dr. Bernadeta Killian Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow June 28, 2007
Identity Politics in Zanzibar and Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania
Dr. Bernadeta Killian
Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow
June 28, 2007
Please note that the views expressed in this presentation represent the opinions and analysis of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment of Democracy.

3. United Republic of Tanzania
One unitary republic, two governments
Composed of two formerly sovereign states: Tanganyika and Zanzibar
1961: Tanganyika gains independence from the British
1963: Zanzibar gains independence
1964: Revolution in Zanzibar
April 26, 1964: Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar
Zanzibar enjoys semi-autonomous status, exercises its sovereignty over all domestic and non-union matters
Zanzibar non-union matters: setting up national and budgetary policies on such sectors as agriculture, tourism, health, education, water, communication, industry, etc.
Union Matters: Foreign affairs, defense and security, police, emergency powers, citizenship, external borrowing and trade, mineral oil resources, higher education, court of appeal, registration of political parties, etc.
Each government has her own executive, legislature and the judiciary.
The Union government is also responsible for the Tanzania Mainland issues.

4. Basic Data Tanzania:945,087sq. km
Tanzania: per-capita income: US$340 (2006)
Zanzibar: per-capita US$327 (2005)
Tanzania (total pop.): 34,443,603
Zanzibar: 981,754 people
Unguja Island (60%)
& Pemba Island (40%)
Zanzibaris constitues only 2.9 % of total Tanzanian population
Two big islands, but there are other smaller islands like Tumbatu islands etc.
Just 15 minutes by flight, and 90 minutes by speeding boat.
Presentation is divided into 6 sections
Introduction
Historical context: on the shaping of political identities and development of state formation, setting up a stage for the subsequent discussion
Brief analytical discussion in the area of identity politics and democratic consolidation
The return to multi-party politics and resurgence of political identities
Implications of politics of identity to democratic consolidation
Conclusions and recommendations

5. I. Introduction Tanzania: Unity in Diversity
Tanzania is renowned for its long-established civic peace & unity among its diverse ethnic, religion & racial groups
It has been a peace-broker & model of national cohesion in E. Africa
The use of Swahili language has been a binding thread
In the case of Zanzibar, a common religion (Islam) and a high rate of intermarriage have unified the state’s diverse ethno-racial groups
Tanzania is renowned for her long-established civic peace and national unity among its 35 million people of diverse ethnic, religion and racial groups. It has been a Peace-broker and a model of national cohesion in the Eastern Africa region (compared to Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo)
An homogeneous culture is believed to be prevalent both in T/Mainland and ZNZ where the use of swahili has been a binding thread. In the case of Zanzibar, despite of being a multi-racial society, …………has made cultural homogeneity even stronger

6. Why is Zanzibar Different?
Struggle for the control of the state has been intense, deadly & zero-sum
Unlike in mainland Tanzania, the struggle for political power in Zanzibar has largely been shaped by the politics of identity on the basis of race.
Racial labels of ‘Africans’ vs. ‘Arabs’ are widely used in the context of political contestation for power.
This presentation seeks to understand why.
Why do political elites in Zanzibar politicize racial identities, particularly at election time?

7. Politicized Racial Identity Explained
Control of the State
Identity of the State
(Arab vs. African)
It is the struggle over the control of the state that is the driving force behind the politics of identity in Zanzibar. However, while the struggle for a control of the state accounts for a multitude of ethnic conflicts in various parts of the world, in Zanzibar, the distinctive character of the state itself makes it appealing for the political elites to politicise ethno-racial identities in order to claim legitimacy to rule. Apart from the control of the state, two more things are at stake regarding the Zanzibar state—that is, the identity of the state (on whether it is an Arab or African state) and sovereignty of the state (Zanzibar vs. the Union). The control of the state by a certain group therefore is of paramount importance as it paves the way for either the preservation or reconstruction of the state identity as well as state sovereignty. Stiff competition between two divided groups in Zanzibar brings to the fore these unresolved contradictions of the Zanzibar semi-autonomous state, which manifest themselves through the realm of ethno-racial politics.
Sovereignty of the State
(Zanzibar vs. Union)

8. II: Historical Context The Shaping of Political Identities
Over the centuries, Zanzibar attracted several immigrant groups, including:
Mainland Africans (3rd-4th century)
Persians (10th century)
Arabs (11th century)
Europeans (16th century)
Comorians (18th Century)
Indians (19th century)
Intermarriage between Persians & Africans led to the emergence of Shirazi Africans
The Africans are believed to have originated from the hinterland of East African countries of Tanganyika, Malawi, Mozambique and Eastern Congo. The Persians came from the Persian Gulf regions. Intermarriages between the Persian and African communities led to the gradual formation of an existing ethnic group that identifies itself as Shirazi, linking their origin to the Eastern Persian region around Shiraz.[1] [1] Michael Lofchie (1965) Zanzibar: Background to Revolution, p.25; Norman R. Bennett (1978) A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar, Methuan & Co ltd, p. 5
It is debatable among scholars and politicians alike on who is the indigenous native of Zanzibar (who got there first) and therefore justifying entitlement to rule. A widely held view amongst scholars is that the original inhabitants are believed to be Bantu who migrated from the Mainland at about 3rd and 4th century.[1] It is believed that the name Zanzibar originated from the Persians’ description of the Islands on their arrival around 10th centuary. They called the islands ‘Zanj bar’ which means ‘the land of blacks’.[2] [1] Gray (1962) in Mukangara, Newman in Mbwiliza p.11; Michael Lofchie, Mukangara, Othman, Mapuri
Other scholars however regard the Shirazi as the indigenous population “whose claim to originality and to the land could hardly be contested by any one.[1]
[1] Bakari,Abdul Sharrif “Race and Class, p. 306; Seif Kharusi (1967 ) Zanzibar, Africa’s First Cuba: A Case Study of the New Colonialism, London; A. Sherrif (1994)

9. The Shaping of Political Identities
Shirazi Africans
Africans
Mainland Africans
Shirazi Africans = the Hadimu, Tumbatu and Pemba Shirazi
Mainland Africans = Africans of recent arrival from the African hinterland (slaves, freed slaves and their descendants, and migrant laborers) (latecomers)
1948 census: the Shirazi (55.8%), Mainland African (19.8%), Arabs(16.9%), Indians(6.2%), Comorians (1.1%),Europeans (0.1%),Other (0.1%)
Africans were not a homogeneous group. Distinction was made between Shirazi Africans and Mainland Africans. Shirazi are divided: the Hadimu, Tumbatu and the Pemba Shirazi partly due to geographical differences and the nature of colonial economy
Both the Hadimu of Southern and South eastern Unguja and the Mainlanders became the victims of oppression as labourers and victim of land alienation to provide for the expanded clove plantation by the Arabs.
In contrast, the Shirazi in Pemba experienced less degree of land alienation and their livelihood system was left more or less uninterrupted. Infact, many of the Pemba Shirazi were also able to own clove plantations just as the Arabs. There was a higher rate of intermarriage between the Shirazi and the Arabs in Pemba than in Unguja where intermarriage was predominantly between the Hadimu Shirazi and mainland Africans.[1] Thus, while African-Arab relation was highly antagonistic in Unguja, it was less so in Pemba. (Arabisation process more so in pemba than Unguja)
Arab traders and explorers also interacted with the local population creating a mix of Afro-Arab people who could either identify themselves as Africans, Arabs or Shirazi
Mainland Africans included the Africans of recent arrival from the Mainland who included slaves, freed slaves, their descendants and migrant laborers whose number increased especially after the abolition of legal status of slavery in Zanzibar in 1897.
***In terms of political struggle; Mainland Africans & the Hadimu Shirazi in Unguja against Arab hegemony
The Shirazi (esp. Pemba Shirazi) (more Arabs than african): Mainlanders as enemies & foreigners, accusing them of taking their jobs and promoting Christianity in a predominately Muslim state.
The Arabs sought to maintain their political and economic hegemony. But for Mainland africans and a section of the Shirazi (hadimu) –struggled to get rid of both the Arab and British rule. British policies accentuated ethno-racial animosity through communal-based representation in the colonial advisory body, favouring Arabs in recruitment in govt. bureaucracy, education, food rationing, agricultural/land policies, elections, thereby promoting an Arab state. All groups waged a struggle against British rule

10. Colonial Economy and the Shaping of Political Identities
British
Arabs
Indians
Africans
As part of the Omani empire, Zanzibar was under the control of the Omani sultanate. In 1832 Sultan Seyyid Said of Oman decided to shift his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar until 1856 when Zanzibar became a separate entity from the Oman Empire, turning Zanzibar into an independent Arab state and remained so for about six decades.[2] The period of Omani rule witnessed a flourishing slave trade turning Zanzibar into a slave society. Hand in hand with lucrative slave trade, the establishment of clove plantation economy in Zanzibar led to the increased use of slave labor. It was estimated that about two-thirds of the Islands’ total population of 300,000 by the end of the 1850s were slaves brought in mainly from the African hinterland[3] Given the commercial and strategic position of Zanzibar as well as the need to effectively put an end to slave trade, the British colonialists took control of Zanzibar as a Protectorate in 1890.
As the colonial economy prospered in ivory, slaves, cloves and other commodities, and so did changes in the Zanzibar society which structured into a three-tiered pyramid. The Africans, who formed the class of agricultural and manual laborers, occupied the lowest tier. In the middle was a small Asian community engaged in commerce and in administration especially in tax and revenue collection. The Arabs occupied top positions, maintained control over plantation economy and ruled the country under the tutelage of the British colonial masters.

11. Shaping of Political Identities (cont’d)
Politics deeply divided along ethno-racial lines
African Association, Shirazi Association, Arab Association, Indian Association
Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP): Arab-led
Formed in 1955
Support base: Arabs, Pemba & Tumbatu Shirazi
Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP):
Formed 1957
Support base: Mainland Africans & Unguja Shirazi (Hadimu)
Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP):
Formed in 1959
Support base: Pemba Shirazi
Based on the appeal of common Islam religion and the advocacy for multi-racialism, the ZNP was able to draw a significant level of support from the African Shirazi.
In 1957 the fragile union between the Shirazi Association and African Association led to the formation of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP).
These two largest parties (i.e. the ZNP and ASP) represented the main racial and ethnic adversaries-the Africans and the Arabs and those close to them on the social ladder.
Whereas the ASP attracted Africans of Mainland origin and the Unguja Shirazi (the Hadimu), the ZNP drew its membership largely from Arabs, the Pemba Shirazi and the Tumbatu. In 1959, a segment of the Pemba Shirazi broke away and formed their own political party, the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP) and therefore reducing the ASP support in Pemba. In electoral politics, ZPPP maintained a close relationship more with ZNP than the ASP.
Campaign issues ( ): ASP: Adoption of an African state, Unity of all Africans, Africans who joined ZNP as “ignorant, traitors”,Land belong to Africans, Arabs as foreigners/aliens, Re-distribution of fertile land to Africans, ‘Zanzibarisation’ of civil service i.e. recruiting more Africans, Link with the Mainland and Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), Mainland nationalist party, Delayed independence until Africans are ready (fear of domination by Arab rule)
ZNP: Building Islamic multi-racial society (‘multi-racialism’), Restricted citizenship for Mainland immigrant labourers, Mainlanders were not citizens, Shirazi-indigeneous natives, Defender of Shirazi economic rights against cheap immigrant labor, Safeguarding the monarchy e.g. Bicameral legislature: lower house (elected members), upper house (appointed by the Sultan), Disapprove of any link with Mainland, Independence now (Fear of domination of Mainland domination)

12. State Succession & State Identity in Zanzibar
ZNP/ZPPP government
Dec 10, 1963–Jan 12, 1964 (33 days)
Shirazi chieftainships until 16th century
Arab Rule (219 years)
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar
Jan 12, 1964–April 26, 1964 (3 ½ months)
British Rule (73 years)
The process of state formation is a product of a chain of events that began with the immigration of the early inhabitants to the islands followed by almost centuries of Arab and British colonialism, the independence in 1963, its coming to power, the new government began its exclusive and repressive policies. Signs were evident that the ZNP/ZPPP government was equipping itself towards becoming an exclusive state by enacting policies that favoured the ruling elite and its supporters and excluded ASP and its supporters. It became apparent that inclusion in the government was equated with inclusion in the community and vice versa, the tendency very common in divided societies.[1] Laws were enacted that restricted activities of political parties, the press and civil society organizations. The Umma party became among the first victims of these draconian laws as it was banned in January 6, 1964 and its assets confiscated by the government. Treason charges were being prepared against some of the leaders of the opposition.[2] ‘Arabisation’ of government posts was taking place at a faster rate by removing the Europeans and Mainland Africans from the police force and other posts and replaced them with Arabs, Asians and Shirazi.[3], and Discriminative land policies
The fear of the continuation of the Arab state was aggravated by these exclusive measures. Having secured the popular vote, ASP supporters did not understand their failure to form the government, and they regarded the ZNP/ZPPP government as being led by the alien minority and hence illegitimate. Thus, to the African majority, the 1963 independence was an Arab independence.
All this led to the outbreak of a revolution on January 12, 1964, which overthrew the Arab oligarchy and installed an African led government.[1] It is estimated that more than 5,000 Arabs were killed, many more were detained and their property confiscated or destroyed.[2] The Revolutionary government confiscated a total of 611 homes and 60 percent of confiscations occurred in Stone town, a residential area for Arabs and Asians.[3] The ZNP/ZPPP government ruled for about one month only. Through the revolution the control of the state shifted to the African majority. The revolution put an end to competitive politics and suppressed all other parties with significant following and electoral support.[4] The Arab and Shirazi (especially the Pemba Shirazi) identities came under severe attack.
The 1964 revolution marked a significant turning point for the character of the Zanzibar state. The identity of the state became to be categorically defined as African. Yet, its regime remained fragile due to fear of counter-revolutionary attack by the Sultan and his supporters. The United States was also getting increasingly uneasy with the potential rising of ‘another Cuba’ off the East African coast and plans were afoot for intervention to neutralize the radical faction of the Revolutionary government.[1] Competing factions within the ASP itself between the left wing and the reactionary revolutionary die-hards created instability. All this created an environment for the Union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika in April 26th 1964.
Beginning 1964, with neither competitive elections nor constitution, Zanzibar was ruled by decrees under the ASP making it almost impossible for any social group to challenge the regime.[2] Any dissent was severely suppressed. First Zanzibar constit. Enacted in 1979, elections in 1980
The Union was forged between J.K Nyerere and Abeid Karume as an immediate step to neutralize the radical faction of the ASP as well as to ensure security of the new Revolutionary government. Only three months after the Revolution, Zanzibar became united with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania. The full-fledged African state of the People’s Republic of Zanzibar was short-lived. It enjoyed sovereign power for only three months before surrendering part of it, becoming a micro-state under the Union government. Being in power for hardly 100 days, Zanzibar merger with the larger partner state created another part of the problem on the status of the state. In this period struggle shifted Zanzibar vs. Mainland.
The process of forming the Zanzibar’s state is still unfolding. Ongoing debate now on the status of Zanzibar in the proposed east african federation
E. African Federation?
As the state has changed hands, so too has the identity of the state changed.

13. III: Democratization and & Political Identities
Third wave of democratization brings to the fore suppressed competing diversities
Resurgence of identity politics: Recurrent feature of new democracies in Latin America, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and former USSR
Group/ethnic identities: determining criterion for inclusion or exclusion in the polity in deeply divided societies.
‘Who belongs here?’ has become a buzz word in democratic competition in what Horowitz calls ‘severely divided societies’ (Horowitz, 1985)
The question of ‘who should own the state’ has been posed many times and for a long time in the history of political struggle in Zanzibar. As Horowitz argues, “control of the state and exemption from the control by others are among the main goals of ethnic conflict” (Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 1985:5)
The increasing ethnic tension and political polarization in Zanzibar should therefore be understood in the context of the struggle to re-define and gain control of the state.
In this study, it is the inclusive conception of ethnicity that is preferred in which “ethnicity embraces differences identified by color, language, religion or some other attributes of common origin” (Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 1985:41)

14. Democratization & Political Identities
As opposed to cultural and market-based identities, political identities are those that are legally enforced and institutionally reproduced in the process of state formation (Mahmood Mamdani, 2001)
Plural identities emerge from situations of stress, in which identity is threatened, and when consequences of domination by another group are perceived to be enormous (Horowitz,1985,1999; Rothchild,1997)
Political identities: instrumental rather than primordial due to their dynamics, situational and pragmatic nature.
Inspite of its politicisation(after thousands years of intermarriages), it is difficult to clearly distinguish for instance, between Arabs and black Africans in Zanzibar. This is more so when people identify themselves as Arab when they completely look different. All this has made racial identity in Zanzibar to be a rather unreliable indicator of differentiation. some people can prefer one identity over another depending on the situation. It is no wonder that this has led to flexibility or fluidity in individual identification among many people in Zanzibar.
This comes out as no surprise given the fact that ethnic animosity has been evident in societies without color differences, for instance between the Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi.[1] What is critical in this case as Anthony Smith (1992) argues, is the claim for common ancestry, shared memories, symbols and heighetened sense of collective distinctiveness and mission.[2]
For Zanzibar, politicization of racial identity becomes salient largely because it is not just groups whose identities are perceived to be threatened but also the state identity and the state sovereignty are also perceived to be at stake. [2] Anthony Smith (1992) “Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 15, 3 p.435, 440
(Mahmood Mamdani (2001) When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, p. 15

15. ‘Election-centric conception’ of ‘consolidation’ phase as Harbeson (1999) calls it, is problematic
Even after three consecutive elections, democracy cannot be regarded as having been consolidated in Zanzibar.
Democratic consolidation should go beyond the ‘democratic process,’ which focuses largely on the holding of multi-party competitive elections and focuses on what Dankwart Rustow (1970) calls “habituation”
Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) refers to “a close fit between formal rules and behaviour.”
Challenges of consolidating democracy in Tanzania in general and Zanzibar in particular.
“Habituation” a state in which “the norms, procedures, and expectations of democracy become so internalized that actors routinely, instinctively conform to the written (and unwritten) ruules of the game, even when they conflict and compete tensely” (Dankwart Rustow (1970) “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic model “Comparative Politics 2, no. 3, As Larry Diamond et al, are emphasizing that , “when departures from democratic framework are not just one feature of the system but a recurring and defining feature, they signal a lack of commitment to the basic procedural framework of democracy”. [1]
Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yun-Han Chu and Hung-Mao Tien (eds) (1997) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges, John Hopkins University Press, p. xxi

16. IV: Multi-Party Democracy & Resurgence of Identity Politics (1992–present)
Old political divisions and memories come to the fore.
Two major political parties emerge—CUF and CCM
CCM (or Chama cha Mapinduzi)
is a merger of ASP and Mainland party Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)
fully represents the interests of the old ASP
Electoral support: the same as in pre-independence elections
CCM stronghold: Unguja and Africans
Civic United Front (CUF)
appears to replicate the previous ZNP-ZPPP alliance
CUF stronghold: Pemba and among non-Africans
In the urge to win elections, memories, symbols and beliefs of the past are being politicized to an alarming degree.
Based on their platforms and electoral patterns, CCM and CUF are largely extension of the old division between ASP on one side and ZNP/ZPPP on the other. Four decades after the 1963 elections, both parties still command electoral support in their traditional constituencies.
The major opposition party, CUF, seems to be a replicate of the previous ZNP/ZPPP alliance while the ruling party, CCM, fully represents the old ASP interests.
Four decades after the 1963 elections, both parties still command electoral support in their traditional constituencies. CUF tends to draw a majority of its support from Pemba and among non-Africans, and CCM draws a majority of its support from Unguja and among Africans.
In the 1995 elections, whereas CCM won all of its 26 parliamentary seats in Unguja, CUF won all seats in Pemba, and three seats in Unguja Stone Town and the enclave of Tumbatu.[1] In the 2005 parliamentary elections, CUF won all the seats in Pemba and one seat in Unguja stone town (partly due to constituencies re-demarcation, increased in Unguja from 29-32, and reduced in Pemba from 21 to 18.)

17. CCM versus CUF
Votes earned by CCM and CUF presidential candidates in Unguja and Pemba
(1995–2005)
Geographical distribution of electoral support for the presidential candidates shows the same patterns of CUF and CCM electoral support. In the 2005 election for instance, about 91 percent of CCM presidential votes came from Unguja and only 9 percent were obtained from Pemba. In contrast, 42 percent of CUF presidential votes were obtained from Unguja and 58 percent from Pemba. Compared to the 1995 election results, CUF seems to be expanding its support base in Unguja while that of CCM seems to be shrinking in Pemba. Thus, it is getting increasingly difficult for CCM to break the rigidity of Pemba’s electorate while it is becoming easier for CUF to convince the Unguja electorate. It is nevertheless more likely that the CUF voters in Unguja are from the people from Pemba, who are migrating to Unguja seeking opportunities in business and education. The expansion of CUF support base in Unguja has taken place more dramatically in Urban West region than in other regions.

18. Politicization of Racial Identities
The return of multiparty politics has revived unresolved questions concerning control of the state in Zanzibar, its identity, and its sovereignty.
Politicized racial identities during campaigns: ‘Africans’ vs. ‘Arabs’
For the regime in power, democratization can as well lead to losing control of the state, its African identity, and the possibility of being ruled by what they find as being the remnants of the Sultanate oligarchy.
The state sovereignty is also at stake given the fact that the policy of the major opposition party is to revisit the Union question (form and content).
The revival of multi-party politics in 1992 brought in its wake not only potential for democratization, but also revival of the unresolved questions of the control of the state and its identity and status. During elections, campaigns assume vivid racial tones of Africans vs. Arabs.

19. Politicization of Racial Identities CUF Campaign Speeches
Elections would lead to “the end of a blackman’s rule.”—CUF leader, campaign rally at Kibandamaiti, 21 October, 1995
“The African-led Revolutionary government has been far more brutal than the Arab aristocracy…and that people’s living standards were better off before the Revolution than it is today.”—CUF presidential candidate, campaign rally at Makunduchi, September 17, 2005
During the 1995 campaigns for instance, predicting the victory, one CUF leader said elections would lead to “the end of a blackman’s rule”.[1] CUF Presidential candidate is quoted in April, 1995 as saying that the Africans-led Revolutionary government has been far more brutal than the Arab aristocracy,……. and that people’s living standards were better off before the Revolution than it is today” [2].
To CCM leaders and supporters, these statements are interpreted to mean that CUF intends to re-install the so called ‘Arab regime’ if it capture power.

20. CUF Campaign Issues (cont’d)
Question legitimacy of the 1964 Revolution
Cherish Zanzibar’s 1963 independence
Pay reparations or return confiscated property to pre-revolution owners
Convict those engaged in arbitrary killings and torture during and after the revolution
Advocate for a federal system, 3-government structure
Suspend and review additional Union matters
Promote “equal rights for all,’ including equality in development

21. Politicization of Racial Identities CCM Campaign Issues
“The Zanzibar population is predominantly black; the colour of indigeneous Africans…There is a need to ensure that the great 1964 Revolution remains for ever and that Zanzibar remains African. That is the only way Africans as the majority Zanzibaris can determine their own fate and the destiny of Zanzibar”
“CUF is a party representing Arab interests and voting for it would lead to the restoration of the Sultanate, and the subsequent break-up of the Union.”
CUF is portrayed to be a Muslim party “with an intent of establishing an Islamic state.”
—Omar Mapuri (former CCM deputy chief minister, minister of education in Zanzibar, and former Union minister), Zanzibar Revolution: Achievements and Prospects, 1997
Atrocities of slavery are usually recounted in many of CCM campaign meetings. The common message being, “if you bring CUF to power you will once again turn yourself into a slave”. Omari Mapuri, the former Deputy Chief Minister and Minister of Education in Zanzibar and Union minister, who believes that CUF leaders in Zanzibar are only de jure leaders and that Zanzibari Arabs in the Gulf are the CUF de facto leaders, makes a strong case for the African identity of the Zanzibar state by arguing that……….

22. CCM Campaign Issues
Praise & protect the 1964 Revolution ‘Revolution forever’
Support the Union and two-government structure (formal CCM policy)
Bring about development
Maintain peace and unity
(Overall, conclude this section) At the climax of politicized racial politics during campaigns, CCM regards all those who support CUF and those who hail from Pemba as one and are all generically labeled ‘Arabs’ (Waarabu). For CUF on their part, the Africans and those who support CCM are largely portrayed as ‘Mainlanders’ (‘Wabara’). It is this politicization of the memory of past racial relations that constitutes the main part of the formal and an informal dialogue during campaigns, thereby promoting racial animosity between and among social groups. As a result of all this, competition over the control of the state has turned out to be so intense and at times violent.
The contested character of the Zanzibar state makes it very appealing for politicians to resort to the politicization of the racial identity in order to claim legitimacy to rule and subsequent preservation or reconstruction of the identity and sovereignty of the state.
This struggle tends to have adverse effect on the democratic consolidation in Tanzania in general and Zanzibar in particular.

23. Consequences of the Politicization of Racial Identities
Political conflicts, political stand-offs, violence, lack of social and civic peace.
Three rounds of elections (in 1995, 2000, and 2005) do not deepen democracy, but rather, derail it.
1995 and 2000 elections deemed not free and fair, due to voter intimidation, voter fraud, rigging and partisanship of the electoral body.
2005 elections: anomalies in vote counting
Since Tanzania’s return to multi-party democracy in 1992, Zanzibar politics has been marred by Political conflicts that have culminated into political stand-offs, violence, and generalized lack of social and civic peace.
Three rounds of competitive elections held in 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections did not result into enhancing democracy but rather in derailing it.
Donors’ suspension of aid to the Zanzibar government was a reaction to these massive electoral irregularities and human rights abuses
Both elections were followed by the major opposition party’s outright rejection of election results and refusal to recognize the victory of their opponents. They also declined to take up their seats in the Zanzibar legislature.
Even the seemingly peaceful electoral environment in the 2005 election was marred by significant anomalies in vote counting which led to a contested interpretation of the electoral results between major political parties and among electoral observers. The major opposition party refused to recognize the winner of the Presidency and the government. However, they decided to take up their seats in the legislature. Till today, the opposition persists in its demand for a re-run of presidential election to be supervised not by the country’s electoral Commissions but by the United Nations.

24. Consequences of the Politicization of Racial Identities
Sporadic violence during election season (2000). Mass demonstrations lead to death of at least 30 people
Freedom of speech constrained by the government
Two Reconciliation Accords between CCM and CUF (1999 & 2001) breached
‘Ethnicization of state apparatus’
Some of these troubled elections have been accompanied by sporadic violence. Mass demonstration protesting against the 2000 election results turned violent leading to the killing of at least 30 people including two state security officers. Fearing for their lives, about 2000 people fled the country to Kenya as refugees[1]. In a fierce struggle for inclusion and exclusion in the Permanent Voter Register prior the 2005 elections, three people were killed, one of them a member of the para-military unit. Incidences of setting fire to or bombing government buildings, ruling party offices and churches have been observed in various parts of Zanzibar. Freedom of speech has at times been constrained by the government’s move to ban some of the newspapers and individual journalists allegedly due to their ‘threats to national unity’.[2] Two Reconciliation Accords of 1999 and 2001 have been breached and are no longer regarded as the guiding framework for conflict resolution and management in Zanzibar. Overall, since the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in Tanzania, political confrontation between opposing members and supporters of two major political parties in Zanzibar have threatened the functioning of the newly established institutions of democracy.

25. V: Implications of Competing Political Identities on Democratic Consolidation
I: Elections become an instrument to maintain state power
Voters are excluded based on their appearance, area of origin, party affiliation (‘Wapemba’ versus ‘Wabara’)
Security forces as voters—‘voter importation’
Repetitive competitive elections of 1995, 2000 and 2005 have not been able to withstand the power of politics of identity expressed in various stages of election process. Exclusion of voters based on ‘Wapemba’ vs ‘Wabara’ labels has been a recurrent feature of the registration and voting processes in both islands of Unguja and Pemba. In the 2005 elections for instance, cases of exclusions of ‘Wapemba’ were reported in Unguja North region and cases of exclusion of ‘Wabara’ were observed in North Pemba at registration centers[1] [1] TEMCO Newsletter vol. 2, Issue no. 4, March 2005, p.3
Both pol. Parties did engage in mobilizing and demobilizing potential voters based on their origin and/or race not to show up for registration, e.g Makaani case in North Pemba (against mainlanders) and Unguja north against Pembans
CUF’s resentment against the ‘Mainlanders’ partly stems from their belief that the Union government contributes to the manipulation of the election process by sending the military personnel during voter registration and voting (show table next slide)
In all these centers the registration of voters exceeded the estimated number of voters by a larger margin
Thus, in the context of a stiff competition for the control of the state, the gap between the established formal rules and what really takes place persists in repeated rounds of elections, making elections less useful in consolidating democracy.

26. Registration of Security Forces
Turnout in Registration Centers in Central District with Military Camps Nearby
Registration center
Military Camp
Estimated Voters
Registered voters
% of registered voters
Ubago School
Ubago TPDF
441
1402
317.91
Machui School
Machui JKU & FFU
696
1060
152.3
Posta Kaepwani
Unguja Ukuu Navy (KMKM)
1268
2076
163.72
Tunguu School
Tunguu Fire Brigades
520
556
106.92
Marumbi School
Marumbi KMKM
561
876
156.15
Dungabweni School
Dunga JKU & TPDF
1520
2106
138.55
Jendele School
Jendele JKU
907
1366
152.81
Cheju School
Cheju Prison
971
1163
119.77
Bambi Sec. School
Bambi JKU
1336
2125
159.06
Source: TEMCO (2006) The 2005 Presidential and General Elections in Zanzibar, p. 216

27. Implications of Competing Political Identities (cont’d)
II: CUF’s status as the leading opposition party in Tanzania is at risk
Unlike other opposition parties in Tanzania, CUF has a strong social base in Zanzibar, owing to a perceived common history and a collective sense of exclusion
However, politicization of CUF as a “Pemba” party, “Islamic” party, and “Arab” party, makes it difficult for CUF to expand its social base to the mainland.
All other opposition parties are in decline in terms of electoral support.
Since 1995, CUF has been the leading opposition party with the highest number of seats in the Union parliament despite the fact that a majority of its seats are derived from Zanzibar. In the 2005 elections, CCM was leading with 275 seats, followed by CUF with 30 seats (this number includes special seats for women allocated to parties in accordance to the % of total parliamentary votes) (show table next slide, and come back)

28. CUF versus Other Parties: Union Parliamentary Seats

29. Parliamentary Elections in Tanzania (1995–2005)
CCM versus Opposition
Parliamentary Elections in Tanzania (1995–2005)
Tanzania as whole is a dominant one-party system. However, certain areas, led by Zanzibar, exhibit a vibrancy of a two-party system. In Union elections, CCM secured an overwhelming victory in all three competitive general elections of 1995, 2000 and Percentage of seats for CCM increased from about 80 percent in 1995 to about 89 percent in 2005 of all constituency seats in the house. In contrast, the percentage of seats for opposition parties declined from about 20 percent to a mere 11 percent of total Union parliamentary seats. Opposition political parties including CUF are facing difficult times in establishing an electoral social base on the mainland.

30. Implications of Competing Political Identities (cont’d)
III: Ambivalent popular support for institutions of democracy
“Unquestionable embrace of democratic procedures” by a significant segment of the citizenry is a crucial element of consolidation (Diamond et al., 1997)
Unlike in mainland Tanzania, citizens’ support for multi-party democracy in Zanzibar is comparatively low.
Citizens’ support for democracy is considered to be an important ingredient for the consolidation of democracy in a country. That is when all relevant actors find democracy to be “the only game in town” in which various issues including conflicts are expected to be resolved within and not outside democratic framework.

31. Popular Support for Democracy in Mainland Tanzania vs
Popular Support for Democracy in Mainland Tanzania vs. Zanzibar (March 1999)
PARTY SYSTEM
TANZANIA
MAINLAND
ZANZIBAR
Multi-party system
51.5%
54.4%
40.9%
(299)
(247)
(52)
Single-party system
40.4%
37.4%
51.2%
(235)
(170)
(65)
No difference
8.1%
7.9%
(47)
(37)
(10)
TOTAL
100%
(581)
(454)
(127)
According to a 1999 survey, whereas about 54 percent of the respondents in the Mainland supported multi-party democracy, only 41 percent in Zanzibar shared the same view. In contrast, more than half the respondents (51%) in Zanzibar expressed their support for the old single-party political system. Indeed, a majority of these respondents happened to be members of the ruling party, CCM (72.2%). All respondents who reported that they belonged to the opposition party, CUF, expressed support for the multi-party system. Compared to the 1999 Afrobarometer’s average level of support for Africa (64.3%), Zanzibar’s rate of 41 percent was low, lagging behind other African countries.[1]

32. Popular Support for Democracy Mainland Tanzania vs. Zanzibar
Tanzanians’ Support for Party Systems
(March 2006)
PARTY SYSTEM
TANZANIA
MAINLAND
ZANZIBAR
Multi-party system
63.3%
65.5%
55.3%
(857)
(690)
(166)
Single-party system
27.9%
25.4%
34%
(369)
(267)
(102)
No difference
9.4%
9.1%
10.7%
(127)
(96)
(32)
TOTAL
100%
(1353)
(1053)
(300)
Another REDET survey (March 2006), over two-thirds of the respondents in Tanzania expressed their support towards the multi-party competitive system (63.3%). Compared to the average Africa level of support of 61 percent as established by the 2006 Afrobarometer study of 12 countries, Tanzania was above the average.[1] However, when the REDET 2006 survey data is disaggregated, there is a marked difference of the level of support between Zanzibar and Mainland. Whereas 65.5 percent of respondents in Tanzania Mainland supported the multi-party democracy, the support level in Zanzibar is low by 10 percent (55%). Indeed more respondents in the Zanzibar sample (34%) still preferred the one-party system than in the Mainland (25%).
(mention a case of Zanzibar CCM MP, Union parlimantary debate last week (June 21, 2007) asking for the re-adoption of the single-party regime
However, the increase of the level of support for multi-party democracy among the citizens of Zanzibar from 41 percent in 1999 to 55 percent in 2006 is a very important signal for democratic consolidation at least on the citizenry’s side.[

33. Implications of Competing Political Identities (cont’d)
Racial Tolerance Among Zanzibaris (1999 Survey)
Questions
Would Agree
Somewhat Agree
Would Disagree
Depends on his/her decision
TOTAL
Son marry from different racial group
59.8
(76)
2.4
(3)
21.3
(27)
16.5
(21)
100
(127)
Daughter marry from different racial group
56.7
(72)
4.7
(6)
22.8
(29)
15.8
(20)
Son marry from different political party
51.2
(65)
27.6
(35)
16.6
Daughter marry from different political party
59.1
(75)
25.2
(32) 11
(14)
Son marry from another religion
11.8
(15)
68.5
(87) 15
(19)
If your MP is of different race/color
Don’t mind
Somewhat mind
Would mind
Don’t know
14.2
(18)
7.1
(9)
77.2
(98)
1.6
(2)
If your MP is of different religion
17.3
8.7
71.7
(22)
(11)
(91)
Indeed, Zanzibaris public in general expresses a high level of racial tolerance even during the time when their level of support for multi-party political system was low. Based on the 1999 survey, a majority of respondents seem to be comfortable with intermarriages between racial groups. This is largely attributed to a long history of intermarriages among different ethno-racial groups in Zanzibar society. Indeed, a majority of the respondents reported that they would agree if the daughter/son got married to a person from a different political party. This likewise seems to reflect the political realities in Zanzibar where one family can consist of members belonging to different opposed parties. However, when it comes to religion, about 68.5 percent of the respondents expressed their reluctance to allow inter-religious marriages. Given the fact that about 99 percent of the Zanzibaris are muslims, this finding is actually not a surprise. What is surprising is the Zanzibaris’ orientation towards accepting a political leader from another racial group. An overwhelming majority of the respondents reported that they would mind if their Member of Parliament (MP) happens to come from a different racial group (77%), and if the MP is of a different religion (72%). Ironically, although they can tolerate social interactions through inter-racial marriages, many Zanzibaris seems to be less tolerant of the political leadership of the different race or religion.

34. Implications of Competing Political Identities (cont’d)
Respondents’ Support for Democratic Institutions & Processes
 QUESTIONS
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Disagree
Other
Total
All political parties be allowed to hold public meetings
58.3%
(74)
7.1
(9)
24.4
(31)
10.3
(13)
100
(127)
Government critics should not contest for national leadership
28.3
(36)
3.1
(4)
59.8
(76)
8.7
(11)
Private-owned media should be restricted
18.9
(24)
11.8
(15)
57.5
(73)
Only CCM should be allowed to rule
55.9
(71)
0.8
(1)
39.4
(50) 4
(6)
Moreover, whereas a majority of Zanzibaris seem to be supportive of a certain level of competition between political parties (58%) and free media (57.5%), a majority of them are less receptive of the idea of alternation of power from one party to another, which is crucial element of democratic competition. As table 6 shows, 56 percent of the respondents believed that only CCM should be allowed to rule. All this may pose a challenge to democratic consolidation.

35. Implications of Competing Political Identities (cont’d)
IV: Rigidity of Zanzibari Voters
As a result of politicized ethno-racial identities, it has been difficult for a third party or mainland-based parties to gain electoral support
Electoral campaigns are avenues largely for enhancing party loyalty among members, rather than recruiting new members, e.g. role of party youth wings is to guard the meetings against ‘intruders’ (non-members)
Community/group pressure to make people attend only those meetings that are organized by their parties
Politicization of racial identity is employed in an effort to solidify and consolidate one’s group identity as the permanent predictor of political support.
There has been an element of community/group pressure by making people attend only those meetings organized by their respective political parties. In this case, some people are being forced not to attend campaign rallies organized by other parties for fearing for being labeled traitors and probably face retaliation if they do so.

36. Implications of Competing Political Identities (cont’d)
V: The State of the Union
Increased assertiveness on the part of Zanzibar government for more political space and autonomy from the Union government.
As political competition gets tougher, the need for strong control over coercive instruments of the state becomes necessary.
In May 2004, the Revolutionary government of Zanzibar outlined 15 Union matters to be removed from the Union list, including oil and natural gas, international relations, intelligence, police, etc.
The struggle for state power in Zanzibar seems to have an effect on the state of the Union. As the Union government grappled with how to mediate political conflicts in Zanzibar and/ or control the political processes in Zanzibar, it at times gets on the way of the Revolutionary government’s moves to consolidate power.[1] This tends to put the government of Zanzibar on the defensive and hence adding fuel to its pursuit of autonomy, e.g Nyerere’s call for a coalition govt; CCM Zanzibar refused; President Kikwete’s statement on political rift in Zanzibar, CCM leaders in Zanzibar; no political rift etc.
The call for having a separate police force and intelligence may be seen as the Government’s attempt to enhance its coercive instruments of state power. Thus, amidst stiff political competition for state control, the Zanzibar ruling elite is waging a battle on two fronts; the Opposition and the Union government. The fate of the Union rests on the dynamics and outcome of this struggle.
Footnotes: Other matters to be removed include, higher learning, post services and telecommunication, external trade, taxation, industrial licensing, research, statistics, harbors, aviation. In addition, it proposed the introduction of a bicameral legislature, comprising of the upper chamber dealing with Union matters and the lower chamber handling other issues.

37. VI: Conclusions & Recommendations
Consensus, negotiations, accommodation, and compromise become difficult.
Rule of law and good governance become jeopardized
Recognizing variations and contrasts between these two partner states is critically important
Bring ethno-racial issues and their implications to the negotiation table
Building and nurturing incentive mechanisms of dialogue and reconciliations should be made a high priority.
Conclusion: As a result of competing and politicized identities, consensus, negotiations, accommodation and compromise becomes difficult. As the identity and the sovereignty of the state are being contested, chances for building democratic institutions and processes remain slim. Amidst intense struggle for the ownership of the state, rule of law and good governance become jeopardized and thereby limiting the prospects for democratic consolidation.
Recommendations: Efforts to build democracy (promote democracy) in Tanzania need to take into account the variations unique to each partner state. So far, the tendency has been towards generalizations without much success particularly for Zanzibar. Thus, rather than pushing for a similar set of package for both Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar, democracy promotion efforts should be designed in response to these varied dynamics and struggles in the two partner state. What works in the Mainland may not work in Zanzibar and vice versa. Unlike in the mainland, the challenge to Zanzibar is not just to hold free and fair elections, but also on how to design a political system that ensures a broad-based representation of all relevant groups of Zanzibar.
Inspite the prevalency of ethno-racial appeals, the issue of identities and their politicization is rarely discussed in the formal political discourse for reconciliation and negotiations. Yet, they remain the most determining denominators for the struggle of the state, state identity and sovereignty. There is a need to bring issues of ethno-racial considerations and their implications to the negotiation table.
Building and nurturing mechanisms of dialogue and reconciliations should be accorded a high priority if democracy is to be consolidated in Zanzibar. There is a need to expand representation in negotiation organs and include not only political parties but also civil society organizations, community-based organizations, religious groups and opinion leaders.

38. Sunrise in Zanzibar