1. The Institute for Military Support to Governance
COL Warmack
Information v5

2. BACKGROUND

3. Historic Roots
WWII - Civil Affairs and Military Government was a single organizational structure designed to conduct occupation duty in Europe and Asia.
The
The School of Military Government (SOMG) was established in Charlottesville, Virginia in 1942.
The SOMG lacked capacity throughput to meet demand, therefore establishing the Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) at premier academic institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, University of Michigan, etc.
World War II #’s –
Align civilian expertise with Unified Action Partners operational lines
Depletion of historical inventory of experts due to retirements and operational tempo
An inability to procure veritable talent and deliver the right skill, at the right place, at the right time
An inability to adjudicate a practitioners capability to plan and execute at the local, provincial, or national / regional level
The SOMG and CATS generated approximately 6,000 Military Government officers.
The SOMG and Military Government capability eroded due to lack of demand in Cold War conflicts like Korea and Vietnam.

4. Functional Specialist Program
The concept of Functional Specialists derives from our history in World War II – Civil Affairs and Military Government, to conduct occupation duty in post-war Europe and Asia
Relied upon the inherent civilian skills brought into uniform
The current model is flawed due to –
Alignment with Unified Action Partners operational lines
Depletion of historical inventory of experts due to retirements and operational tempo
An inability to procure veritable talent and deliver the right skill, at the right place, at the right time
An inability to adjudicate a practitioners capability to plan and execute at the local, provincial, or national / regional level
World War II #’s -
Veritas et Libertas

5. Why Military Governance? The Blueprint
National Defense Strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense – Deter and Defeat Aggression (A Primary Mission of U.S. Armed Forces) “includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.”
DoDD Functions of the DoD and Its Major Components – Directs the Army to “occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government, pending transfer of responsibility to other authority.”
DoDD Stability Operations – Directs DoD components to Conduct, Support, or Lead Stability Operations.
JP 3-07 Stability Operations – Defines Transitional Military Authority as “a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority.”
JROCM # CA DOTMLPF Recommendation – Doctrine, Organizational, and Personnel changes to CA formations in general and CA Functional Specialty capabilities in governance, economic stability, public health and welfare, rule of law, infrastructure, public education, and public information.
Deter and Defeat Aggression ( A Primary Mission of U.S. Armed Forces) “includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.”
DODD Functions of the DOD and Its Major Components
Directs the Army to Occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.
Conduct CAO.
DODI Stability Operations, directs DOD components and agencies to:
Conduct stability operations.
Support stability operations.
Lead stability operations.
Joint Doctrine
Joint Publication 3-07 defines Transitional Military Authority, "A temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority."
Joint Publication 1-02 defines Military Government as "see Civil Affairs.“
Army Doctrine
FM Law of Land Warfare, July States the legal authority for military government or transitional military authority as the Hague Convention Number IV in 1907.
FM and ADRP 3-07 Stability Operations discusses the execution of Transitional Military Authority.
FM Law of Land Warfare – The legal authority for military government or transitional military authority is the Hague Convention, Number IV in 1907.
ADRP 3-07 Stability Operations – Army doctrine in conducting transitional military authority.

6. IMSG generates the civil sector expertise for:
PREVENT
“…build the capacity of partners to secure populations, protect infrastructure, and strengthen institutions as a means of protecting common security interests, preventing conflict…”
“…address shared interests and enhance partners’ security, governance, economic, development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical functions as part of unified action.”
SHAPE
“…engagement with partners to co-develop mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities to address shared global interests.”
WIN
“civil military operations in a multinational environment with partners and among diverse populations to support allies and partners, protect and reassure populations, and isolate and defeat enemies within the operational environment in support of unified action.”
(Army Capstone Concept, 19 DEC 2012)

7. Gaps Derived from JROCM 162-11
The Army requires the capability to procure, educate, and incorporate the necessary civil sector expertise to integrate and support Unified Action planning and execution.
The Army requires a mechanism to capture lessons learned, cross-pollinate best practices with Unified Action Partners, and develop concepts that foster efficient integration and transition.
The Army requires the capability to manage a network of relationships in order to leverage the private sector.
We partner with PKSOI to support their efforts towards improving military, civilian agency, international, and multinational capabilities and execution.

8. Developing a way ahead for IMSG
Received Hon. Thomas Lamont (Assistant Secretary of the Army JUN 2011
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Memorandum
Reviewed Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Civil Affairs DEC 2011
DOTMLPF Change Recommendation Memorandum
Met GEN Rodriguez (CDR, FORSCOM), LTG Cleveland OCT 2012
(CDR, USASOC), LTG Talley (CDR, USARC / Chief, USAR)
Presented US Institute of Peace FEB 2013
Collaborated US Army War College, West Point Center for FEB 2013
Civil-Military Operations, DoS Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations
Briefed LTG Cleveland (CDR, USASOC) MAR /APR 2013
Briefed USARC / OCAR Senior Leaders MAR 2013
Submitted 38G Military Occupational Classification & Structure Packet JUN 2013
Briefed LTG Talley (CDR, USARC / Chief, USAR) JUL 2013

9. PHASE I

10. IMSG Mission – Phase I
Mission – The Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG) establishes a corporate body to research, analyze, and shape the policies, authorities, and doctrine required to leverage and employ civil sector expertise in contingencies.
Functions –
Shape policy and develop doctrine and training related to civil sector expertise.
Leverage the private sector
The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD, 2005 recommended three structural improvements necessary to institutionalize stability operations:
Establish an organization to effectively exploit our ‘fifth force provider’ – the private sector
Strengthen our ability to communicate DOD’s intentions and actions to the public in foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operations
Recruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that have the requisite skills and experience for Civil Affairs

11. IMSG Phase I Timeline MAR 14 FEB 14 JAN 14 DEC 13 NOV 13 OCT 13 SEP 13
PHASE I KEY TASKS –
1. “Get the shingle out”
2. Distribute white papers
3. Research, analyze and shape policies, authorities, and doctrine
IMSG Initial Team in place
Publish First White Paper
Develop MOU
JUN 13
JUL 13
Develop Draft Charter
AUG 13
BG Director identified and in-place
SEP 13
OCT 13
NOV 13
Develop IMSG TDA
DEC 13
Determine Charter Members
JAN 14
Facilities Established
FEB 14
Publish Charter
MAR 14
PHASE I OUTCOME –
38G Implementation
Doctrinal Production

12. IMSG Proposed Structure
Aide-De-Camp
TPU / AGR 38A CPT
Academic
Dean
Director
Institute for Military Support to Governance US
Asst Dean
GS-14
Operations & Integration Section
Deputy Director, AGR 38A COL
Essential and Humanitarian Services Dept
Civil Security Department
Rule of Law Department
Governance Department
Economy and Infrastructure Department
Homeland Integration Department
Private Sector Integrator 38 A MAJ
Operations Officer, AGR 38A MAJ
Director
USAR COL
Director
USAR COL
Director
USAR COL
Director
USAR COL
Director (Econ)
USAR COL
Director
USAR COL
Asst Operations, DA Civilian
Lead Coord
AGR 38A LTC / MAJ
Lead Coord AGR 38A LTC / MAJ
Lead Coord
AGR 38A LTC / MAJ
Lead Coord
AGR 38A LTC / MAJ
Director (Infra)
USAR COL
Lead Coord
AGR 38A LTC / MAJ
DEPARTMENTS –
-The Director is a TPU or IMA Army Reservist. Until the inventory of 38G is robust enough to provide a director from this field, we will have to use 38As. It is essential that they possess civilian education and experience in their respective departments.
-The Lead Coordinator in each department is the continuity for the TPU Director. Each Lead Coordinator is either AC or AGR to work on issues daily related to the discipline at the direction of the Director.
OPERATIONS SECTION –
-Since 38G will solely reside in the Army Reserve, this section needs to be heavy on AGRs to know the systems and processes to move TPU Soldiers.
Asst Operations, AGR 38A CPT
Partners –
-USAID
-Dept of Education
Partners –
-Military Police
-Maneuver COE
-National, state, and local law enforcement entities
Partners –
-DOS
-USAID
-JAG
-Court systems
Partners –
-DOS
-USAID
-State Government
-Local Government
Lead Coord
AGR 38A LTC / MAJ
Partners –
-DHS
-Private/Public Partnerships
Operations NCO, AGR E8
Partners –
-USAID
-USACE
-Department of Agriculture
-Chamber of Commerce
Public Affairs Officer, MAJ
USAR TPU / IMA
USAR AGR
DAC (USASOC) AC
AGR

13. PHASE II

14. Proposed IMSG Mission – Phase II
Mission – The Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG) is corporate body to research, analyze, and shape the policies, authorities, and doctrine; manages and leverages a network of relationships; conduct professional credentialing of Military Governance Officers; and support concept development for experimentation in order to provide civil sector expertise to the Joint Force Commander and achieve Unified Action.
Functions –
Shape policy and develop doctrine and training related to civil sector expertise
Leverage our ‘Fifth Force Provider’ – the private sector
Extend operational reach
Identify and coordinate with pertinent credentialing associations
Establish advanced educational opportunities at premier academic institutions
Perform talent management
The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD, 2005 recommended three structural improvements necessary to institutionalize stability operations:
Establish an organization to effectively exploit our ‘fifth force provider’ – the private sector
Strengthen our ability to communicate DOD’s intentions and actions to the public in foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operations
Recruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that have the requisite skills and experience for Civil Affairs

15. IMSG Proposed PH II Timeline
PHASE I KEY TASKS –
1. “Get the shingle out”
2. Distribute white papers
3. Research, analyze and shape policies, authorities, and doctrine
IMSG Initial Team in place
Brief Key Decision Makers
3Q FY 13
Facilities Established
MOCS Packet thru HQDA
BG Director identified and in-place
4Q FY 13
1Q FY 14
FDU
2Q FY 14
3Q FY 14
IMSG develops recruit and credential plans
CA Proponent
Implement DOTMLPF solutions for 38G
PHASE II KEY TASKS –
1. Establish credentialing for 38G
2. Develop Doctrine and Training
3. Inject 38G capabilities into concepts and experiments
4Q FY 14
USAFMSA
and
MACOMs
build MTOEs
1Q FY 15
2Q FY 15
3Q FY 15
Set conditions to recruit and train 38G
4Q FY 15
IMSG
38G

16. Distinct Roles and Functions
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
Institute for Military
Support to Governance
FOCUS –
Serve as the U.S. Army’s Center of Excellence for Stability and Peace Operations at the Strategic and Operational levels in order to improve military, civilian agency, international, and multinational capabilities and execution.
FOCUS –
Phase I –
A corporate body to research, analyze, and shape the policies, authorities, and doctrine required to leverage and employ civil sector expertise to support Army and Joint Force Commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
Phase II (Proposed) –
A corporate body to research, analyze, and shape the policies, authorities, and doctrine; manages and leverages a network of relationships; conducts professional credentialing of Military Governance Officers; and supports concept development for experimentation required to leverage and employ civil sector expertise to support Army and Joint Force Commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to achieve Unified Action.
Center for the Study of
Civil-Military Operations
FOCUS –
Developing West Point leaders to capitalize on their understanding of CMO within the framework of the broad challenges they will face in military service.
Facilitate transformational changes to Professional Military Education across DoD and interested USG activities.
West Point established as a wellspring of Professional Military Education in the realm of CMO.
Veritas et Libertas

17. IMSG and CMAG

18. IMSG is a component of CA Futures Planning
CA Org. Future Force Structure Concept
CA Re-
assignment Initiative
IMSG Concept
Civil-Military Advisory Group (CMAG)
CA Future
38G Concept
Vision, Brief, Implement
Future Core Compe-
tencies
Rewrite

19. Civil Military Advisory Group
Part of SOCOM’s effort to expand the Global SOF network and ARSOF 2022’s vision of “Operationalizing the CONUS base”
Established national-level forum for stakeholders for civil-military collaboration, integration and planning that can analyze, inform and develop strategies across the spectrum of conflict and emerging crisis.
Incremental build beginning with the establishment of a CMAG cell within the SOCOM CCF structure.
The CMAG cell would work to build and sustain relationships for collaboration, integration and planning capability to support activities at both the operational and tactical level.
In an ambiguous and complex environment the CMAG will systematize the relationships and mechanisms required to better integrate whole of government (Unified Action Partners) and other relevant partners’ efforts in support of USG objectives.
We see a national level body as an integral part of the Global SOF network.
Incremental build that begins with the establishment of a CMAG Cell Civil Military Support Element –National Capital Region (CMSE-NCR)
These relationships would enable standing partnerships (DoD, DoS, USAID, USIP, UN, academia and other relevant actors) to better address emerging crises with the intent to inform planning and leverage resources in support of the TSOCs.
CMAG is not a duplicative effort but complementary to meet operational requirements.

20. Unified Goals Common Goals
Institute for Military Support to Governance
Civil Military Advisory Group
Common Goals
Information Analysis and Fusion
Procure Talent
Coordinate with Stakeholders
Standing Expertise
Academic Research
Cross-Pollinate Best Practices
Educational Opportunities
The blue highlighted areas are the only areas common to both IMSG and CMAG
Establish Credentialing Gates
Operational Support
Experimentation
Concept Development
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21. Operational Framework
CONPLAN 7500
TSCP
GEF
PHASE
DOD GWOT Campaign Construct/ 7500
Indirect Approach
Shape and Stabilize
Enable Partners to Combat VEOs
Deter Tacit and Active support to VEOs
Erode Support for Extremist Ideologies
Increase Friendly Freedom of Action
Reduce Enemy Freedom of Action
MSP
COP
Non-Conflict Environment
Conflict Environment
F PROCESS
Preventative Engagement
USAID
Department of State (DOS)
USSOCOM
95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)
CMAG
Current
Gap
Relevant
Partners
GCC
TSOC
Theater
CMSE
SOF CA BN
CAPT
Function: Support TSOC planning efforts; Coordinate SOF CA ISO TSOC Objectives; Build Partnership activities; Provide Civil Component of TSOC OPE; Coordinate Crisis Response.
SOF CA Company
CMOC
TSOC
Forward
Function: Provide Civil Component of OPE; Fuse CMSE/CAT CIM data ISO Regional Targeting Priorities; Develop plans to engage threats to civil society by, with and through legitimate indigenous authorities IOT reduce, mitigate and eliminate civil vulnerabilities.
US Embassy
USEMB
Country Team
CMSE
SOF CA Team (CAT)
Function: Conduct Targeted CAO; Conduct CIM; Leverage Country Team programmatics, HN assets and NGO capabilities ISO TSOC Objectives.
Currently we have a persistent presence in over 25 countries and we’re enduring engagement at the tactical and operational levels.
But at the national / strategic level we continue to conduct episodic engagements in an ad-hoc manner. In an effort to build trust slowly and deliberately we see the CMAG as a necessary tool to collaborate across a community of action in support of the efforts of TSOCs.

22. IMSG Concept Potential Scenario: Crop Failure in Sudan
JTF HOA soldiers report wheat crop failures in rural South Sudan
Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Naval Postgraduate School
Northwestern Center for Public Safety
US Army PKSOI
USAID
National Defense University
Institute Of Peace
DOS
Hoover Institution
Stanford University
AFRICOM
UVU Institute of Emergency Services and Homeland Security
Notre Dame School of Business
UNC Institute for Global Health & Infectious Diseases
CMAG
IMSG
USC Keston Institute for Public Finance and Infrastructure Policy
USCAPOC
This represents a potential scenario involving the IMSG in its role as leveraging and employ civil sector expertise in contingencies. In this scenario, crop failures in rural Sudan are reported from JTF HOA to AFRICOM and are forwarded to the CMAG. The CMAG contacts IMSG for assistance. The IMSG contacts a civil sector partner with international access to expertise.
Borlaug Institute for International Agriculture
Texas A & M
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
JTF HOA
Stem rust is a fungus that damages wheat and other cereal crops. In recent years, a particularly virulent strain (Ug99) emerged in Uganda and is currently spreading to Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen. Ug99 is becoming more virulent as it spreads. This strain of stem rust fungus causes crop yield losses of 50 to 70 percent resulting in food insecurity, population vulnerability and, without intervention, famine. Ug99 is a threat to global agriculture and the global food supply.

23. 38G

24. IMSG supports 38G Concept Development
CA Org. Future Force Structure Concept
CA Re-
assignment Initiative
IMSG Concept
IMSG Required Capabilities
Civil-Military Advisory Group (CMAG)
CA Future
IMSG
Vision, Brief, Implement
Future Core Compe-
tencies
38G Concept
38G Required Capabilities
Rewrite

25. IMSG Phase II: 38G (No Growth)
187
240
132 21
Grade
38A
38G
Total O6 41 21 62 O5
159
187
346 O4
433
240
673 O3
974
132
1106
Total
1607
580
2187
38G
673
346
1106
Current 38A 62
433
159
974
38A 41
Structure slice only.
38A must prove credentials and civilian skills and be proponent (GO) boarded to reclass to 38G
A March 2013 review found only 97 personnel in the USAR with the 9 CA functional specialty identifiers only 41 in Civil affairs units. Of those, none were in 38A slots coded for their specialty.
38G positions derived from existing 38A functional specialty authorizations

26. 38G Professional Tiering

27. 38G Professional Tiering
Master
Recognized Expert in Field
Positions coded w/SI for professional expertise and specialty skill
Distinguishes professional abilities for effective employment
PhD
Terminal Professional Certifications
Master
12 Yrs Exp
Expert
Masters
8 Years Experience
Professional Certifications
Education
Experience / Certifications
*Masters
*4 Years Experience
Senior
Bachelors
*Professional Certifications
* Requires two
Bachelors
Basic
>4 Years Experience
Education
Experience / Certifications

28. IMSG Logic Map for Phase I
IMA (MOB)
Coordinate w/ USARC and SLDO
Transfer Positions to SWCS Reserve TDA
Determine Funding Source
Personnel Vetting
Orders Process
Initial Talent Recruitment
AGR
Coordinate w/ USARC G-3
Direct Military Overhire Auth
Transfer Positions to SWCS AGR TDA
Orders Process
GS Civilian
Position Description & Org Chart
ID Requirement & Authorization
Submit Civ Workforce Management Council Packet
Classification
Request for Personnel Action
Hiring Board
IMSG Concept
IMSG Provisional TDA
IMSG Required Capabilities
IMSG Tasks Identified
IMSG Troops to Task Analysis
Proposed IMSG TDA
SWCS, USASOC, TRADOC, DA approvals
IMSG in ARSTRUCT
IMSG POM Line
38G Concept
38G Required Capabilities
Publish Charter
Submit to Critical Requirement Review Committee
IMSG Location (Irwin Middle)
Refurb Work Order
SWCS submits to DPW($8K) (OCT13)
Design Plan
Contracting
Start Work
Project complete QA/QC
Reoccupy IMSG
Submit UFR
UFR Board or VOCO
MIPR DPW
Vision, Brief, Implement
Occupy Temporary Offices
DoD Schools vacate (JAN14)
Occupy IMSG As Is
Establish Funding Accounting Procedures
Gain Line of Accounting for Provisional TDA
Informs
Leads To
PHASE I KEY TASKS –
1. “Get the shingle out” Distribute white papers Research, analyze and shape policies, authorities, and doctrine

29. IMSG Required Capabilities
Doctrine Develop 38G / application of civil sector expertise doctrine Organization Input 38G / civil sector expertise to the Force Design Update Process Facilitate interaction between civil sector experts and Unified Action Partners Training Coordinate IET for accessing 38G, Inform development of 38G BOLC II Material Inform Force Development Update regarding Mil-Gov requirements Leadership & Education Identify and Inform education opportunities on the application of civil sector expertise within Unified Action. Personnel Manage personnel life cycle of 38G in conjunction with CA personnel proponent Facilities CAAF through 2018 Policy Identify suboptimal Mil-Gov and Military Support to Governance policies and initiate corrective action

30. Backup

31. IMSG Summary The Institute for Military Support to Governance –
Creates the capability to meet long standing US military governance obligations
Generates the civil sector expertise required to support future operations
IMSG Phase I (no growth) – Focuses on policies, authorities, and doctrine
IMSG Phase II – Generates 38G (converts existing 38A force structure)
Credentials civil sector experts
Develops 38G doctrine and training
Supports concept development and experimentation
Establishes advanced educational opportunities at premier academic institutions
Performs talent management of civil sector experts
Supports operational practitioners with situational research and analysis
The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD, 2005 recommended three structural improvements necessary to institutionalize stability operations:
Establish an organization to effectively exploit our ‘fifth force provider’ – the private sector
Strengthen our ability to communicate DOD’s intentions and actions to the public in foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operations
Recruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that have the requisite skills and experience for Civil Affairs

32. Military Governance Training Pipeline CONCEPT
Civilian Education and Experience Validated
38G
Reclassification Training
Regional Analysis
4 weeks DL
Branch Technical
38A
CAQC
Branch Transfer
Completed
4 weeks
Ft. Bragg, NC
Regional Analysis
4 weeks DL
RC CAQC(-)
3 weeks DL
Branch Technical
Non 38A
4 weeks
Ft. Bragg, NC
Ft. Bragg, NC
Ft. Bragg, NC
RC CAQC Minus CULEX (Sluss-Tiller)
Requires TRADOC Approval
Direct Appointment
BOLC – A
BOLC – B
DCC
5 weeks
BOLC Common
3 weeks
Regional Analysis
4 weeks DL
RC CAQC(-)
3 weeks DL
Branch Technical
Civilians
4 weeks
Ft. Benning, GA
Ft. Bragg, NC
Ft. Bragg, NC
Ft. Bragg, NC
Ft. Bragg, NC
Schools
Existing ARMY
Existing SWCS
Future SWCS

33. Resources PEOPLE FACILITIES FUNDING AUTOMATION
1 x BG Director, TPU / IMA
7 x 38A COL Dept Sr Advisors, TPU / IMA
1 x 38A COL Dep Director, (O6) AGR (En Route)
6 x 38A LTC Lead Coordinator, AGR *
1 x 38A CPT Asst Ops Officer, AGR
1 x 38B MSG Ops NCO, AGR
1 x 38A CPT Aide-De-Camp, AGR / TPU
BOLD = Currently Committed
1 x DAC Asst Dean, GS-14
1 x 38A LTC, Lead Coordinator, AGR (SWCS Auth – En Route)
1 x DAC, Asst Operations, GS-11
1 x MAJ Ops Officer, AGR (SWCS-En route ADOS)
1 x CPT Public Affairs, AC
Initial space in Bryant Hall
Irwin Middle School complex (Estimated FEB 14 - $100K FY 14)
FUNDING
AUTOMATION
RPA for TPU / IMA (29 Days AT / 24 Days IADT)
FY 13 - $15K TDY
FY 14 - $108K TDY
FY 14 - $12K O&M
Initial phone / IT support in Bryant Hall
Irwin Middle School complex ($52K FY 14)
*Six (6) Total Lead Coordinators AC or AGR

34. Developing IMSG Touch Points
Center for the Study of CMO – West Point
Institute Partners and the Expanded Network
US Army War College
PKSOI
Hoover Institution
Stanford
USAID
National Defense University
US Institute Of Peace
DOS
Harvard Kennedy School of Government
ASA M&RA
OSD Public-Private Collaboration
NATO CIMIC COE
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Naval Postgraduate School
USC Rule of Law Collaborative
UNC School of Government
Borlaug Institute
Texas A & M
CMAG
GCC
TSOC
IMSG
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
JTF
Charter IMSG Partners
Extended Partners

35. The Operational Context
Unified Action
Synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and non- governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort
Unified Land Operations
How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.
Lasting Stable
Peace
Support to GCCs and Ambassadors
To Achieve . . .
Offensive
Defensive
Stability
DSCA
By Means of the Army’s Core Competencies Provides the Operational Context
Combined Arms Maneuver
The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative.
Wide Area Security
The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.
The realm of Military Governance Operations
Defeat or Stability Mechanisms How Friendly Forces Accomplish the Mission
Destroy
Dislocate
Disintegrate
Isolate
Influence
Support
Compel
Control
Stability mechanism – Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 Operations
The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.
*Usually used in Wide Area Security. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone.
Influence involves altering the opinions and attitudes of the host-nation population through inform and influence activities, presence, and conduct.
Support involves establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively; coordinating and cooperating closely with hostnation civilian agencies; and assisting aid organizations as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations.
Compel involves maintaining the threat—or actual use—of lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other arrangements.
Control involves establishing public order and safety; securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; and physically occupying key terrain and facilities.
The combination of stability tasks conducted during operations depends on the situation. In some operations, the host nation can meet most or all of the population’s requirements. In those cases, Army forces work with and through host-nation authorities. Commanders use civil affairs operations to mitigate
how the military presence affects the populace and vice versa. Conversely, Army forces operating in a failed state may need to support the well-being of the local populace. That situation requires Army forces to work with civilian organizations to restore basic capabilities. Again, civil affairs operations prove essential in establishing trust between Army forces and civilian organizations required for effective, working relationships.
PREVENT SHAPE WIN
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Build Partner Capacity
Support to Civil Administration
Control Populations and Resources
Transitional Military Authority
Transition
Unclassified
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