3 Historic RootsWWII - Civil Affairs and Military Government was a single organizational structure designed to conduct occupation duty in Europe and Asia.TheThe School of Military Government (SOMG) was established in Charlottesville, Virginia in 1942.The SOMG lacked capacity throughput to meet demand, therefore establishing the Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) at premier academic institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, University of Michigan, etc.World War II #’s –Align civilian expertise with Unified Action Partners operational linesDepletion of historical inventory of experts due to retirements and operational tempoAn inability to procure veritable talent and deliver the right skill, at the right place, at the right timeAn inability to adjudicate a practitioners capability to plan and execute at the local, provincial, or national / regional levelThe SOMG and CATS generated approximately 6,000 Military Government officers.The SOMG and Military Government capability eroded due to lack of demand in Cold War conflicts like Korea and Vietnam.
4 Functional Specialist Program The concept of Functional Specialists derives from our history in World War II – Civil Affairs and Military Government, to conduct occupation duty in post-war Europe and AsiaRelied upon the inherent civilian skills brought into uniformThe current model is flawed due to –Alignment with Unified Action Partners operational linesDepletion of historical inventory of experts due to retirements and operational tempoAn inability to procure veritable talent and deliver the right skill, at the right place, at the right timeAn inability to adjudicate a practitioners capability to plan and execute at the local, provincial, or national / regional levelWorld War II #’s -Veritas et Libertas
5 Why Military Governance? The Blueprint National Defense Strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense – Deter and Defeat Aggression (A Primary Mission of U.S. Armed Forces) “includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.”DoDD Functions of the DoD and Its Major Components – Directs the Army to “occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government, pending transfer of responsibility to other authority.”DoDD Stability Operations – Directs DoD components to Conduct, Support, or Lead Stability Operations.JP 3-07 Stability Operations – Defines Transitional Military Authority as “a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority.”JROCM # CA DOTMLPF Recommendation – Doctrine, Organizational, and Personnel changes to CA formations in general and CA Functional Specialty capabilities in governance, economic stability, public health and welfare, rule of law, infrastructure, public education, and public information.Deter and Defeat Aggression ( A Primary Mission of U.S. Armed Forces) “includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.”DODD Functions of the DOD and Its Major ComponentsDirects the Army to Occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.Conduct CAO.DODI Stability Operations, directs DOD components and agencies to:Conduct stability operations.Support stability operations.Lead stability operations.Joint DoctrineJoint Publication 3-07 defines Transitional Military Authority, "A temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority."Joint Publication 1-02 defines Military Government as "see Civil Affairs.“Army DoctrineFM Law of Land Warfare, July States the legal authority for military government or transitional military authority as the Hague Convention Number IV in 1907.FM and ADRP 3-07 Stability Operations discusses the execution of Transitional Military Authority.FM Law of Land Warfare – The legal authority for military government or transitional military authority is the Hague Convention, Number IV in 1907.ADRP 3-07 Stability Operations – Army doctrine in conducting transitional military authority.
6 IMSG generates the civil sector expertise for: PREVENT“…build the capacity of partners to secure populations, protect infrastructure, and strengthen institutions as a means of protecting common security interests, preventing conflict…”“…address shared interests and enhance partners’ security, governance, economic, development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical functions as part of unified action.”SHAPE“…engagement with partners to co-develop mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities to address shared global interests.”WIN“civil military operations in a multinational environment with partners and among diverse populations to support allies and partners, protect and reassure populations, and isolate and defeat enemies within the operational environment in support of unified action.”(Army Capstone Concept, 19 DEC 2012)
7 Gaps Derived from JROCM 162-11 The Army requires the capability to procure, educate, and incorporate the necessary civil sector expertise to integrate and support Unified Action planning and execution.The Army requires a mechanism to capture lessons learned, cross-pollinate best practices with Unified Action Partners, and develop concepts that foster efficient integration and transition.The Army requires the capability to manage a network of relationships in order to leverage the private sector.We partner with PKSOI to support their efforts towards improving military, civilian agency, international, and multinational capabilities and execution.
8 Developing a way ahead for IMSG Received Hon. Thomas Lamont (Assistant Secretary of the Army JUN 2011for Manpower and Reserve Affairs) MemorandumReviewed Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Civil Affairs DEC 2011DOTMLPF Change Recommendation MemorandumMet GEN Rodriguez (CDR, FORSCOM), LTG Cleveland OCT 2012(CDR, USASOC), LTG Talley (CDR, USARC / Chief, USAR)Presented US Institute of Peace FEB 2013Collaborated US Army War College, West Point Center for FEB 2013Civil-Military Operations, DoS Bureau of Conflict andStabilization OperationsBriefed LTG Cleveland (CDR, USASOC) MAR /APR 2013Briefed USARC / OCAR Senior Leaders MAR 2013Submitted 38G Military Occupational Classification & Structure Packet JUN 2013Briefed LTG Talley (CDR, USARC / Chief, USAR) JUL 2013
10 IMSG Mission – Phase IMission – The Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG) establishes a corporate body to research, analyze, and shape the policies, authorities, and doctrine required to leverage and employ civil sector expertise in contingencies.Functions –Shape policy and develop doctrine and training related to civil sector expertise.Leverage the private sectorThe Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD, 2005 recommended three structural improvements necessary to institutionalize stability operations:Establish an organization to effectively exploit our ‘fifth force provider’ – the private sectorStrengthen our ability to communicate DOD’s intentions and actions to the public in foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operationsRecruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that have the requisite skills and experience for Civil Affairs
11 IMSG Phase I Timeline MAR 14 FEB 14 JAN 14 DEC 13 NOV 13 OCT 13 SEP 13 PHASE I KEY TASKS –1. “Get the shingle out”2. Distribute white papers3. Research, analyze and shape policies, authorities, and doctrineIMSG Initial Team in placePublish First White PaperDevelop MOUJUN 13JUL 13Develop Draft CharterAUG 13BG Director identified and in-placeSEP 13OCT 13NOV 13Develop IMSG TDADEC 13Determine Charter MembersJAN 14Facilities EstablishedFEB 14Publish CharterMAR 14PHASE I OUTCOME –38G ImplementationDoctrinal Production
12 IMSG Proposed Structure Aide-De-CampTPU / AGR 38A CPTAcademicDeanDirectorInstitute for Military Support to GovernanceUSAsst DeanGS-14Operations & Integration SectionDeputy Director, AGR 38A COLEssential and Humanitarian Services DeptCivil Security DepartmentRule of Law DepartmentGovernance DepartmentEconomy and Infrastructure DepartmentHomeland Integration DepartmentPrivate Sector Integrator 38 A MAJOperations Officer, AGR 38A MAJDirectorUSAR COLDirectorUSAR COLDirectorUSAR COLDirectorUSAR COLDirector (Econ)USAR COLDirectorUSAR COLAsst Operations, DA CivilianLead CoordAGR 38A LTC / MAJLead Coord AGR 38A LTC / MAJLead CoordAGR 38A LTC / MAJLead CoordAGR 38A LTC / MAJDirector (Infra)USAR COLLead CoordAGR 38A LTC / MAJDEPARTMENTS –-The Director is a TPU or IMA Army Reservist. Until the inventory of 38G is robust enough to provide a director from this field, we will have to use 38As. It is essential that they possess civilian education and experience in their respective departments.-The Lead Coordinator in each department is the continuity for the TPU Director. Each Lead Coordinator is either AC or AGR to work on issues daily related to the discipline at the direction of the Director.OPERATIONS SECTION –-Since 38G will solely reside in the Army Reserve, this section needs to be heavy on AGRs to know the systems and processes to move TPU Soldiers.Asst Operations, AGR 38A CPTPartners –-USAID-Dept of EducationPartners –-Military Police-Maneuver COE-National, state, and local law enforcement entitiesPartners –-DOS-USAID-JAG-Court systemsPartners –-DOS-USAID-State Government-Local GovernmentLead CoordAGR 38A LTC / MAJPartners –-DHS-Private/Public PartnershipsOperations NCO, AGR E8Partners –-USAID-USACE-Department of Agriculture-Chamber of CommercePublic Affairs Officer, MAJUSAR TPU / IMAUSAR AGRDAC (USASOC)ACAGR
14 Proposed IMSG Mission – Phase II Mission – The Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG) is corporate body to research, analyze, and shape the policies, authorities, and doctrine; manages and leverages a network of relationships; conduct professional credentialing of Military Governance Officers; and support concept development for experimentation in order to provide civil sector expertise to the Joint Force Commander and achieve Unified Action.Functions –Shape policy and develop doctrine and training related to civil sector expertiseLeverage our ‘Fifth Force Provider’ – the private sectorExtend operational reachIdentify and coordinate with pertinent credentialing associationsEstablish advanced educational opportunities at premier academic institutionsPerform talent managementThe Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD, 2005 recommended three structural improvements necessary to institutionalize stability operations:Establish an organization to effectively exploit our ‘fifth force provider’ – the private sectorStrengthen our ability to communicate DOD’s intentions and actions to the public in foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operationsRecruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that have the requisite skills and experience for Civil Affairs
15 IMSG Proposed PH II Timeline PHASE I KEY TASKS –1. “Get the shingle out”2. Distribute white papers3. Research, analyze and shape policies, authorities, and doctrineIMSG Initial Team in placeBrief Key Decision Makers3Q FY 13Facilities EstablishedMOCS Packet thru HQDABG Director identified and in-place4Q FY 131Q FY 14FDU2Q FY 143Q FY 14IMSG develops recruit and credential plansCA ProponentImplement DOTMLPF solutions for 38GPHASE II KEY TASKS –1. Establish credentialing for 38G2. Develop Doctrine and Training3. Inject 38G capabilities into concepts and experiments4Q FY 14USAFMSAandMACOMsbuild MTOEs1Q FY 152Q FY 153Q FY 15Set conditions to recruit and train 38G4Q FY 15IMSG38G
16 Distinct Roles and Functions Peacekeeping and Stability Operations InstituteInstitute for MilitarySupport to GovernanceFOCUS –Serve as the U.S. Army’s Center of Excellence for Stability and Peace Operations at the Strategic and Operational levels in order to improve military, civilian agency, international, and multinational capabilities and execution.FOCUS –Phase I –A corporate body to research, analyze, and shape the policies, authorities, and doctrine required to leverage and employ civil sector expertise to support Army and Joint Force Commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.Phase II (Proposed) –A corporate body to research, analyze, and shape the policies, authorities, and doctrine; manages and leverages a network of relationships; conducts professional credentialing of Military Governance Officers; and supports concept development for experimentation required to leverage and employ civil sector expertise to support Army and Joint Force Commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to achieve Unified Action.Center for the Study ofCivil-Military OperationsFOCUS –Developing West Point leaders to capitalize on their understanding of CMO within the framework of the broad challenges they will face in military service.Facilitate transformational changes to Professional Military Education across DoD and interested USG activities.West Point established as a wellspring of Professional Military Education in the realm of CMO.Veritas et Libertas
18 IMSG is a component of CA Futures Planning CA Org. Future Force Structure ConceptCA Re-assignment InitiativeIMSG ConceptCivil-Military Advisory Group (CMAG)CA Future38G ConceptVision, Brief, ImplementFuture Core Compe-tenciesRewrite
19 Civil Military Advisory Group Part of SOCOM’s effort to expand the Global SOF network and ARSOF 2022’s vision of “Operationalizing the CONUS base”Established national-level forum for stakeholders for civil-military collaboration, integration and planning that can analyze, inform and develop strategies across the spectrum of conflict and emerging crisis.Incremental build beginning with the establishment of a CMAG cell within the SOCOM CCF structure.The CMAG cell would work to build and sustain relationships for collaboration, integration and planning capability to support activities at both the operational and tactical level.In an ambiguous and complex environment the CMAG will systematize the relationships and mechanisms required to better integrate whole of government (Unified Action Partners) and other relevant partners’ efforts in support of USG objectives.We see a national level body as an integral part of the Global SOF network.Incremental build that begins with the establishment of a CMAG Cell Civil Military Support Element –National Capital Region (CMSE-NCR)These relationships would enable standing partnerships (DoD, DoS, USAID, USIP, UN, academia and other relevant actors) to better address emerging crises with the intent to inform planning and leverage resources in support of the TSOCs.CMAG is not a duplicative effort but complementary to meet operational requirements.
20 Unified Goals Common Goals Institute for Military Support to GovernanceCivil Military Advisory GroupCommon GoalsInformation Analysis and FusionProcure TalentCoordinate with StakeholdersStanding ExpertiseAcademic ResearchCross-Pollinate Best PracticesEducational OpportunitiesThe blue highlighted areas are the only areas common to both IMSG and CMAGEstablish Credentialing GatesOperational SupportExperimentationConcept DevelopmentVeritas et Libertas
21 Operational Framework CONPLAN 7500TSCPGEFPHASEDOD GWOT Campaign Construct/ 7500Indirect ApproachShape and StabilizeEnable Partners to Combat VEOsDeter Tacit and Active support to VEOsErode Support for Extremist IdeologiesIncrease Friendly Freedom of ActionReduce Enemy Freedom of ActionMSPCOPNon-Conflict EnvironmentConflict EnvironmentF PROCESSPreventative EngagementUSAIDDepartment of State (DOS)USSOCOM95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)CMAGCurrentGapRelevantPartnersGCCTSOCTheaterCMSESOF CA BNCAPTFunction: Support TSOC planning efforts; Coordinate SOF CA ISO TSOC Objectives; Build Partnership activities; Provide Civil Component of TSOC OPE; Coordinate Crisis Response.SOF CA CompanyCMOCTSOCForwardFunction: Provide Civil Component of OPE; Fuse CMSE/CAT CIM data ISO Regional Targeting Priorities; Develop plans to engage threats to civil society by, with and through legitimate indigenous authorities IOT reduce, mitigate and eliminate civil vulnerabilities.US EmbassyUSEMBCountry TeamCMSESOF CA Team (CAT)Function: Conduct Targeted CAO; Conduct CIM; Leverage Country Team programmatics, HN assets and NGO capabilities ISO TSOC Objectives.Currently we have a persistent presence in over 25 countries and we’re enduring engagement at the tactical and operational levels.But at the national / strategic level we continue to conduct episodic engagements in an ad-hoc manner. In an effort to build trust slowly and deliberately we see the CMAG as a necessary tool to collaborate across a community of action in support of the efforts of TSOCs.
22 IMSG Concept Potential Scenario: Crop Failure in Sudan JTF HOA soldiers report wheat crop failures in rural South SudanHarvard Kennedy School of GovernmentNaval Postgraduate SchoolNorthwestern Center for Public SafetyUS Army PKSOIUSAIDNational Defense UniversityInstitute Of PeaceDOSHoover InstitutionStanford UniversityAFRICOMUVU Institute of Emergency Services and Homeland SecurityNotre Dame School of BusinessUNC Institute for Global Health & Infectious DiseasesCMAGIMSGUSC Keston Institute for Public Finance and Infrastructure PolicyUSCAPOCThis represents a potential scenario involving the IMSG in its role as leveraging and employ civil sector expertise in contingencies. In this scenario, crop failures in rural Sudan are reported from JTF HOA to AFRICOM and are forwarded to the CMAG. The CMAG contacts IMSG for assistance. The IMSG contacts a civil sector partner with international access to expertise.Borlaug Institute for International AgricultureTexas A & MKenya Agricultural Research InstituteJTF HOAStem rust is a fungus that damages wheat and other cereal crops. In recent years, a particularly virulent strain (Ug99) emerged in Uganda and is currently spreading to Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen. Ug99 is becoming more virulent as it spreads. This strain of stem rust fungus causes crop yield losses of 50 to 70 percent resulting in food insecurity, population vulnerability and, without intervention, famine. Ug99 is a threat to global agriculture and the global food supply.
24 IMSG supports 38G Concept Development CA Org. Future Force Structure ConceptCA Re-assignment InitiativeIMSG ConceptIMSG Required CapabilitiesCivil-Military Advisory Group (CMAG)CA FutureIMSGVision, Brief, ImplementFuture Core Compe-tencies38G Concept38G Required CapabilitiesRewrite
25 IMSG Phase II: 38G (No Growth) 18724013221Grade38A38GTotalO6412162O5159187346O4433240673O39741321106Total1607580218738G6733461106Current 38A6243315997438A41Structure slice only.38A must prove credentials and civilian skills and be proponent (GO) boarded to reclass to 38GA March 2013 review found only 97 personnel in the USAR with the 9 CA functional specialty identifiers only 41 in Civil affairs units. Of those, none were in 38A slots coded for their specialty.38G positions derived from existing 38A functional specialty authorizations
27 38G Professional Tiering MasterRecognized Expert in FieldPositions coded w/SI for professional expertise and specialty skillDistinguishes professional abilities for effective employmentPhDTerminal Professional CertificationsMaster12 Yrs ExpExpertMasters8 Years ExperienceProfessional CertificationsEducationExperience / Certifications*Masters*4 Years ExperienceSeniorBachelors*Professional Certifications* Requires twoBachelorsBasic>4 Years ExperienceEducationExperience / Certifications
28 IMSG Logic Map for Phase I IMA (MOB)Coordinate w/ USARC and SLDOTransfer Positions to SWCS Reserve TDADetermine Funding SourcePersonnel VettingOrders ProcessInitial Talent RecruitmentAGRCoordinate w/ USARC G-3Direct Military Overhire AuthTransfer Positions to SWCS AGR TDAOrders ProcessGS CivilianPosition Description & Org ChartID Requirement & AuthorizationSubmit Civ Workforce Management Council PacketClassificationRequest for Personnel ActionHiring BoardIMSG ConceptIMSG Provisional TDAIMSG Required CapabilitiesIMSG Tasks IdentifiedIMSG Troops to Task AnalysisProposed IMSG TDASWCS, USASOC, TRADOC, DA approvalsIMSG in ARSTRUCTIMSG POM Line38G Concept38G Required CapabilitiesPublish CharterSubmit to Critical Requirement Review CommitteeIMSG Location (Irwin Middle)Refurb Work OrderSWCS submits to DPW($8K) (OCT13)Design PlanContractingStart WorkProject complete QA/QCReoccupy IMSGSubmit UFRUFR Board or VOCOMIPR DPWVision, Brief, ImplementOccupy Temporary OfficesDoD Schools vacate (JAN14)Occupy IMSG As IsEstablish Funding Accounting ProceduresGain Line of Accounting for Provisional TDAInformsLeads ToPHASE I KEY TASKS –1. “Get the shingle out” Distribute white papers Research, analyze and shape policies, authorities, and doctrine
29 IMSG Required Capabilities Doctrine Develop 38G / application of civil sector expertise doctrine Organization Input 38G / civil sector expertise to the Force Design Update Process Facilitate interaction between civil sector experts and Unified Action Partners Training Coordinate IET for accessing 38G, Inform development of 38G BOLC II Material Inform Force Development Update regarding Mil-Gov requirements Leadership & Education Identify and Inform education opportunities on the application of civil sector expertise within Unified Action. Personnel Manage personnel life cycle of 38G in conjunction with CA personnel proponent Facilities CAAF through 2018 Policy Identify suboptimal Mil-Gov and Military Support to Governance policies and initiate corrective action
31 IMSG Summary The Institute for Military Support to Governance – Creates the capability to meet long standing US military governance obligationsGenerates the civil sector expertise required to support future operationsIMSG Phase I (no growth) – Focuses on policies, authorities, and doctrineIMSG Phase II – Generates 38G (converts existing 38A force structure)Credentials civil sector expertsDevelops 38G doctrine and trainingSupports concept development and experimentationEstablishes advanced educational opportunities at premier academic institutionsPerforms talent management of civil sector expertsSupports operational practitioners with situational research and analysisThe Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD, 2005 recommended three structural improvements necessary to institutionalize stability operations:Establish an organization to effectively exploit our ‘fifth force provider’ – the private sectorStrengthen our ability to communicate DOD’s intentions and actions to the public in foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operationsRecruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that have the requisite skills and experience for Civil Affairs
33 Resources PEOPLE FACILITIES FUNDING AUTOMATION 1 x BG Director, TPU / IMA7 x 38A COL Dept Sr Advisors, TPU / IMA1 x 38A COL Dep Director, (O6) AGR (En Route)6 x 38A LTC Lead Coordinator, AGR *1 x 38A CPT Asst Ops Officer, AGR1 x 38B MSG Ops NCO, AGR1 x 38A CPT Aide-De-Camp, AGR / TPUBOLD = Currently Committed1 x DAC Asst Dean, GS-141 x 38A LTC, Lead Coordinator, AGR (SWCS Auth – En Route)1 x DAC, Asst Operations, GS-111 x MAJ Ops Officer, AGR (SWCS-En route ADOS)1 x CPT Public Affairs, ACInitial space in Bryant HallIrwin Middle School complex (Estimated FEB 14 - $100K FY 14)FUNDINGAUTOMATIONRPA for TPU / IMA (29 Days AT / 24 Days IADT)FY 13 - $15K TDYFY 14 - $108K TDYFY 14 - $12K O&MInitial phone / IT support in Bryant HallIrwin Middle School complex ($52K FY 14)*Six (6) Total Lead Coordinators AC or AGR
34 Developing IMSG Touch Points Center for the Study of CMO – West PointInstitute Partners and the Expanded NetworkUS Army War CollegePKSOIHoover InstitutionStanfordUSAIDNational Defense UniversityUS Institute Of PeaceDOSHarvard Kennedy School of GovernmentASA M&RAOSD Public-Private CollaborationNATO CIMIC COEGeorge C. Marshall European Center for Security StudiesNaval Postgraduate SchoolUSC Rule of Law CollaborativeUNC School of GovernmentBorlaug InstituteTexas A & MCMAGGCCTSOCIMSGAsia-Pacific Center for Security StudiesJTFCharter IMSG PartnersExtended Partners
35 The Operational Context Unified ActionSynchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and non- governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effortUnified Land OperationsHow the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.Lasting StablePeaceSupport to GCCs and AmbassadorsTo Achieve . . .OffensiveDefensiveStabilityDSCABy Means of the Army’s Core Competencies Provides the Operational ContextCombined Arms ManeuverThe application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative.Wide Area SecurityThe application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.The realm of Military Governance OperationsDefeat or Stability Mechanisms How Friendly Forces Accomplish the MissionDestroyDislocateDisintegrateIsolateInfluenceSupportCompelControlStability mechanism – Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 OperationsThe primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.*Usually used in Wide Area Security. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone.Influence involves altering the opinions and attitudes of the host-nation population through inform and influence activities, presence, and conduct.Support involves establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively; coordinating and cooperating closely with hostnation civilian agencies; and assisting aid organizations as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations.Compel involves maintaining the threat—or actual use—of lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other arrangements.Control involves establishing public order and safety; securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; and physically occupying key terrain and facilities.The combination of stability tasks conducted during operations depends on the situation. In some operations, the host nation can meet most or all of the population’s requirements. In those cases, Army forces work with and through host-nation authorities. Commanders use civil affairs operations to mitigatehow the military presence affects the populace and vice versa. Conversely, Army forces operating in a failed state may need to support the well-being of the local populace. That situation requires Army forces to work with civilian organizations to restore basic capabilities. Again, civil affairs operations prove essential in establishing trust between Army forces and civilian organizations required for effective, working relationships.PREVENT SHAPE WINForeign Humanitarian AssistanceBuild Partner CapacitySupport to Civil AdministrationControl Populations and ResourcesTransitional Military AuthorityTransitionUnclassifiedVeritas et Libertas