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Fourth Generation Warfare, Terrorism & the Internet Yael Shahar & Don Radlauer Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Can 4GW Conflicts be Won?

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1 Fourth Generation Warfare, Terrorism & the Internet Yael Shahar & Don Radlauer Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Can 4GW Conflicts be Won?

2 Four Generations of Warfare 1 – Line and column: an orderly military for an orderly battlefield; the State monopolizes warfare. (~1648 – ~1860) 2 – Massed firepower: “ The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies. ” (France, WWI) Attrition is the basic strategy. 3 – Maneuver: “ Instead of close with and destroy, bypass and collapse. ” (Germany, WWI) 4 – Asymmetric warfare: The monopoly ends. “ State militaries are fighting non-state entities worldwide — and almost everywhere, the state is losing. ” © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

3 Victory in 4GW conflicts 1. Are non-state actors the necessary ‘ victors ’ in a Fourth Generation War? 2. What role does intervention on the part of third parties have on the outcome of Fourth Generation Conflicts? © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

4 Defeat and Victory in 4GW 1. 4GW – A new paradigm 4GW – A new paradigm 2. Case study: the Second Lebanon War u Hizballah as 4GW Force Hizballah as 4GW Force  Hizballah ’ s challenge and Israel ’ s response Hizballah ’ s challenge and Israel ’ s response 3. 4GW in action - ExerciseExercise 4. Can a democracy win a Fourth Generation War? Can a democracy win © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

5 Can a state win a 4GW conflict? Either side may win a political/moral victory even if it loses or achieved only a stalemate in strictly military terms. Or … it may achieve a Pyrrhic victory, in which its ostensible military victory is outweighed by its political/moral losses. Strategy in 4GW must focus primarily on political and moral goals, and only secondarily on tactical considerations. It may even be necessary to “ lose ” in order to win. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

6 Yes, but … u A state can win a 4GW conflict, providing that certain guidelines are adhered to. u The most decisive factor in whether a state wins such a conflict is the presence or absence of third party interference. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

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9 Hizballah as 4GW Force © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

10 Hezbollah: terror/guerilla organization, media empire, and more Hezbollah is perhaps today ’ s leading example of an integrated terrorist/guerilla/political movement — or, in other words, a “ 4GW force ”. It combines one of the world ’ s most dangerous and far-reaching terror networks with a substantial localized guerilla capability, as well as many impressive non-military capabilities: © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

11 Hezbollah: terror/guerilla organization, media empire, and more Hezbollah owns and operates the Al-Manar ( “ The Lighthouse ” ) satellite television station, as well as Al-Nour ( “ The Light ” ) radio, various paper publications, and Internet sites. Hezbollah has published video games along with other material aimed at indoctrinating young people. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

12 Hezbollah: terror/guerilla organization, media empire, and more Hezbollah ’ s in-house construction company, Jihad al-Binnaa ( “ Jihad Construction ” ) is one of Lebanon ’ s largest building contractors. Jihad al-Binaa is Lebanon ’ s leader in reconstructing houses and infrastructure damaged by war. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

13 Hezbollah: terror/guerilla organization, media empire, and more Hezbollah operates hospitals, schools, clinics, agricultural training centers, and other social services. Hezbollah has taken over the role of the Lebanese government in providing services to Lebanon ’ s Shi ’ ite community. Hezbollah has provided direct financial aid to Lebanese whose homes and businesses were damaged by the fighting. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

14 Hezbollah: terror/guerilla organization, media empire, and more Hezbollah is a successful political party, most recently winning fourteen out of 128 seats in Lebanon ’ s Parliament. As a result of negotiations in Qatar, held in the aftermath of a near-revival of Lebanon ’ s civil war, Hezbollah and its allies have returned to government, with an effective veto in Lebanon ’ s Cabinet. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

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16 Lebanon 2006: a “ textbook ” 4GW In 2006, Israel and Hezbollah basically fought to a military stalemate. Politically, however, Hezbollah achieved a substantial victory — enhancing its own prestige and power in Lebanon while successfully portraying Israel to much of the world as a perpetrator of war crimes. The perception of an Israeli defeat despite its use of apparently indiscriminate force has been very damaging to Israel ’ s reputation. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

17 The war Hizballah fought © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

18 Playing for a stalemate Traditional warfare aims for traditional victory: taking and controlling territory, destroying the enemy ’ s military capabilities, and thus forcing the enemy to agree to a favorable peace settlement. Hezbollah ’ s preparations for conflict with Israel — while elaborate, careful, and expensive — clearly were not focused on achieving a victory of this sort. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

19 Playing for a stalemate 1. Rockets: thousand at the beginning of the 2006 war, mostly Katyushas; basically a provocation weapon. 2. Fortifications: designed to withstand aerial or artillery attack; equipped with food, ventilation systems, communications, etc. 3. Anti-tank missiles: the “ surprise weapon ” of the war. Around 50% of Israeli casualties were caused by these missiles. None of this weaponry is useful for advancing and capturing enemy territory. Instead, it is designed to pursue a 4GW strategy: provoke, withstand, resist, and propagandize. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

20 Playing for a stalemate Hezbollah ’ s armament and training was intended specifically for an engagement like the one that actually happened in Hezbollah would create a provocation of some sort, trigger a predictable Israeli response of aerial assault and perhaps a ground invasion, and then render that Israeli response both ineffective and costly. In other words, Hezbollah ’ s goal was to create a military stalemate which could be transformed into a political victory. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

21 Playing for a stalemate “ The rockets are the matador's cape. Their purpose was to get the bull to charge, and in that they were successful. ” -William S. Lind © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

22 1. Difficulty in distinguishing between civilian and military targets 2. Aerial attacks would look like a deliberate, large-scale assault on civilian housing and infrastructure. 3. “ Small ” ground invasion would be costly to Israel; Hizballah would survive, and minimize its apparent losses. 4. Massive ground invasion would find nobody to fight. Hizballa ’ s strategy was built on © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

23 Hizballah ’ s information-warfare strategies Hizballah ’ s PR points 1. Rocket attacks on Israeli cities, while militarily ineffective, create an image of defiance and audacity on the Arab “ street ”. 2. To Lebanese Shi ’ ites, Hizballah would be the protector and rebuilder. 3. Israel would be the weak bully, and Hizballah the victorious underdog, simply by surviving. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

24 Hizballah ’ s information-warfare strategies News Management 1. Hizballah controlled what foreign reporters could see and to whom they could speak, 2. Hizballah (or sympathetic but non-affiliated photographers) actually manufactured or altered images to convey messages of Israeli barbarity and Lebanese victimization.manufactured or altered images to convey messages © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

25 The war Israel fought © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

26 The war Israel fought The signs of what Hizballah was up to were all open knowledge: u Missiles, u Construction and media empires, u Ground fortifications  Hizballah ’ s use of the media © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

27 The war Israel fought Further, Israel had every reason to understand and anticipate the public-diplomacy issues raised in the course of asymmetric conflict. However, Israel ’ s military and political leaders do not appear to have used any of this knowledge or experience in constructing a strategy to deal with Hizballah. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

28 The war Israel fought At the outbreak of the war, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressed maximalist goals: “ We will eliminate Hizballah …” © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

29 The war Israel fought Publicly committing Israel to such goals was self-defeating. u Given the extreme difficulty of eradicating any guerilla movement, there was no realistic possibility that these goals could be achieved. u This statement of goals ensured that whatever result ensued, Israel would be perceived as having failed in its declared mission. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

30 Media response – too little; too late Even after it became clear that Lebanese civilian casualties were being used as a weapon against Israel ’ s international reputation, Israeli leaders failed to respond effectively. Assertions that Israel was carefully targeting only military facilities and personnel lacked credibility when weighed against the reported numbers of Lebanese civilians killed, combined with the emotive photographs emanating from the rubble of bombed Lebanese villages.emotive photographs © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

31 Lebanon 2006: a “ textbook ” 4GW Hizballah prepared to fight and win a political conflict. They stood to win by loosing. Israel prepared to fight a military conflict, not a political one. Israel stood to lose by winning. Result: A classic dilemma for a state facing a terrorist organization! © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

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33 Hizballah ’ s media strategies © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

34 Adnan Hajj – the “ cloned smoke ” photo, as published © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

35 Adnan Hajj – the original, released after the scandal broke © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

36 More Adnan Hajj Photoshopping © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

37 "A Lebanese woman wails after looking at the wreckage of her apartment, in a building, that was demolished by the Israeli attacks in southern Beirut July 22, REUTERS/Issam Kobeisi " "A Lebanese woman reacts at the destruction after she came to inspect her house in the suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, Saturday, Aug. 5, 2006, after Israeli warplanes repeatedly bombed the area overnight.(AP Photo/Hussein Malla)" This image appeared on the on the cover of the July 22 edition of the London magazine The Spectator. It also appeared on the cover of Socialist Worker. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

38 1: Ben Curtis, AP. 2-4: Sharif Karim, Reuters. 5: Issam Kobeisi, Reuters. 6: Mohamed Azakir, Reuters 5) WeddingMannequin.jpg: "A mannequin adorned with a wedding dress stands near the site of an Israeli air raid in Qana July 31, 2006, where more than 54 women and children were killed a day earlier. REUTERS/Sharif Karim (LEBANON)." 6) BurningKoran_Hajj.jpg: "This burning Quran, supposedly ignited by Israeli missiles -- also miraculously captured by Adnan Hajj of Reuters -- is almost certainly a staged scene. The odds of any book -- much less a Quran -- bursting into flame hours after an air strike, right when a photographer was there to snap its picture, are rather slim. Since stories of desecrated Qurans have gotten so much media play in the past, it seems as if the Reuters photographer arranged the exact kind off iconic image he knew would arouse outrage in the Muslim world. " Ben Curtis, AP Sharif Karim, Reuters Mohamed Azakir, Reuters Issam Kobeisi, Reuters © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

39 “A mannequin adorned with a wedding dress stands near the site of an Israeli air raid in Qana July 31, 2006, where more than 54 women and children were killed a day earlier.” REUTERS/Sharif Karim (LEBANON). "This burning Quran, supposedly ignited by Israeli missiles—also miraculously captured by Adnan Hajj of Reuters—is almost certainly a staged scene. The odds of any book—much less a Quran—bursting into flame hours after an air strike, right when a photographer was there to snap its picture, are rather slim. Since stories of desecrated Qurans have gotten so much media play in the past, it seems as if the Reuters photographer arranged the exact kind off iconic image he knew would arouse outrage in the Muslim world. " © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

40 “ Green Helmet Guy ” © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

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43 What is 4GW? © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

44 Modern warfare: All in the comfort of your living room! The success of terrorism as means of achieving — or at least calling attention to — political aims is the prime example of how the focus of war has shifted toward civilian populations. The aim of terrorism is not to destroy the enemy ’ s armed might, but to undermine his will to fight. By hitting the citizen just where he thinks he is safest, the terrorist causes the greatest confusion and loss of morale. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

45 Converging trends Warfare increasingly concentrates on civilian targets. The focus of war since the last century has shifted from being the preserve of governments and the armed forces to involve entire civilian populations. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

46 Converging Trends: The homefront as battlefield Recent trends in military doctrine show a clear shift in focus, from the battlefield to the civilian sector. Although this shift is a relatively modern trend in conventional military warfare, the focus on the civilian population has been the trademark of terrorism from the beginning. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

47 Converging trends Terrorism has two primary target audiences: u The enemy homefront u The friendly homefront Both are classed as civilians © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

48 Furthermore … Information warfare serves the traditional goals of a terrorist organization u Erosion of the sense of personal safety of target population,  Self-advertising and morale-building within the terrorist group ’ s constituency u Provocation of a reaction by the target population and its government. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

49 A multi-dimensional paradigm for conflict Fourth Generation Warfare is fought on the battlefield of Public opinion. Increasing democratisation makes the civilian sector the primary focus for those attempting to alter national policies. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

50 Democracies are at a disadvantage Citizens of democracies, which are founded on free speech coupled with accountability, are more susceptible to media manipulation than are dictatorships, since information provided by the media is generally considered reliable. (even when it isn't!) © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

51 A multi-dimensional paradigm for conflict An emphasis on perception and psychology is a defining characteristic of fourth-generation warfare, pitting non- state actors against traditional nation-states. This warfare simultaneously addresses three levels of conflict: physical, moral and mental. “ The fourth-generation forces play the whole spectrum, and they realize that the moral level is the most powerful and the physical level is the least powerful. ” – William S. Lind © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

52 “ Clausewitzian ” warfare versus 4GW Traditional warfare is coercive. The ultimate threat is that one side will eliminate the other ’ s ability to control its territory and population — and of course, a government that does not control ceases to exist in any meaningful sense. 4GW is persuasive rather than coercive. Non-state actors do not generally pose an existential threat to state actors, and usually don ’ t want to govern territory — at least for now. Instead, they fight in order to get their messages across. In essence, 4GW is the continuation of public relations by other means. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

53 “ Clausewitzian ” warfare versus 4GW “ Insurgent campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerilla and terrorist operations …” - Col. Thomas X. Hammes © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

54 The messages of 4GW combat The primary audience addressed by a 4GW force is its home front; its goal is to preserve and increase its power, influence, and public support. Its messages … u Define roles: The enemy is evil; we are your loyal, steadfast, virtuous, brave, and true defenders.  Lower expectations: But we are physically weak, so don ’ t blame us if you get bombed. u Boost morale: We are spiritually and morally strong, so we will go on fighting and the enemy will ultimately be defeated. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

55 The messages of 4GW combat Other messages are directed at the 4GW force ’ s state adversary; its state (and non-state) backers; and the broader international community: u You can kill and destroy, but you cannot win. We may not be able to eliminate you; but we can make you miserable whenever we want, until you go away. u We are a reliable and effective ally, worthy of further support.  Our enemy is an evil, inhuman monster; we are innocent victims; and thus our acts of “ resistance ” are righteous and justified. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

56 The messages of 4GW combat The messages of the 4GW combatant may have nothing to do with the state adversary at all! The state adversary is being used as the foil in a media stunt. The non-state actor will define victory or defeat solely by whether its messages get through to its audience(s). © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

57 Asymmetrical combat, asymmetrical messages State actors are often tempted to fight 4GW forces ’ messages head on — but just as the sides are physically asymmetrical, so are the demands of public relations. In particular, “ competitive victimization ” doesn ’ t work for states: u The state is held responsible for protecting its citizens and promoting its economy; thus playing up victimization is counter-productive for governments.  The outside world is very reluctant to accept the “ more powerful ” side as righteous victim — so the strategy simply isn ’ t effective. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

58 Calibration of violence While non-state actors can calibrate their level of violence to suit their political goals, state actors have a much harder time calibrating their level of violence:  Citizens expect their government to provide complete security, and conventional militaries are equipped and trained to fight “ Clausewitzian ” war. u Enough force for security is typically too much force for political victory in 4GW. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

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60 Holy Polder! The Fight for Free Frisia

61 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

62 Groep fan Auwerk “ Mission: The Groep fan Auwerk strives by means of a confederation of the four Frisian regions, (through cooperation more self- determination) for an independent state. ” Source: This will be the Red Team!

63 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Daughters of Frya The ‘ Daughters of Frya ’ project aims to recreate the order of priestesses described in the Frisian manuscript known as the Oera Linda Book. Participants are required to: 1. Abstain from meat, intoxicants, sexual activity and orgasm 2. At all times wear only the tohnekka, the short white tunic 3. Perform 1,200 deep knee-bends every day in devotion Source:

64 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Greet Wildly In a snap election, Greet Wildly has been elected Prime Minister of the Netherlands. He has appointed a special cabinet to deal with the Frisian crisis. This will be the Blue Team

65 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict The story thus far … The Groep fan Auwerk (GFA), organized in 2003, has been peacefully advocating for recognition of Frisian nationality in the Frisian regions of the Netherlands and Germany. The group went as far as adding an "FR" nationality sticker to automobile license plates and (in 2006) designing a pan-Frisian flag; but until 2012 no more dramatic steps were taken.

66 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict The story thus far … Gradually, however, a radical group gained strength within the GFA. The Sons of Grutte Pier (SGP) -- known colloquially as the Pieristas -- decided that mere recognition as a minority group was not enough. They demanded full independence for Greater Frisia, including all the formerly Frisian territories of the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark. Allied with the Daughters of Frya, they began a campaign of terrorism, mostly directed at the Netherlands. While no state has officially declared its support for the SGP, there are persistent rumors that the group is receiving covert support from elements within the United Kingdom -- possibly motivated by the ancient kinship between the Frisians and the Saxons.

67 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict The story thus far … The conflict did not receive great public attention until the SGP began a devastating series of attacks on the Dutch state, featuring a new tactic: the cow bombing. After successful mass-casualty attacks in several Dutch cities, a government crisis brought about snap elections, and Greet Wildly' Party for Freedom forms the new government of the Netherlands.

68 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict The Dutch Narrative “ Frisian nationality is a myth! The territories claimed by the SGP are, and will forever remain, Dutch. – PM Wildly addresses a rally in Amsterdam

69 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict The Frisian Narrative “ The Frisian lands have the right to self-determination as one united European region/entity. ” – Frisian Declaration of Independence

70 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Netherlands: Allies u Germany u Denmark u Israel

71 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Frisians: Allies It ’ s complicated … u The Moslem World (in opposition to Greet Wildly) u The UK, while officially neutral, appears to be secretly backing the insurgents  Belgium is getting restless …

72 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Take into account … 1. Extensive Media Coverage 2. Diplomacy and Counter-Diplomacy 3. Surface-to-Surface Missiles 4. Cows

73 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Audiences of the Frisians u The adversary population of the Netherlands u Uncommitted Frisians u The International Arena

74 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Audiences of the Netherlands u The home population u Uncommitted Frisians u The International Arena Notice anything here?

75 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Act One: Frisian Declaration of Independence 1. The Frisian lands (Friesland, Fryslan, Freesland, Fryslond) have the right to self-determination as one united European region/entity. 2. The new Friesland as an independent European region has its own borders. Within those borders we have the province Fryslân and Groningen (in the Netherlands). Ost-Friesland (in Germany) and Nord- Fraschlonj in the north of Germany and the south of Denmark. 3. The Frisians should have, like other people in other countries rights for their autonomy. The Groep fan Auwerk will support autonomy. Because the group believes that it's a principle for the Frisian Freedom. […][…] 5. We struggle for the whole Frisian nation with a national hymne, flag, coat of arms, sportsteams and other Frisian symbols. So we are able to create one united feeling under the Frisian people. […][…] Source:

76 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict The rest is in your hands ….

77 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Opening shot Dutch infrastructure hit by massive DDOS attacks. Government sites down for three days. IP tracing implicates a Frisian hacker ring.

78 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Insertion 1 A U.K.-owned vessel, the Albion A, is discovered at sea transporting 30 tons of weapons, apparently bound for Frisia.

79 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Insertion 2 A missile has landed on a German dairy processing facility, causing no deaths but seriously impacting the availability of milk to the population of a large part of the country.

80 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict And now … The Frisian Media Campaign!

81 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

82 Can a state win a Fourth Generation Conflict? States that have “ lost ” 4GW conflicts: u The US in Iraq u Israel in Lebanon States that have “ won ” 4GW conflicts: u Sri Lanka against the LTTE Sri Lanka against the LTTE u The UK against the IRA © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

83 A decisive factor in victory … Two crucial factors make the Sri Lanka vs. LTTE different from Israel vs. Hizballah: u The absence of media interest u Lack of third party pressure © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

84 Third party interference is a deciding factor It may not be possible to win a 4GW conflict in the presence of outside interference. Sri Lanka vs. LTTE showed that without such interference, the conflict can be won. Sri Lanka did this by: u completely isolating the LTTE, u clamping down on media absolutely, u gaining the complicity (and buying the complacency) of near neighbours. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

85 Third party interference is a deciding factor This isolation was much easier for Sri Lanka than it would be for Israel due to the fact that: u Sri Lanka is an island and thus it was possible to push the LTTE into one corner of the island. This made swift & complete military victory achievable. u Sri Lanka is less dependent upon trade than Israel. u There is less focus of the world's media on Sri Lanka. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

86 Lessons of Appropriate Response Not only must the state not over-reach itself, it should endeavor to let the non-state actor make mistakes. The LTTE over-reached itself and made enemies. The things they did to play well to their own people didn't play to well with India! Hamas suicide bombings blew a lot of political capital that the Pals had before the intifada started. This gave Israel more leeway to act. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

87 Lessons of comparative victimisation Civilian and pseudo-civilian casualties are weapons in 4GW conflicts There's a fine line here. Some actions that are required to win the support of third parties aren't likely to play well domestically! For example, Israel can't afford to take casualties among its civilians, while Hizballah benefits from every Lebanese civilian killed. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

88 Factors contributing to victory in 4GW Understand vulnerabilities 1. The governmental side in an asymmetric conflict almost always faces difficulties in the public- diplomacy sphere. 2. Non-governmental combatants are more or less automatically accepted as the underdog in such conflicts, and thus gain much of the world ’ s sympathy by default. 3. However, this does not mean that governments confronted by low-intensity conflict must assume that they will be defeated in the battle for hearts and minds. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

89 Factors contributing to victory in 4GW Understand what the enemy ’ s strategy is. 1. Don ’ t fight a 4GW conflict as if it were a purely military affair! 2. Guerilla and terrorist organizations are not conventional enemies, and cannot be effectively fought using only conventional means. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

90 Factors contributing to victory in 4GW Redefine victory 1. Set realistic goals. Eliminating a guerilla organization is almost impossible, and any military “ victory ” is likely to be Pyrrhic. 2. The pursuit of conventional military victory by the state is, paradoxically, what is most likely to create a political victory for the Fourth-Generation force. 3. Educate for flexibility. Once people understand the nature of manipulation, they are much harder to manipulate! © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

91 Factors contributing to victory in 4GW Minimize PR damage: 1. Even careful target selection doesn ’ t work against a “ human shield ” strategy. Innocent civilians will often be killed despite best efforts to avoid “ collateral damage ”. 2. The government must be prepared in advance to publish proof that the targets it struck were indeed military ones, and that the force used was appropriate given the nature of the targets. 3. These materials must be made available immediately after attacks that kill or injure civilians, so that accusations of deliberate or reckless targeting of civilians do not have time to take root in the mind of the public. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

92 Factors contributing to victory in 4GW Minimize outside interference 1. Keep the campaign short! A war of attrition wears down your political capital faster than it does the opponents military capital. It takes time for the UN and various protestors to organize. 2. Go in, accomplish stated goals, and get out again. 3. Make arrangements with other states and third party actors before commencing the campaign 4. Avoid giving the appearance of over-reaching, which may raise dilemmas for tacit 'partners ‘. 5. Keep military objectives clear, concise, and limited. Make it clear to all that your objective is to right a very specific wrong and no more than that. This also serves to call attention to the wrong. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

93 Factors contributing to victory in 4GW Take the initiative 1. Alternatively, in the case of state-sponsored Fourth-Generation warfare, avoid 4GW entirely! 2. Instead of fighting the kind of war that is very difficult for a state to win, bypass the Fourth-Generation force and attack the state sponsors directly. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

94 Factors contributing to victory in 4GW Military and political victory are not mutually exclusive A decisive military victory is necessary not only to keep the home front's support, but also discourages the 'pointlessness' syndrome, whereby a state does enormous damage to its own political capital without accomplishing anything concrete. However, in cases where a decisive victory is not possible, the campaign goals should be specific and limited. There should be clear objective tests as to whether the goals were accomplished © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

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96 How Sri Lanka won the “ unwinnable ” war 1. The army used guerrilla tactics — moving in small groups through the jungle rather than on main roads — while the Tigers fought a conventional campaign to defend their territory. 2. Military intelligence split the Tigers by persuading Colonel Karuna, their second in command, to defect in 2004, allowing the army to drive the rebels out of eastern Sri Lanka in The navy played a crucial role by attacking the Tigers ’ supply ships, with help from India and the US. 3. In the international arena Sri Lanka outmanoeuvred the Tamil Tigers by taking advantage of counter-terrorism legislation introduced after the attacks on the US on September 11, It lobbied hard to have the Tigers banned as terrorists in the US, EU, Canada and Australia, forcing those countries to crack down on their financing and arms procurement. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

97 How Sri Lanka won the “ unwinnable ” war 1. Sri Lanka cultivated ties with China, Iran and other non-Western powers to counterbalance Western criticism of its conduct of the war. 2. Sri Lanka secured tacit approval for its campaign from the ruling Congress party in India, whose leader Sonia Gandhi was keen to avenge the assassination of her husband, Rajiv, by the Tigers in The result was paralysis of the UN system, with Western governments unable to put Sri Lanka on the formal agenda of the Security Council. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

98 But at a high cost … Britain, the EU and the UN rights chief have called for war crimes investigations and Washington is stalling an application by Sri Lanka for a $1.9 billion ( £ 1.2 billion) emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund. War crimes will be hard to prove and the IMF will probably grant the loan because withholding funds would be counter-productive now that the war is over. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

99 But at a high cost … On the domestic political front Sri Lanka ’ s strategy has been costly. u Mahinda Rajapaksa promised to take a hard line against the Tigers and won the presidential election in u Since then the President has joined forces with a Sinhalese nationalist party to stir patriotic fervour that has stifled all political opposition by branding critics as terrorists.  The domestic media have been silenced by the Government ’ s failure to investigate attacks on journalists, of whom 14 have been killed since © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

100 But at a high cost … Access to the front line has been minimal. There has been no scrutiny of military tactics, which included shelling civilian areas, and no public debate about a long-term political solution. Consequently, the army has alienated many moderate Tamils through its disregard for civilian casualties and callous treatment of the 200,000 Tamils in internment camps. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

101 Sri Lanka vs. LTTE: A counter example The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay called for an investigation into the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. But a majority of the 47 countries on the council, which has no enforcement power, appeared unwilling to heed her appeal for a war crimes probe. Sri Lanka, which has strong support in the 47-member council, proposed a resolution of its own stressing "the principle of noninterference in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states." © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict


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