Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Shifting Battle Lines Yael Shahar Institute for Counter-Terrorism Armies, Media, and War.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Shifting Battle Lines Yael Shahar Institute for Counter-Terrorism Armies, Media, and War."— Presentation transcript:

1 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Shifting Battle Lines Yael Shahar Institute for Counter-Terrorism Armies, Media, and War as Political Theater: Challenges of “Fourth Generation” Warfare

2 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict States are losing sovereignty Discuss!

3 What is a state? An entity is a state “if and insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its order.” - Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1964). p © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

4 Which of the following represent a decline in state sovereignty? u The U.S. outsourcing of force protection in Iraq? u Lobbyists u Madrassas in Pakistan u The European Union u The International Court of Justice

5 What is happening? Changes in the way nations perceive themselves and their actions allows non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, to vie with sovereign states in the battle of ideas, and arguably to leverage ideational power into “real” power. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

6 Who are the movers and shakers? Increasing democratization has changed the way people make changes. Globalization has changed the way states project power. The Information age has changed the way people get information for decision-makering. Which brings us to …

7 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict What we ’ re dealing with here …  The power of statelessness The power of statelessness  Converging Trends and the privatisation of warfare Converging Trends  Clauswitzian Warfare vs. 4GW Clauswitzian Warfare vs. 4GW  Implications and conclusions Implications and conclusions

8 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

9

10

11 Converging trends “ I felt that on the first night, the power should have gone off, and major bridges around Belgrade should have gone into the Danube, and the water should be cut off so that the next morning the leading citizens of Belgrade would have got up and asked, ‘ Why are we doing this? ’ and asked Milosevic the same question. ” Lt. General Michael C. Short, commander of the United States air war in Kosovo

12 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Converging trends “ There has been significant discussion in the United States about IO encompassing attacks on financial markets, automatic teller machines, toll road metering systems, mass transit systems to create a panic in the civilian population in the hopes of realizing the dreams of political compellence …. ” William Church, “ Information Operations. ” Centre for Infrastructural Warfare Studies.

13 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict The homefront as battlefield Recent trends in military doctrine show a clear shift in focus, from the battlefield to the civilian sector. Although this shift is a relatively modern trend in conventional military warfare, the focus on the civilian population has been the trademark of terrorism from the beginning.

14 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Converging trends Terrorism has three primary target audiences: u The enemy homefront u The friendly homefront u The international arena All of which are classed as civilians

15 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Converging trends Low Intensity Conflicts are fought on the battlefield of Public opinion. Increasing democratisation makes the civilian sector the primary focus for those attempting to alter national policies.

16 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

17 “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” - Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter 1, Paragraph 27 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

18 Four Generations of Warfare 1 – Line and column: an orderly military for an orderly battlefield; the State monopolizes warfare. (~1648 – ~1860) 2 – Massed firepower: “ The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies. ” (France, WWI) Attrition is the basic strategy. 3 – Maneuver: “ Instead of close with and destroy, bypass and collapse. ” (Germany, WWI) 4 – Asymmetric warfare: The monopoly ends. “ State militaries are fighting non-state entities worldwide — and almost everywhere, the state is losing. ”

19 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict A multi-dimensional paradigm for conflict An emphasis on perception and psychology is a defining characteristic of fourth-generation warfare, pitting non- state actors against traditional nation-states. This warfare simultaneously addresses three levels of conflict: physical, moral and mental. “ The fourth-generation forces play the whole spectrum, and they realize that the moral level is the most powerful and the physical level is the least powerful. ” – William S. Lind

20 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict “ Clausewitzian ” warfare versus 4GW Traditional warfare is coercive. The ultimate threat is that one side will eliminate the other ’ s ability to control its territory and population — and of course, a government that does not control ceases to exist in any meaningful sense. 4GW is persuasive rather than coercive. Non-state actors do not generally pose an existential threat to state actors, and usually don ’ t want to govern territory — at least for now. Instead, they fight in order to get their messages across. In essence, 4GW is the continuation of public relations by other means.

21 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict “ Clausewitzian ” warfare versus 4GW “ Insurgent campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerilla and terrorist operations …” - Col. Thomas X. Hammes

22 “Clausewitzian” warfare versus 4GW In traditional warfare, public messages are a tool to support the military effort: We’re good, they’re bad. We’re strong, they’re weak. Yay team! But in 4GW, combat is a tool to deliver messages to various publics—and the messages involved are much more complex. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

23 The messages of 4GW combat The primary audience addressed by a 4GW force is its home front; its goal is to preserve and increase its power, influence, and public support. Its messages … u Define roles: The enemy is evil; we are your loyal, steadfast, virtuous, brave, and true defenders.  Lower expectations: But we are physically weak, so don ’ t blame us if you get bombed. u Boost morale: We are spiritually and morally strong, so we will go on fighting and the enemy will ultimately be defeated.

24 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict The messages of 4GW combat Other messages are directed at the 4GW force ’ s state adversary; its state (and non-state) backers; and the broader international community: u You can kill and destroy, but you cannot win. We may not be able to eliminate you; but we can make you miserable whenever we want, until you go away. u We are a reliable and effective ally, worthy of further support.  Our enemy is an evil, inhuman monster; we are innocent victims; and thus our acts of “ resistance ” are righteous and justified.

25 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict The messages of 4GW combat In other words … The messages of the 4GW combatant may have nothing to do with the state adversary at all! The state adversary is being used as the foil in a media stunt. The non-state actor will define victory or defeat solely by whether its messages get through to its audience(s).

26 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Asymmetrical combat, asymmetrical messages The kind of PR that works for states doesn’t work for non-state actors, and vice versa. Competitive victimization ” doesn ’ t work for states: u The state is held responsible for protecting its citizens and promoting its economy; thus playing up victimization is counter-productive for governments.  The outside world is very reluctant to accept the “ more powerful ” side as righteous victim — so the strategy simply isn ’ t effective.

27 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Calibration of violence While non-state actors can calibrate their level of violence to suit their political goals, state actors have a much harder time calibrating their level of violence:  Citizens expect their government to provide complete security, and conventional militaries are equipped and trained to fight “ Clausewitzian ” war. u Enough force for security is typically too much force for political victory in 4GW.

28 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

29 Warfare is just getting there, Terrorism was there all along … Terrorism as means of achieving — or at least calling attention to — political aims is yet another example of how the focus of war has shifted toward civilian populations. The aim of terrorism is not to destroy the enemy ’ s armed might, but to undermine his will to fight. The terrorist seeks to disrupt the daily life of his target population by striking at the most vulnerable points in that society. Such vulnerable areas included transportation networks and public events, which insure good media coverage. By hitting the citizen just where he thinks he is safest, the terrorist causes the greatest confusion and loss of morale.

30 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Warfare is just getting there, Terrorism was there all along … Terrorism tends to follow conventional warfare in terms of methods and tactics. What differentiates the terrorist from the conventional soldier is not his choice of weaponry or tactics, but rather his choice of target. While the soldier fights his enemy on the battlefield, and chooses his targets according to their military value, the terrorist targets the civilian population; his targets are often chosen for purely symbolic value.

31 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Summing up … Increasing democratisation means that societies are increasingly "information sensitive" Public opinion is easily swayed by media. This can translate into pressure on governments …

32 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Summing up … Citizens of democracies, which are founded on free speech coupled with accountability, are more susceptible to media manipulation than are dictatorships, since information provided by the media is generally considered reliable (even when it isn't).

33 © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

34 Different perceptions The western model of nation states is not the only way to divide up the world power structure. u The Global Jihad respects neither the borders nor the sovereignty of nation-states u It considers the entire notion of the nation-state as meaningless. u The essential actors in the Global Jihad worldview are not nations but Da’ar es-Sala’am and Da’ar el-Harb—the Realm of Islam and the Realm of Warfare. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

35 Global Jihadis and the more sophisticated among their Western antagonists perceive their conflict as being essentially and necessarily borderless, and define goals and means in ideational terms; the winning of hearts and minds is considered at least as important as any tangible material achievement. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

36 Significantly, the Western powers have defined the battle in much the same terms. In doing so, they have unwittingly moved into the conceptual space of their opponents. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

37 How much do ideas really matter in the overall balance of power? After all, nation-states continue to outclass non-state actors in all measures of “real” power. In any protracted territorial conflict, state-based militaries enjoy the advantage in terms of numbers, technology, and economic support. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

38 On the other hand, if non-state organizations can force states to act contrary to their own “real” interests, they effectively achieve state- like power without any of the traditional physical or institutional assets (or responsibilities) of statehood. © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict


Download ppt "© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict Shifting Battle Lines Yael Shahar Institute for Counter-Terrorism Armies, Media, and War."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google