1. Service delivery and citizen security in Bogota (1995-2003). Gerard Martin Georgetown University Colombia Program (USAID funded) gm@georgetown.edu

2. What made rapid and profound change possible? Paul Bromberg: “When you work hard, you will get results”. Hard work can still lead to policy failure; how did they proceed to overcome obstacles and implement radical reforms?

3. On crisis and Sputniks 1) No Olympics (no Sputniks) 2) Post local governance crisis: 3) (Post)-violence crisis: city perceived by all as in urgent need of change 4) Demo: 6% (1964-73) versus 2,5% (1995-2003) 5) Age: 15-29 yrs = 34% in early 1980s, versus 28% in 2000s 1958-731970 -821982-861986-911992-03Since 2004 Av 3 yrsAv 2 yrsAv 1 yr2 yrs3 yrs4 yrs

5. City Development plans Coherent, integral (N) Precise goals and objectives (N) Ambitious – city wide (N) Hammered down and mainstreamed (N) Constant benchmark (N) Institutional engineering: administrative and legal reforms: Plan Maestro Seguridad, Codigo de Policia; Sub-Sec Seguridad, POT etc. (N) New vocabulary RESULT: leadership > credibility

6. Thematic areas and objectives of the three administrations (Bogotá, 1995-2003) “FORMAR CIUDAD” (Mockus 1: 1995- 1998) “POR LA BOGOTÁ QUE QUEREMOS” (Peñalosa: 1998-2001) “PARA VIVIR TODOS DEL MISMO LADO” (Mockus 2: 2001-2004) Thematic AreasPlan Objectives (I) Citizen cultura- Citizen cultura (values) - Egalitarian model of the city - Citizen culture (rules) (II) Security and co- existence - Security and co- existence (III) Public space-Environment -Public space -City at a human scale -“Demarginalization” - Environment (IV) Social progress- Social progress- Social interaction-Social justice -Education -Family and children (V) Urban planning and productivity - Urban productivity-Urban planning and services -Mobility (transportation) - Productivity (VI) Legitimacy and institutional effectiveness - Institutional legitimacy -Institutional efficiency - Admirable public management Source: Gerard Martin y Miguel Ceballos, Bogota: Anotomia de una transformacion, 2004.

7. Institutional and management reform to improve services Enlightened technocratic elites. Professional bureaucracy: redefining functions + responsabilities Example: Sub-Sec Citizen Security; Consejo de Seguridad; Consejo ampliado de Seguridad; Consejos locales de seguridad

8. Transparent allocation of resources Ley 80 taken seriously E.g. Fondo de Seguridad y Vigilancia General restructuring of contracting Goals, rules, requirements and evaluation methods widely published RESULT: direct impact on quality of service; public works prove that money is well spend: improved credibility / no corruption charges

9. Citizenship and legitimacy Public officer as educator (M) Public space = citizenship (M) + inclusion/equity (P) Norms, values, rules = producing civic society + SC RESULT: reformulation of social contract

10. Actors: NGO free model? 19951997199920012003 Habs Calle1,0001,5001,3001,5001,838 Indigentes6001,4001,2001,2781,527 Pandilleros5001,9331,7003,468 Madres jóv hab c300 373 Ex callejeros10070661677954 Proyecto Empleo5070661677954 TOTAL1,7503,5295,5165,5778,252 1) Strengthening of Centros IDIPRON 2) ZONAS SEGURAS PROGRAM of Chamber of Commerce

11. Demand driven quality services Less mini-police stations, but better build, on more strategic locations and user friendly Additional in service training for police officers RESULT: credibility with clients + agency

12. Community driven dimension -Frentes de Seguridad Local -Community controlled parks -Community Policing Increased offer of services: increases choice RESULT: people know who is responsible.

13. Shorter routes + stronger oversight E.g.: (i) introduction of Consejos Locales de Seguridad + Local Security Plans + Consejo Distrital Ampliado Easy to scale up Robust checks and balances RESULT: voice + perception of voice

14. Continous M&E Strengthening knowledge and oversight: Crime Observatory -SUIVD Parks Observatory Other observatories: integrated transportation (movilidad) RESULT: city administration knows city > leadership; shared knowledge > credibility increased

15. Innovative forms of information City TV + Canal Bogota Communication strategies M + P talking etc “Bogota como vamos” + public accountability Publications RESULT: voice / change in political incentives

16. Ex-post Bogota model + language part of political agendas Mayors for president Other cities are following Renewed belief in public institutions Improved image of public good + public office Practical turn in academia

17. Can it be repeated? Bogota: -Mayor Garzon Other cities: -Manizales, Pereira, Monteria… But: -Superficial copy cat does not work -Beyond charisma: professional bureaucracy, deep leadership, integrated long and short circuits of poor oriented service delivery