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©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 1 Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation.

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Presentation on theme: "©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 1 Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation."— Presentation transcript:

1 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 1 Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation By Don Olsen For Presentation at Security Working Group Of CCSDS April 11-15, 2005 Athens Greece

2 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 2 Background Satellite TT&C links are susceptible to electronic counter measures (ECM). –Spoofing –Eavesdropping –Denial/Jamming Satellite TT&C links can be protected against ECM by –Encryption, –Authentication, and –Spread spectrum This presentation will focus on AJ performance with spread spectrum.

3 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 3 Waveform Security and Jamming Mitigation Some systems provide anti-jam capability through spread spectrum. –This could include frequency hopping or pseudo-noise (PN) spreading. –The measure of the improvement achieved is called processing gain. –Frequency hopping anti-jam waveforms: –Provide greater processing gain for same complexity than PN, –But has disadvantage of susceptibility to partial band and smart jamming, –Secure TRANSEC can protect against frequency agile, smart, narrow band jamming. –Presentation will restrict discussion to frequency hopping. Power efficient modulation minimizes E b /N o in AWGN as well as jamming.

4 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 4 Waveform Security and Jamming Mitigation (Cont.) Coding needs to maximize the required channel BER (P cbe ) so that partial band jamming is a disadvantage. –BER is inversely proportional to E b /N j, for partial band noise jammed (PBNJ) single diversity signals as shown next. –N j is avg. jammer density. –Curve is tangent to the AWGN curve. (p. 11) –The slope is equal to the diversity symbol repetition combining. –Error correction coding must permit operation with the P cbe at or above the tangent point, –For no E b /N j degradation from the E b /N o performance and –Forces jammer to jam entire hopping bandwidth. Interleaving is needed to protect the decoder from burst channel errors. –The graphs in the backup charts show the P be with both ideal and non-ideal interleaving.

5 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 5 Scope and Limitations Spectral allocation limits S band electronic counter counter measures (ECCM) processing gain. X Band and Ka Band (21 GHz) would improve the processing gain over S band and are included herein as typical but not as exhaustive examples. C and Ku are not Government bands and not included. Since the uplink EIRP advantage is only bandwidth dependent Q band is included with its 3 dB bandwidth advantage.

6 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 6 Assumptions Satellites are at synchronous altitude. Secure TRANSEC will mitigate certain smart jammer attacks. The choice of modulation, coding and interleaving will greatly influence the performance in smart partial band jamming. Hop diversity count has a significant effect on the performance of a frequency hopped waveform in the presence of partial band jammers. –The interleaver needs to preserve a hop diversity of ~700. –To keep diversity related performance losses to 0.3 dB.

7 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 7 Link Parameters

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9 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 9 Conclusions for Above Scenarios Uplink jammer EIRP needed to degrade a 60 dBW uplink is: –50 dBW with no frequency spreading –96 dBW with 80 MHz frequency spreading –130 dBW with 2 GHz frequency spreading The Jammer EIRP needed to degrade a 30 dBW EIRP synchronous altitude satellite downlink is: –-38 dBW at S Band with no frequency spreading. –8 dBW at S Band with 80 MHz frequency spreading. –39 dBW at 21 GHz with 1GHz frequency spreading.

10 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 10 Backup Slides on AJ Performance with Imperfect Interleaving

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12 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 12 Waveform Background Non-ideal interleaving will allow smart jammers to degrade performance. –Slow hopping (many bits per hop) and partial band jamming creates burst errors. –Convolutional and turbo codes are very susceptible to degradation from burst errors. –Ideal interleaving will distribute bursts uniformly to mitigate the loss. Hop diversity is the number of hops across which the code block is spread. –Or the number of hops across which the content of a convolutional code’s path memory is spread –However, the interleaver may not provide enough depth or effective use of the hopping diversity. –This limitation can degrade both processing gain and anti-jam capability. The analysis and graphs later in this briefing show the effect of limited hop diversity.

13 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 13 Hop Diversity Analysis Approach The analysis calculates and plots the BER curve for various E b /N j. –and partial band fraction for various numbers of diversity hops, N h –with E b /N o set to 0. The envelope of P be for worst case jammer fraction at each E b /N j was determined. –The set of envelope curves for various values of diversity were plotted. The model sums the binomial weighted probabilities of error for each number of jammed hops out of a set of N h hops. This was repeated for several modulation and coding options. The waviness of some of the lines is due to the size of the step in the partial band fraction.

14 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 14 Definitions of Parameters The partial band Gaussian noise jammer fraction is r. The code is either –Convolutional with rate, r c of ½ and constraint length 7 –Or convolutional turbo with r c of ½, constraint length 5 and 5120 bit block size. The decoder transfer model was obtained –By fitting a judicious curve to the P be versus P cbe relationship, –Where P cej is the channel probability of error, –P be is the decoder output probability of error, –Given j of N h diversity hops are jammed. Code parameters definitions: –The linear scale factor for the code probability of error transfer model is a. –The exponential factor for the code probability of error transfer model is b. –It is closely related to half the minimum free distance of the code. –The curve corner fitting tightness factor for the code transfer model is n. P be is the sum over j of the decoded binomial distribution weighted P cej.

15 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 15 Analysis for DPSK Modulation Case

16 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 16 Modulation Performance for Coherent DPSK and BPSK Cases Is Respectively

17 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 17 Where the complementary error function is given by Sklar in “Digital Communications” 2 nd ed., p. 210 as:

18 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 18 Coding Parameters

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23 ©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 23 Table of Graphs

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