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Evaluation of demand-side incentives to improve education and health outcomes: Evidence from past and ongoing randomized interventions in Burkina Faso.

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Presentation on theme: "Evaluation of demand-side incentives to improve education and health outcomes: Evidence from past and ongoing randomized interventions in Burkina Faso."— Presentation transcript:

1 Evaluation of demand-side incentives to improve education and health outcomes: Evidence from past and ongoing randomized interventions in Burkina Faso Damien de Walque, The World Bank, DECRG Evidence-Based Decision-Making in Education Workshop Africa Program for Education Impact Evaluation (APEIE) Accra, Ghana May

2 Two different programs, two different impact evaluations School feeding programs: school canteens vs. take home rations in the Sahel region. Impact evaluation is completed. Conditional and Unconditional Cash Transfers in the Nahouri Province.Impact evaluation is ongoing.

3 Impact evaluation of School Feeding Programs : Evidence from a Randomized Trial in Burkina Faso Harounan Kazianga (Oklahoma State University) Damien de Walque (World Bank) Harold Alderman (World Bank)

4 Impact evaluation summary Evaluation of two school feeding schemes in the Sahel region of rural Burkina Faso. School meals and take-home rations The programs are run by the World Food Program (WFP) Outcomes of interest are enrollment, attendance, learning outcomes, child labor and child health, including nutritional status.

5 School meals First scheme: students are served lunch each time they attend school. Both boys and girls. Annual transfer per student, including operating cost (administration, distribution, cooking): USD per student per year -Average number of students per household: Annual program cost per household: USD -Annual program cost per adult: 7.15 USD

6 Take Home Rations Second scheme: students (girls only) receive a take home ration (10kg of cereal flour) each month, conditional on 90% of attendance Annual transfer per student, including operating cost (administration, distribution): USD per student per year -Average number of female students per household: Annual program cost per household: USD -Annual program cost per adult: 4.70 USD

7 Experimental design 45 schools newly opened in in the Sahel School Meals: All children (boys and girls) attending school on that day. In 15 schools Take Home Rations: 10kg flour/month, Girls only, conditional on 90% attendance In 16 schools Control Group: No school feeding program in In 14 schools

8 Experimental design Experimental, prospective randomized design: villages are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. Data are collected before and after the interventions are rolled out. Identification strategy relies entirely on the random assignment of the villages to treatment and control groups. Because of the random assignment, estimated program impact is interpreted as a causal Interventions started in October 2006 and ran through June All results are based on one academic year.

9 At baseline: No significant differences across groups. Randomized assignment was successful.

10 Both programs increase new enrollment among girls by about 5 to 6 percent.

11 Key findings Both school meals and take home rations increase new enrollment among girls by about 5 to 6 percentage points. Other results 1) School absenteeism 2) Child labor 3) Nutritional status of children

12 Findings (2): absenteeism and child labor The interventions caused absenteeism to increase in households who are low in child labor supply while absenteeism decreased for households which have a relatively large child labor supply. The interventions also led to an adjustment in child labor: shift from on farm labor and off-farm productive labor to more domestic tasks.

13 Findings (3): Nutritional status of children School feeding had a positive impact on pre- school age children nutritional status, but not on school age children For younger siblings age 5 and under, take- home rations increased weight-for-age for boys and girls taken jointly and boys taken separately. The school meals intervention has increased weight-for-age for boys. The impact occurred essentially on boys, and not on girls

14 Evaluating the impact of conditional and unconditional cash transfers in rural Burkina Faso A collaboration between the SP-CNLS/IST (Government of Burkina Faso) and the World Bank

15 Objectives Evaluate the impact of different interventions on the health, the education and the welfare of vulnerable children. More specifically: 1) Compare different mechanisms to support vulnerable households? 2) Compare the impact and the cost-efficiency of conditional vs. unconditional cash transfers. 3) Does the gender of the recipient of the transfer makes a difference? Mother vs. Father.

16 Impact evaluation design Compare 5 groups of villages in the Nahouri Province (Center-South, border with Ghana. Gross Primary Enrollment rate: 44%, Gross Secondary enrollment rate : 8,2%) Random allocation of villages in to the 5 groups (done in May 2008). Baseline study, fielded May-July st follow-up study at the end of school year nd follow-up study at the end of school year

17 1st group: Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) to the mother In the eligible and selected households, payment of an UCT for each child under 15. Amount varies with age. Transfer is quarterly. Transfer is paid to the mother. In 15 villages, covering 500 households.

18 2nd group: Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) to the father In the eligible and selected households, payment of an UCT for each child under 15. Amount varies with age. Transfer is quarterly. Transfer is paid to the father. In 15 villages, covering 500 households.

19 3rd group: Conditional cash transfers (CCT) to the mother In the eligible and selected households, payment of a CCT for each child under 15. Amount varies with age and school level. From 0 - 6, the transfer is conditional to visiting the health center. From , it is conditional to school registration and attendance (at least 90%) Transfer is quarterly. Transfer is paid to the mother. In 15 villages, covering 500 households.

20 4th group: Conditional cash transfers (CCT) to the father In the eligible and selected households, payment of a CCT for each child under 15. Amount varies with age and school level. From 0 - 6, the transfer is conditional to visiting the health center. From , it is conditional to school registration and attendance (at least 90%) Transfer is quarterly. Transfer is paid to the father. In 15 villages, covering 500 households.

21 5th group: control group No cash transfer during the impact evaluation. Random allocation of villages in to the 5 groups (done in May 2008). In 15 villages

22 Household selection (Done in May 2008) Eligibility based on poverty criteria or presence of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC). Poverty targeting based on a list of durable assets correlated with household consumption in the most recent LSMS-type survey. Among the eligible households, random selection, within the villages, of the beneficiaries of the transfers. The transfers are limited to children present in the household at the beginning of the project.

23 Conditionality in the CCT groups From 0 - 6, the transfer is conditional to visiting the health center. From , it is conditional to school registration and attendance (at least 90%) Verification mechanism through an attendance booklet (both at the health center and the school levels) Unannounced controls.

24 Transfer amounts 1 US$ = 500 CFA Francs, GDP capita: $440 UCT:  0-6: 1000 CFA/quarter or 4000 CFA/year  7-10: 2000 CFA/quarter or 8000 CFA/year  11-15: 4000 CFA/quarter or CFA/year CCT:  0-6: 1000 CFA/quarter or 4000 CFA/year  2000 CFA/quarter or 8000 CFA/year for grades 1-4  11-15: 4000 CFA/quarter or CFA/year for grades 5-10

25 Implementation Random allocation of villages in to the 5 groups and selection of eligible households (done in May 2008). Baseline study, fielded May-July First payments made in October-November Currently finished 7 th payment rounds (April 2010) and preparing last payment round (June 2010). 1 st follow-up study at the end of school year Currently analyzed. 2 nd follow-up study at the end of school year

26 Thank you !


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