Presentation on theme: "III Corps and Fort Hood 05 NOV 09 After Action Review 17 NOV 09."— Presentation transcript:
III Corps and Fort Hood 05 NOV 09 After Action Review 17 NOV 09
2 Agenda CG Opening Remarks Mission Objectives Process Way Ahead Closing Comments
3 Mission Fort Hood conducts an installation-wide after action review (AAR) to prepare a lessons learned document in response to the 5 Nov 09 incident.
4 Objectives Execute a Senior-level hot wash Identify immediate, mid-and long-term changes and track compliance Recommend input to Higher Hqs MASCAL OPLANS Document our lessons learned in a formal AAR
5 Process Follow the listed AAR topics sequentially Corps Staff Lead has collaborated unit and CORPS/USAG input and will lead discussion addressing approximately six- eight issues Keep the discussion to about 10 minutes per topic Recommend discussions not revolve around internal lessons learned but focus Installation-wide First step in an iterative process
6 AAR Topics with Enumerated Categories 1. Event Summary/Current SITREP (CHOPS) 2. 1 St Response a.Law Enforcement (PMO) b.Medical (SURG) 3. MASCAL a.Triage, mass casualty declaration, policy (Surg) 4. Command and Control (CHOPS) 5. Immediate Care for Patients (Surg) 6. Installation Security (Force Pro) a.CRB b.FPCONS 7. Investigation (PMO) 8. Family/Survivor Care (G1) a.JVB b.Casualty Assistance 9. Media Response (PAO) 10. Reporting (CHOPS) 11. External Support a.Medical (Surg) b.Law Enforcement (PMO) 12. Deployment Effects a.SRP (G1) b.Affected Units (CHOPS) 13. Memorial Ceremony (FUOPS) 14. Donation Assistance (SJA) 15. Cost Tracking (G8) 16. Way Ahead
Event Summary/Current SITREP
Event Summary 1 (1 of 5) On 5 Nov 09 at approximately 1329 HRS, MAJ Nidal Malik Hasan, a clinical psychologist assigned to Carl R. Darnall Army Medical Center entered the Soldier Readiness Center, Bldg 42003 carrying a FN HERSTAL Brand, 5.7X28 MM, Semi-automatic handgun and then began shooting. MAJ Hasan reloaded numerous times, shot and killed 12 Soldiers and one civilian, and injured 43 (34x GSW and 9x non GSW) others both inside and outside of the building. Of those killed, seven were active duty, five were reservists, and one was a civilian contractor.
Event Summary 1 (2 of 5) Two Department of Emergency Services (DES) law enforcement officers responded to the incident location. MAJ Hasan was outside the Soldier Readiness Center firing sporadically at personnel when Officer Munley and Officer Todd exchanged gunfire with him. Officer Munley was struck twice in the legs and once in the arm. MAJ Hasan was struck three times in the upper body and once in the calf and was incapacitated. MAJ Hasan was searched and was found to also possess a Smith & Wesson,.357 caliber revolver.
Event Summary 1 (3 of 5) There were 43 individuals injured, including twenty-one active duty, twenty reservists, one National Guard, and one civilian. All were evacuated to local hospitals including Darnall Army Medical Center, Killeen Metroplex, Scott and White in Temple, and Seaton Williams County Hospital in Round Rock. Law enforcement from the local, state and federal agencies responded with offers and actions of support and assistance.
Event Summary 1 (4 of 5) At 051345 Nov 09, Fort Hood was locked down (all ACPs sealed). All traffic was stopped on and off the installation. Schools and child development centers were locked down. Soldiers were notified through loud speaker to return to their units for accountability. At 1430 the Crisis Response Battalion (CRB) was activated and the Emergency Operation Center was also activated. CRB Soldiers and law enforcement secured the post and crime scene. At 1830 the CG directed opening the gates to traffic leaving post. The children in Audie Murphy and Smith Middle Schools (those that had children in them) were released and the CDCs were opened to parent pick up.
Event Summary 1 (5 of 5) At 2000, CRB Soldiers were released from access control points and in and out bound traffic resumed. A Military Police platoon from 720th MP Battalion and elements of the CRB secured the crime scene through the night. The CG ordered that Fort Hood Soldiers would report for duty no earlier than 060900 Nov 09 at unit commander discretion with on post services running normally, observing a day of mourning, and the post operating with enhanced security.
CURRENT SITREP 1 (1 of 3) Fort Hood priority of effort is taking care of Soldiers and Family members, completing the Grief Counseling / Crisis Response Way Ahead (Campaign Plan), Conducting SRP operations (as of 120730Nov09). We have transitioned from law enforcement and first responder efforts to caring for Soldiers / Family members, recovery from the incident and support to law enforcement agencies and CID investigations. Establishing Behavioral Health Individual Counseling Center at SRP site in Iron Horse Gym Projected ready date is 17Nov09
CURRENT SITREP 1 (2 of 3) Fort Hood continues use of organic and external resources to assist victims and Families to cope with effects of shooting. Command group institutes security requirements and develops timeline and plans to support successful transition to normal operations. Fort Hood supports community information efforts by conducting two Town Hall meetings on 9 Nov and 16 Nov. Investigation concluded that no deaths occurred from gunfire of any first responder (95%---will not be 100% until lab results are completed).
DPTMS Behavioral Health Planning Cell Campaign Plan –Working 15 Nov to complete initial draft –Joint Planning Team 15 Nov 1000 hrsLTC Paz lead –17 Nov COBfinal draft –23 Novpublish Outside expert panel (18 Nov) –Identified 19 experts + moderator to invite –Confirmed attendance: 3 experts + moderator –LTC Griffith will work details with III Corps Community panel on 19 Nov –III Corps working local leaders (mayor, etc.) –CRDAMC staff to identify local BH/medical invitees CURRENT SITREP 1 (3 of 3)
1.PC 09-11-649 Duty Day for Ft Hood – thru Frago 3 2.PC 09-11-652 Incident Support and Healing – thru Frago 7 3.PC 09-11-651 Memorial Ceremony Brief 4.PC 09-11-655 CID Request for Assistance 5.PC 09-11-659 Status of Soldiers and Family Members of 5 Nov 09 Event 6.PC 09-11-660 Donations Handling – thru Frago 1 7.PC 09-11-658 Mass Casualty AAR – thru Frago 1 8.PC 09-11-665 Warno to Campaign Plan 9.PC 09-11-656 Memorial Ceremony – thru Frago 3 ORDERS AND FRAGOS ISSUED 4 (1 of 2)
ORDERS AND FRAGOS ISSUED 4 (2 of 2) 10.PC 09-11-654 SRP Center and Iron Horse Gym Guard Requirements 11. PC 09-11-650 Force Protection Conditions – thru Frago 1 12.PC 09-11-662 Behavioral Health Red Team
5 Nov 09 Jan 10 Feb 10 BH Campaign Plan Timeline III Corps Available 15 Nov 09 (Su) Draft Campaign Plan Complete 17 Nov 09 (Tu) Expert Panel of BH Professionals Review and Assess Campaign Plan 18 Nov 09 (W) 16 Nov 09 (M) Community Outreach Reviews Campaign Plan (1500 hrs – T) 19 Nov 09 (Th) Community Town Hall and Campaign Plan Published 23 Nov 09 (Mo) 11 Dec 09 13 Dec 09 JPT Planning Huddle 151000Nov09 LTC Paz led 20 Nov 09 (Fr) Campaign Plan Revision Current Time Line to OPORD PC 09-11-665 (Ft Hood Behavioral Health Campaign Plan)
Current FPCON: ALPHA 22 Soldiers from CRB providing crime scene security 89 th MP providing security at SRP site while SRP is operational (2 each MPs at the Soldiers Readiness Center entry point and 2 each MPs at the Iron Horse Gym entry point. DES periodic patrols with DA Civilian Police 89th MP providing security guards beginning 16 – 20 Nov 09 from 0730 to 1630 at CRDAMC R&R Center (BLDG 36003), Urgent Care Center (BLDG 36009) and Combat Reset Building (BLDG 36043). Current Installation Security Status
PhaseTotalFacility Operating hoursDate / Time CRB Way Ahead Total CRB Requirement I4Youth Center (1130-2030)09 Nov 09 / 21008 II7Elementary School (0630-UTC)10 Nov 09 / UTC14 2Middle School (0630-UTC)10 Nov 09 / UTC4 4Child Development Center (0500-UTC)10 Nov 09 / UTC8 2AAFES PX (0900-2100)10 Nov 09 / 21306 2Commissary (0900-2000)10 Nov 09 / 20306 1Copeland Center (0730-1700)10 Nov 09 / 17304 1Keith Ware Hall10 Nov 09 / 17002 III1Carl R. Darnall Army Medical Center11 Nov 09 / 06008 6Access Control Point (Non-Contiguous Housing) continue DA /MP patrol of housing 11 Nov 09 / 060024 1Crime Scene CordonDES Decision22 TOTAL:22 Crisis Reaction Battalion Transitioning to Normal Operations
1 st Response Law Enforcement (PMO) Medical (CRDAMC)
1 st Response (2a) Law Enforcement Issue: 911 calls (improve) Discussion: Cell phone and family quarters 911 calls here on Fort Hood are processed through Bell County Emergency Dispatch which are then transferred to FT Hood DES dispatcher. Calls from DSN go directly to FT Hood DES Dispatch. This is the only work around for civilian phones regardless of location. While there is no indication that there was a significant delay in response due to this system, calls directly to DES Dispatch would clearly be quicker. Recommendation: IO Campaign to ensure personnel on FT Hood know to have DES Dispatch in their speed dial as well as 911.
1 st Response (2a) Law Enforcement Issue: Active shoot scenario (sustain) Discussion: In the aftermath of mass shootings like Columbine and other more recent incidents, US Army CID published a document outlining alternative solutions to dealing with an active shooter. FT Hood DES began training this new solution last year which involved law enforcement immediately and aggressively taking the fight to the shooter versus creating a cordon and awaiting SWAT type forces. This training was cited by SGT Munley as the driver behind her and Senior SGT Todds action that day. This action undoubtedly saved countless lives. Recommendation: Continue this training and mandate Army wide.
1 st Response (2a) Law Enforcement Issue: Post Closure (improve) Discussion: The CG made the decision early on to increase to FPCON Delta thus closing the post until further notice. ACPs reported getting calls from IOC and other agencies directing closure of the gate. This confused the guard force and prompted them to call for verification from DES. This order must be given to the DES for action. DES can facilitate simultaneous notification to ACPs and eliminate confusion. Recommendation: Ensure proper line of communication. Review Installation Force Protection Plan to ensure enclosure.
1 st Response (2a) Law Enforcement Issue: Patrol equipment (improve) Discussion: No level III tactical vests available to non law enforcement first responders. No shotgun or rifle available for active shooter first responder (pistols only). MP units who provide response and surge capability do not currently have sufficient operations load within their arms room. MPs draw ammunition from DES for patrol duty. Potentially slows response for scenarios requiring significant MP force. Recommendation: Assess needs for first responders, to include firefighters and EMS for a high level threat and procure resources.
1 st Response (2a) Law Enforcement Issue: C2 of the CRB Assets at ACPs (improve) Discussion: The CRB was deployed in a timely manner but once on the ground there was confusion about who was in charge. Recommendation: Once the CRB is deployed to support a critical incident, it must be OPCON to the DES. This is currently outlined in Phantom Shield.
1 st Response (2a) Law Enforcement Issue: Preservation of critical evidence (sustain) Discussion: Early response by CID ensured critical evidence was preserved before crime scene was disturbed. DES and US Army Military Police first responders are trained in evidence preservation and played an important role in securing a large and complicated crime scene filled with victims, emergency medical personnel and bystanders. Recommendation: Evaluate installation law enforcement training program to ensure this skill is maintained and perhaps increased due to this incident.
1 st Response (2a) Issue: Lack of OPLOAD Ammunition. Discussion: Neither FORSCOM nor IMCOM authorize combat support Military Police companies to maintain operational load ammunition. As a result, additional MP support was critically short of ammunition during incident response. MPs were tasked to clear buildings/parking lots with only limited 9mm ammunition available. Recommendation: 89 MP BDE be authorized to maintain at least one full companys ammunition allocation (9mm,5.56mm,12GA) for use in emergency situations.
1 st Response (2b) Medical Issue: response time to scene, sufficient EMS support Discussion: –Ambulances arrived before scene was secure, were able to call for back-up from on and off post with good response –Good radio communication between Triage Doc at CRDAMC and EMS Incident Commander at scene; facilitated appropriate routing of some ambulances to other area hospitals, some air evac direct from the scene Recommendation: continue drills and support agreements between Ft Hood and community EMS entities
AAR First Response – Medical (2b) Issue: C2 of Medical Evacuation Discussion: Early triage and evacuation from the incident site was not accurately tracked and did not then match the personnel reaching the medical facilities. There were casualties in hospital who were not being tracked at the hospital as injuries from the incident. Recommendation: All Fort Hood sites, military or civilian, have a plan which is disseminated and rehearsed to ensure that an Incident Control Point (ICP) is stood up immediately after a known incident to track evacuation.
Mass Casualty Triage Mass Casualty Declaration Policy
MASCAL - Triage Issue: doctrine calls for Triage at scene and secondary triage at hospital Discussion: when EMS were permitted on scene, Soldiers and SRP staff with medical training had already conducted emergency measures on injured Soldiers. They brought patients to the arriving ambulances and it became more of a scoop and run procedure than a choreographed plan with transport of the most critically injured first, consciously spreading them out between area hospitals. Recommendation: without sacrificing speed for doctrine, a short delay to assess the severity of wounds and allow EMS to prioritize transport might have reduced chaos and patient tracking later
MASCAL Evacuation Issue: Transferring of patients from outside facilities back to military MTF Discussion: Active duty Soldiers heal better in a military environment. Recommendation: Return military patients to military MTF as soon as possible
MASCAL - Declaration Issue: speed of declaring a MASCAL; access of staff to hospital Discussion –Overhead paging and electronic notification to hospital staff happened within 10 minutes of 911 call –Staff reported to their appropriate stations per plan and drills –Staff off-post when notified had difficulty getting on-post to care for patients Recommendation: 79 th street gate should be open to anyone with a hospital ID badge and one other form of picture ID; CRDAMC has responsibility for educating staff
MASCAL - Patient Accountability Issue: It took longer than expected to get firm identification on all admitted patients at areas hospitals Discussion –Patient Administration (PAD) rehearsed going to the incident scene with the 1 st EMS ambulance, but in this rapidly evolving situation, they were not called in time –Some patients were transported directly from the scene to area hospitals with no military accountability of name, unit, level of injury Recommendation: Send PAD representatives to area hospitals pre-emptively when CRDAMC capacity is exceeded. This will require MOUs with Metroplex and S&W for data sharing without HIPAA violation (Command exemption)
MASCAL - Reporting Numbers – Admitted versus Evaluated Issue: Initial injury numbers reported to III Corps included victims admitted to local area hospitals. One unit later submitted names of staff they claimed received GSW but were treated and released at the scene. Discussion: further investigation revealed some had superficial or minor GSW, but others were seen and released at the scene for stress symptoms without physical injuries. The method of reporting terminology (i.e. RTD versus discharged and admitted versus treated) created confusion in the total number reported. Recommendation: report categories and be very specific about the criteria. Admitted, evaluated at hospital and released, evaluated on scene and released (also differentiate between physical and psychological injuries)
MASCAL - Casualty Reporting Issue: Initial report on 5 November that Dr. Hassan was in S&W Morgue confirmed by Judge Botkin. Discussion: The JP was in the casualty affairs office at CRDAMC. He was on the phone with representatives from S&W inquiring about the status of casualties at their location. He was informed by S&W that Dr. Hassan was in fact deceased and currently in their morgue. This erroneous information was given to PAD, who further reported to command. Recommendation: All casualty information will be verified through CRDAMC representatives at civilian facilities during MASCAL incidents, this new procedure will be addressed in additional MOUs that need to be established with civilian facilities.
MASCAL - Casualty Reporting Issue: Reporting of accurate and timely casualty information from civilian medical facilities. Discussion: Regardless of existing MOUs with civilian medical treatment facilities, the PAD was unable to obtain information on casualties who were transported to local hospitals. Due to possible security concerns for casualties and their facility, the local hospitals were reluctant to release casualty status to CRDAMC PAD. Recommendation: Enforce current MOUs and notify civilian facilities of MASCAL incident as early as possible in order to establish communication. Engage command immediately when issues are identified.
MASCAL - Casualty Reporting Issue: Engage III Corps Surgeon and CRDAMC Senior Officer Representative in III Corps IOC. Discussion: Absence of III Corps Surgeon PAD representative and senior CRDAMC officer in the IOC added to the confusion of casualty reporting (terminology). Recommendation: The III Corps Surgeon PAD representative and senior CRDAMC officer must be present in the IOC in order to further clarify casualty terminology and status for III Corps Senior Leadership.
Personnel Management, MASCAL Issue: Medics arriving on scene with Aid Bags to assist the wounded were turned away by DA Police at the Perimeter. Discussion: Medics arrived on scene upon notification that there was a shooting in the SRP location. Twelve medics arrived at the location but were turned away by the police providing perimeter security stating there were enough medics on scene already. The medics on scene were calling requesting additional aid and supplies. Recommendation: Upon notification of a Mass Emergency, have a Scene Commander in contact with perimeter security identifying which personnel are needed and directing where to report.
Site Organization, MASCAL Issue: Medics were treating patients where patients were found, ambulances had no designated location to receive patients. Discussion: Patients were being treated on scene but were not moved to a central location for ambulance pick up. Recommendation: Medical Commander designates a Casualty Collection Point, Helicopter Landing Zone, and Ambulance Exchange Point in order to facilitate effective patient care and efficient patient transfer to the nearest medical facility. Medical Commander designates appropriate triage location at the CCP ensuring more serious injuries are evacuated first.
Emergency Response, MASCAL Issue: Medical Supplies on Hand Discussion: Just like when deployed, buildings should have MASCAL Kits Recommendation: Ensure that every building having large amounts of personnel have a MASCAL kit at the main entrance, assessable and well marked. This would expedite the medical care given to injured in the event of an emergency
Treatment, MASCAL Issue: After casualties were treated and before personnel were put on lockdown there was no supervision of personnel accessing the dead. Discussion: There was a collection point for the dead bodies but they were not covered up and access to them was not restricted. A Soldier I talked to that was on site inadvertently walked past the location of the dead bodies and was subjected to the horrific site. Recommendation: As soon as casualties are evacuated and the dead are moved to a collection point a guard should be placed at that location to prevent others from accessing them. A covering should be used to cover their corpses out of respect.
AAR First Response – Medical (3) Issue: Accuracy of Hospital Database (Soldier assignment) Discussion: The hospital database did not correlate with Soldier unit of assignment, leading to initial delays in notifications. We acknowledge that the hospital database is not updated unless the soldier physically goes and updates his details. DEERS does not transfer UIC updates automatically to CHCS, resulting in a disparity. Recommendation: Develop a system linking personnel data across all agencies at Fort Hood.
Command and Control
COMMAND AND CONTROL Issue: Achieving COP early in the MASCAL Discussion: Info sharing and establishing COP is best conducted at Ops Center. Ops Center has multiple means to communicate with all parties involved (VTC, conference phone, radios, etc.). CMD GRP also received updates in offices but achieving COP at both Ops Center and CMD GRP was a challenge. Information flow is wherever the CG needs it to be, but responsive to the immediate decisions required – Phantom Seal, lockdown, CRB activation Recommendation: Once Ops Center is established, info needs to be shared between all. Need a deliberate battle handover to enable the EOC to pick up all reporting and routinely update the CMD GRP
COMMAND AND CONTROL Issue: LNOs at the EOC Discussion: LNOs from units facilitated communication and provided both the EOC and unit with SA. LNOs from the CRB, Mobilization BDE, Hospital, DES, 36th EN and DA were very useful in facilitating two-way information flow Recommendation: Immediately require affected units to send an LNO to the EOC so information sharing/SA occurs early and units can address their concerns
COMMAND AND CONTROL Issue: Lead and Support Relationship Discussion: During the incident, III Corps and Garrison were intermixed and trying to solve the problem without a common means for communication. Reports continued to come in through IOC. Orders/Fragos, issued through CHOPS throughout became more challenging once SIPR was used for Memorial Ceremony. Phone rosters required on-the-fly updating and portal usage was not immediate. Recommendation: Initial FRAGOs should establish a stream-lined communications apparatus with EOC phone numbers and POCs, share portals, how orders will be issued, along with CCIR, LNO requirements, and reporting requirements.
COMMAND AND CONTROL Issue: Utilization of Big Voice Discussion: IOC initiated Big Voice during the incident to advise the Post of the situation and issue instructions. Use of the Big Voice prevented a lot of phone calls into the IOC/EOC for basic information. Big Voice initiated the moment of silence and used both recorded and scripted communications Recommendation: Continue to utilize Big Voice. Review pre-recorded messages and determine if more are needed or if a generic version fulfills need with a scripted follow-on announcement to add more details.
COMMAND AND CONTROL Issue: Lack of III Corps LNO at CRDAMC EOC Discussion: Presence of III Corps LNO at CRDAMC will increase situational awareness and accurate reporting to III Corps IOC. Recommendation: Identify III Corps LNO to report to CRDAMC EOC and participate in all MASCAL exercise.
Command and Control (4) Issue: Numerous, disparate EOCs caused inconsistencies in information and data flow. Discussion: Following the event, information became disjointed due to numerous EOCs receiving and processing information independently. There was no apparent centralized tracking system that subordinate/tenant organizations could use to pull and verify information. Recommendation: Central processing tracking system within secure net disseminated to subordinate/tenant organizations. III Corps determine and provide requirements for LNOs with subordinate/tenant organizations.
Command and Control (4) Issue: Battle rhythm efficiency Discussion: Uneven flow of information requirements to subordinate/tenant organizations. Recommendation: III Corps establishes a crisis action battle rhythm that is incorporated into the current III Corps Crisis Action Plan. III Corps reviews plan periodically with subordinate/tenant units.
4. Command and Control – JVB Issue: Integrating JVB within the EOC Discussion: - Identify key personnel within the EOC along with their roles and responsibilities - Communicate roles and functions of the JVB to EOC cells - Identify resources to assist (SOS, Red Cross, Resiliency Campus) and establish contact - Although initially intended to facilitate the Memorial Ceremony, products and contacts continue to help units take care of families Recommendation: Develop family reception SOP/ MASCAL ConPlan within EOC & Garrison Staff and supporting agencies.
EOC Capability and Location (Category (4)) Issue: EOC Capability & Location Relocation Discussion: The Garrisons Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is currently planned to stay on the second floor of the HQ, rather then relocate to the newly- christened Corps Command Center (CCC). Recommendation: Enable the CCC to function as the EOC.
4. Command and Control – JVB Issue: Integrating JVB within the EOC Discussion: - Identify key personnel within the EOC along with their roles and responsibilities - Communicate roles and functions of the JVB to EOC cells - Identify resources to assist (SOS, Red Cross, Resiliency Campus, others) and establish contact Recommendation: Develop family reception SOP/ MASCAL ConPlan within EOC & Garrison Staff and supporting agencies.
Command and Control (4) Issue: Unclear tasking pathway for non-standard law and order missions. Discussion: During the incident, MP units received orders (sometimes conflicting) from DES, the Corps PMO, and the Corps G3 section. Some orders bypassed the BDE HQ and went directly to subordinate units. Valuable time was spent de-conflicting which orders were valid and ascertaining a clear task and purpose for execution. Recommendation: Clearly define the C2 path, with accurate POC listings, for additional and emergency law and order missions above the normal patrol distribution.
Command and Control Issue: LNOs to III Corps Discussion: III Corps had a significant and well-organized C2 capability in the EOC. MSEs would have benefitted from having an individual at III Corps to give and take available information in the EOC. 1CD benefitted from attendance at the IPRs throughout the weekend through a LNO. Recommendation: III Corps incorporate MSC LNOs within the EOC immediately following incidents.
Issue: Phantom Seal & Standing Orders Discussion: When Operation Phantom Seal was enacted the unit did not know where to reference the order. Recommendation: Consolidate to a single source and publish the source through either the MSO distribution list or Phantom Distribution list on a re-ocurring basis Command and Control
Issue: Back-up communications with III CORPS IOC Discussion: Unit relied heavily on E-mail and Telephone for communication with III CORPS IOC. Recommendation: Determine the necessity of an alternate communications architecture. Command and Control
Immediate Care for Patients
Issue: sufficient numbers and type of staff, equipment, and supplies available to care for patients Discussion –ED provider staff augmented by Family Medicine Residents, Anesthesiologist, General Surgeons, & others –ED nursing staff augmented by additional RNs, & NCOs –Patient Administration assets in ED for patient tracking –Logistics push system for supplies implemented –Blood Bank provides blood per existing trauma protocols –Pharmacy staff present in ED and OR –Nutrition Care prepares and delivers meals and beverages Recommendation: continue with current plan
Installation Security CRB FPCONS
INSTALLATION SECURITY- CRB (6a) SUSTAIN Issue: Overall CRB Response Execution. Discussion: CRB provided outstanding support to crisis reaction/response. 3d ACR anticipated the requirement and redeployed 2/3 ACR (Sabre) from field training prior to official activation of the CRB. The CRB met or exceeded all timeline gates required by the Fort Hood FP Plan: o Cordoned the crime scene. o Augmented ACP operations IAW OPN Phantom Seal. o CRB effectively executed enhanced FPCON at 22 sites. Recommendation: Continue exercising CRB during all installation FP exercises..
INSTALLATION SECURITY- CRB (6a) IMPROVE Issue: CRB use of CRB Specific Equipment. Discussion: The CRB initially deployed without their distinctive CRB vests and vehicle placards. Although the unit had just redeployed from field training, this lack of distinctive identification had the potential to cause confusion since DES/CID were initially searching for an alleged 2 nd Soldier assailant. CRB only has 24 LMRs plus base station. Recommendation: While designated as the CRB, the specified battalion should maintain ready access to CRB equipment (even while in the field) to ensure CRB deployment and mission execution in correct uniform. Garrison FP will work funding for additional radios through CVAMP.
3d ACR (CRB 6a): Post Lockdown Issue: Determination and Execution of Post Lockdown Tasks Discussion: –Dissemination of lockdown status by CoC, Big Voice, media (channel 10), or other method (AM radio) –Enforcement of lockdown by DES, CRB, or unit personnel –Understanding of exceptions, such as CRB personnel or emergency vehicles –Method and order of unlocking post Recommendation: Publish clear lockdown and release from lockdown guidance
3d ACR(CRB): Communications (6a) Issue: All post responders, to include CRB, need to have a coordinated and synchronized communications architecture and plan. Discussion: –Multiple methods used during incident: FM, cell phone, DES radios –Require one command net for direction and cross talk Recommendation: Establish a principle means of communications for all responders, with the EOC as the lead. The CRB should use FM as the primary C2 means, and report to/from the EOC via phone or DES radio. CRB should use LMR or other to augment FM comms. EOC, IOC, or mobile CP should have FM capability.
INSTALLATION SECURITY- - FPCONs (6b) SUSTAIN Issue: Overall FPCON Decision Making Process during Crisis Reaction. Discussion: Timely FPCON measures provided adequate protection against the threat. As threat diminished, FPCON measures changed, continuing to provide security without over reaction. Phantom Seal was executed only as long as necessary to verify elimination of threat. Modified FPCON measures provided enhanced protection against copy cat and potential follow-on attack. FPCON was methodically reduced to achieve normalcy. Recommendation: Continue threat based approach to FPCON during all FP Exercises and any future crisis response operations.
INSTALLATION SECURITY- - FPCONs (6b) SUSTAIN Issue: Overt FP Guard of Non-Contiguous Housing. Discussion: FP Guards at Non-Contiguous Housing ACPs provided security to a portion of the community with long standing security concerns. Once specific threat was quickly eliminated, residents remained apprehensive due to perceived vulnerability. Extended guard presence enhanced resident security perception and allowed command information operations to prepare residents for normalcy. Recommendation: Continue FP guards at non- contiguous housing area ACPs during future terrorist crisis reaction/response operations. Revalidate/raise CVAMP prioritization to fund permanent fencing for all non-contiguous housing at Fort Hood.
INSTALLATION SECURITY- - FPCONs (6b) SUSTAIN Issue: Coordination for FPCON reductions as the installation returned to normal operations. Discussion: Coordination with DFMWR facility managers, AAFES and DECA store managers, KISD, DHR, USADMC, and family housing mayors proved critical to reducing panic and preparing the installation and community for a return to normalcy. Active discussions with key stake holders created buy-in and allowed stake holders to prepare their constituencies for change of operations. Recommendation: Establish links with all key community stake holders; share themes and messages often; consult/acknowledge stake holder concerns prior to executing FPCON changes.
INSTALLATION SECURITY- - FPCONs (6b) IMPROVE Issue: Execution of FPCON D/Shelter in Place. Discussion: Rapid VOCO decision implemented DES Phantom Seal lock down of the installation ACPs, FPCON D High Risk Target shelter-in-place and limit to all but mission essential movement. Even with community notification over BIG VOICE and mass Fort Hood email distribution, numerous Soldiers and family members continued to go about their daily non-mission essential business. Complacency potentially put them at risk. Recommendation: Push ATFP Command Information stressing required individual actions in heightened FPCON situations.
INSTALLATION SECURITY- - FPCONs (6b) IMPROVE Issue: Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Compliance. Discussion: Garrison ATFP Red Team inspection of numerous high occupancy facilities during heightened FPCON found uneven enforcement by facility mangers (specifically measure C 4, limit high risk target access point to absolute minimum). Recommendation: Conduct Command Group directed threat assessment and FP Review. Use Command Information Program and reinforcement during monthly FPWG meetings to explain and reinforce facility execution of specific actions to comply with FPCON standards.
INSTALLATION SECURITY- - FPCONs (6b) IMPROVE Issue: MSC Reporting of FPCON Execution and AT Training Status. Discussion: OPORD PC 09-11-650 instructed all organizations to report FPCON compliance to the EOC. FRAGO 1 to the OPORD instructed all MSCs to verify and report their AT Level 1 training status for Soldiers and civilian employees IAW AR 525-13 NLT 13 NOV 09. 4 of 26 Fort Hood units and 1 of 10 Garrison agencies complied with the reporting requirements. Recommendation: EOC ATFP reps establish tracking systems for report compliance. MSCs enforce AT training standards to ensure Soldier and employee AT training compliance(Levels I and II).
Installation Security (Force Pro) Issue: Accountability and Reporting Procedures Discussion: Use of the DA 162 is the most accurate method of gaining accountability for the unit, however when using this document it is a time consuming process. Units were forced to gain accountability of personnel via cell phone which greatly increased the time it took to gain accountability of all personnel. Recommendation: If the situation allows, the announcement should be made over the FT. Hood loud speaker that all personnel need to report to their units. In this situation soldiers should have been given access to a phone if needed and directed to contact their units IOT speed up the process of getting accountability of all personnel.
Installation Security (Force Pro) Issue: On post Schools and Day care Discussion: Following the incident, as units continued to be on lock downthere was a concern that schools and day care centers on post would be let out and soldiers would not be able to pick up their children. This was addressed as the situation developed and it was learned that civilian agencies such as school and daycare centers were also in a lock down status. Recommendation: When the post is in a lock down status include a message about the on post schools and daycare centers in the FT. Hood Distro messages that were being sent out IOT reassure soldiers that their children are being held in a safe place.
PHYSICAL SECURITY Issue: Gate Guard Procedures on West Fort Hood Discussion: The West Fort Hood gate was still open after the incident had occurred and Main Post was locked down. Recommendation: Establish a single alert channel / process for gate guards and ensure West Fort Hood is on that channel / process.
Issue: Logistical support during initial phase of investigation (sustain) Discussion: Logistics support for interagency effort involving large numbers of investigators quickly overwhelmed internal resources of the CID Detachment and Battalion. Garrison quickly provided requested resources once made aware of the need. Recommendation: Designate a logistics LNO for CID to work billeting, sustainment, investigative requirements (large evidence receptacle), communications shortfalls and other requirements specific to a extraordinary event.
Investigation Issue: Publics desire for information versus integrity of sensitive case information that jeopardizes prosecution. Discussion: Must strike a balance to satisfy the press need for information and the Commands desire to appear transparent, while ensuring case sensitive information is protected. Historically, defense teams use disclosed information to display carelessness and prosecution in the press. Recommendation: Review of all proposed press releases concerning investigation by III Corps SJA and CIDC PAO.
Investigation Issue: Operational support from III Corps and FT Hood (sustain) Discussion: Numerous requirements surfaced that were beyond CID/FBI capabilities. III Corps and FT Hood staff responded quickly and effectively. Examples – obscuration fence, EXPANDO van, tentage, aerial photography, CRB crime scene security. Recommendation: Continue this outstanding support effort.
Investigation Issue: Armys commitment to giving Corps a dedicated Provost Marshal Cell facilitated MP functions throughout this event (sustain) Discussion: With the 89 th MP Bde Cdr deployed, there would have been no 0-6 level Senior MP officer with staff to coordinate law enforcement and criminal investigative efforts and ensure vertical information flow to the command group. III Corps staff had a single responsive POC for these functions. Recommendation: This event validated this requirement. Maintain this requirement.
Family/Survivor Care JVB Casualty Assistance
Issue: Mission & Roles of the JVB Discussion: –Started out as a JVB, morphed into something else –More of a family reception entity –Mission Creep; good ideas turned into JVB tasks with little or no analysis (travel, lodging, donation management, etc) –Expectation Management from higher, EOC, SGS, CDRs –JVB C2; G2 actual escorted Sec Army and CSA, DG2 picked up JVB supervision Recommendation: If the focus is on families and escorts, call it something other than a JVB. Give the task to an organization with the right experience to deal with grieving families, then assign Corps Staff to augment. 8.a. Family/Survivor Care JVB - Improve
Issue: Command & Control of Escorts Discussion: –Every family (whether of deceased or injured) required a Ft Hood assigned escort officer –Escorts and drivers not identified early on and frequently changed –Not enough initial emphasis on the criticality of this requirement –Not task organized under JVB –Roles & responsibilities of escorts not clearly defined early Recommendation: Direction, guidance, and emphasis to units early. All Escort Teams OPCON to JVB for planning and execution. 8.a. Family/Survivor Care JVB - Improve
All families were received well and taken care of throughout the event JVB Team (including Escorts) were adaptive and highly professional External Community Organizations were vital to the overall success of the JVB –DOL, MWR, AUSA, Post Lodging, DHR Coordinator 8.a. Family/Survivor Care JVB - Sustains
8.a. JVB – Improves Improve JVB situational awareness Ad-hoc mission analysis Post Ceremony operations Call it Family Reception - dont call it a JVB
8.a. JVB – Mission Analysis Issue: Incomplete Initial Mission Analysis Discussion: –G2 executed without conducting mission analysis –Built the aircraft while in flight –No involvement of SMEs –Teams developed based on emerging requirements and good ideas Recommendation: Receive initial guidance, conduct mission analysis and back brief results to G3, CoS, and EOC Director.
Issue: Family Member Assistance of Deceased Discussion: –CAC must be allowed to carry on conducting their critical support actions ICW DA CMAOC per normal SOP as many actions are driven by legal or regulatory requirements –CAC was interrupted and distracted during this event by numerous RFIs, slide updates, requests for information that simply was not yet available due to normal CMAOC timeline Recommendation: DHR will maintain 24 hour casualty representation in the IOC with access to DCSIPS IOT update EOC Operations 8.b. Family/Survivor Care Casualty Assistance - Improve
Issue. External Donor Coordination Discussion. –No Garrison agency designated to coordinate and track donor support –DHR assumed the mission and was effective in making it happen ICW the JVB –DHR was consumed with casualty operations, re-establishment of SRP operations and care for their SRP employees affected by the incident. Recommendation. Designate the agency who has the lead for accepting, coordinating and distributing and tracking external donor support to family members. Logic points to Family Assistance Center or SFAC. 8.b. Family/Survivor Care Casualty Assistance - Improve
Issue. Family Member Assistance of Wounded Discussion. –Family assistance to wounded is a unit responsibility –The JVB was extremely successful and instrumental in coordinating and tracking this support ICW DHR and CRDAMC reps. Recommendation: Identifying JVB personnel as additional duty or designate the SFAC as the agency that will coordinate and be the lead for all assistance to wounded and their family members since that is their primary mission already. Stand up the SFAC with a rep in the IOC. 8.b. Family/Survivor Care Casualty Assistance - Improve
PAO STAFF SUPPORT UNITSOLDIERSDA CIVILIANSCON/OTHERS Fort Hood PAO3146 4 Local PADs26 OCPA on Site3 CRDAMC PAO6 1 st Army DivWest422 Totals36228 Additional support offered/provided by… FORSCOM, IMCOM & MEDCOM HQs Texas Military Forces PAO Numerous private PR firms contracted with DOD
DATETVRADIOPHONERTQsOTHERTOTAL Fri 1320015118 Thu 1281034447 Wed 1125113131 Tue 10130015028 Mon 9131137557 Sun 860041148 Sat 790047561 Fri 69041503166 Thu 53002004207 TOTALS883654224663 LOCAL PAO DAILY ACTIVITY ROLL-UP These totals only represent activities directly processed through the Media Relations Branch
INITIAL COVERAGE ANALYSIS
VOICE OF THE LEADERSHIP
WEAKNESSES -Increased emphasis on the Armys oversight of potential signs -Limited info due to ongoing investigation resulting in media speculations -Emphasis on the role of religion in the attack & links to terrorism -Speculations on Soldier suicides and stress - especially at Fort Hood STRENGTHS -Speedy handling of the incident -Assistance to victims families -Frequent & ongoing updates from designated spokespeople -High senior leadership visibility -Emphasis on resiliency programs -Clearly formulated & unified communication messages OPPORTUNITIES -Continued emphasis on Army efforts to help victims -Continued emphasis on resiliency -More one-on-one media engagements with senior leaders -Opportunity to shape media coverage through updates on the investigation THREATS -Possible discussions on Hasan determined to be unfit -Shift in discussions from missing the signs to overlooking the potential signs -More unknown details surfacing -Discussions on inadequacies &unpreparedness of the Army INITIAL SWAT ANALYSIS
PAO IMPROVEMENT ISSUE NO. 1 Issue: Lack of Media Ops Center located separately from Media Relations Branch Discussion: Immediate activation of a pre-designated MOC could have significantly reduced pressure on small MRB staff Recommendation: Designate, equip & exercise stand up of MOC to support all significant post incidents
PAO IMPROVEMENT ISSUE NO. 2 Issue: Lack of adequate communication assets to execute mission in crisis mode Discussion: PAO staff disbursed across post to support myriad of media activities. Small number of cell phones & Blackberries meant staffers had to use personnel cell phones to coordinate efforts Recommendation: Perform critical review of assets on hand and develop procurement package to meet staff needs & stand up of MOC
PAO IMPROVEMENT ISSUE NO. 3 Issue: Media query tracking process inadequate during initial surge. Discussion: PAO has a SharePoint tracker, but queries came in too fast to keep pace. Paper copies were kept, but some calls werent recorded. Actual numbers, as a result, are low. Recommendation: Update & automate office SOP on query tracking. Grant staff augmentees access to SharePoint capability to ensure better documentation.
PAO SUCCESS STORY NO. 1 Issue: Demonstrated rapid growth & integration of PAO staffs to meet crisis response needs. Discussion: Fort Hood PAD commanders, CRDAMC & DivWest PAOs all responded immediately so that staffing could be expeditiously augmented. Recommendation: Review and update local, command & OCPA procedures on augmenting PAO staffs, to include all possible regional AC/RC assets. OCPA assignment of PAOs to support CAOs should become routine procedure, regardless of incident magnitude.
PAO SUCCESS STORY NO. 2 Issue: Rapid division of labor – based on areas of expertise – was crucial in quickly responding to media Discussion: BG Boone, Deputy Chief of Army PA, on site to provide leadership council. Worked closely with PAO to develop focus areas: General inquiries Medical-related questions Investigation updates Recommendation: Priority be given during initial PAO response efforts to identify & focus on critical topics.
PAO SUCCESS STORY NO. 3 Issue: Consolidation of locally generated activity reports, news releases & talking papers for up-channel situational awareness was consistent over time. Discussion: All PAO elements – to include CID, CRDAMC & DivWest PAOs contributed daily feedback which was basis of daily (sometimes multiple) SitRep to all PAOs impacted Army-wide. Recommendation: Direction be given by OCPA that all PAO Teams designate a specific staff member to gather & update senior leaders & external PAO.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS WAY AHEAD - Stand up Media Ops Center in basement of Bldg 1001 staffed by PAD Soldiers - Continue to facilitate access for all media reps remaining in the local area -Evaluate requests for Soldier & witness interviews with CID and support as appropriate - Maximize use of all Command Info products to inform & educate greater Fort Hood community Rumor control is the parallel internal focus - Coordinate & announce media events as needed
Media Response, PAO Issue: Information flow to the Soldier. Discussion: Soldiers were getting information through their cell phones, and computers. There was a lot of bad information being passed and trying to control rumors became over whelming. When putting the Soldiers on a lock down status, leaders need to be able to explain the events. Recommendation: Information needs to be pushed down to the Company level as soon as available and a single post needs to be put to the media.
Media Response (9) Issue: Coordinated more than 35 interviews with 1908 th and 467 th Medical Detachment Soldiers with more than 20 national, regional and local TV, radio and newspaper outlets. Discussion: Effective, efficient teamwork and communication with III Corps PA in fielding media RFIs and Soldier interviews. After immediate media response, Division West PA assumed PA C2 of North Fort Hood units when requested by III Corps. Recommendation: Sustain
REPORTING Issue: Initial Reports to IOC/EOC Discussion: Reports submitted were unformatted, contradictory and of varying reliability. As a result, erroneous data was either acted upon or reported as factual without a means to validate in a timely manner Recommendation: IOC/EOC enforces a 5w report format when another format is not specified. Recording Who is rendering a report may be useful in screening for reliability and enables more accurate confirmation if there is confusion or contradictory reporting.
REPORTING Issue: Reports to Higher Discussion: IOC initiated SIR reports to IMCOM and FORSCOM during the initial hours of the incident. Reports, approved by CHOPS, allowed IOC/EOC to focus on the situation and continue to gather information. DA provided a format for routine reporting. Recommendation: IOC continues initial reporting in SIR format using approved distribution lists.
REPORTING Issue: Standard Reports to Higher/Unity of Effort Discussion: As the situation stabilized, standardized, routine reports were submitted by various organizations (MEDCEN etc), but what was reported was not specifically tracked/coordinated through the EOC. The EOC had data slides and analysis slides to present to the CMD GRP but not all were report worthy Recommendation: Single approval chain for reporting through EOC and CMD GRP applies to all on post agencies and units. Other staff agencies/sections send reports only after EOC reviews to ensure compatible CMD approved information. Code EOC update slides for fact (reportable) vs analysis (non-reportable) and upon approval report using update slides.
REPORTING Issue: CCIR Established Discussion: III Corps established CCIR a couple of hours into the MASCAL. This served to focus EOC efforts in collecting reports and providing updates. Recommendation: (Sustain) Take the time early to collaboratively establish CCIR to focus the effort and provide a basis from which to adjust.
External Support Medical Law Enforcement
External Support (11a) Medical Issue: Dual reporting to Southern Region Medical Command and III Corps Discussion: Requirements to simultaneously report information to two separate chains of command added to the confusion of report to higher commands Recommendation: Ensure unity of command through the incident commander. All reports from CRDAMC must be routed through incident command headquarters (III Corps)
External Support (11a) Medical Issue: on 5 Nov, requests made for blood & rapid sequence intubation medications Discussion: –Blood products brought by air from BAMC and WHMC –Products received in trauma push-pack were primarily red blood cells, did not include clotting agents –RSI drugs brought by ground from Temple VA –ED was the only place short of RSI drugs, sufficient amounts available in ICU and OR – internal communication breakdown Recommendation: improve internal communication for cross- leveling when shortages exist; provide specific breakdown of blood products needed based on types of injuries
External Support (11b) Law Enforcement Issue: Multi-agency First Responder Cooperation (sustain) Discussion: Due to the outstanding relationship building efforts by FT Hood Emergency Response personnel, a multitude of civilian agencies monitored emergency net and responded to support without official requests from FT Hood. These agencies took direction from the FT Hood Mobile Emergency Command Post on scene who ensured unity of effort and unity of command. This gave the incident commander flexibility to surge and respond as needed. Recommendation: Continue this outstanding relationship.
External Support (11b) Law Enforcement Issue: Interagency Investigative Cooperation (sustain) Discussion: Waco FBI office maintains an LNO with FT Hood CID. Continuous coordination and active investigative cooperation between CID and FBI facilitates efficient interagency execution. Texas Rangers offered support and were quickly integrated into the investigative process. Recommendation: Continue cooperative relationship through frequent joint investigations and daily interaction.
External Support (11b) Law Enforcement Issue: CID Commands support in PAO and Crime Lab and the MP Schools support in Critical Incident Peer Support (sustain) Discussion: While the FT Hood CID office had sufficient resources to handle this investigation, CID Command and the MP School sent subject matter experts to assist and provide on scene evidence collection support to our already proficient CID Agents. CID PAO worked closely with III Corps PAO to shape the message regarding the crime and support the Corps PAO campaign. Recommendation: Continue to take advantage of these resources.
External Support (11b) Issue: Coordination between External and Internal Law Enforcement Agencies. Discussion: There was a tremendous response from both Fort Hood and surrounding area law enforcement agencies. However, many of these agencies have not previously operated together, and the joint performance could be improved. Recommendation: At least annually, conduct joint training between MPs, DACPs, K9, SRT, and local law enforcement, culminating in a simulated MASCAL exercise.
Deployment Effects SRP Affected Units
Deployment Effects (12a) SRP- Improve Issue. Safety and Security at the SRP site Discussion. –DPW and DES provide limited visibility barrier over windows in Bldg 42000 –Install silent alarm at front desk direct to MPs –Long term-barrier around compound to control flow and traffic –Short term actions for Iron Horse Gym SRP processing include armed guards and access control points. Recommendation. Action items as deemed appropriate by DPW and DES subject matter experts, as quickly as possible. Directorates look at their internal operational facilities and determine actions based on lessons learned that may need to be implemented within their facilities.
Deployment Effects (12a) SRP - Sustain Issue. Suspension of SRP operations for 3 days following incident Discussion. –The SRP staff which includes medical, dental, and finance were traumatized by this incident. –The decision to suspend SRP ops until after Veterans Day allowed those employees and Soldiers down time to deal with the situation, spend time with families, attend the Memorial Ceremony, attend counseling and overall begin to recover. Recommendation. Sustain. Make the decision early in a traumatic event such as this.
Issue. Immediate trauma and grief counseling for employees and Soldiers Discussion. –Eight chaplains were on site immediately following the incident. –Medical personnel began receiving counseling the day after and the SRP personnel received counseling within 72 hours. –Behavioral Health Specialist set up on site to continue individual counseling which facilitated employees recovery and ability to get back to normal and move forward. Recommendation. Sustain. Deployment Effects (12a) SRP - Sustain
12.a. Deployment Effects SRP - Improve Issue. Casualty risk on site Discussion. 14 medical providers are required to move processing Soldiers through the SRP site quickly to avoid crowded congestion that lent to high number of casualties Recommendation. Work to ensure 14 medical providers are dedicated to the SRP mission on a daily basis in addition to the PDHRA providers that operate next door. Relook medical facility within SRP footprint.
DEPLOYMENT EFFECTS – Affected Units 12b Issue: Units are affected by the 5 Nov incident which may have an impact on their deployability. Discussion: Affected units not only must deal with the aftermath of Soldiers killed and injured, they must also assess the impact on ability to deploy IAW the current timeline. This will include an updated status of personnel including critical MOS and an objective/subjective assessment of their ability to deploy and function. Recommendation: Formalize the timeline, assessment metrics and decision points initiated by 1 st Army Division West to enable objectively based decisions on a units ability to deploy and establish a timeline to follow.
Deployment Effects (12b) Issue: Personnel withheld from Deployment Flights Discussion: 1CD had 14 late deployers involved with the incident at the SRP site who were due to fly on a replacement flight eight days after the event. The decision was made not to deploy them to theater until completion of all phases of Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM). Recommendation: Each Soldier should default to a no- fly status until full evaluation is complete using CISM.
Memorial Ceremony Planning – FUOPs Issue: MSE and Garrison Staff support during planning efforts Discussion: –Ability of MSE/Garrison to retain flexibility to execute short-notice support requirements reflects positively on MSE capability –MSE/Garrison is poised to execute requirements effectively and efficiently –Uniformed staff needs to better understand MSEs role and how to best support the MSE/Garrison –MSE/Garrison collective resident knowledge of Fort Hood proved vital during planning and execution of memorial ceremony Recommendation: Sustain working relationship with MSE/Garrison staff to maintain III Corps ability to react to a post-incident crisis
Memorial Ceremony Planning – FUOPs Issue: Use Major Subordinate Command (MSC) LNOs during planning Discussion: –Inclusion of MSC LNOs during OPTs mitigates the impact of short-notice tasking requirements Recommendation: Use existing tasking distribution list (MSE Tasking) to request MSC LNOs attendance during OPTs
Memorial Ceremony Planning – FUOPs Issue: Cell phone communication unreliable Discussion: –Cell phone communications were unreliable during the execution phase of the POTUS visit –G6 radios were utilized by ceremony personnel for coordination of actual ceremony –No additional radios were available for key personnel who needed them to handle unforeseen events Recommendation: Additional radios for action officers / POCs should be maintained by the EOC and available for distribution during crisis
Memorial Ceremony – SGS Issue: Handicap/Elderly Access to Memorial Ceremony Discussion: Currently, no wheelchair ramp exists at the command group entrance of Corps HQ. Wounded Soldiers had to be assisted down the steps to their seats. Elderly community leaders could not enter at the DV entrance and instead had to walk to the western VIP entry point. Recommendation: Construct or purchase a wheelchair ramp for the Corps HQ command group entrance. Plan for elderly community leaders to enter the ceremony through the shortest route possible.
Memorial Ceremony – JVB Issue: Synchronization of Visitor Movement Discussion: –Distinguished Visitor movement did not sync with family movement –Post ceremony plan for family and DVs not well known –Develop contingency plans for the unexpected; child care, lost items, water, lost/ wandering family members, facility maintenance, room temp, etc Recommendation: Define & rehearse actions on the objective
Memorial Ceremony (13) Issue: Memorial Ceremony Support Discussion: III Corps had an effective support plan for the Memorial Ceremony to include acquiring equipment for the fallen Soldier Memorial Display (ACH, boots, I.D. tags, stairway to Heaven, weapons), lodging and transportation for Soldiers and Family members of victims. Recommendation: Sustain
SUSTAIN Pre-established procedures were in place and responsive for gifts to MWR and the Chaplains Fund. Commanders and staff understood the GENERAL rules on gifts, and raised issues before committing or accepting a gift/donation. Private Organizations (USO, AUSA, etc.) were very helpful and quick in filling gaps in re: the needs of Family and friends of victims (e.g. airline tickets, hotel rooms, rental cars).
Donation Assistance IMPROVE DoD rules need to be more flexible on giving cash donations directly to Families. Faster guidance on the SPECIFICS of donations, actual process, and POCs (both Army and Private Organizations) for sending and accepting various types of gifts (cash, items, plane tickets, etc.); need installation crisis SOP. Faster distribution of the unit and CAO POCs for Families and victims (information pushed vs. pulled from unit representatives). Due to concern for privacy and Family contacts, information on wounded POCs was not as quick as for deceased Soldiers and civilians.
Donation Assistance (14b) Issue: No approved list of Federal, State, Local and private agencies to provide assistance to victims and their families. Discussion: There are numerous Federal, State, Local organizations and private agencies with established programs for assisting victims and their families. Recommendation: III Corps and its Tenant Units should establish, in advance, a list of approved victims assistance organizations and the appropriate procedures for accepting gifts from private organizations and citizens. Such a list should be developed and reviewed through a collaborative effort of all Command SJA offices at Fort Hood.
RM After-Hours Contacts Issue: Resource Management support for emergencies and crisis situations after normal work hours Discussion: Ops Center for MSE G8, Garrison RM and MEDCEN RM maintain a list of Resource Management contact personnel for after-hours funding situations Recommendation: Continue current practice, ensuring lists are updated as needed and provided to Ops Centers
Cost Tracking Issue: Cost tracking for emergencies or crisis events Discussion: HHQ guidance normally is received after a crisis situation occurs, directing establishment of cost tracking codes in the financial system and periodic reporting requirements IOT to identify support costs for potential reimbursement Recommendation: Resource Management offices establish a cost tracking methodology each fiscal year to identify costs for crisis situations; amend as required when HHQ guidance is received
141 Way Ahead EXSUM NLT 20 NOV Gather documents for archiving Draft AAR 4 DEC Final AAR and OPLAN recommendations: 11 DEC
III Corps and Forth Hood 05 NOV 09 After Action Review 17 NOV 09