Presentation on theme: "ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003. Trends, scenarios and future threat. Shabtai Shavit, Chairman of ICT. Defeating International Terrorism."— Presentation transcript:
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September Trends, scenarios and future threat. Shabtai Shavit, Chairman of ICT. Defeating International Terrorism
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 I.Classic terrorism vs. current terrorism. II.Potential threat latent in current terrorism. III.Fighting terrorism – Strategy. IV.Fighting terrorism – Operational-tactical. V.Fighting terrorism – Ideology. VI.International Organization dedicated to the fight against terrorism. VII.Summary. List of Contents
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September s:Watershed line between classic terrorism and current terrorism. Classic terrorism: Local.Local. Secular.Secular. National – aspiration for self- determination.National – aspiration for self- determination. Solidarity amongst secular organizations.Solidarity amongst secular organizations. Socialist / Marxist.Socialist / Marxist. Weak local message.Weak local message. Current terrorism: Global.Global. Religious – radical.Religious – radical. Imperialist – aspiration for a Theocratic - Muslim world.Imperialist – aspiration for a Theocratic - Muslim world. Solidarity based on religion.Solidarity based on religion. Muslim / Theological.Muslim / Theological. Strong global message in real-time.Strong global message in real-time. I. Classic vs. current terrorism
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 II. Potential threat No coexistence: Holy war (Jihad), war of shock and awe.No coexistence: Holy war (Jihad), war of shock and awe. No need for provocation by heretics.No need for provocation by heretics. a. Divine command Suicide for the sake of Islam is a commandment; The suicide becomes a martyr (Shahid), his family earns the respect of the community.Suicide for the sake of Islam is a commandment; The suicide becomes a martyr (Shahid), his family earns the respect of the community. b. Willingness to commit suicide
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 II. Potential threat continued… The end justifies the means.The end justifies the means. Fewer suicides could kill more heretics.Fewer suicides could kill more heretics. c. Weapons of mass destruction Amorphous organization; no headquarters, no hierarchy, fluid tactics.Amorphous organization; no headquarters, no hierarchy, fluid tactics. d. Virtual deployment Worldwide free press coverage in real-time.Worldwide free press coverage in real-time. e. The message
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 III. Fighting terrorism–strategy. 1.Right to self-defense justifies a pre- emptive strike. 2.Right to self-defense justifies the use of targeted killing. 3.Heads of states that support terrorism are legitimate targets. International legitimacy to the following actions:
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 III. Fighting terrorism–strategy Continued… 4.Heads of terrorist organizations are legitimate targets, including religious, political and military leaders. 5.Transfer of war to the territory of a state that supports terrorism, is legitimate.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 IV. Fighting terrorism – operational-tactical. 1.Enhancement of means of intelligence gathering for all weather condition, day or night, through hideouts, from undergrounds etc. 2.Improvement of sensors based gathering tools, for the collection of samples and materials found in air. 3.Development of sophisticated search engines with which one can identify funds related to terrorist groups and their flow. Consequential to the international and embracing nature of terrorism, one must internalize insights and translate them into tools.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 IV. Fighting terrorism – operational-tactical continued… 4.Enhancement of intelligence cooperation systems among states and amongst friendly intelligence agencies, to a level of cooperation in real time. 5.Development of operational cooperation amongst friendly intelligence agencies, despite of the reasonable reservations of exposing their tools and methods.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 IV. Fighting terrorism – operational-tactical continued… 6.In order to focus the efforts towards the heads of terrorist organizations, one should maximize the utilization of real time intelligence, and targets acquisition and precision weapons. 7.In order to maximize intelligence, there should be cooperation amongst intelligence agencies in the Humint arena, which combines the relative advantages of each organization.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 V. Fighting terrorism – ideology. 1. Culture based cooperation: The leaders of international terrorism are in a minority amongst the 1.3 milliard Muslims in the world. The West must create a dialogue with the moderate Islamic leaders and convince them in: Acting against radical Islam and its terrorist envoys.Acting against radical Islam and its terrorist envoys. There is no expectancy in terrorism, just the continuation of decline of Islam.There is no expectancy in terrorism, just the continuation of decline of Islam. It is better to reach coexistence and a modus operandi with the Western World, which will facilitate the development and flourishing of both cultures.It is better to reach coexistence and a modus operandi with the Western World, which will facilitate the development and flourishing of both cultures. Several conditions, which currently seem utopian, must coexist:
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 V. Fighting terrorism – ideology – Continued. 2. Economic based cooperation: The fact that since the end of 1st World War, the Islam is in a process of political, economic, cultural and scientific decline, introduces additional elements to the conflict. Many members of the Islamic world suffer from hunger, poverty and despair. Those elements feed and breed terrorism.Many members of the Islamic world suffer from hunger, poverty and despair. Those elements feed and breed terrorism. A content population, even under occupation, would prefer negotiation for national autonomy over armed struggle.A content population, even under occupation, would prefer negotiation for national autonomy over armed struggle. Consequentially, the primary step is to aid those under developed economies, even prior to the attempt to educate the Islamic people to democracy.Consequentially, the primary step is to aid those under developed economies, even prior to the attempt to educate the Islamic people to democracy. Market place economies would serve as a catalyst in the future, also to the process of democratization.Market place economies would serve as a catalyst in the future, also to the process of democratization.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 IV. International Organization. 1.The UN is a natural home for such an organization. For obvious reasons it is reluctant to execute this role. 2.If a comprehensive international consensus cannot be achieved, it is suggested to commence with the league of states that fight terrorism, to which additional states would join-in in the future. 3.An international definition for terrorism would be achieved. Suggestion: terrorism is the use of violence against civilians with the aim of promoting political objectives. Terrorism cannot exist without territory; thus the action taken must be against states that support terrorism.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 IV. International Organization -continued 4.The source of authority would be an agreed convention, agreed upon by the founders. 5.There would be experts originating from different countries, who will investigate the involvement of states and organizations in terrorism. 6.An involvement scale would be defined, by type and level of gravity. 7.On-going update of the states that are involved with terrorism will be published, by the type of involvement and its gravity.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 IV. International Organization -continued 8.The need and the duty to punish states for their involvement with terrorism will be acknowledged. 9.States that are involved with terrorism will be penalized, based upon a fixed scale which will be defined. 10.The scale will match the different types of involvement, in order to shift the balance of interests of those states, and convince them that supporting terrorism is not worthwhile.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 IV. International Organization -continued 11.There would be a secondary embargo with states and companies which sustain connections (in the open / secretive, economic or others) with states which are embargoed for their involvement with terrorism. 12.A Permanent international mechanism for the fight against terrorism will be established. Amongst others, its goals would be to scrutinize punishment of states that are involved with terrorism, and to deter any deviation.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 The late Hayim Herzog said: It is unrealistic to expect any positive development to be initiated by the UN regarding terrorism, as in regards to many other issues. The only hope is that such development would be initiated by the free states, led by the USA, that would bind themselves, outside the scope of the UN, by a convention against terrorism, that would enable international sanctions. VII. Summary.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 The late Prime-Minister Yizhak Rabin referred to this issue saying: The answer to the International terrorism, must be international. States must find ways to cooperate against the nets of terrorism… I suggest that this institute of cooperation would be institutionalized, and concrete. States that choose to coordinate their actions against the international terrorism, must establish an international organization dedicated for this purpose. It is obvious that such an organization cannot be part of the UN. It could only be established if the USA, the strongest state in the free world, would take initiation and would call for its establishment. VII. Summary – continued.
ICT - Shabtai Shavit - September 2003 … the role of the organization is to coordinate four functions: the first is gathering intelligence and counter-intelligence, the second is the protection of facilities and transportation routes... third, military action in the case of emergency… fourth, and most difficult, action against States that intervene and encourage terrorism. It must be clarified to states that initiate terrorism, that they would be obliged to face a united and organized front of states, with an organization, that is ready to take actions, when the attacked state is unable to take action alone. Such an organization is important for the sake of deterrence, and it is reasonable to believe that it would serve as an effective tool for sanctions and punishment.