1. HINWEIS: Wenn Sie das Bild auf der Folie ändern möchten, markieren und löschen Sie es. Klicken Sie dann im Platzhalter auf das Symbol für Bilder, um ein eigenes Bild einzufügen. European Conditionality in Eastern Europe The absence of a membership perspective: Failure or Success? Maastricht, 08. Mai 2014 | A long and winding Road Presentation Group: 1

2. Outline 1)Introduction 2)Theoretical overview Carrots, Sticks and Conditionality The External Incentives Model 3) Case Study: Ukraine 4) Theory vs. Reality 5) Concluding remarks

3. 1. Introduction EU´s Eastern enlargement  EU came closer to Russia and got new neighboring countries ENP as alternative to further enlargement and as means to strengthen ties with neighboring countries Eastern Partnership: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine The current Ukrainian crisis brought the issue of how the EU should (re) act towards its neighbors and Russia back on the agenda Theoretical framework: Carrot/ Stick approach and external incentives model to test the effectiveness of EU conditionality in the Ukraine Research Question: How effective is conditionality in the absence of membership perspective in the case of Ukraine?

4. 2. Theoretical overview I Conditionality and the ‘Carrots and Stick’ approach Conditionality: Policy instruments by which one party is able to secure compliance and shape the actions of another party Motivates and encourages governments to bring about change and comply with EU norms and regulations Governments are purpose-oriented: Rewards offered by the EU > Costs of compliance Carrot and Stick: Conditionality may entail both the ‘carrot’ (positive incentives) and the ‘stick’ (negative massacre) Power of sanctions: Possibility to withhold benefits and punish the target country

5. 2. Theoretical overview II External Incentives Model Based on the strategy in which a target country must fulfill a set of pre-imposed conditions, in order to be rewarded Actors are always strategic utility-maximizers, interested in the maximization of their own power and welfare External partner shall adopt EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs The effectiveness of conditionality can be tested by four factor: (1) Veto player and adoption costs (2) Credibility of conditionality (3) Size, speed and rewards (4) Determinacy of conditions

6. 3. Case Study: Ukraine I Yanukovych asked for EU membership  Ukraine tried to pressure the EU to gain candidate status by voluntarily adopting stricter democracy reforms than required The EU has always used a policy of “economic cooperation in exchange for political reforms” -> Type of conditionality ENPI 2007- 2010: Democracy promotion addressed under the first priority area “One- way street”  EU gives and Ukraine consumes

7. 3. Case Study: Ukraine II Recent developments: 2012 Signing of the Association Agreement 11. 11 2013 Ukraine cabinet suspended preparations for the Association Agreement 20. 02. 2014 EU imposed first sanctions on Russia 05. 03. 2014 EU offers Ukraine financial support: Up to 11 bio. €

8. 5. Theory vs. Reality General PerspectiveUkraine Case 1) Veto player and adoption costs Little national consensus  High compliance cost  Less likelihood of compliance Sharpe East/ West devide  Ethnic Russians are more opposed to the EU than Ukrainians 2) Credibility of conditionality Concerned country sees that compliance leads to candidate status in other countries but not in the own case  Less likelihood of compliance Compliance to EU conditionality in the Balkans lead to candidate status but although the Ukraine voluntarily adopted stricter reforms than required, it did not achive this status 3) Size, speed and reward The higher the financial incentive, the higher the likelihood of compliance Money by the EU granted to the Ukraine increased, EU offered up to 11 bio. € in the recent crisis 4) Determinacy of conditions The clearer and the more determined conditions, the higher the likelihood for compliance Conditions are vague and unclear, different EU member states emphazise different aspects

9. 6. Concluding remarks The external incentives model explains the initial interest of Ukraine in further collaboration with the EU In the past, the EU has initiated numerous opportunities for political, economic, and democratic progress within the ENP and the enlargement framework Internal political trends and close ties to Russia affect relations to the EU EU incentives do not exceed diverging interests of the domestic elites The case study has shown: Conditionality is not effective in the case of Ukraine

10. Thank you for your attention! Milan Vukas (i6043013) Andrea Weller (i573043) Sjoerd Hooymans (i6002925) Dana Urbanus (i6036852) Annika Schulz (i6028717)