1. Economics of Conflict Session 7: Civil military relations Ismene Gizelis & (Kristian Skrede Gleditsch) Department of Government University of Essex Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) tig@essex.ac.uk/ksg@essex.ac.uk http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/scipo2016.html

2. Key issues from previous sessions Factors related to challenges by non-state actors – Political and economic/social grievances, state strength Regime types and conflict Regime stability – Economics factors (performance, rents) Ability to deter challenges and repress threats

3. State security apparatus Role of military in repression – Leaders order repression against popular threats (e.g., China 1989) – Military may or may not comply – Military defection, e.g., 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, 1986 revolution in Philippines

4. China 1989

5. Iran

6. State security apparatus Role of military as a threat/coup – Military coups most common challenge against autocratic leaders – Coups may be opportunistic or policy-based – E.g., Egypt 1952 Nasser against King Faruq 2013 el-Sisi against Morsi (2011 ouster of Mubarak plausible coup/push, although Mubarak stepped aside)

7. Egypt

8. Total coup attempts 1950-2015

10. Sources of coups Political turmoil, establish “law and order” Opportunistic concerns Policy/military policy concerns Prospects for success

11. Coup dilemmas Coup trap – Leon: coups increase in military expenditures – But may increase risk of future challenges against coup leaders through stronger military and demonstration effects Trade off effective military to ward of challenges from states and risk of challenges from military

12. Why and where have coups declined? Strong decline in Latin America, less so in Africa and Middle East Military less willing to assume control of government – Decline of communist threat, poor experiences from rule Norm of democracy/coup de democracy? – Calls for elections after coups – Only individuals who can win elections will carry out coups

13. Outcomes of coup attempts, pre-vs-post Cold War (Monkey cage) by By Joseph Wright, Barbara Geddes, Erica Frantz and George Derpanopoulos

14. Military defection Principal agent problem – Leader orders repression, military may refuse to comply or idles/shirk Opportunism + identification – More likely the greater participation in dissent and leaders unpopular – Concerns over carrying out orders that may generate persecution – Easier to repress distinct ethnic groups/violent rebels than urban non-violent protest?

15. Coup proofing Rely on family/ethnic ties to ensue loyalties of key armed positions Creation parallel units (make collective action more difficult) Multiple internal security agencies that monitor military Greater specialization in military

17. Coup-proofing in rentier states: Saudi Arabia

18. Outcome of coup-proofing Inefficient armies Military as a clientelistic institution