1. Realism

2. Basic Assumptions of Realism 1. States are the most important actors in world politics 2. States in anarchic systems are driven to seek security 3. Economic power is less relevant to national security than is military power 4. The most stable international system is one with a balance of power

3. Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, `The New Grand Strategy’, Atlantic Monthly, 2002 Great powers have two basic strategic options: they can pursue geopolitical dominance (a `unipolar’ or `hegemonic’ strategy) or they can seek to maintain a rough balance of power among the strongest states in a region or around the world (a multi-polar strategy).

4. Christopher Layne, `America as European Hegemon’, The National Interest, 2003 America is asserting its hegemony in Europe through three main policies: 1. It is still actively discouraging Europe from either collective, or national, efforts to acquire the full-spectrum of advanced military capabilities 2. It is pushing for an enlargement of the EU to weaken the movement towards political unification 3. It persistently reminds the Europeans of the need to keep the Germans down

5. Arguments against Hegemony (pp.36-38) 1. Domestic Political Resistance 2. New Challengers 3. Counter-Hegemonic Balancing 4. Overcommitment (overreach)

6. Christopher Layne, `America as European Hegemon’, The National Interest, 2003 Why do France, Germany and much of the rest of the world, including other major powers such as Russia and China, worry about American hegemony? The simple answer is that international politics remains fundamentally what it has always been: a competitive arena in which states struggle to survive. States are always worried about their security. Thus when one state becomes overwhelmingly powerful-that is, hegemonic-others fear for their safety

7. Samuel Huntington `The Lonely Superpower’ Foreign Affairs 1999 Why has a counter-balancing coalition not yet formed? 1. It is too soon 2. States want the benefits of `free riding’ 3. Secondary regional powers have an interest in using the superpower to balance the regional hegemon

8. Christopher Layne, `America as European Hegemon’, The National Interest, 2003 At the end of the day, hegemonic decline results from the interplay of overextension abroad and domestic economic weakness. Over time, the costs of America’s hegemonic vocation will interact with its economic vulnerabilities-endless budget deficits fueled in part by burgeoning military spending and the persistent balance of payments deficit- to erode America’s relative power advantage over the rest of the world As the British found out toward the end of the 19 th Century, a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity

9. Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, `A New Grand Strategy’ 2002 Offshore balancing accepts that the US cannot prevent the rise of new great powers, either within the present American sphere (the EU, Germany, Japan) or outside it (China, a resurgent Russia). Instead of exhausting its resources and drawing criticism or worse by keeping these entities weak, the US would allow them to develop their militaries to provide for their own national and regional security.

10. Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, `A New Grand Strategy’ 2002 Although some might characterize an offshore strategy as isolationist, it emphatically is not. Rather, its guiding principle is a clear-eyed realism. It is a workaday policy-pragmatic, flexible and opportunistic. But it will also bring America into a more respectful and natural relationship with the other great powers, as the US forsakes the temptations of hegemony.