2. Objectives Comprehend the causes and actions associated with the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study of American-Soviet relations at the height of the Cold War Material drawn from John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum http://www.jfklibrary.org/

3. Cuban Missile Crisis: Background In 1962, the Soviet Union was desperately behind the United States in the arms race. Soviet missiles were only powerful enough to be launched against Europe but U.S. missiles were capable of striking the entire Soviet Union. In late April 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev conceived the idea of placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. A deployment in Cuba would double the Soviet strategic arsenal and politically counter U.S. missiles placed in Turkey, thus providing a real deterrent to a potential U.S. attack against the Soviet Union.

4. Meanwhile, Fidel Castro was looking for a way to defend his island nation from an attack by the U.S. Ever since the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Castro felt a second attack was inevitable. Consequently, he approved of Khrushchev's plan to place missiles on the island. In the summer of 1962 the Soviet Union worked quickly and secretly to build its missile installations in Cuba. Cuban Missile Crisis: Background

5. Day 1: October 16 President Kennedy and principal foreign policy and national defense officials are briefed on the U-2 findings. Discussions begin on how to respond to the challenge. Two principal courses are offered: an air strike and invasion, or a naval quarantine with the threat of further military action. To avoid arousing public concern, the president maintained his official schedule, meeting periodically with advisors to discuss the status of events in Cuba and possible strategies.

6. Day 2 and 3: October 17-18 Day 2 (17 Oct): American military units begin moving to bases in the Southeastern U.S. as intelligence photos from another U-2 flight show additional sites; and 16 to 32 missiles Day 3 (18 Oct): President Kennedy is visited by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who asserts that Soviet aid to Cuba is purely defensive and does not represent a threat to the United States. Kennedy, without revealing what he knows of the existence of the missiles, reads to Gromyko his public warning of September 4 that the "gravest consequences" would follow if significant Soviet offensive weapons were introduced into Cuba.

7. Day 4-6 (October 19-21) Day 5 (Oct 20) President Kennedy returns to Washington and after five hours of discussion with top advisers decides on a naval quarantine of Cuba to block Soviet ships from completing the missile site construction. Naval units are deployed and work is begun on a speech to notify the American people. Day 6 (Oct 21) Soviet vessels approach the quarantine line. U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces at full alert. Soviet freighters turn and head back to Europe. The Bucharest, carrying only petroleum products, is allowed through the quarantine line. U.N. Secretary General calls for a cooling off period, which is rejected by Kennedy because it would leave the missiles in place.

8. Day 7 (October 22) President Kennedy formally establishes the Executive Committee of the National Security Council and instructs it to meet daily during the crisis. Kennedy briefs the cabinet, U.S. congressional leaders and the British Prime Minister Macmillan of the situation President Kennedy writes to Nikita Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union, prior to addressing the American public on live television:... “I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would In this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.” President Kennedy speaks on television to the American people, revealing the evidence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and calling for their removal. He also announces the establishment of a naval quarantine around the island until the Soviet Union agrees to dismantle the missile sites and to make certain that no additional missiles are shipped to Cuba

9. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson briefs the U.N. Security Council. The U.S. naval quarantine fleet is now fully in place around Cuba. Soviet submarines threaten the quarantine by moving into the Caribbean area. Soviet freighters bound for Cuba with military supplies stop dead in the water, but the oil tanker Bucharest continues towards Cuba. Day 8 (October 23)

10. Chairman Khrushchev replies indignantly to President Kennedy's October 23 letter stating in part: "You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us." Day 9 (October 24)

11. Day 10 (October 25) Knowing that some missiles in Cuba were now operational, President Kennedy personally drafts a letter to Premier Khrushchev, again urging him to change the course of events. U.S. military finalizes plans to attack missile sites U.N. Secretary General U Thant calls for a cooling off period, which is rejected by Kennedy because it would leave the missiles in place. Heated debate between the United States and the Soviet Union in the halls of the United Nations. During the debate in the Security Council, the normally courteous U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson aggressively confronts his Soviet U.N. counterpart Valerian Zorin with photographic evidence of the missiles in Cuba.

12. A Soviet-chartered freighter is stopped at the quarantine line and searched for contraband military supplies. Photographic evidence shows accelerated construction of the missile sites and the uncrating of Soviet IL-28 bombers at Cuban airfields. In a private letter, Fidel Castro urges Nikita Khrushchev to initiate a nuclear first strike against the United States in the event of an American invasion of Cuba. John Scali, ABC News reporter, is approached by Aleksander Fomin of the Soviet embassy staff with a proposal for a solution to the crisis. Later, a long, rambling letter Khrushchev Kennedy makes an offer: removal of the missiles in exchange for lifting the quarantine and a pledge that the U.S. will not invade Cuba. Day 11 (October 26)

13. A second letter from Moscow demanding tougher terms, including the removal of obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey, is received in Washington. Over Cuba, An American U-2 plane is shot down by a Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile and the pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, is killed Day 12 (October 27)

14. Radio Moscow announces that the Soviet Union has accepted the proposed solution and releases the text of a Khrushchev letter affirming that the missiles will be removed in exchange for a non-invasion pledge from the United States. Day 13 (October 28)

15. Aftermath Impact on future U.S. Foreign Policy: Under Secretary of State on October 29, 1962, writing: "If we have learned anything from this experience, it is that weakness, even only apparent weakness, invites Soviet transgression. At the same time, firmness in the last analysis will force the Soviets to back away from rash initiatives.“ Crisis, even as close as this one, can be effectively managed at the highest levels (implications of which we will see later in Vietnam) Soviet Union: Crises must be prevented. Hard-liners argued that this could be achieved by building up Soviet military forces, to discourage U.S. aggressive tendencies. Soviet concerns about losing control over their nuclear weapons led them to resolve never again to place nuclear missiles in a country so far away from their home territory. The primary lesson Cuba drew, then, was that neither superpower could be trusted. It viewed U.S. guarantees as ploys and Soviet promises as hollow.