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Higher Education Bridge Certification Authority Scaleable Linking of PKI trust domains Scaleable Linking of PKI trust domains David L. Wasley Fall 2006.

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Presentation on theme: "Higher Education Bridge Certification Authority Scaleable Linking of PKI trust domains Scaleable Linking of PKI trust domains David L. Wasley Fall 2006."— Presentation transcript:

1 Higher Education Bridge Certification Authority Scaleable Linking of PKI trust domains Scaleable Linking of PKI trust domains David L. Wasley Fall 2006 PKI Workshop

2 2 Topic Span  What’s a bridge?  How is it different than “normal” PKI?  Why is it useful?  What is the HEBCA?  What’s a bridge?  How is it different than “normal” PKI?  Why is it useful?  What is the HEBCA?

3 3 Bridged v.s. Hierarchical PKI  Hierarchical PKI assumes uniform policy and works with most products today  Hierarchies are “PKI islands”  Therefore browsers include 100+ “trust anchors”  Bridging allows mapping between different PKI policies but very few products support this (yet)  Mapping info is used during path validation  Bridging can link “islands” and provide superior trust management  Therefore we believe it will become important …  Hierarchical PKI assumes uniform policy and works with most products today  Hierarchies are “PKI islands”  Therefore browsers include 100+ “trust anchors”  Bridging allows mapping between different PKI policies but very few products support this (yet)  Mapping info is used during path validation  Bridging can link “islands” and provide superior trust management  Therefore we believe it will become important …

4 4 PKIs are islands of common trust

5 5 They can be ‘networked’

6 6 What this looks like  A Relying Party under (A) can build a path from a Subject under (C)  This avoids the RP having to know and understand Trust Anchors (B) and (C)  But not vice versa  A Relying Party under (A) can build a path from a Subject under (C)  This avoids the RP having to know and understand Trust Anchors (B) and (C)  But not vice versa

7 7 Cross-cert can be done bi-laterally

8 8 A “bridge” serves as the hub of trust

9 9 How does the bridge deal with differences in PKI domain CPs?  Trust is established by Certificate Policy  Each PKI domain has a Trust Anchor  Each domain can specify how it’s policy is met or exceeded by the other domain’s policy  Each can place limits on this trust  If there is no equivalency, one doesn’t trust the other  The bridge does this with respect to each of its member domains  Members must trust the bridge to do this adequately  Each can limit how far it is willing to ‘network’  Trust is established by Certificate Policy  Each PKI domain has a Trust Anchor  Each domain can specify how it’s policy is met or exceeded by the other domain’s policy  Each can place limits on this trust  If there is no equivalency, one doesn’t trust the other  The bridge does this with respect to each of its member domains  Members must trust the bridge to do this adequately  Each can limit how far it is willing to ‘network’

10 10 How CP’s are compared  Identify all important issues in the CP  Organizational responsibilities  Trust affecting issues  Create matrices to organize the comparison  General or common elements  Elements that determine Level of Assurance  Other differentiating elements  Identify all important issues in the CP  Organizational responsibilities  Trust affecting issues  Create matrices to organize the comparison  General or common elements  Elements that determine Level of Assurance  Other differentiating elements

11 11 How mapping is instantiated  A CA’s policy is identified by an OID  One policy may define OIDs to represent variations such as LOA, etc.  CA cross-certificate includes “policy mapping field”  Contents defined by Issuer  Pairs of OIDs  “Issuer considers its CP (OID) to be equivalent to Subject CA’s CP (OID)” [See RFC 3280]  A CA’s policy is identified by an OID  One policy may define OIDs to represent variations such as LOA, etc.  CA cross-certificate includes “policy mapping field”  Contents defined by Issuer  Pairs of OIDs  “Issuer considers its CP (OID) to be equivalent to Subject CA’s CP (OID)” [See RFC 3280]

12 12 Higher Education Bridge CA - HEBCA  Sponsored by EDUCAUSE to support linking campus PKI’s with each other and with sponsored partners  Patterned after the Federal Gov’t FBCA  Will cross-cert with FBCA eventually  Operated at Dartmouth College  Test bridge is running  CP/CPS almost complete  Concern about whether there is enough interest (yet) to justify full operation  Planning to keep test bridge running  Sponsored by EDUCAUSE to support linking campus PKI’s with each other and with sponsored partners  Patterned after the Federal Gov’t FBCA  Will cross-cert with FBCA eventually  Operated at Dartmouth College  Test bridge is running  CP/CPS almost complete  Concern about whether there is enough interest (yet) to justify full operation  Planning to keep test bridge running

13 13 Questions?  dlwasley@earthlink.net


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