1. Safety and Security culture C. Almeida National Commission for Nuclear Energy - Brazil September 2014

2. Safety Culture History Security Culture Development Regulatory Perspective

3. Safety Culture History - The word - The Chernobyl Report - The questioning - The difficulties

4. SAFETY CULTURE BHOPAL(1884)

5. SAFETY CULTURE BHOPAL(1884)

6. SAFETY CULTURE BHOPAL(1884)

8. Chernobyl Report: INSAG1 (1986) Safety Culture ( Lack of safety culture…)

9. INSAG-7 - Chernobyl Review (1992) 5.7. GENERAL REMARKS ON THE LACK OF SAFETY CULTURE In its report on the Chernobyl accident, INSAG coined the term 'safety culture‘ to refer to the safety regime that should prevail at a nuclear plant. In its later report, INSAG-4, Safety Culture3, which expounded the concept, INSAG traced the development of a safety culture to its origin in the national regime of law relating to nuclear safety. This establishes the proper chain of responsibility and authority for the required level of safety. In both operating and regulatory regimes, safety culture must be instilled in organizations through proper attitudes and practices of management. It has been pointed out several times in the preceding discussion that safety culture was lacking in the operating regime at Chernobyl.

10. Safety Culture: Internal questioning at IAEA

17. INSAG-4 - Safety Culture (1991)

18. Security culture development Security was not addressed in the NUSS nor in the new Safety Standards “The physical security of fissile and radioactive materials and of nuclear power plants as a whole is mentioned where appropriate, but is not treated in detail” (* NUSS Foreword and IAEA Safety Standards Series )

19. Convention on Nuclear Safety refused to address security matters (Review Meeting 2002) 6. In the light of the events of 11 September 2001, the issue of assuring the security of nuclear installations from terrorist attacks was a matter of significant concern to Contracting Parties. However, noting that security and physical protection matters do not lie within the scope of the Convention, and that the sensitivity of information related to the issue would make it difficult to conduct meaningful discussion in this forum, the Review Meeting decided that consideration of this issue be excluded from the scope of the Country Group sessions. Contracting Parties were encouraged to address this issue in other appropriate international fora and in bilateral consultation.

20. Security culture development Security Series Technical Guidance: Technical and functional specifications for border monitoring equipment (2006). Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material (2007) Security Culture mentioned: Nuclear security culture (2008) FUNDAMENTALS: Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime (2013) Nuclear Security Culture. The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviours of individuals, organizations and institutions which serve as a means to support, enhance, and sustain nuclear security.

21. Regulatory Perspective Safety and Security can be regulated. Safety Culture and Security Culture cannot be regulated, but can be assessed

22. CNEN Perspective No specific regulation about safety culture. Monitoring of safety culture by:  Resident Inspectors (observation)  Analysis of operation experience (events).  Performance indicators (trends)